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Abstract of Thesis 
The purpose of the thesis is to consider travel relations with regard to their onto- 
phenomenological and semantic conditions of possibility and to raise the question of a 
possible ethics of travel. In turning the notion of travel back upon its signifying conditions, 
a connection is established with the notion of metaphor. The metaphysical polarity 
between proper and metaphorical meaning is furthered onto a problematic of the couple 
Oikos (house. home in Greek and generally everything that constitutes a sense of the-at- 
home) and travel with the purpose of complicating their mutual determination and to 
de constructively challenge the derivational and recuperative logic that permeates their 
intra-metaphysical designation. The reconsideration of the conceptual presuppositions of 
"travel" is carried out through the critique of what is called its hermeneutic premise, 
formulated here largely drawing on Paul Ricoeur. It is maintained that "travel" in its 
Western European conceptualisation participates in the traditions of the metaphysics of 
presence and logocentrism and it is on this level that deconstructive thinking takes effect. 
Questions related to the theme of travel, such as space, time, boundary, itinerary, event, 
encounter, as well as to travel writing, such as generic delimitation, representation, 
constative reference and performative engagement, testimonial value, and the antinomy of 
fact and fiction, are addressed and relocated through the preoccupation with their 
phenomenological and tropological motifs and in particular with their generalised 
metaphorical and allegorical conditions, as these are designated by Jacques Derrida and 
Paul de Man, respectively. The association of the notion of travel with metaphor, and, by 
extension, that between Oikos and properness, will show that senses of home and away, 
rather than being pregiven, emerge from a scriptural condition -a structure of difference 
and deferral- that interrupts their reductive, totalising, monistic formulations as well as 
dialectical conceptualisations. Travel as metaphor and as writing are not treated as 
metaphors in the conventional sense but name and attest to a structural and historical a 
priori or aporetic law, that is, to the phenomenological and signifying conditions that allow 
for the emergence of both a sense and a history of travel. It is through the movement of 
signification that effects of sameness and difference are produced showing that identity 
neither precedes nor opposes alterity but rather already bears its trace. The lack of an 
originarv identity or first sense, which is tantamount to the loss of Oikos, reinscribes 
tropology in the radical sense of indeterminacy and of a priori self-disruption as/at the 
origin" of meaning and language. These signifying conditions, however, manifest both 
language's totalizing and appropriative forces, of which a high point and rigorous historical 
implication has been colonialism, as well as its self-disruptive mode of emergence, an 
originary openness which bears the possibility of hospitality towards and welcoming of the 
other. Phenomenological questioning of the structures of meaning reaches back to the 
constitutive opening of consciousness to the world, to what is other and beyond, to a first 
exteriority in general. But since meaning emerges through this void or space in-between 
that constitutes the world as a world for consciousness, through this relation that creates 
the relata in creating itself; there is no solid ground, enunciative position or subjectivity 
that would operate as the origin of meaning. Since consciousness, the moving habitat of 
meaning becomes such in receiving the world, since it is for and destined to the other than 
itself, it is already marked by a condition voyageuse. It dwells upon the condition of 
travelling and of the encounter. It is in this sense that travel, writing and metaphor, the 
three focal themes here, testify to the fundamental phenomenological and tropological 
conditions of language and experience in general and are already marked by the possibility, 
or promise of ethics. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is about loss. An irreparable loss. It is about the catastrophe of a place 
of origin, of what gives one's language, one's identity and culture, one's history and 
destiny. It is about the loss of roots, of derivation and destination, the loss of property, of 
one's proper name, the loss of one's father. It is a thesis about travel. Are we certain we 
know what "travel" is? Travel, to be sure, signifies some kind of movement or 
displacement. It cannot fail to involve a sort of distancing from a place of origin in view of 
a place of destination, even when these are largely unspecified. One leaves what one calls 
home, one takes the road, takes a turn (strophe), one puts oneself on a track or course 
(trope), exposes oneself to an exterior, to something distant and alien. Travel is the 
experience of a passage, the crossing of a boundary that allows for an encounter with 
otherness to take place. But, as we shall see, to take place is also to give place; to give 
chance to an event of travel, to the arrival and the welcoming of the other. By moving 
between places the traveller lays down a path, forms a trajectory or route on the map that 
brings everything this involves together and lets them signify anew. To expose an interior, 
a closed space of familiarity, what we propose here to call Oikos (house, home in Greek), 
to an exterior is to operate within a primarily oppositional distinction, one that is 
fundamental for metaphysical thinking. The exposure of interiority, which can take on the 
sense of subjectivity or the inner world of consciousness, to exteriority is also constitutive 
of the process of metaphor, which is traditionally defined as an abstract sense or image of 
the thing itself in its absence or unavailability. A metaphorical sense or image stands for an 
absent or lost proper meaning; it is the outcome of a process of substitution of a proper or 
"natural" sense that becomes exteriorised, distanced and other than itself. The undertaking 
here will be to draw the notions of "travel" and "metaphor" together in order to consider 
their semantic and structural affinity and to ponder their conditions of emergence and 
signification. In so doing we hope to draw implications for and from what shall be called 
the at once structural and historical a priori of travel, to raise questions regarding travel 
relations and their significant historical and ethical consequences and possibilities. 
The title of the thesis, Metaphors of Travel and Writing: The Deconstruction of 
"the-at-home " and the Promise of the Other, aims at bringing out the structural affinity 
between metaphor and travel and to reinscribe it onto a scriptural condition, what is called 
ii'riting in a broad and generalised sense. In this way, everything that is involved and 
implicated with metaphor and travel -for instance, the notion of origin, which always 
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implies familiarity, be it with literal and already established senses or with what one calls 
home and from which metaphor and travel respectively depart- is called into question and 
is radically disrupted once these are relocated or displaced in a graphematic drift that 
knows no origin or telos, that disclaims the possibility of closure and return to a lost but 
recoverable properness. It will be claimed, after Jacques Derrida, that everything begins 
with writing, which is generalised to the condition of meaning, to the signifying movement 
that rather than mediating between or representing already constituted entities (object and 
subject, world and consciousness) opens up a space for the inscription of meaning in 
general, for what makes the world and the subject thinkable and possible. This is the space 
of differance, what constitutes the world as a world for consciousness, what emerges as the 
opening of consciousness to a first exteriority, what is also called by Derrida trace. The 
world and consciousness do not pre-exist as such before their coming together in the 
movement of differance, before they enter in this "nonrelational" relation that constitutes 
the relata in constituting itself. This is not to say, of course, that the world does not exist 
apart from the signifying structures of consciousness, but that the world as we know it and 
find ourselves in it is a world for consciousness. Being in the world and with the world (as 
an exterior opposed to consciousness) does not signify that consciousness acts upon it by 
giving it a sense or that it passively receives it as it is. Beyond and before "activity" and 
"passivity" in the usual sense, we are here making reference to a radical passivity, the 
world's inscription on consciousness as trace, as something which is nothing in itself, 
which has no essence or substance, which does not happen as such, but which must have 
always already constituted consciousness and the world for each other. Every sense 
emerges in/from this void, which shall be later called khora (place, space, division in 
Greek), from the indeterminacy of the in-between, which makes every (re-)presentation of 
the world inadequate, for the latter is never given to consciousness as such. Since sense is 
no longer, or better, has never been based on solid ground or an enunciative position that 
would secure its self-identity, it is always "other" than itself. It is possible to claim that 
both world and consciousness enter in or rather emerge from a "tropological" relation, 
through a figuration or metaphorisation in a radical sense, which exceeds derivation or 
mediation between polarities. Being other than itself, from the inscription of the trace as 
first exteriority, is what gives sense its paradoxical condition of emergence and what 
promises more meaning, since there is no such thing as primary or final meaning, and so, 
more reference. It is what promises the coming of the other, and thus gives, as shall be 
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claimed, the possibility of travel, that is, the possibility of encounter with otherness from 
immemorial depths. 
What is claimed here is not that everything is to be reduced to the signifying 
structures of language. This would amount to a linguisticism, which would not be far from 
logocentrism, the metaphysical tradition that poses logos at the heart and origin of truth. ' 
To claim that everything begins with the trace is to disrupt all monisms and reductive 
attitudes and bring forward the condition which makes all meaning possible, a condition 
that exceeds language in the narrow sense and reinscribes it as a species of writing. 2 
Language in the narrow sense is made possible through what Derrida calls the "movement 
of the reduction of the trace", a movement of appropriation and totalisation that promises 
a transparent and adequate idiom and, thus, communication, but which by the same token 
does not take place without a disruptive remainder. This disruptive remainder, supplement 
or residue of sense not accounted for in the movement of appropriation, could be called 
language's drive to expropriation or metaphoricity, the impossible condition of anything 
signifying fully. Language is on both conditions: it is on the condition of ex-appropriation, 
of an impossible or aporetic promise that both gathers and disseminates meaning, that lets 
it emerge in a self-subversive mode and be repeated as same and other at once. To say that 
meaning originates neither in the world nor in consciousness but begins as trace, as the 
world for consciousness, is not to posit the trace, which does not exist, as origin. All that 
endures is the nonoriginary movement of the trace, the process of its becoming- 
3 unmotivated. 
The thought of the trace, which is structurally prior to entity as its signifying 
condition, comes to disrupt a theme that will be central in this thesis, that of the 
metaphysics of presence. Presence considered either as interiority (consciousness) or 
exteriority (things in the world) is a theme that runs through the long tradition of Western 
metaphysics and structures its whole vocabulary and thinking according to oppositional 
and hierarchical pairings. "Presence" is the mode or form of the manifestation of an idea or 
thing, that is, the way it appears, "presents" itself in its full radiance and plenitude. A thing 
or an idea, thus, makes itself manifest always in the modality of the "present" as something 
available in the world or in consciousness. Hence, presence becomes thinkable as a closed, 
' Derrida, Jacques, Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, London, The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. 3. 
2 Ibid., p. 52. 
3 Ibid., p. 47. 
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self-evident and circumscribed totality, as something which is at one with itself, upon 
which everything is thought and from which everything derives as its modification, whence 
the metaphysical priority of presence over absence, proximity over distance, signified over 
signifier, speech over writing and so forth. It will be argued that "travel" in its, let us say 
with the purpose of economy, "European" tradition(s), both as concept and practice, if one 
can separate the two, is inextricably implicated with the metaphysics of presence, which 
has posited Oikos (proximity, familiarity, nearness) as a place of derivation and 
destination, as the origin and telos of travel. 
In order to challenge the authority and priority of Oikos over travel, which by 
being restricted to the periphery of the house is denied its eventful character, one has to 
dwell within metaphysics, to borrow from it concepts and work one's way from within. 
Rather than attempting to leave metaphysical notions behind in favour of a totally different 
mode of thinking, an unthinkable enterprise, one must push these notions to their limits by 
folding them in and on themselves in order to bring out their internal antinomies and 
inconsistencies. This deconstructive attitude, however, does not signal the end and 
demolition of what it radically puts into question but opens up infinite possibilities for 
thought, for subversion of authoritative standings and for keeping the promise of the other 
alive. Accordingly, it would be impossible to attempt a reconsideration and reinscription of 
the premises and possibilities of travel, if one did not repeat and dwell on its metaphysical 
conditions. This is why in order to think "travel" and travel relations "otherwise, " one 
would have to start from their metaphysical designation, which will be treated here with 
regard to the way it is formulated by what shall be called the hermeneutic premise of 
travel. It will be posited, at least as a working hypothesis, that travel is primarily 
designated as an interpretive enterprise. Even in discourses of/about travel that relegate the 
subject/traveller to a marginal position (for instance, the self-effacing pilgrim or the 
overdetermined colonial and discursive subject) there is an underlying notion of an 
intentionality that is distorted and inhibited by the workings of power, received knowledge 
and prejudice that condition and alter direct and authentic experience, as if this was self- 
evident. So travel could be defined as the encounter of an interpretive subject at a given 
moment in a given place, which is distant from and alien to what one calls home, with a 
subject or object that become available to it by virtue of this encounter. It thus involves a 
collectivity of presences: a subject which is present to another present and available subject 
or object at a present moment in a certain place and given context. In hermeneutic terms, 
travel is the meeting and interaction of two formerly distant semantic horizons, those of the 
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traveller and of the visited culture, out of which new configurations of meaning emerge. 
The assumption of the availability and presence of an object to the intentionality or 
intuition of the travelling subject can also be called the essential phenomenological motif of 
travel. The undertaking here will be to consider such presuppositions, the structures that 
enable and also limit them, the way these are implicated with hermeneutic or historical 
understanding, and, most importantly, the way these are inherently and radically disrupted 
and reinscribed in an aporetic mode in the Derridean sense. 
This thesis will attempt to unfold the argument in two apparently opposite 
directions. One is the consideration of the structural possibilities and signifying conditions 
of the notion of travel and of those inextricably related to it such as Oikos, derivation, 
destination, boundary and itinerary. The second one involves the historical, textual and 
contextual manifestations, articulations and delimitations of these notions. The structural 
and historical considerations of "travel" do not constitute adverse approaches. They are 
inseparable and inconceivable on their own terms. It will be claimed that the aporetic 
condition for the emergence of senses of travel, however varied and diversified, constitutes 
its at once structural and historical a priori. It is what enables and limits senses of home 
and away through the differing and deferring movement of differance, through a force of 
signification that is already described in travel terms allowing thus for a generalisation of 
"travel" before and beyond the metaphysical polarity between Oikos and travel stricto 
sensu. The movement of differance or trace by virtue of what is called its iterability and 
alterability engenders noncausal effects (since movement is its own becoming an origin 
without precedence) of sameness and otherness, or otherwise, of properness and metaphor 
and thus of homeliness and expatriation. 
This thesis will primarily focus on the semantic and onto phenomenological 
conditions and limits of travel, which are often left in abeyance in anthropological and 
cultural histories of this notion and practice. 4 Without disclaiming the validity of and 
4 Studies of travel relations and travel writing that focus on tropological conditions and figurations 
and not simply with regard to their occurrence and manifestation in texts but with the way these 
permeate the very experience of travel, such as Caren Kaplan's Questions of Travel, Postmodern 
Discourses of Displacement, London, Duke University Press, 1996, David Spurr's The Rhetoric of 
Empire, Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration, London, 
Duke University Press, 1994, Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America, The Question of the 
Other, translated by Richard Howard, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1999, to mention 
some, do not investigate the semantic and onto-phenomenological conditions that, as will be argued, 
allow for these figurations. The consequence of this lack is often the construction and reduction to 
rhetorical typologies that fail to address and efficiently ground the way the latter arise, primarily due 
to not attending to the value and distinction between proper meaning and metaphor. 
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necessity for such studies, it will be maintained that the enduring structures that allow the 
practice and notion of "travel" to signify are not simply reducible either to their context of 
emergence (which is never saturated) or to a genealogy and history of travel relations. 
There are senses and histories of travel to begin with -"travel" here is used as a general 
term and comes to name a structure that traverses all sorts of displacements- but these are 
never simply given as such without some sort of reduction and totalisation. To probe into 
the semantics of travel is not to posit a structural centre or semantic kernel with 
transformational capacity and also sensitive to context which would engender and account 
for all senses of travel. It is to suggest that insofar as different senses and histories of travel 
are possible, this necessarily implies that there is at least a minimal semantic identity of 
"travel", to the extent that a sort of "ideality" is ascribed to it by virtue of its repeatability, 
its structure of overflowing particular contexts that enables it to signify in unlimited 
number of contexts. 5 Moreover, this ideality or generality is not a pre-existent meaning or 
transcendental signified. If it is posited as such this can only happen post factum. A general 
sense of travel rather emerges out of particular inscriptions and realisations again by way 
of iterability but also alterability, for nothing is repeated as exactly the same. This 
condition is what gives travel a meaning and a history. By folding "travel" upon its 
phenomenological condition, which presupposes the intuition of a present object by a 
present subject as such, and by challenging the priority of the "present" as the modality and 
form of meaning, in other words, by bringing out the self-disruption of the 
phenomenological motif of travel, one is able to unsettle everything related to and thought 
on the basis of rigorous demarcations and "self-righteous" identities. The 
phenomenological crisis amounts to the erasure of the boundary, to the suspension of 
closure and the interception of unified, homogenised and regulatory spaces. Because 
meaning arises out of its repetitive inscriptions and is never simply given or present as 
such, everything thought on the basis of the present (subject, object, time, space, context) is 
divided in and of itself. 
5 It has to be clear from the start that the notion of "structure" here exceeds a strict, "structuralist" 
sense. To speak of the onto-semantic and phenomenological structures or conditions of the 
experience of travel is not to reduce it to a core, regulative and transformational association or 
interplay of signs. Derridean notions such as differance, dissemination, trace, writing do not 
preclude the use of this term since, as will be shown, they refer to a semantic movement or iteration 
that is not without a certain rhythm and organisation of space. The old term is reinscribed in a 
Derridean fashion that points to a broken, impure and disjunctive "structure" or tracing as the 
possibility of meaning. Of course, the term "structure" will be unavoidably used here both in the 
Derridean and a traditional, metaphysical way, however, always in view of the latter's reinscription 
and surpassing. 
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The experience of travel (experience is essentially related to the theme of presence 
but also signifies the crossing of a boundary -ex-peras, limit, end in Greek) is thereby 
enabled and traversed by repetitive or scriptural structures that essentially imply and 
engender a certain sense of ideality, which is nothing outside factuality or empiricity, and 
have an at once systematic and aleatory character. Travel is a necessary accident, however, 
one that does not befall an essence or Oikos given beforehand; it is as much contingent as 
structural. Insofar as meaning is understood as an inscriptive force, it confers upon the 
empirical or experiential field in its entirety a textual quality. Textuality in the general 
sense thereby exceeds the opposition between text stricto sensu and context. The textual 
experience of travel enables, engulfs and traverses the genre, if it is one, of travel writing. 
It will be argued that the phenomenological motif of travel and by consequence its 
disruption can be extended onto the travel text that purports to be the re-presentation of an 
experience of travel. Accordingly, the question of proper meaning and metaphor, which in 
the travel text takes effect as the antinomy of fact and fiction, the interpretive subject, who 
becomes a signatory, the problem of the boundary, which is rearticulated in generic 
delimitation repeat and actualise what are essentially onto-phenomenological conditions 
and questions. I will try to explore how all these are interconnected and also subvert one 
another and to draw some implications about their historical significance and potentialities. 
To challenge boundaries, hierarchies and divisions is to acknowledge the impossibility of 
firm and grounded positions. To put indeterminacy and mediacy before determinacy and 
immediacy is to unsettle final decisions and judgements, to make decision making an 
infinite task. In the event of encounter that travel is, as much as in the re-presentative 
discourse that travel writing claims to be, the impossibility of decision and judgement 
about the other -something that phenomenological disruption forbids since the other (a 
place, a culture, a language, a person) is neither available, nor knowable or apocalyptic in 
its essence- gives the chance for an ethics of travel, for a hospitable reception and 
welcoming, for a response to the other's summons that shows respect to the other as other. 
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first part consists of two chapters, 
Metaphors and Metaphors of Travel, which aim at elaborating the concept of "metaphor" 
and the semantic structures that allow for its emergence and extending these to 
problematise "travel". It will be argued that the fundamental metaphysical opposition 
between literal or proper meaning and metaphor with all the questions it raises can be 
rearticulated with regard to what shall be postured as the metaphysical division between 
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and hierarchy of Oikos over travel, which on the whole traverses the latter's European 
tradition. The point of departure will be Paul Ricoeur's theory of metaphor and its place in 
the hermeneutical project. The hermeneutics of Ricoeur will provide us here with a 
rigorous and comprehensive formulation for what will be defined (and, to be sure, 
challenged) as the hermeneutic premise of travel. It will be argued that his theory of 
metaphor can offer the conceptual gear for exploring the metaphysical presuppositions of 
travel. Ricoeur designates metaphor as the linguistic process for the creation of new 
meaning that proceeds from the interaction of previously established literal meanings that 
are, however, being brought together in a incongruent mode. Ricoeur explains this process 
according to dialectical pairings that fall under the primary dialectics of belonging and 
distanciation and he, finally, reinstates the priority of properness over metaphor, hence in 
keeping this distinction, which he ultimately cannot avoid to take for granted by 
incorporating it in what he calls "the struggle for univocity". It is on the level of the 
philosophical concepts of proper and metaphor that such distinctions are established and 
can be challenged. Jacques Derrida's critique of the concept of metaphor, which he 
reinscribes as the general and aporetic condition of meaning beyond the intrametaphysical 
polarity between proper and metaphor stricto sensu, takes effect on this level by proposing 
to think metaphor in a nondialectical mode. Henceforth, the values of proper and 
metaphorical meaning are radically disrupted, erased and reinscribed in the movement of 
differance that creates irreducible effects of sameness and difference, resisting synthesis 
and dialectisation and thus suspending closure in a teleological horizon of meaning. 
In the second chapter it will be argued that the dialectical and teleological thinking 
of metaphor is coterminous with a dialectical notion of travel, which can be formulated on 
the basis of what is called here the "hermeneutic premise of travel". It will be argued that 
in the tradition of Western metaphysics "travel" has been designated as secondary to and 
derivative from Oikos, which has always taken the value of immanence, interiority and 
permanence. In the same way that metaphor is submitted to a logic of derivation and 
recuperation, travel is commanded by the-law-of-the-house (Oiko-nomy) that imposes on it 
the exigency of return, that posits Oikos as final destination, thereby, as that which acts at 
once as the prime mover and telos of travel. It will be maintained that return structurally 
belongs to travel. Travel, at least in its Western European tradition, is submitted to a 
circular, that is, restricted economy; it cannot distance itself from Ulysses path. The 
notions of Oikos and travel are indissociable even in discourses that attempt to challenge 
and disengage them. In order to disclaim the authority of the house and its colonising 
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implications, one rather than doing away with such totalising notions, must endeavour to 
think them and think them through otherwise. One must turn them upon their semantic and 
onto-phenomenological conditions in order to bring out their aporetic and self-subversive 
character. The deconstruction of Oikos or of the-at-home and travel as its dialectic 
counterpart takes effect on this level through the reconsideration of the primary categories 
of space and time and their metaphysical motifs, and of the signifying structures that give 
rise to senses of place, of boundaries and of the itinerary. Oikos and travel as an 
oppositional and dialectical pair re-emerge as the totalised effects of a movement that is 
structurally prior to such oppositions. It will be argued that senses of Oikos and travel are 
made possible through the appropriative and ex-propriative forces of signification. They 
are always already inscribed in a graphematic drift that enables them without ever letting 
them signify as such. Hence, Oikos and travel, like properness and metaphor, arise as 
effects of writing in the generalised sense. This is what allows for the proposition that there 
is no travel without writing. 
The second part of the thesis proposes to extend the problematic of travel to a 
consideration of the historical category of narrative in order to draw further implications 
with regard to concrete instances and actualisations of the phenomenological a priori of 
travel. The third chapter, Metaphors of Writing endeavours to review the notion of 
narrative, both in the broad (narrativity) and narrow senses, with regard to travel writing, 
with the aim of bringing forward an understanding of travel as inter-textual experience, 
within which travel writing is inscribed. The chapter will start with the hermeneutic 
definition of narrative, largely drawing on Ricoeur, as a configuration which mediates 
between the experience of the world and the projection of a possible and inhabitable world 
before the text. Mediation, according to Ricoeur, works as a synthetic and mimetic 
operation that progresses towards univocity and necessitates the totalising action of 
narrative. However, the fundamental function of narrative, that is, its ultimate reference to 
a possible world that turns upon the ontological condition of belonging and actualises 
being's ownmost possibilities, can only advance through the exchange between and 
interweaving of fact and imagination that Ricoeur mainly discusses with regard to 
historiography and fiction. This poses the question of generic boundaries, which will be 
discussed with regard to "factual" and "fictional" travel writing. In order to remove travel 
and travel writing from a dialectical and mimetic arch, that is, from its hermeneutic 
designation, we shall attempt to reinscribe the hermeneutic circle of mimetic mediation 
onto the aberrant and disjunctive structures of allegory, as formulated by Paul de Man. 
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Allegory, generalised into the aporetic structure of meaning, resists dialectical synthesis 
and reinstates literariness as the defective condition of language before and beyond the 
distinction between fact and fiction. With regard to the travel narrative the critique of 
totalising configurations takes effect on the level of its constantive and performative 
function. It will be argued, after de Man, that these operations do not simply undo one 
another and thus the text's pronouncements, but are themselves radically disjunctive acts. 
But these are, however, what enables and "promises" the text's emergence and repetition in 
infinite number of contexts, what allows the text to keep signifying and to engender more 
meanings and more references. In terms of the travel narrative this is what allows for and at 
once undoes authoritative judgements upon the other and dismantles any claim to adequate 
representation. Finally, the question of the testimonial value of travel writing will be 
addressed largely drawing on Jacques Derrida, with the purpose of disrupting the travel 
text's claim to truthful representation. It will be argued that the necessarily singular and 
irreplaceable character of testimony is divided in itself by the general structures of meaning 
that make it possible and communicable and thus potentially universalisable. Every 
testimony in order to signify must be able to overflow any particular instance of attestation, 
thus it must be structurally capable of becoming other than itself, of becoming a lie, a 
fiction or perjury. 
The third part of the thesis proposes to bring everything previously elaborated 
together and to draw implications with regard to the way this enables and traverses 
historical and mainly colonial situations in view of showing the latter's inherent grains of 
resistance that also give the chance of a different mode of thinking them through, beyond 
and not simply through contextual reductions, explications or justifications. The chapter 
Colonialism, Ethics and Travel aims at the reconsideration of prominent approaches to the 
phenomenon of colonialism with particular reference to Edward Said's Orientalism as well 
as to the criticism it has received from post-colonial theorists. It will be argued that the 
phenomenon of colonialism can be best understood as a high peak of the appropriative and 
totalising forces of language (in a broad sense) and that, consequently, it can be radically 
intercepted through the awareness of the aporetic and disjunctive character of its premises. 
Even discourses that deplore and go against colonial projects, such as Claude Levis- 
Strauss' Tristes Tropiques, may form, as will be shown, instances of ethnocentrism. Of 
course, to challenge these is by no means to reduce determined historical situations to a 
linguistic structure and to outline a project or programme for overcoming them in the 
future but rather to raise the issue of the possibility of an ethics of travel and travel writing, 
an issue that must be taken up again and again and always with regard to particular 
instances. The question that is urgently and permanently posed is that of the possibility of a 
hospitable opening to the other, of the welcoming of the other as other beyond 
pragmatically determined rules of hospitality with specific demands and reductive attitudes 
that show no respect for otherness but rather attempt to assimilate and subjugate it. To be 
sure, it is impossible to brush pragmatic conditions aside in favour of an "unconditional 
hospitality". Unconditional hospitality becomes thinkable and desirable through its 
particular inscriptions within determined situations. If it becomes possible as a regulatory 
idea and aspiration, it exists by its own pervertibility, something which posits, however, the 
demand or rather promise of perfectibility. As Derrida claims, a promise is not nothing; it 
is not a non event. Everything happens on its condition. Even if a promise can never be 
fulfilled, for it would cease to be what it is, a promise, even if promise must always be 
inadequate and anachronistic to what it commits itself to, everything is waited upon and 
happens on its impossible condition. Nowadays, in the epoch of the so-called globalisation, 
international organisations and the advent of democratisation, when international law seeks 
to interfere with and limit State sovereignty, notwithstanding that this in its application 
usually implies the domination of particular nation-States, there is a lot of discussion and 
controversy around discourses on human rights, crimes against humanity, the questions of 
asylum, of refugees, immigration control but also of forgiveness that one tends to look 
upon with reservation and suspicion. 6 However, to disclaim and criticise the justifications 
and premises of such discourses does not erase the fact or event of promise, even if this 
lastingly fails to be adequate to what it pledges. Maybe, in a certain sense, it should fail, 
that is, fail to deliver calculated and predetermined goals so that it can be posed anew in 
every single instance. 
In order to better understand what is happening today in a age of rapid techno- 
scientific and, more importantly, ethical-political-juridical mutation, which sustain such 
institutions as that of international law and impose cultural and linguistic hegemonies on a 
global forum and on the (cyber) space of communication and exchange, it is more pressing 
than ever to turn upon the signifying conditions, the enduring structures or genealogies that 
let new configurations of power and distribution emerge. One can only proceed in the 
examination of what are matters of urgency by detecting old structures in new concepts and 
the way these enable and limit them: "without yielding to empiricist relativism, it is a 
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matter of accounting for what in this genealogy, let us say European to go quickly, gets 
carried away, exceeds itself by exporting itself'. ' If one wants to take the measure of the 
significance of travel today with respect to the increasingly accelerated developments in 
transportation and telecommunication, which give rise to new configurations of space, of 
boundaries and cultural identities, it is very important not simply to consider its historical- 
semantic genealogy but also its onto-phenomenological conditions. The infinite 
possibilities and, to be sure, the new forms of hegemonies and restrictions of intercultural 
encounter and exchange problematise and unsettle the traditional notions and practices of 
travel and its related themes. Cultural encounter seems to become more of a virtual 
experience in an electronic age but so does travel to the extent that such indissociable 
notions or regulative principles like Oikos, itinerary, boundary and so forth are constantly 
under challenge and increasingly become more unspecified, while at the same moment 
giving rise to new divisions and new responsibilities. This virtualisation or spectrality or 
metaphorisation (since they all bear the structure of an "as if"), however, is not something 
novel for the signifying structures of travel. It is their very condition. If the experience of 
travel is, as shall be claimed, essentially a figurative one, if it is necessarily disrupted from 
the start, that is, if it belongs to the structure of the trace, then what we are witnessing 
today not only has had its possibility but was already at work since travel begun to make 
sense. 8 
This thesis proposes to explore travel relations with regard to their 
phenomenological, rhetorical and ethical premises. These, however, neither constitute 
separate categories or concerns, nor do they enter in relations of causal or temporal 
succession. This is to say that despite the formalisation and the successive treatment of 
these themes here, it is not implied that the self-disruption of the phenomenological motif 
of travel comes first and is then re-presented in the figurative structures of travel writing, 
which a posteriori give rise to questions of ethics. The thought of the trace as the 
constitutive opening of consciousness to exteriority or otherness, in a way establishes 
6 Derrida, Jacques, Spectres of Marx, The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New 
International, translated by Peggy Kamuf, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 83-84. 
' Derrida, Jacques, "Globalization, Peace, and Cosmopolitanism" in Negotiations, Inteventions and 
Interviews, 1971-2001, edited, translated and with an Introduction by Elizabeth Rottenberg, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 376. 
8 For as soon as there is trace, there is also some virtualization; these are the abc's of 
deconstruction. " Derrida, Jacques, "The University Without Condition" in Without Alibi, edited, 
translated and with an introduction by Peggy Kamuf, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 
210. 
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ethics as first philosophy, but it is also its phenomenological and tropological condition. 
Consciousness and the world emerge as destined to each other from this void that gives 
place to the with and the simul of a relation without precedence, from this movement 
without assignable origin or telos, a voyage of meaning that makes dwelling possible on 
the condition of travel. 
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Part I 
Chapter I 
Metaphors 
Travel has to begin from some place, a topos. Whenever the word "travel" 
comes up we believe we know what it means: a displacement, a departure from what 
is taken provisionally or not for a place of origin, a change of location, a movement 
towards what is further, other, beyond. Travel begins when there is movement away 
from the familiar. It is filled with expectation and promise and riven by surprise and 
chance. When one turns away from home, one performs a strophe (twist and turn in 
Greek) -and with strophe cata-strophe is always a possibility- that opens up a path, a 
way or tropos in Greek, that takes on a course or trope with incalculable 
consequences. Let us begin with this tropeltrope, embark on a journey hoping to 
arrive at that beginning where "travel" begins. Let us retrace this mysterious path, the 
secret narrative of travel, always in view of travels to come. But before we are carried 
away by "travel", we shall make a detour. We will set off with metaphor (and when 
we speak of metaphor travel is already on its way) and, in so doing, try to think of the 
"double turn" or semantic structure that opens "metaphor" and "travel" at once. 
The title of this chapter, "Metaphors" in the plural, does not solely imply a 
preoccupation with two treatments of the concept of metaphor, namely those of Paul 
Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida, but rather stresses the problematics of metaphor. It will 
be argued that metaphor extends far beyond its use and function as a single "tropic" 
force that befalls literal meaning making it signify in spite of itself. If we spoke of 
metaphor in the singular, we would assume that this twist in meaning was reversible 
and controllable, that we would be able to isolate the semantic kernel that acted as 
point of departure and thus calculate loss or gain in meaning. "Metaphors" in the 
plural suggests that "metaphor" -and meaning in general- is not reducible to what is 
posited as a single, original, proper meaning. Before "proper" or "literal" and 
"metaphor" in the singular become thinkable, there are always already metaphors. 
Our journey with metaphor will take off from Ricoeur's expansive and 
comprehensive hermeneutical project that will also familiarise us with this 
"defamiliarising" figure and with the major theoretical approaches it has received. At 
the end of this trajectory, which will take us to the limit or delimitation of metaphor, 
another path will be opened, one that will reinscribe and retrace this limit, in vie\ý of 
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showing that, rather than circumscribing, it traverses and cuts across the discourse 
that it is supposed to contain. This path is opened up by Jacques Derrida. 
In 1971 Jacques Derrida published an article in Poetique (5) under the title 
"White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy"' ("La Mythologie 
Blanche"), in which he proposed a deconstructive rethinking of the classical concepts 
of the proper and metaphor. In 1975 Paul Ricoeur in The Rule of Metaphor2 
elaborated his interaction theory of metaphor, which he defined as the linguistic 
process of the creation of new meaning. This volume also comprised a critique of 
Derrida's "unbounded deconstruction", 3 which was centred on Derrida's assumed 
prioritisation of "dead" metaphor and denomination over "live" metaphor and 
contextual action, which form the premises of Ricoeur's theory. Derrida replied to 
Ricoeur's criticism in his lecture entitled "The Retrait of Metaphor"4 given at the 
Colloquium "Philosophy and Metaphor", which was held in 1978 at the University of 
Geneva. These three texts constitute a debate, which also reflects and should be 
understood within the framework of a more general discussion between hermeneutics 
and deconstruction and their impact on human sciences. Even though the debate 
focuses on the place and function of metaphor in the text of philosophy, its 
implications can be extended to every discourse on metaphor, for it is articulated on 
the level of its philosophical presuppositions. Most discourses on metaphor fail to 
recognise the philosophical grounds that condition its every single occurrence. This is 
not to say that metaphor in general operates in a specific and determined way 
independently of discourse or discipline. It is to suggest that, despite of its diverse 
and multiple uses and functions, metaphor always refers back to the constitutive 
distinction between literal and figurative meaning, to a metaphysical division that is 
impossible to do away with. The issue, as will be argued, is not choosing between a 
systematic or a historical (and contextual) approach to metaphor but to acknowledge 
' This article is included in the volume Margins of Philosophy, translated by Alan Bass, 
London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982. 
2 The French title is La Metaphore Vive, which translates as `the living metaphor'. 
Ricoeur, Paul, The Rule of Metaphor, Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning 
in Language, London, Routledge, 1978, p. 284. 
' The title of the French original is "Le retrait de la metaphore". As the translators of this text, 
Frieda Gardner, Biodun Iginla, Richard Madden, and William West explain, the word retrait 
brings into play a variety of meanings in French some of which are: withdrawal, retracement, 
recess, and retraction and it also metonymically touches on retraite: retreat, retirement, place 
of retirement, shelter or refuge; trait: line, mark, stroke, or feature; traite: road, place of 
passage, bank draft or bill of exchange; retirer: to retire, to retreat. 
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instead the historical constitution of a structure that receives the imprints of a long 
sequence of occurrences, a structure as formal and systematic as it is historical and 
contingent. 
Paul Ricoeur: Living Metaphor 
In The Rule of Metaphor Ricoeur designates metaphor as the linguistic 
process of creation of new meaning. Metaphor is not to be understood merely as the 
rhetorical figure, as a deviation of meaning by means of the substitution of a word by 
another more striking word. Metaphor is not just a stylistic or pedagogical device, 
although it carries the burden of a long tradition from Aristotle to the present that 
designates it as such. Metaphor is the dynamic aspect of language: it is the force that 
enables semantic innovation and new insights into reality. Indeed, for Ricoeur, 
metaphor has the power to redescribe reality by giving rise to novel ways of looking 
at and experiencing the world. For Ricoeur, the semantic innovation brought about 
through metaphor is an ontological event for it discloses new aspects of reality and 
new modes of being in the world, increasing our awareness of it and at the same time 
projecting new possibilities of action. In this sense, metaphor is creation-as- 
discovery. It is a heuristic function of language that permits new insights into a reality 
that is already there, a reality to which we belong but have no full grasp of, and at the 
same moment a reality which is being transfigured and transformed. 
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor amounts to a theory of meaning and 
interpretation that exceeds the description of particular aspects and functions of 
language (like semantic innovation) and assumes its full scope in the hermeneutic 
project. Ricoeur's aptitude to synthesise and put to work prominent philosophical 
traditions as well as linguistic and literary theories is clearly exposed in the unfolding 
of his argument in The Rule of Metaphor. Departing from Aristotle and classical 
rhetoric, he passes from structuralism and semiotics to semantics and the theory of 
discourse to finally reach the hermeneutics of disclosure and to readdress the question 
of the ontological import of metaphor. In this theoretical trajectory prevalent theories 
of metaphor are discussed, criticised, taken up and synthesised in a dialectical mode. 
At each phase a ne\\ question is posed leading to the final argument in the seventh 
and eighth studies of the work that introduce the concept of "metaphorical truth, " 
address the problematic of "the intersection of discourses" and argue for the 
"autonomy" of philosophical or speculative discourse. So the work moves from 
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classical tropology (taxonomy and classification of the figures of speech) to the 
structural explanation of semiotics (metaphor as an operation of the systematic layer 
of language) and the question of sense, to the semantics of the sentence and 
discourse, where the question of reference is introduced, and, finally, to the 
hermeneutics of the text where all previously elaborated theories attain their 
``righteous" place in the broader scope of hermeneutics. 
We will attempt to reconstruct this movement in a moment. For now it is 
important to ask what is at stake in the theory of metaphor, what is its place in 
Ricoeurian hermeneutics, and why does this long theoretical journey end up with the 
question of ontology and an argument for the autonomy of philosophy? To do this we 
have to go back to the basic premises and central notions of the hermeneutics of 
Ricoeur. Ricoeur's ambitious and comprehensive project is to formulate a 
hermeneutical model that would bring together Husserl's phenomenology, 
Heidegger's and Gadamer's hermeneutics, French structuralism, Anglo-American 
philosophy of "ordinary language" and the critique of ideology. His objective is to 
balance two adversarial movements in the history of hermeneutics: 1. the exigency 
for an epistemological hermeneutics that would raise exegesis and philology, the 
traditional branches of regional hermeneutics, to a "technology" and a general 
method for interpreting texts according to established and objective criteria 
(Schleiermarcher, Dilthey) and 2. the consideration primarily and fundamentally of 
the ontological condition of understanding that precedes and grounds epistemological 
preoccupation (Heidegger, Gadamer). This dichotomy within hermeneutics can be 
summed up under the opposed notions of understanding (Verstehen) and explanation 
(Erklären), which Ricoeur brings together in a dialectical pairing and in a single 
encompassing process, which he calls interpretation. 
Understanding here refers to the immediate grasp of, and familiarity with, the 
world that human beings acquire simply through the irreducible and primordial fact 
of being-thrown into the world. The structure of being-in-the-world, that is, the 
structure of Dasein, constitutes the ontological condition of all understanding and, 
hence, precedes the theory of knowledge and its mutually constitutive categories of 
subject and object. The ontology of understanding, as articulated by Heidegger and 
taken up by Gadamer, seeks to go before and beneath the methodological attitude of 
the human sciences to the fundamental conditions of human existence, of that being 
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which finds and orients itself within the world. The structure of understanding has the 
paradoxical character of a priori throwness or belonging and of projection or 
anticipation of different possibilities of being. Explanation, on the other hand, is an 
epistemological attitude that presupposes a methodological and objectifying 
distancing or "alienating distanciation", to use Gadamer's term, which, in his view, 
disrupts the immediate and primordial relation of belonging. Ricoeur, however, wants 
to overcome the alternative between understanding and explanation, ontological truth 
and method, and, consequently, to keep open the dialogue between hermeneutics and 
the human sciences: 
"How is it possible to introduce a critical instance into a consciousness of belonging 
which is expressly defined by the rejection of distanciation? It is possible, in my view, only 
insofar as historical consciousness seeks not simply to repudiate distanciation but to assume 
it. »5 
Ricoeur incorporates the critical moment of distanciation to the ontological 
condition of belonging as its dialectical counterpart. Belonging is the positive 
expression of the unsurpassable ontological condition of finitude that precedes 
reflection, encompasses and grounds cognitive categories and constitutes the structure 
of understanding or rather pre-understanding. However, (pre-)understanding cannot 
become meaningful, cannot become itself, if it is not mediated by interpretation. 
Because we already find ourselves in medias res, in a historical situation, 
transmission and conversation which has long begun, understanding always involves 
the overcoming of distance and estrangement: 
"The concept of distanciation is the dialectical counterpart of the notion of 
belonging, in the sense that we belong to a historical tradition through a relation of distance 
which oscillates between remoteness and proximity. To interpret is to render near what is far 
(temporally, geographically, culturally, spiritually). "6 
Now, for Ricoeur, distanciation is a positive condition understood either as 
ontological or epistemological category. Because there can be neither a total or 
unique nor closed horizon of meaning, one constantly finds oneself exposed to 
situations in which one's singular vantage point enters in a relation of tension with 
distant and alien semantic fields. Understanding thus becomes a project enabled by 
the structures of belonging and developed or extended by the positive condition of 
SRicoeur, Paul, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, Essays on Language, Action and 
Interpretation, edited, translated and introduced by John B. Thompson, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1981. p. 61. 
6 Ibid., pp. 1 10-111. 
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distanciation. Interpretation as the interplay of nearness and remoteness, of identity 
and difference, acquires an ontological value as general as that of understanding. 
Now, any philosophy of interpretation is necessarily centred on the question 
of meaning. The ontological question of being is primarily a phenomenological one 
since what is principally asked is "what is the meaning of being? " To the extent that 
the meaning of being is not evident or easily accessible but requires investigation and 
meditation, the phenomenological question, according to Ricoeur, is essentially a 
hermeneutical one. Hermeneutics by definition addresses the problem of concealed 
meaning. But since the question of meaning is at the heart of the hermeneutic 
preoccupation, hermeneutics maintains an unsurpassable phenomenological 
presupposition. ' The act of perception or intuition of a present object that lies outside 
consciousness and which consciousness intends, could not be elevated to meaning if 
it were not completed by an act of suspension or phenomenological reduction. 
"Phenomenology begins when, not content to `live' or `relive', we interrupt 
experience in order to signify it. "8 On the other hand, phenomenology cannot advance 
without incorporating a hermeneutic critique, an instance of explication and 
interpretation. Since consciousness is always already exposed to the effects of history, 
which already contain the element of distance, the movement of signification must 
involve an act of interpretation. Because interpretation presupposes both proximity 
and distance, it includes a moment of suspension, which disrupts our immediate 
relation to the historical situation we unreflectively find ourselves in. Hermeneutics 
"begins when, not content to belong to transmitted tradition, we interrupt the relation 
of belonging in order to signify it. "9 
Ricoeur rearticulates Husserl's principal notions in terms of hermeneutical categories and 
concerns. In other words, he extends Husserl's philosophical gesture onto the plane of history. 
For Ricoeur there can be no ultimate or presuppositionless ground for the constitution of 
meaning and, accordingly, no scientific description of it, since it would always have to come 
to terms with the ontological condition of understanding, that is, the irreducible and primordial 
fact of belonging. Accordingly, phenomenological experience can be realised only as 
hermeneutical experience. In hermeneutical terms, the phenomenological notion of 
intentionaliti y is actualised as interpretation, epoche becomes distanciation, and lived 
experience the historically lived experience and situation of belonging. Thus, according to 
Ricoeur, the discourse of phenomenology attains its full scope when it is incorporated in the 
hermeneutical project, that is, in historical understanding. Inversely, hermeneutical notions 
take on epistemological rigour and value drawing on phenomenology's method of 
"questioning back" to the ideal and objective aspects of meaning. 
8 Ibid., p. 116. 
9 Ibid., p. 117. 
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The notion of phenomenological epoche signals a preoccupation with sense, 
with the objective and ideal side of meaning. This is what has enabled hermeneutics 
to move away from the psychologising and historicist model (Romanticist 
hermeneutics, which prioritised a notion of understanding defined as the recognition 
of the author's intention from the point of view of his/her original audience). 
Counter-movements to this approach focused on the immanent structures and formal 
properties of the text, which was defined as an autonomous, self-contained and 
atemporal entity, employing explanatory strategies and structural analysis. Ricoeur's 
model aims at bringing these two attitudes, the historical and the structural, together 
in a theory of interpretation that would make this dichotomy positive and productive. 
For Ricoeur, the division between objectified and historical meaning falls 
under the dialectical pair of sense and reference (a distinction taken up by Frege's 
Sinn and Bedeutung). Sense is the immanent and repeatable structure of meaning, 
what enables a proposition to be identified and reidentified as such, to be rephrased 
and translated. It is a structure of sameness. Reference pertains to the eventful 
character of meaning. It is meaning actualised in specific contexts and historical 
situations. While meaning cannot exist outside its particular instantiations, it would 
be impossible if it were not supported by an ideal and objective structure. In other 
words, meaning must always have a reference but it must also exceed every single 
reference. While the dialectic of sense and reference is something inchoate in the oral 
speech situation, it is best manifested on the level of the text, the proper field of 
hermeneutics. With regard to the text, sense corresponds to its synthetic structure and 
immanent properties revealed by explanation, while reference pertains to its 
actualisation in a specific context and in the present of discourse as event. The text is 
the most exemplary instance of what Ricoeur calls distanciation, which apart from a 
positive ontological condition also becomes a positive methodological attitude, since 
it enables the description of structural and objectifiable aspects. 
Each time a text is read, it is interpreted in a particular context and actualised 
in a new event of discourse. Interpretation always involves the application of the text 
in a specific historical situation, from which it also receives a new referent. It 
intercepts the suspension or epoche of reference by redirecting the text to the world: 
If reading is possible. it is indeed because the text is not closed in on itself but opens 
out onto other things. To read is, on any hypothesis, to conjoin a new discourse to the 
discourse of the text. This conjunction of discourses reveals, in the very constitution of the 
21 
text, an original capacity for renewal which is its open character. Interpretation is the concrete 
outcome of conjunction and renewal 10 
However, the new reference of the text is not of a situational or ostensive 
character. It is a projection of a new mode of being that is unfolded by the text and 
appropriated by the reader. At this juncture Ricoeur introduces the notion of 
appropriation as a dialectic counterpart of distanciation. Appropriation and 
distanciation is another form of the dialectic of understanding and explanation. The 
act of interpretation is only completed through the movement of appropriation, which 
constitutes its final stage. The interpreting subject finally renders the distant semantic 
horizon into something familiar: 
"One of the aims of all hermeneutics is to struggle against cultural distance. This 
struggle can be understood in purely temporal terms as a struggle against secular 
estrangement, or in more genuinely hermeneutical terms as a struggle against the 
estrangement from meaning itself, that is, from the system of values upon which the text is 
based. In this sense, interpretation `brings together', `equalises', renders `contemporary and 
similar', thus genuinely making one's own what was initially alien. "" 
But what exactly of the text is appropriated by the reader? Appropriation here 
does not strictly signify taking possession of or merely reading into the text one's 
prejudices and expectations. Nor does it mean recognising the authorial intention or 
the historical conditions of the text's production. Appropriation, in Ricoeurian 
hermeneutics, is primarily a force of disclosure and manifestation. What it discloses 
is a world, the world of the work which, far from a situational reference to the 
intentional horizon of its author, is a projection and a proposal of a new mode or 
possibility of being-in-the-world displayed in font of the text: "Ultimately, what I 
appropriate is a proposed world. The latter is not behind the text, as a hidden intention 
would be, but in front of it, as that which the work unfolds, discovers, reveals. "12 The 
world of the work, or in Gadamer's terms the matter of the text, is a dynamic 
structure that unfolds and orients towards new possibilities of being, a process which 
more than an act on the text, is the act of the text. How can we speak of the matter or 
world of the work if this is comprehended as something which exceeds and thus 
suspends ostensive reference without, moreover, bestowing it a static, atemporal or 
"unworldly" character? It is at this point that the dialectic of understanding and 
explanation reaches its full potential. As Ricoeur shows in his reading of Levi- 
Strauss' analysis of nmyyths, structural explanation does not merely reveal a logic of 
10 Ibid., p. 158. 
'' Ibid., p. 159. 
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distribution, combination or formal arrangement of textual units but brings out what 
he calls depth semantics, that is, the internal structure of the text that is not 
understood in analytical terms but rather as the synthesis of meaningful 
propositions. 13 
The explicatory phase of interpretation recovers the depth semantics of the 
text and orients the reader to a potential meaning. In other words, it opens up the 
horizon of the text, in front of which the reader activates his/her own finite conditions 
of understanding, thus bringing them forth but also expanding them since the reader 
now receives an enlarged horizon of meaning through what is called the fusion of 
horizons, his/hers and the text's. The fusion of horizons, again a notion Ricoeur 
borrows from Gadamer, is the interaction and convergence of two semantic fields in a 
way that reveals their essential structures and culminates in the eruption of a new 
meaning and reference. "What is to be interpreted in the text is a proposed world 
which I could inhabit and in which I could project my ownmost possibilities. "14 
Appropriation is completed as self-understanding in front of the text, which far more 
than an action controlled by a dominant subject, by "a narcissistic ego", involves the 
effacement of the ego before a distant and larger horizon of meaning and, finally, its 
reemergence an enlarged self. 15 The reader loses and regains him/herself in front of 
the text, which by displaying a possible world unfolds his/her power-to-be. 16 
Let us recapitulate. We said that the hermeneutics of Ricoeur is centred 
around the primary dialectics of belonging and distanciation. Belonging is the 
unsurpassable ontological condition of understanding, Dasein's structure of pre- 
understanding conferred upon it by the simple and irreducible fact of being-in-the- 
world. Dasein is designated as a "thrown project", a set of possibilities, which it 
1Z Ibid., p. 143. 
'' Ibid., pp. 154-162. 
14 Ibid., p. 112. 
15 "To understand is not to project oneself into the text but to expose oneself to it; it is to 
receive a self enlarged by the appropriation of the proposed worlds which interpretation 
unfolds. In sum, it is the matter of the text which gives the reader his dimension of 
subjectivity; understanding is thus no longer a constitution of which the subject possesses the 
key. " Ibid., p. 94. 
16A new meaning points to a new reference and a new modality of being. Thus, by revealing 
an unthought possibility, the text introduces to the reader "imaginative variations of the ego". 
Into this stage of the interpretive process Ricoeur incorporates the "critique of the illusions of 
the subject" especially in the form of the Marxist and psychoanalytical traditions that could be 
put in the service of hermeneutics as an integral part of a general theory of prejudices. Ibid., 
p. 191. 
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receives and hands down to itself, which it unfolds and realises. Belonging already 
bears the element of distance, since Dasein finds itself at a particular moment of the 
historical connection and transmission, at the receiving end of historical efficacy. And 
exactly because its horizon is finite and limited, it is constantly engaged in the 
overcoming of distance and estrangement, that is, in interpretation. It is through 
interpretation that Dasein's ownmost possibilities, its finite project of life, are 
realised. Understanding becomes itself, that is, self-understanding as the 
appropriation of the estranged meaning of being. Of course, this is an infinite task, 
since the structure of belonging precedes and encompasses all reflection, so it can 
never be fully comprehended. 
The primordial dialectics of belonging and distanciation becomes explicit in 
the interpretation of texts, the paradigm of distanciation and domain of hermeneutics, 
and particularly through the derivative dialectic of understanding and explanation. 
Interpretation consists of three phases: pre-understanding (the structure of belonging), 
explanation (the existential and epistemological moment of distanciation) and 
understanding as self-understanding (the phase of appropriation). Interpretation 
brings the text to discourse and realises it as an event of language. The eventfulness 
of discourse is of primary importance since, for Ricoeur, an event of language (and an 
event is always something new) signals an ontological event. A possible new 
meaning has an ontological import for it points to a new possibility of being, to a 
possible world. In other words, new meaning brings about a redescription of the 
world. By suspending reference to the actual and familiar, the text releases the 
potential of another type of reference, what Ricoeur calls second order reference. 
Second order reference may disrupt direct reference to everyday reality but still has a 
claim to truth, since it unfolds the essential structures and possibilities of being, since 
it turns back to and also projects the ontological conditions of belonging. 
This takes us back to where we started from. For is not metaphor defined by 
Ricoeur as the process of creation of new meaning, as the creative force of language 
that unfolds new possibilities of being, that enables new insights into reality, and 
unleashes a new reference that has a claim to truth, to what Ricoeur calls 
metaphorical truth? The metaphorical process is another manifestation of the 
dialectic of belonging and distanciation, which takes the form of that of literal and 
metaphorical meaning. Literal meaning is designated as that which pertains and 
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belongs to one's semantic horizon, as that which is familiar, one's own, appropriated. 
Metaphorical meaning is the outcome of the exposure of one's semantic horizon to 
another that is distant and alien. It is a new event of language. 
If metaphor is language's power to cast a new light on, redescribe and 
transform reality, then where does it stand in relation to literature that is usually 
ascribed a similar function? For Ricoeur, metaphor is the paradigm for all creativity 
through language. Literary works, by disrupting direct reference to everyday reality 
and by pointing to an imaginary or fictional world, bring the metaphorical potential of 
language to its full blossom. Because literature and poetry engender "imaginative 
variations of reality" more than any other form of discourse, they offer the best 
example of metaphorical action. This is why the theory of metaphor can provide a 
medium for the analysis of literature. For Ricoeur, metaphor is an "abridged version" 
of the literary work or, as Monroe Beardsley sustains, "a poem in miniature". " 
Literature receives here a semantic definition, since it is foregrounded as the 
exemplary case of the production of new meaning. Insofar as literature radically 
suspends first order reference, it is also a limiting case of distanciation, thus it raises 
the fundamental problem of hermeneutics. And as long as hermeneutics' principal 
aim is to make explicit the implicit ontology of discourse, it must seek its completion 
in philosophy, in the discourse that is centred and structured around the question of 
being. If literature is under the rule of metaphor, philosophy is the reign of the proper. 
The dialectical couple "literal" or "proper" and "metaphorical" is at the heart of a 
problematic that has preoccupied literary theory as well as philosophy among other 
disciplines concerning the separation and/or intersection of cognitive discourses and 
literature, the function of rhetoric in philosophy, the dichotomy or interweaving of 
fact and fiction. This problematic is posed in the last study of The Rule of Metaphor 
and is explored on the fundamental level of its conceptual premises and in terms of 
the question of the boundary between philosophy and literature. 
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor integrates and deploys all the hermeneutical 
notions and themes elaborated above. It is important before we go into the details of 
his formulation to establish one more distinction, that between metaphor and 
polysemy. Polysemy is for Ricoeur an essential characteristic of language, which 
17 Ricoeur, Paul, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, Fort Worth, 
Texas Christian University Press, 1976, p. 46. 
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manifests the ambiguous and open character of words and their sensitivity to context. 
Polysemy refers to the already established and lexicalised multiple semantic potential 
and possible contextual uses of words and pertains to the order of the literal. For 
Ricoeur, every single word is polysemic, yet no polysemic word is a metaphor. While 
polysemy brings to discourse a semantic dynamic, which is activated within context 
and is then reduced through the labour of interpretation to a relatively univocal 
meaning, metaphor explodes this dynamic since, in its case, polysemy comes short of 
pertinent semantic values and a new one has to be created. Polysemy and metaphor 
constitute another form of the dialectic of belonging and distanciation. Let us now 
proceed to a more extensive elaboration of Ricoeur's theory of metaphor. 
Ricoeur criticises numerous theories of metaphor, of which the main trait is 
that they, in a more or less direct way, address metaphor as a phenomenon of 
substitution at the level of the word or sign and on the basis of resemblance. This trait 
is repeated in a consistent way in the discourses of classical rhetoric, semiotics and 
the semantics of the word, which are word-focused theories. For Ricoeur metaphor is 
a far more complex and productive element of language. To show this, he advocates a 
passage from semiotics and the semantics of the word to the semantics of the 
sentence, that is, the unit of discourse. This shift from the level of the word/sign to the 
level of the sentence, pen-nits Ricoeur to further his theory to the level of the text, the 
province of hermeneutics. In order to do this, Ricoeur develops a theory of discourse 
and a theory of the text. '8 
18 Ricoeur draws on Emile Benveniste's theory of discourse and elaborates it in the context of 
the debate between semiotics and semantics. Semiotics' domain is that of langue, that is, 
language as a homogeneous, self-regulated and closed system of hierarchically structured and 
differentially defined linguistic units, whereas semantics' object of study is parole, the 
realisation of langue in a meaningful event of language. Langue is a linguistic code composed 
of finite sets of discrete linguistic entities with combinatory capacities, which, precisely 
because of its systematic character furnishes linguistics with an accessible and manageable 
object of study. It is parole, however, that actualises the communicative and referential 
functions of language, that carries the message and relates language to reality. While langue 
has only a virtual existence, parole is the actual event of language with individual and 
contingent character. Now, Ricoeur's aim is not to substitute semantics for semiotics but to 
show the mutual and necessary exchange between the two disciplines, and accordingly 
between langue and parole. Metaphor, as will be shown, is exemplary of this relation. In 
Ricoeur's view, semiotics provides a unidimensional approach to language and needs to be 
supplemented by a theory of discourse. Following Benveniste, he uses the term discourse 
instead of parole in order to underscore the shift of focus from sign to sentence. The sentence 
disposes a synthetic structure, which is different from the analytic structure of the combination 
of signs. With it one enters a different domain, the province of the semantics of discourse. 
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Discourse is described by Ricoeur according to dialectical traits. " The first 
and "nuclear" one is the dialectic of event and meaning. For Ricoeur "discourse 
always occurs as an event, but it is to be understood as meaning. "20 The event of 
discourse is fleeting and repeatable at the same time. It is "fleeting" because it always 
takes place in a here and a now, in a passing instant, and "repeatable" because it bears 
a structure that allows it to be identified and reidentified as the same. This structure 
constitutes the propositional content of the utterance, which transcends the transitory 
and singular event and can be repeated at another instance. Ricoeur says: "There is 
meaning because there is sameness of meaning. "21 The act of discourse may vanish 
but its propositional content or locutionary mode, to use a speech act theory term, 
outlives the intention that activates it each time. It can be repeated, rephrased, 
translated and still be identified as such. What is finally retained and understood in 
the event of language is its meaning. 22 
Sense and reference form another dialectical pairing that falls in the inner 
dialectic of meaning. Sense corresponds to meaning's synthetic structure, to the 
correlation of the identifying and predicative functions of the proposition. It is the 
objective or ideal aspect of language in the sense that it is repeatable and identifiable. 
Reference marks the movement of language towards the world. Sense manifests 
"what" is being said, whereas reference shows the "about what" of the saying. 
Language in use and in action" rests upon the dialectic of sense and reference, which 
19 The Ricoeurian notion of discourse, which is a decisive part of his theory of metaphor, is 
not presented here in comparison and disjunction to other theories of discourse, which are 
arguably more prominent, for instance, that of Michel Foucault, which also happens to be the 
departure of a prevalent, albeit often disfiguring, as will be argued in the last chapter, trend of 
discourse analysis with regard to travel writing. We are here interested in the hermeneutic 
experience of travel, that is, in the core experience of the interpretive subject and the onto- 
semantic structures that make it possible even before and beyond contextual and historical 
determinations and discursive constraints and delimitations. 
20Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 70. 
21Ibid., p. 70. 
22 This, whatsoever, does not reintroduce the distinction between code and discourse and all 
the more in favour of the former. Ricoeur stresses that what we have is "the repeatability of an 
event, not an element of a system. " This repeatability is immanent to the event and it is 
supported by a synthetic structure which is particular to discourse and consists in the 
connection of a subject to a predicate or, differently said, in the intertwining of the identifying 
and the predicative functions. The subject of the proposition refers discourse to a particular 
entity or situation and is designated by a predicate, which attributes to it qualities or actions, 
or places it in classes and sets of relations. The concrete subject of a proposition is what gives 
the predicate a transitory character because it links a potentially universal attribute to a 
particular here and now. The instance of discourse may have a fleeting quality but it is not 
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also indicates its ontological dimension. As Ricoeur argues, "it is because there is 
first something to say, because we have an experience to bring to language, that 
conversely, language is not only directed towards ideal meanings but also refers to 
what is. "23 According to Ricoeur, experience is prior to language. It is the ontological 
condition of language. 
The theory of discourse provides by extension a theory of the text, which is 
understood as an entity homogeneous to the sentence, which, after all, is the unit of 
discourse and the foundational entity of semantics. The text is defined as any 
discourse fixed by writing. Fixation by writing is for Ricoeur constitutive of the text 
itself, yet without limiting it to a transcription of oral discourse. The notion of 
discourse as work is important here. Discourse as work is a closed sequence 
characterised by a certain structure and internal organisation. It is a structured totality 
composed of sets of sentences that is, however, irreducible to them. The structured 
work either oral or written falls into a primary type of distanciation, the dialectic of 
event and meaning. In the case of the text, distanciation becomes more obvious 
because as soon as the text is completed, it is freed from the writer's intentions and its 
conditions of production. If dialogue is the paradigm of communication, since it takes 
place as a play of question and answer in a shared context, the text is the paradigm of 
communication in and through distance and, hence, the domain of hermeneutics, the 
art of rendering alien meaning familiar. It is the structure of the work that makes its 
mediation and its repetition in different contexts possible. It is what allows for the 
detachment of meaning from the event of language, something that is nascent in 
living speech but made explicit by writing. 24 So, the seemingly negative notion of 
distanciation becomes a positive and productive condition for interpretation. 
The theory of discourse provides Ricoeur with the basis for his theory of 
metaphor. For Ricoeur metaphor is a phenomenon of discourse that takes effect on 
the level of the sentence through the interaction of words. Metaphor, then, is always a 
statement and not a word. The difference between metaphorical and literal statements 
is that the synthetic structure of the former produces a semantic impertinence, which 
can only be resolved by adding to the term that causes the disruption in the coherence 
merely a vanishing event, for its synthetic structure preserves and secures for it an identity of 
its own. Event and meaning traverse one another. 
2'lbid., p. 21. 
24Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 25. 
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of the context a new meaning that would restore semantic congruence. In this sense 
metaphorical meaning is always something new. It does not belong to the so-called 
secondary meanings of a word nor is it an instantiation of polysemy, of the outline of 
accepted and literal uses. Living metaphor is not yet part of the lexicon. Ricoeur 
maintains that there are no metaphors in the dictionary. The dictionary contains only 
dead metaphors, i. e., literal senses, which were first engendered through the 
metaphorical process and were then lexicalised as their use became expanded. 25 
Metaphorical meaning eventually becomes literal. 
Ricoeur's discussion of the most prevalent theories of metaphor is essential to 
the formulation of his own model. He begins with the classical definition of metaphor 
in Aristotle's Poetics: 
"Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the 
transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to 
species, or on the grounds of analogy. "26 
According to Aristotle, metaphor is a change of meaning that affects the 
word. It is an epiphora, a displacement or transposition of a name, which is borrowed 
from an original domain to substitute for a literal word, and in doing so deviates from 
its original use. Metaphor, according to Aristotle, is a transposition between "logical 
poles", a transference between already constituted categories. This, for Ricoeur and in 
spite of Aristotle, introduces a discursive moment in the definition of metaphor. 
Metaphor by being essentially the designation of one term by another involves an act 
of predication, which is a lot more than a change of meaning affecting the word. It is 
rather the alteration of semantic distance that results in a disturbance of the whole 
network of meanings. 
According to Aristotle, the transference of meaning presupposes the 
perception of resemblance between two at first sight different things. He writes in 
Poetics: 
"It is a great thing, indeed, to make a proper use of the poetical forms as also of 
compounds and strange words. But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is 
the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good 
metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars. "27 
25 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 99. 
26Ibid., p. 13. 
27lbid., p. 23. 
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"To metaphorise well", for Aristotle, is to "see resemblance". Resemblance 
adds a dynamic aspect to metaphor, which, more than a deviation at the level of the 
lexical code, is the perception or establishment of a relationship between the things 
and ideas it brings together. However, for Aristotle, resemblance must be a pre- 
existing though unrecognised relation. Ricoeur maintains this feature of metaphor in 
his own theoretical model but ascribes it a different function, since resemblance now 
becomes a creation and not a condition of metaphor. 
In late rhetoric, metaphor is relegated to one of the figures of speech along 
with metonymy and synecdoche and it is not designated as the paradigm of all figures 
as in Aristotle. 28 Metaphor becomes the single word trope that consists of the 
substitution of an absent proper word for a borrowed figurative one on the basis of 
resemblance. Resemblance is the reason or rationale of the trope of metaphor, the 
exploration of which could lead to the restoration of the absent term through an 
"exhaustive paraphrase ". Therefore, since the trope can always be restored in a 
proper available and already established meaning, metaphor provides "no new 
information" and is restricted to a merely pedagogical function. 29 
Substitution theories tend to deprive metaphor of any cognitive value that 
would emerge from the creation of a new meaning, since they confine metaphor to 
the already established and static aspects of language. Semiotics, it could be argued, 
continues the tradition of substitution theory, by trying to account for the change of 
meaning by referring solely to intra-linguistic rules and operations. 3° Ricoeur 
28 In the second study of the Rule of Metaphor, "The decline of rhetoric: tropology, " Ricoeur 
considers the passage or decline of rhetoric as designated, for instance, by Aristotle, to a 
restrictive theory of tables of tropes and figures as in Pierre Fontanier's Les Figures du 
discours (1830). 
29 Substitution theories of metaphor by necessity imply the condition of translatability of the 
metaphorical into the literal. Since metaphor is defined as a deviation from literal meaning, it 
is implied that a rhetorical analysis that would explore and expose metaphorical action could 
restore the meaning which acted as point of departure. In other words, insofar as metaphor is 
engendered from and, consequently, reducible to an original proper meaning, it by necessity 
implies translatability between the former and the latter. This would secure that there is no 
loss of meaning and that metaphor is submitted to the economy of the same. However, 
restricting metaphor to a series of controllable substitutions also implies that there is no gain 
in meaning either. For Ricoeur, metaphor brings about a change of meaning that cannot be 
exhausted in a paraphrase or in the retrieval of an absent literal word. In this sense, metaphor 
defies translation in its classical notion because it always conveys something more than 
already established meanings. To Ricoeur's mind, semantic innovation is untranslatable. 
30 The structural linguistics of Roman Jakobson designates metaphor as a substitution of a sign 
for another sign on the basis of resemblance. Jakobson's bipolar schema associates metaphor 
and metonymy with two general processes of language, that of selection and combination. In 
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advocates a passage from semiotics and the semantics of the word to the semantics of 
the sentence and to an interaction and contextual theory of metaphor. This transition 
does not abolish its point of departure. The change of focus rather means 
concentrating on the metaphorical process than just describing its effects on the level 
of the word. Ricoeur sustains that semiotics and substitution theory are not only 
compatible with his own model but also an integral part of it. 
Metaphor illustrates the necessary exchange between the systematic traits of 
language, which constitute the domain of semiotics, and discourse through its relation 
to polysemy. Polysemy is a feature of the linguistic code describing potential and not 
actual meanings. Metaphor, on the other hand, is an event of language that is always 
realised in the present of discourse and brings about a change of meaning, which has 
the power to alter the lexical code. Polysemy would not exist without the 
metaphorical process, which creates additional meanings for words, and metaphor 
would never take place if words had not the capacity of acquiring new meanings and 
at the same time preserve their old ones. Each time a word is used in a sentence it 
brings with it all its potential meanings, which are screened by its context and 
reduced to the one that makes sense. In the case of metaphor none of the word's 
the case of selection, signs are related on the basis of resemblance on the paradigmatic plane 
of language that pertains to the linguistic code only, whereas, in the case of combination, signs 
are related on the basis of contiguity on the syntagmatic plane, which takes effect on both 
code and message. Metaphor, thus, pertains to the paradigmatic pole of language. These 
operations control all levels of language from phoneme to text in exactly the same way not 
admitting any difference between the sign and discourse. See Roman Jakobson's "Two 
Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disorder" in Selected Writings. II: Word and 
Language, The Hague, Mouton, 1971. Ricoeur objects to such a restricted rhetoric of two 
figures and to the exclusion of the function of discourse from the explanation of the 
metaphorical process. His main criticism of the structural method is that, although it provides 
a highly technical theory of metaphor, it fails to account for semantic innovation, since it 
explains metaphor solely on the grounds of intra-linguistic operations and not as a discursive 
phenomenon. Theorists of what has been called "new rhetoric" like Gerard Genette, Jean 
Cohen and A. -J. Greimas also employ a structural model of language and attempt to formalise 
a common structure of figures, one that would be governed by the same two operations at all 
levels of language (phoneme, seme, sign, sentence), namely, those of deviation and reduction 
of deviation. New rhetoric introduces a new unit of meaning, the seme, by breaking down the 
signified to minimal semantic entities. The sense of words, accordingly, is an accumulation of 
semes. The decomposition of the signified aims at the isolation of a semantic unit that carries 
an essential and identical meaning that has not been affected yet by rhetorical deviation. This 
unit constitutes the rhetorical degree zero and has only a virtual existence since it cannot 
occur as such in discourse. Deviation is explicated as a relation of semes and it is something 
that can be measured. The concatenation of semes distances them from their "natural" 
meaning. But as Genette admits, it is impossible to decide at what degree of accumulation of 
inessential semes a deviation begins to be perceived". So the structural explanation of 
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established meanings is suitable for its context, so the word has to retain all its 
semantic acceptations plus one, a new one that would render the statement 
meaningful and would achieve semantic pertinence. As is shown, metaphor involves 
the action of the whole statement though its effect focalises on a single word. It is a 
discursive phenomenon that relates a word and a predicate and can be sufficiently 
described by a theory of interaction. 
To formulate his interaction or tension theory of metaphor, Ricoeur borrows 
from the works of I. A. Richards, Max Black and Monroe Beardsley . 
31 These theorists 
move from the semantics of the word to that of the sentence and argue for a 
contextual theory of meaning. Accordingly, meaning proceeds through the 
interanimation of the words of a sentence and not merely through their summing up. 
By extension, metaphorical meaning is the result of the action of the whole sentence, 
although it is made manifest in a single word. 32 In contrast to substitution theory, 
these thinkers do not think resemblance is a pre-existing similarity that grounds 
metaphor but rather a likely outcome of a semantic approximation initiated in the 
metaphorical statement between the two things or ideas that are brought together. 
Hence, resemblance is not included in the explication of the metaphorical process. 
This is precisely the point from which Ricoeur takes his separate way from all 
previous theory by reformulating the function of resemblance in the metaphorical 
process. Richards, Black and Beardsley saw resemblance as the outcome of the 
metaphorical action and not as functional feature. Ricoeur reinstates the notion of 
resemblance in his theory of metaphor by shifting attention to its semantic character. 
metaphor reaches an impasse when it comes to demarcating literal from metaphorical 
meaning. 
31 Richards, Ivor Armstrong, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1971, Black, Max, Models and Metaphors, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1962, Beardsley, 
Monroe C., Aestetics, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958. 
32 For I. A. Richards metaphorical action is made manifest as the incongruence between the 
tenor, that is, an underlying idea, and its vehicle, the word under the sign of which this idea is 
apprehended. Richards, p. 116. Black also designates metaphor as a phenomenon generated by 
the whole sentence but centred on a single word, which is now called the focus, while the rest 
of the sentence functions as its frame. Black, p. 47. According to Beardsley, metaphor 
emerges from an attribution of a modifier to a subject that causes an incompatibility of 
meaning. Beardsley, pp. 139-140. The tension that is inflicted through semantic incongruence 
is resolved by reference to pre-established classes of potential connotations, what Beardsley 
and Black respectively call "inventory of secondary meanings" and "system of associated 
commonplaces". As Ricoeur points out, however, these theorists fail to account for semantic 
innovation since they reduce its dynamism to an index of available meanings and, therefore, 
do not acknowledge the productive character of metaphor. Ricoeur, The Rule of iletaphor, p. 
85. 
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To perceive resemblance is to have the capacity to imagine something as or 
through something else, to be able to see as. For Ricoeur the operation of "seeing as" 
is at the same time iconic and verbal. The apprehension of similarity between 
logically distant things is a "seeing" or "iconic" instant which is not reduced to a 
sensible urvage. It is "thinking" and "seeing" at the same time. 33 The reformulation of 
the iconic character of resemblance allows for the inclusion of the function of 
imagination and feeling as components of metaphorical cognition and not simply as 
accompanying psychological features. Metaphor holds together a sense and an image, 
a verbal and a non-verbal element, precisely because it arises at the borderline 
between the semantic and the psychological. This limit is the locus from which the 
creative force of language, or linguistic imagination, springs forth. 34 For Ricoeur, the 
image aroused by metaphor is not a perceptual residue or a replica of an absent thing. 
It is first an emerging meaning, an outline of possible meanings that has not yet 
reached the level of "conceptual peace" and, therefore, has still a quasi-verbal 
character. The quasi-verbal is the condition of the quasi-optic aspect of imagination. 
In order to better explicate the at once verbal and iconic aspect of metaphor, Ricoeur 
resorts to the Kantian notion of productive imagination. Productive imagination, in 
disjunction to "reproductive imagination" or quasi-sensual imagery, is the 
schematisation of the synthetic operation initiated by metaphor. It is a "logical 
structure of likeness" that holds two meanings together preserving similarity in and in 
spite of difference. Ricoeur describes the workings of linguistic imagination in three 
phases. His aim is to provide an explication of the passage from semantic 
incongruence to metaphorical congruence, what, in his view, all theories previously 
mentioned leave in abeyance. 
11 " The "iconic" element of metaphor is acknowledged in most theories of metaphor and has 
received various treatments. For theorists like Michel LeGuern and Paul Henle metaphor 
emerges as a disruption of the semantic coherence that triggers a verbal image. Nonetheless, 
this image is ascribed a psychological and affective function reverting thus to an emotionalist 
theory of metaphor. The image in the end becomes external to the linguistic process and 
metaphor is driven out of the jurisdiction of semantics to that of psychology. Ibid., pp 182- 
191. 
34 In The Rule of Metaphor I try to show how language could extend itself to its very limits 
forever discovering new resonances within itself. The term vive in the French title La 
Metaphore Vive is all important, for it was my purpose to demonstrate that there is not just an 
epistemological and political imagination, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, a 
linguistic imagination which generates and regenerates meaning through the living powers of 
metaphoricity. " Quotation from Richard Kearney's "Paul Ricoeur and the Hermeneutic 
Imagination" in The Narrative Path, The Later Works of Paul Ricoeur, edited by T. Peter 
Kemp and David Rasmussen, London, The MIT Press, 1989, p. 14. 
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Primarily, imagination is understood as a "seeing", an insight into likeness 
that is homogeneous to discourse. Two things or two different registers of meaning 
are brought together through a predicative act that describes the one in terms of the 
other, altering their logical distance and giving rise to new combinatory possibilities. 
Ricoeur calls this productive and linguistic insight predicative assimilation. It is a 
discursive event by means of which two separate semantic fields approximate and 
clash. It is important to note that the semantic conflict is not simply between a subject 
and a predicate but rather between semantic incongruence and congruence. It is at this 
phase that the pictorial aspect of metaphor is introduced. A new connection begins to 
appear; a schema or pattern for the creation of new meaning is formed: an outline 
that holds similarity and difference in tension and for a moment keeps the possibility 
of many different meanings alive. This is the moment metaphor unfolds its figurative 
power by creating a milieu or space within language where new connections and 
images can be perceived. These images are called by Ricoeur "tied, " a term borrowed 
from Richards35, since they are aroused and controlled by the verbal element. 
Language -and poetic language par excellence- has the power to evoke verbal 
images, which are seen, felt, as well as understood. According to Ricoeur, linguistic 
imagination has both iconic and emotive aspects, though these are bounded by its 
essentially verbal character, out of which they also emerge. Ricoeur sustains that 
there is a "structural analogy between the cognitive, the imaginative, and the 
emotional components of the complete metaphorical act. "36 This phase correlates 
with the explanatory moment of interpretation since it involves the manifestation of 
the essential structures of two clashing semantic horizons in an encounter initiated by 
an original insight into similarity. At this stage of the metaphorical process, meaning 
is still suspended (and so is reference) since no fusion is yet accomplished. This 
necessitates an intuitive passage that would establish a new connection and 
pertinence out of the density and intensity of the semantic potential of the 
metaphorical schematism. Interpretation is completed when a relative univocal 
meaning is reached out of the confrontation of identity and difference outlined by 
metaphor. At this point, semantics and the psychology of imagination and feeling 
reach their common border. However, Ricoeur keeps the theory of metaphor within 
Richards, Ivor Armstrong, Principles of Literati' Criticism, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 
1925, pp. 118-119. 
36Ricoeur, Paul, The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling" in On 
Metaphor, edited by Sheldon Sacks, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 157. 
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the limits of semantics by "prudently" framing innovation within Kantian "productive 
imagination" and by underscoring the cognitive import of feelings. 37 The 
metaphorical process is initiated by an incompatibility of meaning and terminates in a 
new pertinence, though it also necessitates the participation of nonverbal components. 
Another essential function of linguistic imagination, which was previously 
touched upon, is the suspension of ordinary descriptive reference. At the phase of 
metaphorical schematism reference to reality is provisionally disrupted: 
"Imagination does not merely schematise the predicative assimilation between terms 
by its synthetic insight into similarities nor does it merely picture the sense thanks to the 
display of images aroused and controlled by the cognitive process. Rather, it contributes 
concretely to the epoche of ordinary reference and to the projection of new possibilities of 
redescribing the world. "38 
Ambiguity in sense always implies ambiguity in reference. The moment of 
schematism is one of undecidability (however, not between concrete choices but one 
involving the dismantling of certitude before a new possibility), which concerns them 
both and is, finally, resolved through the advent of the new pertinence. For Ricoeur 
every gain in meaning regards both sense and reference. Throughout the metaphorical 
process reference is merely suspended and not completely abolished and this is where 
its creative force lies. As the literal interpretation of the statement becomes 
impossible, literal meaning self-destructs giving way to a metaphorical meaning. In 
the same way, metaphorical reference is constructed on the ruins of literal reference. 
Again, literary reference is exemplary of this function. Ricoeur here resorts to 
Jakobson's notion of split reference. Jakobson thinks that "the supremacy of poetic 
function over referential function does not obliterate the reference but makes it 
ambiguous. "39 For Ricoeur, "the poet is a genius who creates split references by 
creating fiction S.,, 40 The suspension of direct reference to reality is the paradoxical 
condition for the disclosure of its deeper structures, which are blurred in everyday 
'' Ricoeur defines feelings as "interiorised thoughts". Feelings do not obstruct the process of 
cognition but, on the contrary, they accompany and complete it for it is through them that 
thoughts are made ours. In the same way imagination suspends reality and points to a second 
order reference, feelings imply an epoche of bodily emotions. Aristotle's theory of catharsis is 
exemplary here. The feelings of phobos and eleos entailed in the tragic tale are not real, 
everyday life feelings. They involve the suspension of emotions and the schematisation of a 
structure of feeling. The negative moment of suspension does not imply the complete 
abolition of emotions, but rather their metamorphosis, their elevation to poetic feelings. Ibid., 
p 153-157. -s 
Ibid., p. 152. 
39 Jakobson, "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disorder", p. 371. 
40Ricoeur, The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling", p. 153. 
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life. This is possible since metaphorical reference is not radically discontinuous from 
ordinary reference. Literature, by representing reality in a creative way, imposes on it 
an order and composition that everyday life lacks. So, according to Ricoeur, the 
literary text, precisely because it has a structure which makes it objectifiable and at 
the same time distant, at once accessible and subversive, has the power to alter and 
reorganise our perception of reality pointing to its most fundamental layers. 41 This is 
what Ricoeur calls "metaphorical truth", that is, the projection of another inhabitable 
world, one corresponding to possibilities that would be most deeply our own. 2 Split 
reference is ultimately displayed as a conflict between the metaphorical "is" 
(possibility of new congruence) and the literal "is not" (impossible congruence) 
condensed in the metaphorical format "being as". The ontological force of metaphor 
is finally made manifest in the copula, which carries the tension between same and 
other as well as between actuality and potentiality. The paradox of the metaphorical 
4'Aristotle's theory of mimesis is exemplary here. Mimesis in Poetics is not the faithful copy 
of nature but a representation of essential traits of that which is human in a way that elevates 
and ennobles it. Muthos (plot) is a constituent element of the tragic tale and has a similar 
function with what Ricoeur calls the sense of the text. Muthos is not just a "rearrangement of 
human action into a more coherent form, but a structuring that elevates this action. " Thus 
muthos structures reality in a comprehensible and knowable form that also points to new 
possibilities of action. Muthos preserves reference to reality but also refigures it through 
creation, poiesis: it is both mimetic and metaphorical. Mimesis was already related to 
metaphor by Aristotle, who attributed to both the same structure of "setting before the eyes" 
and of creative representation. The notion of mimesis as creative or metaphorical imitation can 
manifest the power of literature to redescribe reality and to raise metaphorical reference to the 
enterprise of "saying what is". For Ricoeur this is the ontological function of metaphorical 
discourse. The notions of mimesis and muthos will be extensively discussed in relation to 
narrative in the third chapter. 
42 Literature then becomes a heuristic discourse with cognitive import. It is a medium of 
describing reality and moreover describing it anew. In this sense, the function of literature is 
not that different from that of epistemological models. According to Max Black, theoretical 
models constitute a new language or idiom that provides a better known and controllable field, 
on which new hypotheses and new relations can be tried out. In the same way with productive 
imagination, scientific imagination holds the power to make new connections by verbal 
means. The perception of new connections on the linguistic plane extends scientific language 
and thus enables new descriptions of reality. Fictional and scientific discourses are both 
engendered by linguistic imagination. They both endeavour to master meaning by relating it 
to different referents and to investigate new referents by describing them in inventive ways. 
Scientific discourse claims a place in the enterprise of stating "what is", while fiction 
maintains the paradoxical character of referring to what "somehow" is and at the same time is 
not, thus keeping potentiality and actuality together. However, if scientific discourse depends, 
as Black and Ricoeur argue, on heuristic devices in order to designate reality more precisely, 
then well established distinctions like discovery and creation, and fact and fiction are shaken. 
Ricoeur, however, is far from identifying poetic with scientific discourse. What he wants to 
demonstrate is, on the one hand, the ontological function of the former and, on the other, a 
lack of thematisation and clarification of the presuppositions and operative concepts of the 
latter. 
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copula, which is both relational and existential, points to a tensional truth: what being 
could reveal itself to be. 
If metaphor is the paradigm of creativity in language, best displayed in 
literary discourse, with cognitive and referential functions and, most importantly, 
with ontological import, then is the distinction between the so-called cognitive or 
factual and emotive or fictional discourses still valid? And if the metaphorical 
process, such as described by Ricoeur, is the general "formula" for the creation of 
new meaning and for concept formation, then are discourses metaphorically 
engendered? Indeed, are they all under the rule of metaphor? 
In the eighth study of The Rule of Metaphor, which bears the title "Metaphor 
and Philosophical Discourse", Ricoeur's argument reaches its utmost formulation and 
is elucidated with regard to two "extreme" discourses, poetry and philosophy. 43 If 
poetry carries the semantic dynamism of metaphor to its extreme, it is philosophy that 
ultimately comes to reflect upon it, to have the "final" word. As was elaborated 
above, metaphor is a general process for the production of new meaning that operates 
in, expands and indeed (re)generates all discourses, including philosophy. However, 
Ricoeur is far from considering that all discourses, and philosophy in particular, are 
metaphorical or secondary to metaphor. Metaphor springs forth at the moment when 
two separate semantic and referential fields collide and interact, a procedure called 
predicative assimilation. Yet, this implies the prior constitution of the semantic fields 
in question. For Ricoeur, discourses have a relative autonomy without being radically 
heterogeneous, since they interrelate and interact. He pleads for a "relative pluralism 
of forms and levels of discourse" that would be regulated and sustained by a 
"principle of discontinuity". 44 Ricoeur is particularly interested in securing the 
45 autonomy of philosophical or speculative discourse, since it is through the 
We will not get into Ricoeur's discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of the analogical unity of 
the multiple meanings of being and its later reformulation by onto-theological discourse. 
Ricoeur, in order to show the discontinuity of philosophy and poetry, refers back to Aristotle's 
exemplary project to establishing an order for the multiple ways being is said in the 
philosophical logos, without reducing it to chance equivocity (poetry) or to absolute univocity 
(generic unity), by means of a concept of analogy that is disengaged from that of metaphor 
and is understood instead as an order of polysemy referred to a first term (pros hen). 
4 'Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, pp. 257-8. 
4'Ricoeur defines speculative discourse as "the discourse that establishes the primary notions, 
the principles, that articulate primordially the space of the concept. " lt is what founds the 
discontinuity of all modes and levels of discourse by structuring the conceptual space in which 
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philosophical act that the conceptual premises and the principles of identification and 
differentiation, as well as that of interaction, can be established. Consequently, the 
discourse on metaphor would not be possible if it were not inscribed in the conceptual 
space set up by speculation. 
According to Ricoeur, even though philosophy draws on metaphorical 
potential, the philosophical act precedes the metaphorical one. Philosophical 
discourse, for Ricoeur, aims at making the implicit ontology that underlies all 
discourses explicit. Thus, it is considered first in the order of grounding. Philosophy 
is structured and thematised around the question of being. Through an epoche it 
elevates the primordial experience of belonging that all discourses articulate to the 
enterprise of saying "what is". When a word is transposed into the philosophical field, 
it enters into a relation of tension and interaction with an already established rigorous 
conceptual order. By the end of the metaphorical process a new concept is formed 
and set up in a network of philosophemes given in advance. According to Ricoeur, 
the discursive production of new pertinence has a particular function in philosophy. 
The establishing of a new semantic value does not coincide with concept formation. 
The "spark" of imagination that renovates discourse and adds new perceptions of 
reality cannot reach the clarity of the concept but in speculative discourse. We said 
earlier that the semantics of discourse primarily considers the referential function of 
language. Yet this function is only thought as such or reflected upon by speculative 
discourse, in which "language becomes aware of itself in the self-articulation of the 
being which it is about. "46 Here metaphorical dynamism encounters its limit. The 
schematic potential of double meaning and split reference must here subdue to the 
horizon of speculative logos constituted in advance and conform to the requirements 
of the concept. 
Ricoeur seems to want to at all costs purify philosophy from metaphorical 
ambiguity. Metaphor finds its limit when it is taken up by interpretation, a composite 
discourse that mediates between the dynamism of meaning and the clarity of the 
concept: 
"interpretation is the work of concepts. It cannot help but be the work of elucidation, 
in the Husserlian sense of the word, and consequently a struggle for univocity. Whereas the 
metaphorically engendered meaning comes to be inscribed. Therefore, the speculative is the 
condition of the conceptual and "first" discourse in the order of grounding. Ibid., p. 300. 
46 Ibid., p. 301. 
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metaphorical utterance leaves the second sense in suspension, while its reference continues to 
have no direct presentation, interpretation is necessarily a rationalisation that at its limit 
eliminates the experience that comes to language through the metaphorical process. "47 
Metaphor, by bringing a new experience to language, poses the demand of 
"thinking more". However, at the conceptual level where this demand attains its 
ultimate articulation, it must also comply with the rules of speculation, which works 
by its own necessity. This mediation or exchange between metaphor and philosophy 
is regulated by the idea of univocity, which draws a limit between the two. As we 
said in the beginning, Ricoeur's hermeneutics does not prefigure an ultimate or 
totalised horizon of meaning. It is not a dialectics of absolute knowledge. However, it 
operates along the lines of synthetic dialectics and the demand for univocity, even if 
this cannot be finally attained. The hermeneutics of Ricoeur seeks to explore our 
primordial experience of belonging and bring it to the level of conceptual 
understanding, a task never to be completed, since it is itself rooted in and structured 
by the irreducible fact of belonging. The critical moment of conceptual thinking is an 
instant of distanciation that is initiated by metaphor, which displays most forcefully 
its dynamism in the articulation of the limit experience of poetry. Poetry may be the 
paradigm of the dialectic of belonging and distanciation but it is speculative thought 
that takes it up and "carries it to the highest point of reflection. " Finally, 
"What is given to thought in this way by the `tensional' truth of poetry is the most 
primordial, most hidden dialectic -the dialectic that reigns between the experience of 
belonging as a whole and the power of distanciation that opens up the space of speculative 
thought. "48 
Metaphor, as Ricoeur describes it, is a short-lived event of discourse that 
enables and registers a dialectical movement from a literal meaning to another that is 
newly established. In the end, semantic dynamism is subordinated to the rule of the 
proper, to an economy of the same. Living metaphor eventually dies by being 
incorporated into what originally gave rise to it, by ceasing to be a novelty. The death 
or catastrophe of metaphor is not without gain, since it is what brings about the 
extension and deepening of our understanding of the world and of ourselves in it. The 
return of metaphor to the literal and its effacement in it all along presupposed a firm 
distinction between the two, if only to the extent they are inscribed as regulative 
concepts in the internal dialectic of meaning. However, Ricoeur's theory of metaphor 
for all its breadth, detail and vigour falls short of addressing the heart of the matter: 
4' Ibid., p. 302. 
48 Ibid., p. )1 ,. 
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what allows for the delineation of literal and metaphorical meaning in the first place 
and whether there is room for a nondialectical approach to metaphor. 
As will be argued in the next chapter, the dialectical conceptualisation of 
metaphor rests upon the same premises that formulate the oppositional and 
hierarchical pairing of Oikos and travel. The hermeneutics of metaphor and travel 
subdue to a logic of derivation and recuperation that necessarily presupposes an 
original, familiar and undivided point of departure, literalness or the house, which 
already limits and structures the conceptual space within which metaphor and travel 
move and operate. It is this logic that will be put to the test by the deconstructive 
challenge of the premises of metaphor. 
Jacques Derrida: Leaving Metaphor 
"Metaphor" is a term that often appears in Derrida's works. How does then 
such an enduring and persistent notion justify the title of this section, "Leaving 
Metaphor"? In "White Mythology" and elsewhere, Derrida criticises a classical 
concept of metaphor defined as the oppositional counterpart to that of literal or proper 
meaning. 49 His aim is to radically reinscribe these notions and explode their primary 
metaphysical partition. For Derrida, metaphor is neither just a deviation from a proper 
meaning, nor the creative force of language that opens up hidden yet already present 
potentialities. Such definitions necessarily imply the assumption of a rigorous 
demarcation between literal and metaphorical meaning. Derrida wants to explore the 
conditions of possibility of such a distinction, which is too problematic to be taken for 
granted. Proper meaning and metaphor are not understood as pregiven or separate 
values, but rather emerge as effects of the movement of meaning, which resists 
totalisation and division into clear-cut typologies. Accordingly, all oppositional pairs 
which correspond to the kernel distinction of proper and metaphor, like logos and 
muthos, philosophy and literature, fact and fiction begin to blur. Paul Ricoeur also 
puts into question such delimitations but only in order to reinstate in the end the 
authority and priority of proper meaning. Metaphor is, to him, a necessary detour 
submitted to the dialectical movement of the proper. This hierarchisation is precisely 
49 Derrida, Jacques, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy" in Margins of 
Philosophy, translated by Alan Bass, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982, The Retrait of 
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what Derrida puts in question not simply by reversing but disrupting both concepts of 
proper and metaphor. Metaphor as such withdraws and in withdrawing its effects 
become all the more pervasive. Metaphor or rather metaphoricity is generalised to the 
extent that it traverses all meaning as its irreducible condition. No proper meaning 
precedes it and no teleology governs it. This, however, does not amount to a reversal 
of the hierarchy of properness over metaphor. What is called metaphoricity or quasi- 
metaphor is an essential semantic structure that gives the condition of both proper and 
metaphorical meaning in the traditional sense. But it also gives the possibility of 
reinscribing them as irreducible effects or traces of a structure that, as we shall see, is 
broken and disseminated from the start. 
Before attempting to reconstruct the argument of "White Mythology", it is 
useful to consider some of Derrida's major notions related to the theme of metaphor. 
With respect to the aim of this chapter, it would be more helpful to consider these in 
relation to Ricoeur's theoretical premises, also with the purpose of establishing a 
context for the debate that took place between them. A good starting point would be 
the consideration of two notions inextricably related to that of metaphor: polysemy 
and dissemination. We saw that in Ricoeur, polysemy is a dialectical counterpart of 
metaphor, a structure which supports and enables the metaphorical process and which 
is, in turn, altered and reformulated by metaphor. Polysemy is an order that gathers 
together the multiplicity of meanings around a semantic kernel, resisting, in this way, 
absolute dissemination. Polysemy's function is that of establishing an economy of 
meaning regulated by the ideal of univocity and re-appropriation. This is why, despite 
being a description of semantic multiplicity and ambiguity, it necessarily implies a 
pregiven distinction between proper and metaphorical meaning. To this notion 
Derrida opposes that of dissemination. Dissemination points to the irreducible 
ambiguity of language, to the radical and essential undecidability of meaning that 
resists assimilation by and reduction to a fixed semantic order. Dissemination, 
however, does not purport the loss of meaning to absolute indeterminacy and 
confusion. Undecidability always implies the drive towards a decision, however, a 
decision which, in being constantly deferred and delayed, promises more meaning. 
What is at stake with dissemination is not the unbounded free play of meaning but a 
Metaphor" translated by Frieda Gardner, Biodun Iginla, Richard Madden, and William West, 
in Enclitic, vol. 2, no. 2. Fall 1978, University of Minnesota. 
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relative indeterminacy, which is nothing but determinability, 50 a certain non-identity 
of meaning, which does not preclude sameness altogether but rather challenges the 
idea of the primacy of a semantic core. Now, dissemination does not completely 
denounce polysemy but reinscribes it in a way that radically solicits its conceptual 
premises, that is, the values of the proper and metaphor. Dissemination is an 
irreducible polysemy, since it does not refer everything to a first term or an order of 
meaning, though, as will be shown, it is not without a certain structure. 
To be sure, the difference between Ricoeur and Derrida is not a matter of 
choice between absolute univocity and equivocity. Ricoeur evokes the regulative 
notion of polysemy in order to explain the diversity and multiplicity of the ways 
Being is said and at the same time to dispense with the danger of absolute dispersal. 
What he finally maintains is the idea of relative univocity. The dialectic of polysemy 
and metaphor becomes part of the mediation between a lost or estranged immediacy 
(the unreflective experience of belonging) and the projected unity of the horizon of 
meaning. Metaphor is a necessary detour from proper meaning always in view of re- 
appropriation, a journey that makes a profit out of its investment by reserving and 
interiorising everything, that creates a continuous and homogeneous space expanding 
towards the ever receding horizon. Derrida, far from taking the side of absolute 
equivocity (for meaning would not exist -and it certainly does- if it were not 
supported by a structure of sameness, that is, of idealising repetition), refers to 
semantic movement not as mediation between an origin and an end but as an 
unprecedented and irreducible structure, as a sheaf of forces and differences, that 
precisely resists dialecticising and appropriation. There might as well be a chance that 
the expenditure of meaning delivers unforeseeable effects that are beyond 
accountability and calculability, that identity cannot assimilate difference without a 
remainder, that the surplus of meaning produced by metaphor is all the more 
pervasive precisely where it is not intelligible. And these, according to Derrida, are 
not accidents befalling the course of language but rather pertain to its very condition 
of possibility. 
50 To sustain that meaning manifests a certain indeterminacy is not to uphold that it is not 
determined in the specific and singular instances it occurs. It is rather overdetermined and 
reduced to contextual explications, which, however, can always be subverted by its multiple 
interpretative potential. This is to say that meaning is always and necessarily determinable and 
this precisely constitutes its force of self-disruption and its structure of overflowing every 
particular instance and context. 
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For Ricoeur, language comes to reflect an experience prior to it, although 
experience already disposes a "lingual condition" (Sprachlichkeit) or else 
"expressibility". 51 This "lingual dimension" is, however, subordinated to the structure 
of experience that gives the ontological condition of language. There is language 
because there is something to be said in the first place. It is true that before one thinks 
or speaks one is already in the world. The primordial fact of belonging is not 
contested here. What is however questioned is a certain priority given by Ricoeur to 
experience with regard to what he calls the "lingual condition". One could relate the 
latter with what Derrida calls "writing" in order to refer to the signifying structures 
that precisely make experience possible. For Derrida, language and thought do not 
come to supplement or represent an immediate and unreflective experience of the 
world. Experience is not the a priori condition and origin of language and neither is 
language a mediation or modification of a lived-present and its unfolding and 
fulfilment in self-reflection. Experience, for Derrida, is always the experience of 
meaning. It has thus a phenomenological presupposition. Something must make itself 
manifest to someone for an experience to take place. The notion of experience has 
always implied the unity of a present: a self-present consciousness intending a present 
object or situation at a given moment. But experience is nothing outside meaning 
(outside signification) and, since the latter emerges from the interplay of differences, 
it constantly divides and defers everything it is associated with, the signifying 
intention, the intended object, the context, in short, everything that is supposed to 
confer on experience unity. In other words, experience is always the experience of 
difference or differance. However, differance from what? 
Before oppositions and hierarchies such as empirical/transcendental, 
sensible/intelligible, object/subject and all couples that organise metaphysical thought 
were formed, an "older" difference must have opened a space of structural 
possibilities that gave the condition for metaphysical reduction to oppositional 
thought, however, without being itself reduced to it: the space of d ferance. This 
space is the opening up of consciousness to the world, an unprecedented opening that 
constitutes them both, what structures the world as a world for consciousness. This 
pouring or movement of an "interior" (consciousness) towards an "exterior" (world) 
is not an event that once took place bringing together previously constituted entities. 
51 Ricoeur, Herr»c. 'nc'utic. s and the Human Sciences, p. 115. 
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Consciousness and the world are not posited one against the other engaging in a 
relation of passivity or activity. Before such a distinction becomes thinkable there 
must have been something like a more originary passivity that marks the advent of the 
other, "the opening of the first exteriority in general". And this again does not refer to 
an event but rather points to a structural law, to an unrepresentable and irretrievable 
"absolute past" that never was present as such. One cannot recall the first time one 
thought or said "I" or the first time something made sense. The impossibility of a first 
time, of the inauguration of identity, is what gives the very condition of signification 
as relation to the other, that is, as the trace of an "originary difference" before 
identity. For Derrida, everything begins with the trace, which is neither a thing nor a 
substance, which is nothing present in itself but still gives the paradoxical condition 
of meaning. 
Differance points to the essentially aporetic structure of language, which 
gives at once the possibility and impossibility of meaning, its double bind: the 
impossibility of an ever same, adequate, identical and fully present meaning and at 
the same time the possibility of meaning as a "weave of differences", a chain of 
traces with no unified origin or telos. What is referred to here is the movement of 
signification which, rather than the teleological unfolding of meaning, is a play of 
marks or traces, that is, of nonpresent elements that forbid meaning ever to gather and 
reserve itself in the immediacy and self-containment of a present instant. What comes 
to language, what lends itself to signification, never comes to it as such, as a whole. 
Signification emerges as a process of temporalisation (and spacing, as we shall see in 
the next chapter) which, rather than being a linear succession of present moments, a 
sequence of signs, is a movement that divides everything it involves in and of itself, 
since each of its elements is related to and marked by something other than itself, that 
is, the past and future elements within the infinite chain of traces. The trace is the 
form and structural necessity of meaning that lets everything signify (a thing, an idea, 
a subject) on the condition that it does not assemble itself in a present and available 
meaning. What comes together in the structure of the trace is not already constituted 
elements and, hence, differences. The trace, where the relationship with the other is 
marked, is rather the movement of production of difference, of differences that are 
not preceded by identity but perpetually defer it from coming together as such. The 
movement of meaning is reinscribed as the movement of differance, a structure of 
difference, deferral, and delay. 
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If meaning emerges out of a movement, in other words, from instability, 
mediacy, mediation, from the middle and the in-between, then movement must be its 
nonsimple, divided and multiple origin. That is to say, meaning has no origin, no pure 
and simple arche or absolute beginning. It has always already begun and begun as 
trace. What allows us then to have the idea of origin and of telos, if these never were? 
The movement of the trace where everything is at stake is not without a certain 
rhythm or structure. A linguistic sign, oral or written, must have a certain self-identity 
in order to be recognisable and repeatable. But this relative identity is not guaranteed 
by the unity of a signified, a semantic intention, a referent or the context of 
communication that the sign comes to represent or is attached to. A sign or mark must 
be always able to disengage itself from all these in order to be meaningful in other 
events of language. This capacity of having a signifying function that overflows any 
given context, that is, of signifying in an infinite number of contexts, divides the sign 
in and of itself and reinscribes it in a structure of self-effacement that is precisely the 
effect of its repeatability and iterability. Iterability always implies alterability. '' The 
mark or trace is repeated always as other, never itself as such. And this self-effacing 
in repetition is what makes it possible; it is its very condition of possibility. The 
structure of iterability is more manifest in the case of the written sign or mark, which 
by definition is instituted by its capacity of disengagement from its context of 
inscription. Derrida shows that this trait of the written sign is equally pertinent to all 
forms of signs. "Writing" is generalised as the condition for all signification beyond 
the narrow sense of inscription. The phonic sign thus becomes a grapheme, at once 
the condition of possibility and impossibility of identity: 
"Why is this identity paradoxically the division or dissociation of itself, which will 
make of this phonic sign a grapheme? Because this unity of the signifying form only 
constitutes itself by virtue of its iterability, by the possibility of its being repeated in the 
absence not only of its `referent, ' which is self-evident, but in the absence of a determinate 
signified or of the intention of actual signification, as well as of all intention of present 
communication. This structural possibility of being weaned from the referent or from the 
signified (hence from communication and from its context) seems to me to make every mark, 
included those which are oral, a grapheme in general; which is to say, as we have seen, the 
nonpresent remainder [restance] of a differential mark cut off from its putative 'production' 
or origin. And I shall even extend this law to all `experience' in general if it is conceded that 
there is no experience consisting of pure presence but only of chains of differential marks. "53 
52 As Derrida points out fiter probably comes from itara, which means other in Sanskrit. 
"Signature Event Context", translated by Alan Bass, in Limited Inc. Evanston, IL, 
Northwestern University Press, 1988, p. 7. 
53 Ibid., p. 10. 
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The structural law of iterability is what gives meaning its ideal dimension. 
Linguistic elements must have at least some degree of ideality in order to be 
repeatable and recognisable. However, this ideality is not at the origin of meaning as 
a transcendental idea or principle, as a presence of any kind (in the form of 
consciousness or not). It is rather the effect of idealisation, a certain residue of 
sameness in, through, and in view of repetition and alteration. Moreover this effect of 
sameness is what gives the condition for every form of ideality: presence, essence, 
truth, origin, telos, the transcendental, the proper and so forth and everything that is 
thought in relation and opposition to them. Thus the idea of origin is something added 
to meaning post factum, a prosthesis. No retrospection or genealogy can ever reach 
and reconstitute what was always already a trace. The thought of the trace, however, 
does not amount to a relativism, scepticism or nihilism. Derrida does not set out to 
undo the concept of truth or ideality, to leave them behind for better or worse. What 
he challenges is the idea of purity and unity. 54 Iterability is the very condition of 
idealisation, without which there would be no meaning. But iterability is at once 
"identificatory" and "altering". 55 If it were not so there would be no history. It is what 
creates identity and difference; it broaches and breaches. The concepts of iterability 
and idealisation emerge as "conceptualisations" of a structural law, which cannot 
assemble or present itself as such but lies as the general condition of every singular 
event of meaning. And this is a positive condition, "the promise at the origin of 
history". It enables one to think generality and singularity, concept and event at once. 
Now Ricoeur clearly misses the mark when he remarks that Derrida holds 
that "writing has a root distinct from speech and that this foundation has been 
misunderstood due to our having paid excessive attention to speech, its voice, its 
logos", thus overlooking "the groundings of both modes of the actualisation of 
54 "The concept of iterability itself, like all concepts that form or deform themselves in its 
wake, is an ideal concept, to be sure, but also the concept that marks the essential and ideal 
limit of all pure idealisation, the ideal concept of the limit of all idealisation, and not the 
concept of nonideality. " Derrida, Limited Inc, p. 119. 
55 "The concept of iterability is this singular concept that renders possible the silhouette of 
ideality, and hence of the concept, and hence of all distinction, of all conceptual opposition. 
But it is also the concept that, at the same time, with the same stroke marks the limit of 
idealisation and of conceptualisation: `concept' or quasi-concept of concept in its 
conceptualisable relation to the nonconcept. " Ibid. Iterability is the concept of concept 
formation and also of the impurity of the concept. Thus, itself only to an extent 
conceptualisable, is a quasi-concept signifying the impossibility of complete and adequate 
conceptual isation. 
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discourse in the dialectical constitution of discourse. "56 "Writing", which Derrida 
uses not in the conventional but in a generalised sense, is neither a foundation nor is it 
opposed to speech. It precisely challenges the notion of foundation and oppositional 
thinking. Although Ricoeur refers to writing as the paradigm of distanciation and as 
the condition for the projection of a "world" of new possibilities, 57 he stays close to 
the tradition that privileges speech over writing, what Derrida calls logocentrism, and 
renounces the latter as the dangerous and immobilising inscription of oral discourse. 
To be sure, Ricoeur does not simplify the relation of discourse to writing as a mere 
material fixation. To his mind, "writing" as the figuration of speech, a technique that 
forms, shapes, and deforms, has its own particular traits. But they are conditioned by 
and derived from the primary dialectic of event and meaning already at work in the 
speech situation. What is fixed in writing, for Ricoeur, is the meaning of a speech 
event, or else the "intentional exteriorisation", which can be described according to 
the dialectical traits of discourse. Meaning is what survives the event of discourse but 
still bears grammatical markers that point to the communicational situation. What is 
communicable here is the synthetic structure of discourse. Now, communicative 
discourse, according to Jakobson's model, to which Ricoeur subscribes, presupposes 
a signifying intention on the part of the addresser, the recognition of the latter by the 
addressee, a shared code, a given context, a message, and a medium of 
communication. The collaboration of all these "factors" with the end of 
communication, that is, an intersubjective exchange, is what is called by Austin "total 
speech act". Thus discourse is realised as a dialogic event. Hermeneutics begins when 
dialogue ends, when the animating intention of communication is no longer present 
and understanding assumes the task of overcoming distance and estrangement. This 
task, which is imposed by writing, is necessarily pursued within a horizon of 
communication and aims at the reactivation of the text in a quasi-dialogical event, 
which is not the reanimation of a writer's intention by means of empathy, but the 
realisation of the text as a discursive event. The "intentional exteriorisation" (the 
intention to mean is always an exteriorisation), which could also be the interpretive 
labour of the reader, is the organising centre of discourse. It is also what reduces the 
56 Ricoeur. Interpretation Theory, p. 26. 
57 "Thanks to writing, man and only man has a world and not a situation. " Ibid., p. 36. 
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danger of ambiguity by initiating the screening function of the context. "The 
contextual is the dialogical". 'g 
Although Ricoeur at various instances refers to the generalisable traits of 
writing -which is after all the paradigm of distanciation and what makes explicit the 
essential characteristics of oral discourse- foreshadowing, in a way, the possibility of 
a further complication of its relation to speech, 59 he maintains the speech event as the 
ideal and regulatory model of all communication. Now, Derrida does not disclaim the 
theories of discourse and communication but is more attentive to the conceptual 
premises that these are constructed upon. What he objects to by evoking the 
generalisable traits of writing, is the organisation of the discursive event around the 
themes of presence and telos (presence of intention, of sense and referent, of unified 
and unifying context and horizon) that seems to disregard the very condition for the 
constitution of meaning and for the emergence of the event itself. 60 Iterability, by 
virtue of its differential structure, always and necessarily implies from the inception 
of meaning and even before the occurrence of the event (as its structural possibility, 
what is called 61) that the signifying intention (vouloir-dire) is not at the 
centre of discourse but is already divided and displaced. Intentionality, however, is 
58 Ibid., p. 17. 
59 "This affinity [between writing and the specific codes which generate the works of 
discourse] is so close that we might be tempted to say that even oral expressions of poetic or 
narrative compositions rely on processes equivalent to writing. The memorisation of epic 
poems, lyrical songs, parables and proverbs, and their ritual recitation tend to fix and even to 
freeze the form of the work in such a way that memory appears as the support of an 
inscription similar to that provided by external marks. In this extended sense of inscription, 
writing and the production of works of discourse according to the rules of literary composition 
tend to coincide without being identical processes. " (my italics) Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
60 Derrida sums up the "nuclear" traits of writing: "I) the break with the horizon of 
communication as communication of consciousnesses or of presences and as linguistical or 
semantic transport of the desire to mean what one says [vouloir-dire]; 2) the disengagement of 
all writing from the semantic or hermeneutic horizons which, inasmuch as they are horizons of 
meaning, are riven [crever] by writing; 3) the necessity of disengaging from the concept of 
polysemics, what I have elsewhere called dissemination, which is also the concept of writing; 
4) the disqualification or the limiting of the concept of context, whether `real' or 'linguistic, ' 
inasmuch as its rigorous theoretical determination as well as its empirical saturation is 
rendered impossible or insufficient by writing -1 would like to demonstrate that the traits that 
can be recognised in the classical, narrowly defined concept of writing, are generalisable. 
They are valid not only for all orders of `signs' and for all languages in general but moreover, 
beyond semio-linguistic communication, for the entire field of what philosophy would call 
experience, even the experience of being: the above-mentioned 'presence. ' " Limited Inc, pp. 
8-9. 
61 "What makes the (eventual) possibility possible is what makes it happen even before it 
happens as an actual event (in the standard sense) or what prevents such an event from ever 
entirely, fully taking place (in the standard sense). " Ibid., p. 57. 
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not an absent category from Derrida's notion of writing, something he has been 
charged with. 62 Iterability is not the annulment of intention but, on the contrary, its 
(paradoxical) condition of possibility: 
"intention or attention, directed towards something iterable which in turn determines 
it as being iterable, will strive or tend in vain to actualise or fulfil itself, for it cannot, by virtue 
of its very structure, ever achieve this goal. In no case will it be fulfilled, actualised, totally 
present to its object and to itself. It is divided and deported in advance, by its iterability, 
towards others, removed [ecartee] in advance from itself. This re-move makes its movement 
possible. Which is another way of saying that if this remove is its condition of possibility, it is 
not an eventuality, something that befalls it here and there, by accident. Intention is a priori (at 
once) differante: differing and deferring, in its inception. "63 
Ricoeur himself speaks of the impossibility of "complete mediation" but 
reduces it to the dialecticisable and intelligible surplus of meaning. His theory of 
interaction is a dialectic of identity and difference premised on the reducibility of the 
latter to the former. Distanciation might be a positive condition for understanding but 
it is, however, a condition that in every case, if only provisionally, one has to 
overcome. It has to be clear that Derrida does not privilege difference over identity 
but speaks of the nondialectical "symploke" of the two. The chain of differences from 
which meaning arises would not signify if it did not imply a certain economy that by 
definition involves sameness. Moreover, differance does not signify merely a play of 
differences of the semiological order, as Ricoeur seems to think. 64 The "originary" 
difference or trace, or differance that makes all differences (semiological, semantic 
and so on) possible is that between consciousness and the world, the opening of the 
space within which everything comes to be inscribed as meaning, before and outside 
which nothing is. "The trace must be thought before the entity. "65 Hence, the 
ontological presupposition which Ricoeur assumes with regard to language (i. e., the 
priority of experience) is a derivative effect of differance ("derivative" here, however, 
has neither a causal nor a temporal sense; differance is structurally "older" than the 
entity as its condition of signification). That everything begins with the trace by no 
means suggests that there are actually no entities or beings outside the differential 
marks of writing. Differance refers to the structural presuppositions as well as to the 
predicament of our relation with the world (a sort of nonrelation too, for it constitutes 
62 See John R. Searle's "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida", Glyph 2,1977, 
which is a response to Derrida's criticism of Austin in "Signature Event Context". 
6; Derrida, Limited Inc, p. 56. 
64 The deconstruction of the concept of the sign is at the centre of Derrida's critique of 
logocentrism. The first part of Of Grammatology contains an extensive critique of the concept 
of the "sign", which is at the heart of metaphysics. 
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the relata in constituting itself), to what makes the world as we understand it 
possible. The thought that we cannot have a direct and transparent relation with 
things is very old. Things, entities cannot be fully present as such in consciousness. 
What we can have are "representations" (let us use this word here provisionally and 
in quotation marks) of them and not the thing itself. Now, differance does not suggest 
that consciousness passively and inadequately receives imprints of the world. That 
would be an empiricism that would reduce meaning to factuality. Neither does it 
suggest that consciousness invests the world with meaning, being its transcendental 
origin. The distinction between factual and ideal, or empirical and transcendental, 
emerges as an effect of the historical movement of differance, which involves both 
ideality and factuality. A thing cannot appear as such to consciousness in the mode of 
disclosure. Before a certain identity is formed (idealisation) there have to be repetitive 
inscriptions (element of factuality), which in turn would not be possible without the 
identificatory (and altering) operation of iterability. Through this movement of 
signification sense (that is, both the signifying intention and the sensory) is being 
divided in and of itself in constituting itself. 
Let us now see what the foregoing implies for the concept of metaphor. We 
can begin by saying that the differing and deferring (and also idealising) movement of 
differance is synonymous with the movement of metaphor. However, such a 
proposition necessitates and, of course, signals a deconstructive thinking of metaphor 
and of the inextricably related concept of proper meaning. To avoid confusion we 
first have to make "confusion" our theme and speak of the myth of the "proper 
name", the myth of Babel. 66 Babel is a name (of God, of a city, a tower and a story) 
and a narration. In a single stroke, God proclaiming His name "YHWH" or "Bavel", 
which in Hebrew sounds "confusedly" like the word "confusion, " it makes the proper 
name possible and impossible at once. The "proper name" is the reference of a pure 
signifier to a single being; it must, therefore, be unique and irreplaceable. It must 
narre a thing and narre it properly letting it fully signify in all its plenitude and 
radiance. But as soon as there is more than one proper name and thus distinction, as 
65 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 47. 
66 Babel, "telling at least of the inadequation of one tongue to another, of one place in the 
encyclopedia to another, of language to itself and to meaning, and so forth, it also tells of the 
need for figuration, for myth, for tropes, for twists and turns, for translation inadequate to 
compensate for that which multiplicity denies us. " Derrida, Jacques, "Des Tours de Babel", 
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soon as the proper name receives determinations and attributes, it is drawn into the 
differential drift of language. Hence, it becomes impure and improper, impossible as 
such. However, Derrida asks, what would be a language without proper names, 
without the possibility of nomination and appellation? 
Language presupposes and at the same time renders "proper names" 
impossible. They belong without actually belonging to it. Let us try to be clearer. As 
we speak I want to make myself understood (the "I" is no less problematic than the 
"we", insofar as it implies an intentionality present to itself and outside the 
differential marks of language) and also to understand. In other words, to create a 
common idiom with my interlocutor. Although I acknowledge that my language is 
singular and idiomatic (as it must also be general and communicable), that there can 
be no transparent communication and that misunderstanding is always and essentially 
possible, I necessarily presuppose that a thing like a common idiom should exist. 
Otherwise, I would not open my mouth. Even though, there is no pure idiom that 
would enable immediacy and transparency in communication, the possibility of an 
ideal communicative situation is presupposed. Language is in/on the condition of the 
promise of immediacy and purity, even if such a thing is impossible. 67 
Likewise, the pure signifier of a unique signified and referent, that is, the 
proper name, is still promised (notwithstanding that this promise at times delivers the 
most dangerous and colonising effects). It has to be promised for there to be a 
language, though it can never belong to language as such. It belongs to it on the 
condition that it is always almost translated into language by becoming a common 
noun, by being interpreted by its semantic equivalent and by assuming conceptual 
generality. 68 One should remember that the proper name of God in the myth of Babel 
already signifies "confusion". It is already a common noun. 69 That is to say, there is 
translated by Joseph F. Graham, in Difference in Translation, edited by Joseph F. Graham, 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985, p. 165. 
67 "it is not possible to speak outside this promise that gives a language, the uniqueness of the 
idiom, but only by promising to give it. " Derrida, Jacques, Monolinguism of the Other or The 
Prosthesis of Origin, translated by Patrick Mensah, Stanford, California, Stanford University 
Press, 1998, pp. 66-68. 
68 Derrida, "Des Tours de Babel", p. 172. 
69 That the proper name of God becomes a common noun is not an argument for the non- 
existence of God. It rather means that there can be no ideality outside language that the latter 
in turn would come to represent and that the name of God -and accordingly all proof of His 
existence, for "God, Himself, should certainly exist"- is already drawn "into a graphematic 
drift [derive] that excludes (for instance) any decision as to whether God is more than the 
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no (original or translatable) proper name and no noun (translation) but rather the 
process of the becoming-noun-of-the-proper-name. Insofar as the noun is considered 
a generalisation or abstraction of the proper name (the presumed unity of a singular 
and unique signifier-signified that does not even necessitate language in order to 
signify, that is on the condition of its self-erasure before the thing itself), it has no 
traceable or recoverable origin, since, what is posited as its origin, that is, the proper 
name, is a priori impossible due to its enmeshing in the graphematic drift of 
language. What endures is the function or promise of the proper name as the arche 
and telos of language. The possibility of the common noun rests upon the condition of 
translatability from a singular and self-transparent idiom to a general one. But again 
what endures is the condition or imperative of translatability and not the event of a 
translation that once took place, for its posited source idiom never was; it never 
existed before generality. But generality also points to the possibility of a universal 
idiom, of the reduction by means of translation to a universal singularity. Translation 
in its metaphysical designation presupposes the existence of a transcendental 
signified, that is, an independent sense that can detach itself from its phonetic element 
and conditions of inscription and that can thus transcend the limits of a single idiom. 
Translation, to be sure, can never achieve adequacy and full correspondence of 
meanings but it is still on the condition of this (im)possibility. 7° Since universal 
singularity is impossible, even though it is still pointed to, what finally endures is the 
movement of the becoming-noun-of-the-proper-name (a movement without origin or 
name of God, whether the `name of God' refers to God or to the name of God, whether it 
signifies `normally' or `cites, ' etc., God being here, qua writing. " It speaks of the relation of 
the name and of reference to writing, which is not opposed to God or to existence in general; it 
is "outside the alternative of existence and non-existence. " Derrida, Limited Inc, pp. 82-83. 
70 We are here referring to the double bind of translation, which gives at once its paradoxical 
condition of possibility and impossibility. The classical philosopheme of translation posits the 
imperative and possibility of translatability, that is, the possibility of adequacy between 
linguistic idioms. If it were not so, translation would be unthinkable. However, its general 
aporetic structure, which exceeds the restricted concept of translation, also posits the 
prohibition of a complete and adequate translation, and thus gives the imperative of infinite 
translation, because if adequate translation were possible this would put an end to the 
signifying movement and differential structure of language that would then achieve 
transparency. The end of translation, both in the sense of teleology and prohibition, would 
presuppose an originary or source idiom, that is, an absolute and recoverable source of 
meaning, to which translation would point back. But since such an idiom never existed, since 
there are only languages and not a language (this is to say that the concept of a language 
emerges out of the plurality of languages and, more importantly, out of their translatability). 
what comes structurally first is not the source idiom but paradoxically translatability, the 
impossible promise of a language out of the multiplicity of target idioms. Insofar as there is no 
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telos), that is, translation as an infinite task. To return to the myth of Babel, when 
God "imposes and opposes" his name to the people of Shem, he inflicts dispersal and 
the imperative for perpetual translation. And in a stroke he makes translation both a 
necessary and impossible task, a "necessity as impossibility". " There can be no end 
to translation as there is no original translation of something like a first and originary 
language, a proper idiom to be adequately rendered. The story of Babel, to which 
Derrida comes back again and again, does not recount an inaugural event. It is a myth 
about the origin of language as dispersal (there are always already languages before a 
language becomes thinkable) that lets the silhouette of an aporetic law flicker: the 
untranslatable translatability of the proper name. 
So if the proper name can be part of language only through its enmeshing in 
the differential chain, one can say that there is no proper name but only metaphors. 
Accordingly, metaphor is to be inscribed anew as it is no longer understood as a 
single tropic force overtaking the proper. This gesture can take effect through a 
reconsideration of the philosophical concept of metaphor and the place it holds in 
philosophical discourse. The problematic thus must be dealt with on the level of its 
essential and conceptual premises. Derrida in "White Mythology" proposes a 
deconstructive critique of the classical concept of metaphor and of the prominent 
philosophical tradition that reduces philosophical concepts to a genealogy of 
metaphors. His departs from all theories, Ricoeur's is no exception, which construct 
metaphorics on ready-made metaphysical oppositions. Derrida exposes the frailness 
and the fundamental impossibility of such a project, i. e., the construction of a 
metaphorics which would exhaustively define metaphor. Derrida poses straight away 
absolute source or target idiom but only idioms, which are both translatable and untranslatable 
(in an absolute sense), translation becomes an impossibility qua necessity. 
71 "]n seeking to `make a name for themselves, ' to found at the same time a universal tongue 
and a unique genealogy, the Semites want to bring the world to reason, and this reason can 
signify simultaneously a colonial violence (since they would thus universalise their idiom) and 
a peaceful transparency of the human community. Inversely, when God imposes and opposes 
his name, he ruptures the rational transparency but interrupts also the colonial violence or the 
linguistic imperialism. He destines them to translation, he subjects them to the law of 
translation both necessary and impossible; in a stroke with his translatable-untranslatable 
name he delivers a universal reason (it will no longer be subject to the rule of a particular 
nation), but he simultaneously limits its very universality: forbidden transparency, impossible 
univocity. Translation becomes law, duty and debt, but the debt one can no longer discharge. 
Such insolvency is found marked in the very name of Babel: which at once translates and does 
not translate itself, belongs without belonging to a language and indebts itself to itself for an 
insolvent debt, to itself as if other. Such would be the Babelian performance. " Derrida, "Des 
Tours de Babel", pp. 174-175. 
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the problematic and asks to what extent and in what form is metaphor implicated in 
the text of philosophy. He will establish that metaphor involves the "usage of 
philosophical language in its entirety, nothing less than the usage of so-called natural 
language in philosophical discourse, that is, the usage of natural language as 
philosophical language"72. The term usage here has a double delineation which, 
Derrida in order to better demonstrate, substitutes with the term usure, which bears 
both the meanings of wearing out, using up, loss, and of usury, reserving, profit. 
Metaphor is always caught in this juncture. Usure constitutes the very history and 
structure of the philosophical metaphor. Metaphor traditionally balances itself 
between the idea of profit and loss of meaning. It signals the loss of properness but at 
the same time an interest in re-appropriation. However, Derrida's notion of usure 
does not signify gradual wearing out or accumulation but the loss of proper meaning 
as origin and telos of language. Everything thereby signifies in "relation to this loss of 
meaning", a relation that engenders traces of meaning or, if one is allowed to say, 
effects of nonmeaning. 
Derrida's critique of the classical concept of metaphor illustrates the limits of 
that philosophical tradition that designates philosophical discourse as a trajectory of 
"tropic energy. " This tradition, which is called artistic, attempts to reveal the rhetoric 
of philosophical discourse in view of recovering a "natural" language unaffected by 
tropological deviation. For instance, Nietzsche asks: 
"What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymics, anthropomorphisms: 
in short, a sum of human relations which became poetically and rhetorically intensified, 
metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage, seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; 
truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions; worn out metaphors 
which have become powerless to affect the senses, coins which have their obverse effaced and 
now are no longer of account as coins but merely as metal. "73 
This quotation recapitulates the basic premises of metaphorology. 
Accordingly, philosophy not only consists of metaphors that have become worn out 
and distant from their sensory origin, but has forgotten its own tropological 
formation. The classical example of the coin of which the exergue74 is effaced and, 
hence, the value inestimable, corresponds to the gradual erosion of the primary, 
"natural" meaning and its metaphorical elevation to an abstract, spiritual level. 
'2 Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy", p. 209. 
Nietzsche. Friedrich, quoted in "White Mythology", p. 217. 
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According to the philosophical tradition under consideration, the primary, "true", 
literal meaning of a philosophical concept can be retrieved through the practice of 
etymologism. This project articulates the longing of metaphysics for an arche, the 
origin of meaning, 75 which is understood as a natural language attached to physical, 
sensible objects. So metaphor here maintains a "continuist presupposition, " since it 
involves a gradual wearing away, and a "symbolist stand, " since its genealogy leads 
back to the symbol, which still maintains a relation of resemblance and natural 
affinity to the physical object. 76 
So behind and under philosophical logos lies the secret narrative of metaphor, 
the myth of its own creation. Derrida sums up: 
"Metaphysics -the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the 
West: the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own logos, that 
is the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form of that he must still wish to call Reason, " 
and further on, 
"White mythology-metaphysics has erased within itself the fabulous scene that has 
produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an 
invisible design covered over in the palimpsest. "" 
Derrida proceeds to a critique of the metaphorology of philosophy, that is, the 
general taxonomy of philosophical metaphors, and shows its structural impossibility. 
He contends that the tropological figuration of philosophical logos is not something 
that befalls a pure and originary language that ought to be reinstated but it is rather 
already inscribed in the very possibility of philosophy. Metaphor belongs to the 
structuration of philosophical discourse, in fact of any discourse. Any attempt to 
74 Exergue, from the Greek ex-ergon, means literally "outside the work" and is used in the 
sense of the inscription on the surface of coins as well as of epigraph. Exergue is also the title 
of the first part of "White Mythology". 
75 It must be said that Nietzsche on whom we drew for illustrative purposes differentiates 
himself on this point. Nietzsche discloses the tropological construction of philosophy but 
leaves no room for metaphysical nostalgia. 
76 It is useful to recall here the distinction between the concept of the "sign" and that of the 
"symbol". Whereas the symbol functions as a tripartite and natural unity of the thing-image- 
idea, the sign is the unity of a signified and a signifier that has broken free from the referent; it 
is instituted, unmotivated and arbitrary. Saussure excludes the symbol from the domain of 
semiology. The sign can thus be defined as a symbol which has become unmotivated. 
Derrida's notion of the trace disrupts the unity of signifier/signified. There is not prior symbol 
or sign that then became unmotivated but only a process of becoming that allowed these to 
signify as effects of the trace: "Without referring back to a `nature', the immotivation of the 
trace has always become. In fact, there is no unmotivated trace: the trace is indefinitely its 
own becoming-unmotivated. In Saussurian language, what Saussure does not say would have 
to be said: there is neither symbol nor sign but a becoming-sign of the symbol. " Derrida, Of 
Grammatology, p. 47. 
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define the philosophical field by means of the concept of metaphor would be doomed 
to failure as it would extract the definition from that which it aims at defining. As 
Derrida maintains, metaphor remains a classical philosopheme, a metaphysical 
concept: 
"Metaphor has been issued from a network of philosophemes which themselves 
correspond to tropes or to figures, and these philosophemes are contemporaneous to or in 
systematic solidarity with these tropes or figures. "78 
So the philosophical concept of metaphor cannot define or master that from 
which it is engendered. Each time metaphor is taken up to define the totality of the 
philosophical field, it cannot help but carry with it a circuit of philosophemes, with 
which it is essentially associated. Furthermore, being extracted from the very field it 
aims at defining, the concept of metaphor would deprive it of at least one of its 
concepts, that of metaphor. The field would contain a metaphor less. On the other 
hand, the definition of the philosophical field would also include a metaphor more, 
which would not be accounted for: the metaphor that produced the very concept of 
metaphor, since like all philosophemes metaphor should be metaphorically 
constituted. Plus de metaphore: "more metaphor" and "no more metaphor". The 
"extra turn of speech" becomes the "missing turn of speech" and the philosophical 
field is never saturated. 79 
According to Derrida, a project of metaphorics would involve a 
"philosophical rhetoric in the service of an autonomous theory constituted before and 
outside its own language, manipulating its tropes like tools. "80 So metaphorics would 
be a derivative discourse borrowing its conceptual categories from philosophy (thus 
being too philosophical and too rhetorical to start with) and constituted on the 
assumption that the latter can be separated from and discharged of its tropic 
figuration. This separation and hierarchy is precisely what Derrida puts into question. 
As he points out, philosophical concepts like theoria, eidos, logos, arche, which are 
considered primary and foundational philosophemes, are themselves " `archaic' 
tropes, " metaphors, 81 which thereby disclaim any possibility of a metaphor-free 
philosophical discourse or rhetorics. What has been imagined and longed for by 
" Derrida, `White Mythology", p. 213. 
78 Ibid., p. 219. 
79 Ibid., p. 220. 
80 Ibid., p. 224. 
81 For example, theoria and eidos derive from the Greek verb oran which means to see, and 
are, therefore, optic metaphors. 
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metaphysics as a "natural" language is already charged with metaphor. The assumed 
"sensuous kernel" of metaphor, that is, its original attachment to the natural object, 
appears to be determined by the very philosophical concepts or metaphors that it is 
supposed to have engendered. 82 
Hegelian dialectics, in Derrida's view, best describes metaphor as the 
process of elevation from the sensuous to the spiritual, as the Aufhebung (or releve, to 
use Derrida's translation of the Hegelian notion) from a "proper sensory meaning" to 
a "proper spiritual meaning. "83 Metaphor in dialectical terms is the movement of 
idealisation through which fundamental metaphysical oppositions such as 
nature/spirit, nature/history, nature/culture, in short, nature and its others come to be 
formed and thought of. It is the formal structure of the transposition from the sensory 
to the nonsensory. 84 Nonetheless, before such transposition puts "smoothly" things on 
track, one has to consider that both sense as meaning and the senses have a common 
root (sensus, Sinn) and structural possibility that resists what dialectical thinking 
presupposes: a separation into the domains of the physical and the non-physical. As 
Derrida puts it, "before utilising a dialectical concept of metaphor, one must examine 
the double turn which opened metaphor and dialectics, permitting to be called sense 
"85 that which should be foreign to the senses. 
Derrida's critique of the concept of metaphor breaks away from the tradition 
of metaphorology, which tries to track down the history of philosophical logos as a 
trajectory of "`tropic' movements" aiming at the recovery of a first proper sense and 
82As Derrida points out, a regression to the "sensory origin" of metaphor and, consequently, of 
the philosophical concept, would demand a classification of metaphor according to the 
"mythology of the four elements" and also to the "regions of sensibility. " Moreover, it would 
require a rigorous definition of the "a priori forms of space and time" and an exhaustive 
delineation of the empirical field. And still such metaphorics would tend to take for granted 
the metaphysical opposition between the transcendental and the empirical. In other words, 
such a project could not advance without having resolved fundamental philosophical 
questions, which constitute philosophy itself. Ibid., pp. 226-228. 
83 Derrida, "White Mythology", p. 226. 
84 The concept of metaphor thus defined is drawn into the structure of the Aufhebung, which is 
essentially a representational one. Metaphor as the movement of idealisation within the 
economy of the proper pertains to a representational logic formalised in the structure of the 
"already-not-yet", which marks a limit to be transcended. The notion of representation carries 
the metaphysical burden of rendering (present) and repeating (perhaps in effigy) by sign or 
symbol what is no longer present. It is a detour in view of re-appropriation, that is, in view of 
a return to presence. Metaphor in these terms would be the image of an absent thing 
interiorised as meaning. It is the image before the thing itself, "before" here used in both 
spatial and temporal terms. See Jacques Derrida's "Sending: On Representation", translated 
by Peter and Mary Ann Ca\\ s. in Social Research, 49, no2, Summer 1982. 
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presupposing "that the sense aimed at through these figures is an essence rigorously 
independent of that which transports it. " And by the same gesture he disturbs the 
totality of the philosophical field as he challenges what "is an already philosophical 
thesis, one might even say philosophy's unique thesis, the thesis which constitutes the 
concept of metaphor, the opposition of the proper and the nonproper, of essence and 
accident, of intuition and discourse, of thought and language, of the intelligible and 
the sensible. "86 Philosophy cannot support a project of metaphorics with 
nonmetaphorical conceptual tools. Every undertaking to define philosophical logos 
from the standpoint of metaphor would be charged with too much metaphor. The 
structural impossibility to account for the metaphorical constitution of the 
philosophical field has vast implications for the concept of the proper, in fact, for the 
concept of the philosophical concept itself. If the concept of metaphor is 
metaphorically generated, in other words, if the concept of metaphor is itself a 
metaphor, then it cannot possess a proper meaning in the rigorous, classical sense that 
would qualify it as a concept. Thus, as the properness of metaphor is lost so is the 
properness of its metaphysical counterpart. 
So the thesis of "White Mythology" has been established: Metaphor (i. e., the 
concept) can have no control over the text of philosophy, even though, it (i. e., 
metaphoricity) thoroughly traverses it. There can be neither independent theory that 
would define philosophy on the grounds of metaphor nor a metaphilosophy not bound 
to the resources of philosophy, which in turn cannot give a full account of the totality 
of its field using one of its philosophemes. Now, if philosophy (as well as all 
discourse) is metaphorical in an irreducible way, then what does this leave us with? 
With too little and too much at once, since any concept from now on will signify less 
(as properness is lost) and more (through metaphor's endless multiplication). 
In "White Mythology" Derrida reads Aristotle, Fontanier, Du Marsais, 
Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bachelard and others but warns against the assimilation 
of philosophical texts to "a homogeneous continuum", while underlining at the same 
time the importance of "attending to such of the most durable constrains which have 
been exercised on the basis of a very long systematic chain. "g' Overlooking these 
85 Derrida, "White Mythology", p. 228. 
86 Ibid., p. 229. 
87 It has to be clear here that deconstruction is neither a self-proclaimed theory nor a polemical 
attitude setting out to undo the great texts of metaphysics, for it would be nothing outside 
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sequences, their limits and functions, would risk "taking the most derivative effects 
for the original characteristics of a historical subset. "88 Metaphor is referred back to 
its first theoretical designation by Aristotle, which laid out its basic premises and put 
later theories on a systematic and historical track: "Metaphor consists in giving a 
thing a name that belongs to something else. " The name or noun is recognised by 
Aristotle as the linguistic entity that governs and best defines the operation of 
metaphor. This is so because the noun more than the other parts of lexis is an 
independent semantic unity. "What is proper to nouns is to signify something. "89 
Metaphor occupies an important place in "the great immobile chain of 
Aristotelian ontology" ranked with the values of truth, logos, mimesis, name. 
Metaphor in Aristotle must be comprehended as part of a wider program: the analogy 
of Being. The significance of metaphor in this project becomes obvious when one 
recalls Aristotle's definition. The fourth and most important type in his typology is 
the one made on the grounds of analogy (e kata to analogon). Analogy is the par 
excellence metaphor. Metaphor makes manifest the analogies and similarities that 
hold together the chain of beings. Thus metaphor assumes the function of inquiring 
into the nature of things, of telling the truth. However, it does so in an intermediate 
way by participating in mimesis. Mimesis says nature otherwise; it is its double since 
nature reveals itself in mimesis and in repetition. For Aristotle it is speech, a property 
of human nature, that is more prone to imitate. " Human beings repeat nature in 
them. Deconstruction involves the close reading of texts, the exposition of their internal 
arrangement and also their relocation in the long sequence of metaphysics. Without 
disclaiming historical concerns and configurations, it ventures to bring out the enduring 
structures (both systematic and historical) that hold these texts together under the aegis of 
metaphysics and that precisely make its history (with all its mutations and disruptions) 
possible. This is why deconstructive reading attends to both structure and context without 
reducing the one to the other. Geoffrey Bennington in his book Jacques Derrida referring to 
the argumentative structure of "White Mythology, " which in his view has "not been read 
philosophically enough, " remarks: "This structure, whereby a law deduced a priori, and which 
has every appearance of being a thesis (there is nothing outside the text, the proper name is 
not proper, at the beginning is repetition, the thing itself always escapes, etc. ), is surrounded 
by long `historical' readings, is not peculiar to this essay, but constitutes the movement of 
deconstruction itself: the relation between `thesis' and `reading' does not answer to a model of 
illustration or exemplification [... ]-but our own reading, which began with a representation of 
apparent theses, will itself have to escape this movement and incline increasingly toward the 
historical. " Bennington, Geoffrey and Derrida, Jacques, Jacques Derrida, The University of 
Chicago Press, London, 1993, p. 125. 
88 Derrida, "White Mythology", p. 230. 
89 Ibid., p. 237. 
90 "In this sense, mimesis is therefore a `natural' movement. This naturality is reduced and 
restricted to man's speech by Aristotle. But rather than a reduction, this constitutive gesture of 
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imitation and by perceiving resemblance, that is, by mastering metaphor, achieve 
insights into the nature of beings. Nevertheless, metaphor is relegated to an ancillary 
status as it only provides an indirect route to truth. It is there where things can always 
go wrong. 
Metaphor marks a departure to an uncertain destination. As Derrida points 
out, metaphor "opens the wandering of the semantic", 91 of which the end is never 
secured. The proper name by definition submits to a teleology of manifesting the 
thing itself in its truth. It fulfils its destiny by erasing itself before the presence of the 
thing, of a plenitude which defies representation. However, the noun is always in 
language and always already in metaphor since it exists "only at the stage when 
meaning has appeared, but when truth still might be missed, when the thing does not 
yet manifest itself in act in the truth. This is the moment of possible meaning as the 
possibility of non-truth. "92 This point is crucial for all theories that designate 
metaphor as a deviation from the proper taking for granted the priority of the latter 
over the former and considering the proper name as "the nonmetaphorical prime 
mover of metaphor. "93 
Derrida discusses two examples of metaphor by analogy from Poetics. The 
first one concerns the poetic analogy between the sun's engendering power and the 
act of "sowing" seeds. The metaphor is: "sowing around a god-created flame" 
(speiron theoktistan phloga). In the analogy between the "casting forth of the sun's 
flame" and "sowing" there is a missing term. The proper name for the sun's 
generative act is lacking and, therefore, is supplemented by that of "sowing. " In the 
case of elliptical analogy the comparison is not made between present words with 
fixed meanings and referents but is created within language. Derrida asks: 
"Where has it ever been seen that there is the same relation between the sun and its rays as 
between sowing and seeds? If this analogy imposes itself -and it does- then it is that within language the 
analogy itself is due to a long and hardly visible chain whose first link is quite difficult to exhibit, and 
not only for Aristotle. " `'' 
Metaphor in this case is not a substitution of one proper name for another. It 
is a creation of resemblance within language, which may inaugurate a series of new 
metaphysics and of humanism is a teleological determination: naturality in general says itself, 
reassembles itself, knows itself, appears to itself, reflects itself, and `mimics' itself par 
excellence and in truth in human nature. " Ibid., p. 237. 
91 Ibid., p. 241. 
`'' Ibid. 
93 Ibid.. p. 243. 
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metaphors that cannot be referred back to an originary proper name, since the latter is 
missing; it is an ellipsis. The second example helps to illustrate this point. An analogy 
is established between the expressions the "shield of Ares" and the "cup of 
Dionysus. " If the shield is to Ares what the cup is to Dionysus then, it follows, that on 
the basis of analogy the metaphor "the cup of Ares" may be created and even 
furthered by another metaphor: "the wineless cup. " As Derrida points out, this is the 
case of a metaphor that bears no relation to a proper meaning since what is proper to 
the "cup" is denied by the "negative addition" of the adjective "wineless": 
"No reference properly being named in such a metaphor, the figure is carried off into 
the adventure of a long, implicit sentence, a secret narrative which nothing assures us will lead 
us back to the proper name. The metaphorisation of metaphor, its bottomless 
overdeterminability, seems to be inscribed in the structure of metaphor, but as its 
negativity. "95 
Let us go back to the example of the sun, to the heliotropic metaphor. What 
would be the ultimate sensory object, the unique, natural referent, that which could be 
named properly and unequivocally but the sun? It seems at first sight that the sun is 
the paradigm of the proper name, what promises and secures the telos of language, 
that is, univocity. However, even the sensory sun becomes an elusive object. How do 
we know what is proper to the sun? Aristotle admits that every sensory object can 
become obscure as it can always not present itself, hide itself, evade our senses. So 
the sensory object, the kernel of metaphor, does not provide reliable knowledge 
precisely because the aistheton (sensory) can always disappear; "it does not yield 
itself upon command, and its presence is not to be mastered. " 96 This is why the sun is 
the sensory object par excellence, the paradigm of the sensory and of metaphor; "it 
regularly turns (itself) and hides (itself). " The sun as the paradigm of the sensory 
represents what is natural in language, stages the very opposition of appearing and 
disappearing and everything associated with it (presence/absence, natural/artificial 
and so forth). In short, it structures the entire lexicon of metaphysics. Insofar as the 97 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 "Heliotropic metaphors are always imperfect metaphors. They provide us with too little 
knowledge, because one of the terms directly or indirectly implied in the substitution (the 
sensory sun) cannot be known in what is proper to it. Which also means that the sensory sun is 
always improperly named. " Ibid.. p. 250. 
97 "The sun does not provide an example, even if the most remarkable one, of the sensory 
Being such that it can always disappear, keep out of sight, not be present. The very opposition 
of appearing and disappearing, the entire lexicon of the phainesthai, of aletheia, etc., of day 
and night, of the visible and the invisible, of the present and the absent -all that is possible 
only under the sun. Insofar as it structures the metaphorical space of philosophy, the sun 
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sun, the "sensory model of the sensory" is im-properly known, it is also im-properly 
named. It therefore emerges as "solely metaphorical" and less "natural" than ever, 
since it is never properly present in discourse. In this way, the sun, the par excellence 
prime mover and sensory kernel of metaphor, is inversely already engendered by 
metaphor98: 
"Each time that there is a metaphor, there is doubtless a sun somewhere; but each 
time that there is sun, metaphor has begun. "99 
So, in the "light" of what has just been elaborated, no genealogy or 
etymological practice would end up with more than metaphors. The presumed 
"tropic" trajectory of each concept will have to be inscribed within a generalised 
notion of metaphor or what Derrida calls after Bataille a general economy of 
meaning. 10° The generalisation of metaphor forbids the recourse to a direct, 
represents what is natural in philosophical language. In every philosophical language, it is that 
which permits itself to be retained by natural language. In the metaphysical alternative which 
opposes formal or artificial language to natural language, `natural' should always lead us back 
to physis as a solar system, or, more precisely, to a certain history of the relationship earth/sun 
in the system of perception. " Ibid., p. 251. 
98 Derrida also considers the metaphor of the house, which along with the metaphor of the sun 
are posited as the two dominant metaphors of metaphysics. The metaphor of the house will be 
extensively discussed in the next chapter in relation to travel. 
99 Derrida, "White Mythology", p. 251. 
goo General economy becomes thinkable through an extension and disruption of dialectical 
reasoning. The dialectical notion of metaphor, that is, deviation in view of re-appropriation, is 
inscribed in what Derrida calls the restricted economy of the Hegelian Aufhebung, of the 
speculative concept par excellence. Aufhebung is a formal notion that describes the passage 
from one level of knowledge and consciousness to a higher one through a series of negations, 
interiorisations and sublations. It is an operation "carried out in the name and insight of 
meaning. " Derrida, Jacques, "From Restricted to General Economy, A Hegelianism without 
Reserve" in Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 
268. 
The "restricted economy" of the Aufhebung is subordinated to the work and labour of 
meaning. It is regulated by the ideal of absolute knowledge that seeks to convert everything 
into positivity and to secure the continuous linking-up of meaning. Hence, whatever lies 
beyond meaning as otherness and negativity is still reducible and reservable. This, according 
to Derrida (and Battaille), is the blind spot in Hegel's philosophy. The dream of the mastery of 
meaning that promises truth, absolute knowledge, self-consciousness and freedom is bound to 
an economy of the same, to the phenomenological epoche; it is subordinated to the slave (the 
master is the truth of the slave, who is interiorised and elevated in the process of the 
Aufhebung). to the thing and to work. "Since it relates the successive figures of phenomenality 
to a knowledge of meaning that always already has been anticipated, the phenomenology of 
the mind (and phenomenology in general) corresponds to a restricted economy [... ]" Ibid., p. 
271. 
The economy of the Aufhebung restricts itself to the conservation, circulation, and 
reproduction of meaning, "thereby simultaneously blinding itself to the baselessness of the 
nonmeaning from which the basis of meaning is drawn, and in which this basis of meaning is 
exhausted. " Ibid., p. 257. 
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continuous line of metaphors that would lead back to a primary metaphor and so to a 
primary proper meaning. We can only speak of metaphors in the plural: 
"If there were only one possible metaphor, the dream at the heart of philosophy, if 
one could reduce their play to the circle of a family or group of metaphors, that is, to one 
`central, ' `fundamental, ' `principial' [sic] metaphor, there would be no more true metaphor, 
but only, through the one true metaphor, the assured legibility of the proper. "101 
So metaphor is not to be reduced to the history of its meaning, to the history 
of a thesis or concept. It is because metaphor is multiple, because metaphor always 
already and only belongs to syntax and to a "more general syntax" called 
metaphysics, that it is divided, multiplied, and organised within the systematic 
structures it appears in. And then again metaphor cannot reduce, cannot account for 
this syntax; it is what disallows for reduction in the first place. In this sense, since 
reducibility to a first term or being is in principle impossible, metaphor is put into 
abyme (Derrida uses Nietzsche's expression 102); it is plunged into the bottomless 
Derrida speaks of a negativity beyond the opposition positivity/negativity, a radical negativity 
which forms no part of the process or system of dialectics. This negativity opens onto the 
possibility of nonmeaning, to an expenditure without reserve, that is, to a irreducible, 
nondialecticisable or interiorisable residue of meaning that comes to disrupt meaning from 
within. The question of meaning is reopened and restricted economy is reinscribed into a 
general economy, an economy which does not reserve everything as potential meaning. 
"Instead of being simply overturned, it [restricted economy] is comprehended: not 
comprehended by knowledge-gathering comprehension, but inscribed within the opening of 
the general economy along with its horizons of knowledge and its figures of meaning. General 
economy folds these horizons and figures so that they will be related not to a basis, but to the 
nonbasis of expenditure, not to the telos of meaning, but to the indefinite destruction of 
value. " Ibid. 
101 Derrida, "White Mythology", p. 268. This, however, does not mean that philosophy is to be 
considered in its synchronic stages or that its concepts do not bear the imprints of their own 
history. The point is not choosing between genealogical or synchronic readings. Derrida takes 
pains in examining the systematic structure and internal construction of the texts he considers 
and the way these are traversed and worked by metaphor. Yet he also acknowledges the 
enduring structures and continuities that support and allow for these and for metaphor. 
102 For a detailed discussion about Nietzsche on metaphor see Sarah Kofman's Nietzsche and 
Metaphor, translated by Duncan Large, London, Athlone Press, 1993. An abridged version of 
the book was first published in Poetique (5,1971) along with parts of Derrida's "White 
Mythology". The first version was also presented to Jacques Derrida's seminar on metaphor at 
the Ecole Normale Superieure (1969-1970). 
In this book Kofman reconstructs the place and the trajectory of the notion of metaphor in 
Nietzsche, which appears by name in his early works and is later substituted by the term 
"representation". The gesture of the generalisation of metaphor that is essential to Derrida's 
deconstruction is first carried out by Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, as Kofman explains, man is "a 
metaphorical animal". an "artist from the beginning", trying to make sense of and to master 
the world by means of what can only be metaphorical transpositions. The "originary 
metaphorical activity" (something already effaced and forgotten in the anthropomorphic 
representation of the world, which expresses a will to power) is displaced in the figure of the 
concept that fails to capture the "innermost essence of things", which can only be felt by 
attuning oneself to the music and rhythm of nature, to the plenitude of life. Instead, man 
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depths of indeterminacy. This is, however, its paradoxical condition of possibility. 
Derrida, in delimiting the project of metaphorology is not interested in discarding it 
altogether along with the concept of metaphor. He wants to bring out a barely visible 
and yet very powerful structure: the very possibility of meaning that rather than a 
teleological progression or regression is an expenditure without reserve, the 
movement of a differance that misses its profit and endlessly unfolds in 
dissemination. What Derrida brings out is something that trembles, something that 
"is" on the condition of its own erasure. 
Metaphor can only be in erasing itself, "indefinitely constructing its 
destruction. " It signifies on the condition of its self-destruction, its own death, 
whether the latter is understood either as its teleological elevation to a concept or as 
its multiplication or generalisation. For Derrida the self-destruction of metaphor 
always takes two different yet inseparable courses. The first one is brought about by 
the place it is assigned by and within metaphysics. Metaphor is submitted to the 
teleology of the proper; it assumes its value and function under the law of the same. 
Insofar as metaphor, at once an endangering and necessary detour, is controlled by 
the economy of the proper, as long as it is annulled (and conserved) in the dialectical 
process of the Aufhebung, it allows for no irreparable loss of meaning. This is the first 
death of metaphor. The triumph of the proper. The second death metaphor suffers is 
through its multiplication and generalisation within syntax. Metaphor is reinscribed 
beyond the traditional opposition proper/metaphorical and now receives a more 
extended sense than that assigned to its metaphysical concept. Endlessly multiplied 
within syntax (out of which it would be nothing), unable to reduce it to a centrality of 
a theme or sense (secretly lurking behind and beneath substitutions and deviations), 
metaphor is its own multiplication. "This time it is no longer a question of extending 
and confirming a philosopheme, but rather, of unfolding it without limit, and wresting 
its borders of propriety from it. "' 03 It is through the deconstruction of the opposition 
between proper and metaphorical that metaphor is for the second time destroyed. And 
with it, as Derrida claims, so is philosophy, which sees or fails to see its most 
produces "substitutive images", human, all-too-human metaphors. Musical language, for 
Nietzsche, is the best metaphor for the "proper" understood as the "essence of the world". 
However, the "proper" is already an interpretation, a metaphor for the superabundancy of life. 
"At this level metaphor is founded on the ontological unity of life represented by Dionysus. 
But if there is metaphor it is because this unity is always already in pieces and can only be 
symbolically transposed into art. " Kofman, p. 14. 
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fundamental concepts tremble. The name of metaphor becomes a catachresis and also 
a homonymy incorporating its two deaths. 
The Debate 
In the eighth study of The Rule of Metaphor Ricoeur engages in a combative 
critique of "White Mythology. " His criticism embarks from a footnote (29) where 
Derrida mentions a passage from Heidegger's Der Satz vom Grund (The Principle of 
Reason), which expresses a "distrust" towards the concept of metaphor. Heidegger 
maintains that there is a collusion of the metaphysical transposition of the sensory 
into the non-sensory and of the linguistic transfer from proper to metaphorical. 104 For 
Heidegger the collapsing of the movement of the Aufhebung with the movement of 
metaphor restricts language to a representation of this transposition. His argument is 
that the sensory can never be a "simple reception of the senses, " since it already 
involves interpretation. Hence, the distinction between sensible and nonsensible and 
its representation in language by the couple proper/metaphorical, which is 
fundamental for metaphysics, cannot be maintained. 105 The passage ends with the 
much quoted proposition: "The metaphorical exists only within metaphysics. 106 
Ricoeur assumes that Derrida subscribes to Heidegger's treatment of metaphor even 
though Derrida clearly states that the opposition sensory/nonsensory is "an important, 
but neither the only, nor the first, nor the most determining characteristic of the value 
of metaphor. "' 07 Ricoeur fails to perceive that Derrida's critique aims at the 
metaphysical concept of metaphor by not taking into account the purpose and context 
103 Derrida, "White Mythology", p. 270. 
104 "Because our hearing and seeing is never a mere sensible registering, it is therefore also off 
the mark to insist that thinking as listening and bringing-into-view are only meant as a 
transposition of meaning, namely as transposing the supposedly sensible into the nonsensible. 
The idea of `transposing' and of metaphor is based upon the distinguishing if not complete 
separation, of the sensible and the nonsensible as two realms that subsist on their own. The 
setting up of this partition between the sensible and the nonsensible, between the physical and 
the non-physical is a basic trait of what is called metaphysics and which normatively 
determines metaphysical thinking when one gains the insight that the above-mentioned 
partitioning of the sensible and nonsensible is insufficient. " Heidegger, Martin, The Principle 
of Reason, translated by Reginald Lilly, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1991, p. 48. 
105 Ricoeur objects to such a designation of metaphysics: "I am afraid that only a reading 
forced beyond any justification can make Western philosophy lie on this Procrustian bed. " 
Ricoeur, The Rule of. 1 fetaphor, p. 282. 
106 Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, p. 48. 
1117 Derrida, "White Mythology", footnote 29, p. 226. 
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of this footnote. Assuming a coincidence between Heidegger and Derrida, 108 Ricoeur 
forces a reading on "White Mythology" which is organised according to two themes: 
"the efficacy of worn-out metaphor in philosophical discourse" and the supposed 
"deep-seated unity of metaphorical and analogical transfer of visible being to 
intelligible being. "109 More specifically, Ricoeur attributes to Derrida the following 
postulates: 1. Derrida uses the notion of usure as simply fraying and wearing-out 2. 
Derrida is interested solely in dead, worn-out metaphor as he believes that 
philosophical concepts are dead metaphors needing to be revived 3. Derrida considers 
metaphor at the level of the word, thus, favours substitution and denomination theory 
discarding the function and importance of discourse 4. Derrida privileges the 
metaphors of sun and home, which manifest the movement of idealisation, a 
Platonism, collapsing, in this way, metaphysics into one, great, homogeneous 
discourse. 
Ricoeur misconstrues Derrida's notion of usure in depriving it of its double 
sense of loss and profit. Usure is misunderstood as the using-up, wearing-out, which 
only deflowers without adding anything to metaphor. The second sense of usure, 
which implies a surplus of meaning is deemed as what is hidden and already dead in 
metaphor. 110 This is why Ricoeur thinks that Derrida is mostly interested in the 
practice of etymologism in an effort to retrieve the continuous line of metaphors 
behind philosophical concepts, whence also the assumption that Derrida's designation 
of metaphor is premised on denomination and substitution theories. However, this 
approach towards metaphor is what Derrida specifically puts into question. 11 As 
Derrida points out in his reply to Ricoeur, usure is "the production of surplus value 
(plus-value) according to laws other than those of a continuous and linearly 
108 "We can now consider the theoretical core common to Heidegger and Derrida, namely, the 
supposed collusion between the metaphorical pair of the proper and figurative and the 
metaphysical pair of the visible and invisible. I myself do not hold this connection to be 
necessary. " Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 294. 
109 Ibid., p. 285. 
110 "Now the non-stated in metaphor is used, worn-out metaphor. Metaphor functions here in 
spite of us, behind our backs so to speak. The claim to keep semantic analysis within a 
metaphysically neutral area only expresses ignorance of the simultaneous play of 
unacknowledged metaphysics and worn-out metaphor. " Ibid., p. 284. 
1" Derrida in his reply to Ricoeur's criticism expresses his discontent for the misreading and 
twisting of his argument: Its logic is sometimes disconcerting: it is because I sometimes 
subscribe to some of Ricoeur's propositions that I am tempted to protest when I see him turn 
them back against me as if they were not already evident in what I have written. " Derrida, 
"The Retrait of Metaphor", p. 12. 
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accumulative capital isation. "12 Usure implies both usage and expenditure; it does not 
restrict metaphor to a linear, interiorising, reserving enterprise but, on the contrary, it 
extends and unfolds it infinitely. So the surplus of meaning does not refer to what 
looms behind metaphor (to what is worn out and hidden) or merely to an addition to 
the linear linking up of meaning but to its constant dissemination and division along a 
movement that a continuist notion of metaphor cannot assimilate. Moreover, the 
infinite play of metaphor does not attest to Derrida's "unbounded `deconstruction"' 
but it conforms to the laws of iteration and repetition; it submits to enduring 
sequences and structures, which Derrida does not overlook. 
Ricoeur acknowledges "a stroke of genius" on Derrida's part in entering the 
domain of metaphor by way of its death. He maintains that Derrida is fascinated by 
dead metaphor and that he equates wearing-out to concept formation. Now, as we 
saw, Ricoeur considers metaphor as only the first phase of concept formation. This is 
a crucial point, since he is mainly interested in establishing and securing the 
autonomy of philosophical discourse. Philosophical concepts may be metaphorically 
engendered but philosophy, to his mind, is not metaphorical. This is so, because the 
network of philosophemes that constitute the philosophical field precedes 
metaphor. 13 Metaphor only provides a schema, which holds resemblance and 
difference, identity and otherness in tension and interaction. It is through the work of 
interpretation that a new meaning finally emerges and a new concept is formulated. 
For Ricoeur, interpretation always draws on a pre-established web of literal meanings 
and involves a conscious effort. This is why live metaphor resides in the awareness of 
it and is an event that always happens in the present of discourse. For Derrida, 
however, metaphorical effects can neither be fixed nor mastered because they operate 
and extend far beyond our awareness of them and this is not due to the impossibility 
of etymological regression to a first term but because of essentially structural 
conditions. Metaphor is not simply an occasion for interpretation, or merely that 
which evades us in contrast to what is already our own. It is the predicament of 
meaning, what both enables and disrupts everything involved with it. Moreover, 
generalised metaphor is not dead metaphor. The distinction between live and dead 
112 Ibid., p. 133- 
113 "So it is not metaphor that carries the structure of Platonic metaphysics; metaphysics 
instead seizes the metaphorical process in order to make it work to the benefit of metaphysics. 
The metaphors of the sun and the home reign only to the extent that they are selected by 
philosophical discourse. " Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor. pp. 294-295. 
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metaphor has no pertinence for Derrida. And, to be sure, he does not endeavour to 
revive dead metaphor and trace it back to its original proper meaning. On the 
contrary, he tries to show the impossibility of such an undertaking by deconstructing 
the couple proper/metaphor, by depriving metaphorics of its conceptual tools and by 
questioning its very presuppositions. ' 14 
Ricoeur reprimands Derrida for not taking into account the semantics of 
metaphor and for adhering to denomination and substitution theories. 1' Derrida 
grants a lot of room in "White Mythology" to the critique of metaphorics, which 
concentrates on worn-out metaphor, but he does so in order to contest the "privilege 
of the name and the word" and not to affirm it. As Derrida himself points out, the 
emphasis on the syntactic motif dominant in "White Mythology" opposes the 
"primacy of denomination. "' 16 Derrida does not deliver a discursive theory of 
metaphor of Ricoeur's detail as he prefers to treat discourse on the level of its 
presuppositions. His designation of meaning as an effect of the infinite chain of traces 
should be enough to rebut the accusation of prioritising the word. Ricoeur is probably 
misled by Derrida's extensive analyses of the metaphors of sun and home, although 
Derrida, far from merely giving a historical and genealogical account, painstakingly 
examines them within the syntax in which they occur. Derrida's persistence with 
these metaphors instigates another objection from Ricoeur. He maintains that Derrida, 
by privileging the metaphors of light and sojourn, which are metaphors for the 
114 S. H. Clark also misreads "White Mythology" by assuming that Derrida favours 
etymologism over usage and discourse analysis. Clark fails to locate Derrida's critique of 
metaphorics within the scope of the latter's deconstructive project. He goes as far as to say: 
"In so far as Derrida seeks to retain the status of `a philosophical rhetoric in the service of an 
autonomous theory constituted before and outside its own language. In this I wholly concur. " 
Clark, S. H, Paul Ricoeur, London, Routledge, 1990, p. 143. A more attentive reading of the 
paragraph Clark refers to would show that it is exactly this "separation" and "hierarchy" that 
is contested. According to Derrida, rhetoric and philosophy are too philosophical and too 
rhetorical, respectively, to be rigorously separated. Derrida does not nurture the thought of an 
"autonomous theory constituted before and outside its own language, manipulating its tropes 
like tools. " That would imply that thought and meaning were prior to language, which, if this 
were the case, would reduce language to a vehicle of an independent sense. This, of course, 
would be unacceptable for the thinker of differance, who precisely challenges the positing of 
an independent signified or sense before the signifier or language. Such divisions and 
hierarchies are at the centre of metaphysical thinking. 
115 The effectiveness of dead metaphor can be inflated, it seems to me, only in semiotic 
conceptions that impose the primacy of denomination, and hence of substitution of meaning. 
These conceptions thereby condemn the analysis to overlook the real problems of 
metaphoricity, which, as we know, are related to the play of semantic pertinence and 
impertinence. " Ricoeur. The Rule of Metaphor. p. 290. 
.. G Derrida, The Retrait of Metaphor, " p. 15. 
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metaphorical process itself (that is, the double movement of idealisation and 
appropriation), tries to show the "primordial metaphoricity" of metaphysics and to 
ground the "auto-implication" and continuity of metaphor. "' In doing so, Derrida, 
according to Ricoeur, ascribes to metaphysics a homogenous unity"g: And so, by 
reason of their stability, their perdurance, the dominant metaphors ensure the epochal 
unity of metaphysics. "' 19 Though Ricoeur agrees with Derrida that each concept 
carries a "traditional metaphorical burden", he maintains that each time an "ancient 
metaphor" (like light, ground, home, path and so on) is used in a new context, it is a 
form of innovation. 120 This is why no metaphor should be either privileged or 
forbidden. The revitalisation of dead metaphors is for Ricoeur a perfectly legitimate 
task as long as one bears in mind that this would involve not the restoration of a 
"primordial meaning" but rather the reactivation of metaphor in a new context and, 
hence, the occurrence of live metaphor. Here, while Ricoeur is forced to admit to a 
certain continuity in the history of metaphor, which his notion of polysemy already 
implies, he once more falls short from acknowledging the syntactic motif of "White 
Mythology. "121 As was suggested, Derrida supersedes the dilemma between history 
117 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 289. 
118 Ricoeur's accusation is also levelled at Heidegger: "It seems to me to deny oneself the 
convenience, which has become a laziness in thinking, of lumping the whole of Western 
thought together under a single word, metaphysics. " Ibid., p. 311. Derrida in his reply to 
Ricoeur points out that his use of the term "metaphysics" or of expressions such as "the 
closure of metaphysics" does not refer to a homogeneous field contained within a circular 
limit: "I have never believed in the existence or in the consistency of something like 
metaphysics itself (la metaphysique). [... ] Representation of a linear and circular closure 
surrounding a homogeneous space is, precisely, the theme of my greatest emphasis, an auto- 
representation of philosophy in its onto-encyclopedic logic. " Derrida, "The Retrait of 
Metaphor, " p. 15. If such a thing as the unity of metaphysics existed or was affirmed by 
Derrida, then deconstruction would be inconceivable. It is because linear and homogeneous 
representations do not go uncontested, because "metaphysics" is always already disrupted 
from within, that no unity is ascribed to it, not even in view of its surpassing. However, this 
does not mean that there are not durable constraints and systematic traits that have allowed for 
something like "metaphysics" to come together, nonetheless, never as such. 
119 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 289. 
120 Ibid., p. 311. 
121 "But noting this continuation is not the same as determining the sense of Idea in each 
philosopher. No philosophical discourse would be possible, not even a discourse of 
deconstruction, if we ceased to assume what Derrida justly holds to be `the sole thesis of 
philosophy, ' namely, `that the meaning aimed at through these figures is an essence rigorously 
independent of that which carries it over. "' Ibid., p. 293 (my italics). Here again the context of 
Derrida's quotation is not taken into account. Derrida criticises rather than affirms the "sole 
thesis of philosophy". If meaning were thought as an "essence rigorously independent of that 
which carries over" then all binary couples, like signifier/signified, form/content, 
material/spiritual, to name a few, that Derrida scrupulously deconstructs would automatically 
69 
and systematicity. He urges that attention is paid to the "durable constraints" and the 
``very long systematic chain" that delimit and support concepts, yet he also denounces 
the philosophical practice of abstracting concepts from their context and use value as 
if a concept could signify by itself, independently of context. 
Finally, Ricoeur believes that the definition of metaphor is not circular, as 
Derrida would have it. One can speak of metaphor non metaphorically. This is so 
because its definition contains already established, literal meanings. It is the 
conceptual network of philosophy that decides upon and formulates the concept of 
metaphor. For Ricoeur, the act of positing the concept dialectically precedes 
metaphor. 122 Ricoeur wants to maintain at all costs the independence of philosophical 
discourse. To him "thinking is not poeticising" 12' and it is the rigorous order of the 
philosophical field that confirms this. However, he accepts that the formation of a 
new concept transforms the totality of the field, which, he quotes Derrida, " `is 
worked by metaphor' . 
"024 It is clear that Ricoeur prioritises the proper, the literal in 
the service of which metaphor is put. This is seminal to a hermeneutics that is 
essentially a "struggle for univocity". Ricoeur has been criticised for bringing 
philosophy to an "instant arrestedness" and "virtual petrification". S. H. Clark scorns 
Ricoeur for not investigating "the relation of active concept to active metaphor. " 25 
He is amazed that "a book so committed to demonstrating the fundamental 
importance of metaphor in human creativity should devote so much of its final 
chapter to trying to fend off the success of its preceding argument. "126 The weakness, 
nonetheless, of The Rule of Metaphor, which is a very consistent and tightly woven 
text, does not rest on an antinomy introduced in the eighth study. Ricoeur's theory is 
grounded in the priority of the proper, from which metaphor dialectically ensues and 
returns to. This is a central theme that develops throughout the book and becomes 
creep back in. It is Ricoeur, rather than Derrida, who accepts this proposition and, in this way, 
relegates metaphor to a secondary place with respect to the proper. 
122 This is the basic premise of Ricoeur with regard to metaphor and concept formation. 
Though, Ricoeur uses the verb proceed instead of precede, ("la position du concept procede 
dialectiquement de la metaphore elle-meme, " La Metaphore Vive, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 
1975, p. 372) here we accept the correction by Leonard Lawlor in his Imagination and 
Chance, The Difference Between The Thought of Ricoeur and Derrida, New York, State 
University of New York Press, p. 40, since in Ricoeur's thinking it is the concept that is prior 
to metaphor. 
123 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 311. 
124 Ibid., p. 293. 
125 Clark, p. 147. 
'26 Ibid., p. 137. 
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more dominant and inclusive when Ricoeur reaches the final stages of his analysis. 
The drawback of The Rule of Metaphor, in my opinion, is that it does not put into 
radical rethinking the traditional couple of proper and metaphor, which seems to be 
taken for granted, although the wealth of argument and the extensive discussion of 
the major theories of metaphor make this study indispensable. 
Ricoeur does not deem necessary any preoccupation with the metaphysical 
concepts of the proper and metaphor. In his view, "a better semantic analysis of the 
metaphorical process suffices to dispel the mystique of the 'proper. " 127 It is discourse 
and the conflict of interpretations that each time decide which meanings are to be 
taken literally or metaphorically. Ricoeur explains that his use of the term "literal" 
refers to what is "simply current, `usual' " in discourse and not to the "proper" in the 
sense of "originary", "primitive" and "natural". However, he also states that "the 
criterion of delimitation is clear: the metaphorical sense of a word presupposes 
contrast with a literal sense. "' 28 So discourse can decide on the value of words under 
the condition of a contrast between literal and metaphorical interpretations. 
Nevertheless, this would need the support of a previous delineation of what is literal 
and what metaphorical. This is essential to a theory that prioritises the philosophical 
concept over metaphorical action and refers the interpretation of utterances to already 
established conceptual networks. Not defining the "literal" as originary or primitive 
does not disengage it from the concept of the proper, which lurks behind each of its 
delimitations. It is precisely this concept of the proper, its history, function and 
construction that Derrida attempts to expose and explode and not to assert its 
originality and primitiveness. 
As Leonard Lawlor observes, neither Ricoeur nor Derrida ever address each 
other's key notions, that is, distanciation and differance, in the texts presented 
above. 12 The fundamental difference that makes all the difference between these 
notions is that distanciation is essentially dialectical, while d ferance demonstrates a 
deeply aporetic structure. Why is metaphor so important for Ricoeur's hermeneutics 
and Derrida's deconstruction? The answer comes from metaphor itself, straight out of 
its classical definition. Metaphor is the movement, deviation, mediation of meaning. 
127 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 291. 
128 "We did admit of course that the metaphorical use of a word could always be opposed to its 
literal use; but literal does not mean proper in the sense of originary. but simply current, 
`usual'. The literal sense is the one lexicalised. " Ibid., p. 290. 
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And here Ricoeur and Derrida would add: a necessary mediation, not an accident that 
befalls language in its pure state. The questions then become: What sort of 
movement? Deviation from what? Mediation between what? Here the answers split. 
Either way, dialectics or aporetics, proper and metaphor are always thought together. 
In Ricoeur's dialectics metaphor struggles to compensate for the loss of the proper by 
seeking re-appropriation. In Derrida's aporetics metaphor disappropriates meaning, 
bringing about an irreparable loss. 
Ricoeur's live metaphor, eventually, becomes a part of polysemy, that is, of 
the regulated and already established system of the multiple ways Being is said. 
Metaphorical deviation is, finally, reduced and submitted to the order of the same, 
which takes its most rigorous form in the discourse of philosophy. So metaphor, for 
Ricoeur, is a mediation between two proper meanings both belonging to the same 
order of polysemy. The originary proper meaning is at the same time cancelled and 
preserved in the second one in an endless but teleological process of elevation 
(Aufhebung or epoche). For Ricoeur, the horizon of meaning constantly recedes 
toward the univocal. For Derrida, metaphor always already disrupts the proper. 
Metaphor as the mediation of meaning proceeds in a nonhorizonal and 
nonteleological fashion. Meaning is an effect of a structure of iteration and it is 
divided and unfolded at every instant of discourse. The concept of metaphor as the 
mediation between two poles of meaning, as the eruption of a new insight, the 
calculated trajectory toward a more inclusive proper meaning, withdraws, retreats, as 
it always has, leaving behind a conceptual field in unrest, in doubt of its own 
definition. And by withdrawing, metaphor, that is, the classical philosopheme, 
infinitely exceeds and expands itself allowing no room but for metaphor, that is now a 
catachresis, a quasi-metaphor because it is no more opposed to properness. 130 After 
129 Lawlor, p. 43. 
The withdrawal of metaphor is, for Derrida, concomitant to the withdrawal of Being. For 
Heidegger, the epoche of metaphysics opens up with this withdrawal, which makes the 
thought and history of Being possible. Being constitutes the transcendental horizon within 
which beings, entities, everything that exists comes to be thought. It is neither a primum 
signatum, nor a transcendental signified, "it has never been thought or said as such except by 
dissimulating itself in beings". Derrida, "Differance", p. 22. Without manifesting itself as such 
in each and every individual being, it underlies and raises the question of "being" in its 
entirety. And it is, precisely, the question of Being, the question of ontico-ontological 
difference, that is, the difference between Being and beings, which, according to Heidegger, is 
forgotten by metaphysics as far back as the Greeks. Being, or truth, or presence does not 
manifest itself in discourse for, if it did so in its fullness and plenitude, there would be no need 
for discourse and no need for the thought of Being. Being, then, in the evidence of is radiant 
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the withdrawal of metaphor131 the metaphysical field appears "more metaphorico" 
than ever. Derrida asks: "What, then, would happen with metaphor? " and replies, 
"Everything: the totality of what is (l'etant). And it would happen that we should get 
along without it, without being able to dispense with it (il se passerait ceci qu'on 
devrait se passer d'elle sans pouvoir s'en passer). "132 It would happen that we should 
get along without the rigorous metaphysical concept of metaphor, however, without 
being able to dispense with metaphor in general, with generalised metaphor, which 
also engulfs, repeats, and deconstructs the "intra-metaphysical metaphor in displacing 
it. " 
After the elaboration of the semantic values of the proper and metaphor and 
the challenge to their oppositional and hierarchical thinking, which best takes shape 
in its dialectical formulation and its historical application along the hermeneutic 
project, proper meaning and metaphor re-emerge rather as functions and effects of the 
signifying movement of differance and not as a kernel distinction structuring 
semantic resources and potentiality. Metaphor as the movement of meaning, or else 
as "the travel of meaning, " is no longer to be understood as a semantic deviation or 
derivation from an established and literal sense. Metaphor henceforth signifies as an 
effect of a detour that is now posited as an irreducible and originary movement, a 
movement without origin or telos. That is to say, in the beginning there is detour, 
movement and travel. 
presence would not necessitate the detour of language. And yet Being does not exist outside 
discourse. It is an effect of discourse even though it is necessarily posited as its origin. Being, 
that is, the thought of Being, is at the same time constituted by and constitutive of discourse. It 
comes to be thought and cared for in language, however, never as such. It only signifies and 
becomes thinkable in withdrawing, making in this way thought and meaning possible and 
desirable. In this way, the withdrawal of Being, that is, the concealment of Truth, is a sort of 
originary movement that opens thought and logos. Likewise, the withdrawal of the proper 
concept of metaphor, which is tantamount to the withdrawal of the proper, creates a space in 
which they are both inscribed as effects of "tropic capacity". We shall develop this more in the 
next chapter. 
''' Derrida warns against an understanding of the expression "the withdrawal of metaphor" as 
a metaphor in the traditional sense. That would be, for him, an almost "catastrophic" or 
"catastropical" metaphor because it would disorient the whole endeavour of deconstruction to 
a hermeneutic enterprise of establishing a new meaning for the vehicle of this "metaphorical" 
expression. Based on the already known and established meaning of "withdrawal, " 
hermeneutics would claim "to procure access to the unknown and to the indeterminate by the 
detour of something recognisably familiar. " According to such schema, "withdrawal" would 
maintain its familiar sense without giving any chance to the thought of ontico-ontological 
difference. For Derrida, one should "allow withdrawal in general to manifest itself, only from 
the withdrawal of Being as a withdrawal of metaphor in all the polysemous and disseminal 
potential of withdrawal. " Derrida, "The Retrait of Metaphor, " p. 23. 
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We began with metaphor, with what has always already begun, with the 
purpose of using this notion along with its related themes and concepts, primarily its 
indissociable concept of the proper, for a discussion of travel relations within the 
context and tradition of Western metaphysics. It will be argued in the next chapter 
that the binary thinking of the literal and the metaphorical and, to be sure, its 
deconstructive challenge, can be raised to a problematic of travel focusing mainly on 
the binary couple of Oikos (which receives here the broad sense of familiarity, of 
what structures and circumscribes one's semantic universe) and travel. The theory of 
metaphor will enable the exploration of the signifying and systematic structures that 
make sense out of Oikos and travel, but which also radically disrupt their traditional 
and largely accepted formulations. Metaphor and travel or rather travel as metaphor 
will be examined with regard to what is posited as its hermeneutic premise and in turn 
with regard to its aporetic condition, which comprehends and interrupts the former. 
We set off with metaphor but, as will be shown, we are already on the course of 
travel, at once moving along and leaving behind what seems more and more 
unfamiliar: Oikos. 
132 Ibid., p. 21. 
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Chapter II 
Metaphors of Travel 
This chapter will attempt to establish a connection between the philosophical 
concept of metaphor and, what shall be called for the purpose of economy, a largely 
Eurocentric notion of travel that underlies and permeates travel writing, the theory of 
travel, as well as other types of discourse, and, indeed, the very practice of travel. It 
will be argued that travel as practised and conceptualised in a long European tradition 
traced back in time and extending up to the present has largely participated in what is 
called the metaphysics of presence. The aim of this chapter is not to produce a history 
or genealogy of travel but rather to trace and present in a systematic way enduring 
structures that have supported and sustained a metaphysical notion of travel lying 
behind and beneath the long and diverse tradition(s) of European travel. To claim that 
travel manifests continuity throughout its long history, or indeed histories, is neither 
to homogenise nor to overlook or cast aside cultural and historical particularities. It 
by no means discredits approaches which draw attention to the multiple designations 
that travel has assumed in different historical periods. However, as soon as we speak 
of the history of travel, we necessarily presuppose a certain and relatively unified 
sense of travel, which gathers around it different meanings and practices, admitting 
semantic deviation or unfolding semantic potential. If there is to be a history of travel, 
it will have to constitute, delineate and circumscribe an object or theme for itself, a 
sense it will try to trace as it emerges and is differentiated throughout the period of 
time under consideration. If one is to write a history of travel, one must presuppose 
that there is a sense of what travel is that allows for such a history to be written. Even 
if this sense alters, even if it acquires different functions and participates in distinct 
discourses, it cannot change beyond recognition, if we are to understand anything by 
the word "travel". 
Accordingly, the aim of this chapter will be to investigate the systematic 
structures that have enabled the emergence and re-emergence of a relatively unified 
notion of travel in various discourses of Western metaphysics. In other words, it will 
attempt to address the essential presuppositions for the constitution and reproduction 
of the metaphysical notion of travel and its far reaching effects. It will be argued that 
the traditional notion of travel is necessarily conceived of in relation to that of Oikos 
or home, which is here used in a broad sense extending to what is familiar -oikeio in 
Greek- to N%hat is one's oNNn, to one's identity, to what pertains to the literalised 
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meanings of one's semiotic universe, to the "proper" place from which travel begins. 
Oikos and travel, home and away, have been traditionally conceived as an 
oppositional couple, of which the former constituent is prioritised over the latter. This 
powerful structure privileges Oikos over what lies beyond it, over its other, which is 
subordinated and appropriated by the order of the same, by the law of the house. This 
hierarchy, either openly or secretly at work throughout the history of colonialism, and 
its pervasive, multi-levelled and manifest or latent effects has been called into 
question by post-colonial theory'. However, as was recognised from its early stages, 
the critique of Eurocentrism, of which travel constitutes an integral and decisive part, 
would be self-defeating if it were to simply reverse the binary couples and hierarchies 
of Western metaphysics and continue to operate along divisions of the type 
West/Orient or West and its Other. 2 Through the critique of Eurocentrism, totalised 
historical narratives, largely defined by operations of subordination, conquest and 
exclusion, receive responses which call for alternative histories and give a hearing to 
silenced voices. Yet making room for alternative histories, paying heed to cultural 
diversity and particularity and celebrating cultural difference by "deconstructing" 
binary thinking does not amount to overthrowing metaphysics. Metaphysics is not 
something that one can simply do away with. It is something that must be thought 
through from within, otherwise one runs the risk of reproducing the very discourse 
one calls into to question. Disclaiming, for instance, the hierarchy of Oikos over 
travel and discrediting the traditional value of these notions in favour of a diverse, 
multiple and hybrid history that overlooks the enduring structures that traverse any 
discourse of travel -if we are to agree that something like the subject of travel exists- 
would fail to interrupt the notions under challenge. There are as many experiences of 
travelling as there are travellers. What home and what being away from home mean 
may infinitely vary. However, as will be argued, the structural and necessary relation 
between home or Oikos and travel lies beneath every discourse of travel, including 
those of the nomad or the cosmopolitan, as their essential possibility. It is the very 
See, for example, Edward Said's Orientalism, Western Conceptions of the Orient, with a new 
Afterword, London, Penguin Books, 1995 and Culture and Imperialism, London, Chatto, 1993, 
Homi K. Bhabha's The Location of Culture, London, Routledge, 1994, Robert Young's White 
A9vthologies, London, Routledge. 1990. 
2See, for instance, Dennis Porter's "Orientalism and Its Problems", Aijaz Ahmad's 
"Orientalism and After" in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, A Reader, edited and 
introduced by Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, also 
Fred Dallmayr's Beyond Orientalism, Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter, New York, State 
University of New York Press, 1996 and Travel Writing & Empire, Post-Colonial Theory in 
Transit, edited by Steve Clark, London, Zed Books, 1999. 
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structure that has enabled the violent eruption and expansion of Oikos against and 
over what was posited as its other. If we were to disclaim the authority of Oikos over 
travel and to make room for what is called hybrid identity, multi-culturalism, the 
figure of the nomad and of the homeless, rather than disengaging the two, we should 
pursue a rethinking of these notions in a way that would bring forth their internal 
discontinuities and antinomies, that would put them forever into unrest, not solely on 
the grounds of cultural difference, but in terms of their very condition of signification. 
In doing this, we must not overlook the pervasive effects that the binary thinking of 
Oikos and travel has had in the history of European travel but we should ask, instead, 
what made this thinking possible and at the same time what makes the rigid 
separation of these notions impossible. Our attempt to reinscribe Oikos and travel in 
their essential possibility of meaning will take effect drawing on the figure of 
metaphor. 
We will try to show that there is an essential correspondence between the 
binary thinking of Oikos and travel and that of proper meaning and metaphor and to 
extend the latter in view of a possible reconsideration of the former. Accordingly, this 
chapter will take up the theme of "travel as metaphor" and will examine the 
implications of such a "figuration". Yet, one may ask, what do we mean by the 
"figure of travel", by the phrase "travel as metaphor"? Is the occurrence of this figure 
simply a metaphorisation of "travel" in the proper sense? 
Travel has its place as a recurrent motif in a wide range of discourses 
incorporating the themes of change, maturation, quest, etc. But even beyond the 
diverse and multi-levelled use of the motif of travel found in all sorts of texts, "travel 
as metaphor" here comes to name the very movement of meaning and language. 
Travel is as much constituted as a literary or philosophical motif or theme as, in this 
broad sense, constitutive of discourse, of every investment and venture of meaning. 
Moreover, travel, in a generalised sense, not only constitutes meaning but also 
suspends and disseminates it. The moment "travel" launches a quest for meaning, for 
the mastery and appropriation of meaning, it also condemns it, as will be shown, to 
an ever-lasting ad-venture, to a perpetual dislocation and disappropriation. Oikos, the 
proper home of meaning, thus becomes an impossible destination. 
Travel in the broad sense does not seem to be clearly distinguished from the 
concept of metaphor. If metaphor is the movement of meaning and travel just another 
metaphor for it. then what sort of movement would define travel in the proper sense? 
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To speak of metaphor as the "travel of meaning" is to metaphorise metaphor, to 
metaphorically speak of metaphor. 3 However, metaphor has no privilege over travel. 
To think "travel" merely as a metaphor for metaphor would be to disregard their 
essential association, a relation so close that hardly allows the one to occur without 
implying the other. "Travel as metaphor" brings forth the essential affinity, the 
common structure of semantic movement and economy of meaning of these terms, 
which is both constitutive of and constituted by them. The classical definition of 
metaphor by Aristotle bears the imprints of travel. 4 If it were assumed, accordingly, 
that "metaphor" signifies the movement of meaning (epiphora noematos) towards an 
alien (allotrio) semantic field and "travel" physical displacement to a foreign place, 
then the phrase under discussion would take on the function of bringing together two 
proper meanings in a way that would permit the establishment of analogy, and thus a 
mutual illumination of the terms. What relates these terms in an evident way is their 
common designation as kinds of "movement" and, moreover, as this sort of 
movement that instigates an "encounter" with otherness. However, to speak of "travel 
as metaphor" is neither simply to detect correspondences between these terms nor to 
use the one as a vehicle for the better understanding of the other. This phrase is not 
metaphorical in the conventional sense. If we deployed the concept of metaphor in 
order to explain it, we would be resorting to a "proper meaning" in view of exploring 
a "metaphorical" sense of metaphor. This would upset the explicatory process from 
the start, since it would charge it with too much metaphor and, inversely, imply a 
metaphor less, the proper concept of metaphor that turns out to be inadequate. 
Moreover, if one were to define travel as physical movement (the displacement of a 
body) and if one were to accept this as the proper, literal and real travel, with regard 
to which any other sense would be an addition, derivation or metaphorical 
displacement, then would one not be drawing a distinction between nonsemantic 
(real, physical) and semantic travel? But even if it were possible, such a distinction 
would not make things any easier since suggesting that physical movement makes 
semantic movement thinkable by means of a metaphorical displacement, in other 
words, that proper meaning engenders metaphor on the condition that it is affected by 
metaphor, would not amount to more than an endless tautology that would 
This point is also sustained by George Van Den Abbeele in his Travel as Metaphor, From 
Montaigne to Rousseau. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1992, which will be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
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presuppose established meanings of the proper and metaphor without ever 
questioning effectively how these came about. We can neither speak of movement in 
the proper nor in a metaphorical sense without drawing upon an already semantic 
distinction. This is to say that the "metaphor of travel" is not simply just another 
medium for probing into the semantics of travel. Metaphor is the travel of "travel" as 
much as travel is the metaphor of "metaphor". Rhetoric in its entirety, as Catherine 
Malabou points out, presents itself as a theory of travel. ' 
To recognise the semantic and structural affinity between travel and 
metaphor is not to collapse every practice, form, or sense of travel, physical or not, 
"literal" or not, with every occurrence of the term as theme and motif or as 
"metaphor" in the conventional sense. It is to say that there can be no such thing as 
pure experience of travel. The experience of travel is an experience of meaning, 
which therefore admits to the problematics and aporetics of the "proper" and 
"metaphor". Travel then in all its possible forms and designations remains an 
"adventure" or "expenditure" of meaning, a movement from something familiar to 
something distant and alien. 6 Arguing that travel is unthinkable outside semantic 
structures or semantic movement (and thus metaphor) is not saying anything novel. 
Travel is the displacement of a subject and signifies only in relation to a place of 
derivation, home, and to a place of arrival. ' Travel cannot be dissociated from Oikos, 
which is not posited here simply as a geographical and circumscribed location but 
rather as the totality of meanings that make up the traveller's semantic universe. In 
order to consider in what sort of relation Oikos and travel enter, one would have to 
think the way through which senses of home and away emerge in the first place. 
4 "Metaphora", still much in use in modern Greek, is a term equally applied to all sorts of 
transfer and movement, including transportation, representation, expression, translation, as well 
as to metaphor, the figure of speech. 
5 "Un trope (de tropos, tour, direction, et trepein, tourner) est une figure du discours par 
laquelle un mot ou une expression sons detournes, derives de leur sens prope. La rhetorique tout 
entiere se presente ä sa maniere comme une theorie du voyage. " Malabou, Catherine et 
Derrida, Jacques, Jacques Derrida, La Contre-Allee, Collection Voyager Avec..., LaQuinzaine 
Litteraire, Louis Vuitton, 1999, p. 203. 
6 As Catherine Malabou explains in her book on the notion of travel in Derrida's work, "Il West 
pas, pour Derrida, de voyage "vecu ", d' "experience " du voyage, qui n'engagent une equipee 
du sens. C'est tres precrsement cette conjointure de 1'experience et du sens qui determine le 
voyage comme economie, ou, ce qui vient au meme, comme metaphysique. " Ibid., p. 16. 
One, however, could also ask whether animals travel or do they simply move about in quest 
for food and shelter, or whether the movement, for instance, of celestial bodies is not movement 
in a literal and objective sense. When we argue that travel is a semantic movement, we do not 
imply, for sure, that there is no movement outside signification. Nonetheless, it takes a 
signifying consciousness to perceive and assign a sense to movement that frames it according to 
places of derivation and destination, that makes it, in a word, meaningful. 
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This chapter consists of three parts. The first part will venture a reinscription 
of the notion of travel by means of its relation to metaphor drawing on Paul Ricoeur 
and Jacques Derrida. Its objective will be the extension of these two theorists' well- 
known debate on metaphor to a problematic of travel. Both thinkers' designation of 
metaphor amounts to a theory of meaning since metaphor is traced back to its very 
constitution. Metaphorical and literal meaning can only exist through their mutual 
definition. Yet, as we tried to demonstrate in the first chapter, what for Ricoeur is a 
dialectical relation always progressing towards the re-appropriation of the literal, for 
Derrida is an aporia, which forbids a clear-cut distinction between literal and 
metaphorical and their subordination to a teleology of the "proper". Ricoeur takes the 
couple literal/metaphorical to a certain extent for granted, while Derrida infinitely 
complicates it. Consequently, the mutually constitutive couple of dwelling and 
travelling, of Oikos and voyage, can be rearticulated according to the problematic 
posed by these thinkers with regard to metaphor. It will be argued that "Oikos" and 
"travel" have been traditionally conceptualised as a dialectical pair, which in a way 
calls upon Ricoeur's hermeneutic approach, but also invites Derrida's far more 
radical and challenging critical thinking. 
The second part of the chapter will attempt to explore two primary existential 
categories related to travel, namely those of space and time, along with the 
inextricably related notions of the boundary and the itinerary. Drawing mainly on 
Derrida's reading of Heidegger, it will be argued that travel is not a mediation 
between fixed and present loci circumscribed by solid boundaries. It will be 
maintained that travel rather than a crossing of boundaries and passage from one 
definite place to another, rather than a linear progression of successive and present 
places and moments, is a movement that structures and generates senses of place and 
time. The itinerary then becomes the origin of Oikos and travel; an origin, however, 
which, as we shall see, does not precede the notions it inscribes and makes possible 
but is constituted and constantly divided along the movement of spacing and 
temporalisation, along the movement of differance. 
The third part of the chapter will try to explore and reinscribe the metaphor of 
"travel as writing". It will be argued that travel and writing have a structural affinity 
since they both imply a certain organisation and distribution of space and time and a 
linear and teleological progression. The prescribed telos of writing and of travel, that 
is, the totalities of the book and of Oikos respectively, enabled the interlacing of these 
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notions and their articulation in powerful metaphors such as "the Great Book of the 
World, " which the traveller traversed, read, or inscribed. However, beyond and within 
their historico-metaphysical configurations and interconnections, travel and writing, 
as will be suggested, manifest an inscriptive force that disrupts oppositional and 
dialectical designations announcing at once the closure and the re-opening of the 
book and Oikos, that is, the beginning of writing and travel. 
Travel Beyond Oikos 
As was shown in the previous chapter, Derrida in White Mythology centres 
his elaboration on metaphor around the two major metaphors of light and home, 
instigating an objection from Ricoeur to such a "privileging. " However, these 
metaphors, according to Derrida, have a significant function in the history of 
metaphysics as they are constitutive of the primary philosophemes of eidos and idea 
(from the Greek orän, which means to see) and of the proper, which is linked to the 
notions of property and proximity. Light and home are not random metaphors and 
deserve special treatment because they can be said to define the very movement of 
metaphor. Metaphorisation in metaphysics always involves a moment of idealisation 
and a moment of re-appropriation. 8 This is why Derrida objects to Du Marsais' 
foregrounding of the metaphor of the house over that of light. For Du Marsais the 
metaphor of home or house is structurally important for the concept of metaphor, 
which he conceives as "a borrowed dwelling". He understands this figure -the 
metaphor of the house- as signifying metaphor itself. Derrida: 
"it is a metaphor of metaphor; an expropriation, a being-outside-one's-own- 
residence, but still in a dwelling, outside its own residence but still in a residence in which one 
comes back to oneself, recognises oneself, reassembles oneself or resembles oneself, outside 
oneself in oneself. "9 
The trajectory of metaphor, thus described, is framed within a dialectical 
back and forth movement within the space of properness/residence. The metaphor of 
light is also an integral part in this movement. Metaphor is an "expropriation, " a 
moving away from what is proper, "one's own", but always in view and in sight of a 
re-appropriation, of "the self-presence of the idea in its own light". One outside one's 
residence returns to oneself, to an enlarged, enlightened, "reassembled"' self, gaining 
self-consciousness and recognition. The self is reassembled rejoicing in the profit of 
its expenditure, in the capitalisation and interiorisation of new meaning. Through this 
8Derrida, "White M) thology", p. 253. 
"Ibid. 
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journey the self aspires to the mastery of meaning and, eventually, to self-mastery. 
This is the vocabulary of the dialectics of metaphor at its most Hegelian moment, 
which Ricoeur largely shares. This is also the hermeneutic premise of travel. 
In the beginning of this chapter it was argued that travel and metaphor are 
essentially linked through a common structure of movement. In effect, everything that 
has been so far elaborated with regard to the metaphysical couple of proper and 
metaphor can be extended to a problematic of the couple of Oikos and travel. Oikos 
incorporates here the senses of property, proximity, of the familiar, the known, and 
domestic. Oikos is properness itself. And travel, the being away from Oikos, is what 
induces disappropriation, distance, the unfamiliar, unknown and foreign. Oikos is 
presence, nearness, interiority. Travel is loss of presence, remoteness, exteriority. 
Finally, Oikos is the same. Travel is the other. Like all metaphysical couples Oikos 
and travel are bound together in a hierarchical relation that in this case prioritises the 
former. Oikos is posited before travel and the latter is conceived as a derivation or an 
accident befalling its essence. Travel, thus, is secondary to Oikos. Should we say that 
Oikos and travel move together in a dialectical course that aims at the re-appropriation 
of the former? What, then, would this movement say about the concept of Oikos? 
What would the essence of Oikos be if it has to be supplemented by travel in order to 
attain self-presence? 
Travel is submitted to Oikos, to an economy of the same, to an "oikonomia, " 
which literally means the law of the house. If it were not so, travel would involve the 
absolute loss of the house, it would expose it to an absolute risk. Travel is, indeed, a 
risky business. But it can also be a profitable business. In both cases, what is at risk or 
what is gained is Oikos, both the prime mover and prohibition of travel. If Oikos is 
provisionally lost, it has to be regained and reaffirmed. Oikos then is the point of 
departure and final destination. Eventually travel has to stop. This is the condition of 
travel as formulated by the-law-of-the-house. Travel in its metaphysical designation 
consists of a departure from home always in view of a return. Whether this is actually 
accomplished is circumstantial. Return essentially belongs to the structure of travel. 10 
'o As Derrida maintains, "Oikonomia would always follow the path of Ulysses. " Derrida, 
Jacques, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, translated by Peggy Kamuf, Chigago, University of 
Chigago Press, 1992, p. 7. Even if return is not physically achieved, in the eco-nomics, that is, 
in the metaphysics of travel, it is always posited as a desirable and commanding destination. 
Travel can take the form of nostalgia; it is the dream of a return home that can be the longing 
for a place where one would feel at home and not necessarily one's actual original place of 
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Oikos, origin, identity, sameness or properness regulate and, finally, incorporate 
travel, derivation, difference, otherness and metaphor in the eco-nomy of the same. 
This is the dialectics of travel, which is not just one designation among others. It 
undercuts travel and travel literature throughout its history from the journey of 
Ulysses back home, to the narratives of exploration and conquest, to picaresque 
literature and the Bildungsroman, to the Grand Tour up to tourist brochures, which 
promise self-fulfilment and capitalisation of experience. This, however, does not 
collapse every sense of travel and every form of travel writing to a single, 
homogeneous discourse but points to the premises with which travel has always had 
to negotiate. Oikos may appear as an axiom, but it is, nevertheless, an axiom that the 
theory of travel cannot dispense with. It will always be repeated, reinscribed, 
rearticulated in the text of travel safeguarding, in this way, its continuity, its 
endurance, its unity as an object of study, even at the moment of its dissemination and 
erasure. Even at the moment the relation of Oikos and travel becomes a trace 
forbidding their clear-cut distinction, these traditional notions are indispensable. 
Let us go back to the key notions that have been up to now our guidelines, 
namely, distanciation and differance. Distanciation is posited by Ricoeur as the 
positive condition for interpretation and is essentially designated as a dialectical 
notion. As was elaborated in the previous chapter, Ricoeur analyses distanciation in 
terms of dialectical pairs, for instance, event and meaning, which all fall within the 
primary pair of belonging and distanciation. This dialectical couple and its concurrent 
pairs of same and other, identity and difference, proximity and distance, also take 
effect in the opposition between Oikos and travel which concerns us here. It has to be 
clear that Oikos is used here in a broad sense that includes all the signifying structures 
that constitute and traverse the interpreting subject. Oikos represents all literalised 
meanings, institutions, cultural conventions, historical vantage points and 
hermeneutic presuppositions that the traveller inhabits. Oikos, hence, is presence and 
proximity also in the form of consciousness, the habitat of meaning. 
In a similar way with metaphor, which consists of a deviation from a proper 
meaning by means of a transposition to an unfamiliar semantic field and of the 
reduction of this deviation through contextual interaction, travel marks a detour from 
Oikos and exposes the subject to a foreign cultural horizon inducing a process of 
residence. In this sense, the law of the house also commands the exile, the fugitive, the nomad, 
the cosmopolitan, the visionary of utopias. 
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interpretation, eventually, resolved in a fusion of horizons. Distanciation in both cases 
is a necessary and positive condition. One must bear in mind that hermeneutics 
assumes the task of overcoming "cultural distance" and "historical alienation, " which 
can take various forms that are gathered under the notion of the horizon of the text in 
its broader sense, that is, as a system of interrelated signs (linguistic or cultural). 
Hermeneutics undertakes to abstract similarity from difference, to create sameness 
out of otherness, to establish an order of regulated polysemy. Hermeneutics is a 
struggle for univocity. However, this can only advance by means of a mediation, 
distanciation, or metaphor. One must acquire distance from home and be exposed to 
an alien semantic or cultural horizon in order to attain a new and fuller insight into 
home. Understanding comes as a result of a tension and conflict between 
interpretations. And in the hermeneutics of Ricoeur, understanding always implies 
self-understanding. Similarly to the metaphorical process, at the moment two cultural 
horizons, that of the traveller and that of the visited culture, meet and clash, a tension 
is produced which makes their deeper structures of meaning appear. At this juncture, 
understanding is still held in suspension. It takes the labour of interpretation, which 
draws on already established meanings, which submits to the-law-of-the-house, for 
this tension to be resolved in a semantic fusion. The traveller in the end returns to 
Oikos, or should we say that Oikos returns to the traveller? The traveller is 
provisionally dispossessed of his/herself only to re-emerge an enlarged self. This 
process forms the dialectic of distanciation and appropriation, which amounts to a 
self-understanding before the text. The text, in this case a distanced cultural horizon, 
opens up a new world for the traveller which offers an invitation and an opportunity 
for the actualisation of his/her ownmost (oikeies as one's own) possibilities. This is 
the profit of travel, the hermeneutic experience of travel. 
Accordingly, travel is the interpretative experience of a subject who is 
transposed to a foreign cultural horizon. This is, of course, the hermeneutic premise 
of travel and not necessarily "what actually happens". The above formulation would 
describe the ideal traveller in an ideal situation, a subject who painstakingly and 
consciously struggles to achieve understanding as self-understanding. Ricoeur admits 
that such a situation would be practically impossible and this is why he incorporates 
the critique of ideology and of false consciousness into his hermeneutic project. The 
critique of ideology attempts to lay bare the structures of power and knowledge and 
to dispel "illusions" of the subject that distort and inhibit communication. In the case 
of the traveller, this would demand a copious analysis of the discursive structures and 
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relations of power which determine and interfere with the experience of travel as 
much as with its representation and articulation in the travel text. Such studies, which 
are today in abundance, tackle travel writing particularly from post-colonial and 
gender point of views concentrating mainly on questions of cultural identity, 
representation, race and genre. " Nonetheless, does not the critique of ideology and 
discourse analysis in attempting to expose and dismantle the layers and constructions 
of power assume and presuppose the possibility of an unprohibited communicative 
situation, a hermeneutic ideal? And does not the positing of such a possibility, even 
though untenable, evade the question of its own essential presuppositions? Are we 
sure of what we mean by experience, presence, meaning, home and travel? 
The notion of differance proposes a radical rethinking of these concepts, 
which are often taken as self-evident. '2 "Experience" and "presence" have been 
inextricably related in the history of metaphysics, whether they were understood and 
treated as exteriority or interiority, in the form of consciousness or not. 13 This is to 
say that meaning, either reduced to an "empirical consciousness", that is, to a psychic 
reality, or to a "transcendental consciousness" (ideality), or to the exterior world 
11 For instance, Mary Louise Pratt's Imperial Eyes, Travel Writing and Transculturation, 
London, Routledge, 1992, Sarah Mill's Discourses of Difference: An Analysis of Women's 
Travel-Writing and Colonialism, London, Routledge, 1991, David Spurr's The Rhetoric of 
Empire, Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration, 
Durham & London, Duke University Press, 1993, Derek Gregory's and James Duncan's (eds), 
Writes of Passage: Travel Writing, Place, Ambiguity, London, Routledge, 1999, Inderpal 
Grewal, Home and Harem: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Culture of Travel, Durham, Duke 
University Press, 1996. 
12 Even approaches that acknowledge the complexity and hybridity of such notions as the 
subject, culture, identity and so forth mainly foregrounding and "celebrating" difference, cannot 
always avoid the "trap" of relativism. Questioning firm positions and "closed" identities, in 
many cases, entails prioritising "difference" over "sameness. " It is thus the reversal of the same 
logic. To champion relativism, in a way, is also to endorse a "relational" logic that necessarily 
implies the pre-existence of certain identities, at least of a minimal identificatory operation, 
which allows for the relata to come together and signify interactively. Deconstruction, it must 
be clear, is not the practice of relativism. It already disrupts the relata as such and relational 
logic on the whole. Relata and relation emerge together without the precondition of a minimal 
and simple identity. The emergence of meaning, however, is not without a certain rhythm and 
structure; it is not the unbounded play of signs and differences. Another crucial difference 
between deconstruction and relativism is that the former engages in bringing out and 
intercepting rigorous structures, that is, the enduring structures that traverse the discourse of 
metaphysics, in a rigorous way. This does not amount to a levelling off of the particularity of 
any given context. It is what multiplies differences within contexts without implying that 
anything is possible or that anything goes. Relativistic attitudes by not attending to these 
rigorous structures foster a "nave" conception of the "values" of identity and difference, which, 
ultimately, go uncontested. 
IS According to Derrida, "experience" has "always designated the relationship with a presence 
whether that relationship had the form of consciousness or not. " Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 
60. 
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(factuality) that then grafts itself onto consciousness, has always presupposed the 
definiteness of something unified and present. "Interior" and "exterior" constitute a 
fundamental metaphysical opposition, one that grounds transcendental (i. e., the 
assumption of the existence of a priori categories) and empirical thinking (the 
reduction of experience and knowledge to the sensible, factual world), one which 
allows for the oppositions between spirit and matter, subject and object, signified and 
signifier, speech and writing, what allows for logocentrism in toto. These divisions 
are put into question by Derrida, who maintains that interiority and exteriority divide 
and traverse each other. 14 Because experience cannot be simply reduced to the 
intuition of a fully present object since the latter involves a process of 
temporalisation, which constitutes and divides its intended object out of and in its 
past and future "presentations" (retentions and protentions), because interiority and 
exteriority cannot be in a relation of direct and transparent correspondence, there can 
be no pure experience lived as such. Meaning neither originates from the "real" 
world, nor from consciousness but rather emerges from the relation of the world to 
consciousness, as the world for consciousness. It emerges out of a space opened 
between consciousness and the world, a space, however, which also opens and 
destines them to each other. Sense or meaning then becomes the "nonreal 
component" of lived experience. 15 
Meaning emerges from a difference between "the world" and "lived 
experience", a difference and a relation, which is not preceded by constituted 
realities, which is already a trace, and which bears the imprints of what could be 
reduced to such "realities. "16 This is to say that, concrete contents can be constituted 
solely on the condition of the "reduction of the trace". According to Derrida, meaning 
is not something disclosed or intuited in the fullness of a present as such, but rather 
arises out of the constant repetition, that is, the iteration and alteration of differential 
relations that form chains of traces. The trace, no more interior (consciousness) than 
exterior (world), no more intelligible than sensible, opens up a space for the 
inscription and the production of meaning. It is the nonsimple origin, the originary 
difference or differance that gives the condition for all difference and for all chains of 
differences. The trace then does not have a representational structure since it does not 
stand for something absent. It is neither an empirical mark, nor an ideal content: it is 
" Derrida, Of Grammatologi", p. 35. 
15Ibid., p. 64. 
16 Ibid., p. 65. 
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nothing present in itself, hence, nothing presentable or re-presentable. This is why 
Derrida's thought of the trace has vast implications for the metaphysical notion of the 
sign, which is essentially premised upon a representational function, that is, the 
function of standing for an absent thing, a past or future present. " Removing or 
dislocating meaning from this representational logic is what makes a trace of the sign, 
intercepting, thereby, a fundamental metaphysical notion. '8 This is not to say, 
however, that the sign is prior to the trace. The sign does not turn into a trace, but 
rather becomes thinkable through what is called "the movement of the reduction of 
the trace. " However, since the trace does not exist, there is neither sign nor trace: all 
that endures is the process of the-becoming-sign-of-the-trace. 
The critique of presence has vast implications for Ricoeurian hermeneutics, 
according to which meaning is always produced and understood in the event of 
discourse, in a present that overdetermines it. For Ricoeur, meaning is actualised as a 
"dialogical event", which is traversed by the subject's intention to communicate in a 
particular situation. The intention of the subject, the "soul" of discourse, is part of the 
contextual determination of meaning, of what furnishes singularity, particularity and 
definiteness to the otherwise fleeting event of language. Now, Derrida neither 
disclaims the eventfulness of meaning nor discards the necessity of a theory of 
discourse but rather objects to their organisation around "a collectivity of presences" 
(for instance, a present signifying intentionality and a present and available object). 
Of course, Ricoeur also speaks of the openness of words or signs to new meanings 
(and thus of a certain ambiguity that upsets the "presence" of meaning), which is 
effected through the workings of metaphor, the force behind semantic innovation. 
The crucial difference is that while Ricoeur accommodates innovation as the 
17 Saussure designated the signifying function as the outcome of the play and the differential 
chains of signs, that is, of arbitrary and unmotivated linguistic entities without positive terms. 
He thus broke away from a tripartite concept of meaning as the unity of signifier-signified- 
thing. However, he still largely maintained the theme of presence, since the unity of the 
signifier-signified (and thus the presence of sense in each of its empirical occurrences), as we 
shall later see, goes uncontested. 
18 Differance forbids the reduction of meaning to an interior or exterior experience or presence. 
Meaning emerges out of imprints, of traces which, as traces, are neither totally present nor 
totally absent but infinitely relate and refer themselves to other traces, to traces of traces, always 
differing and deferring themselves. The thought of differance is not a structural explanation of 
language celebrating and affirming playfulness in detriment of vigorousness and seriousness, a 
rejoicing in depriving it of any possibility of definite meaning. The formal play of signs as 
traces is a rigorous structure that manifests, on the one hand, the essential impossibility of the 
appearance and reappearance of an ever same and present meaning but, on the other hand, 
constitutes the essential possibility of all meaning. 
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dialectical counterpart of a rigorous and regulative order of meanings, polysemy, 
Derrida questions this very order by opposing to it the notion of dissemination, which 
does not accept comfortable settlements of literalised senses precisely because it 
challenges what Ricoeur tends to presuppose: the possibility of demarcating between 
literal and metaphorical meaning. 
So, according to this thinking, what would the meaning of Oikos be -up to 
now understood as presence, interiority, and self-proximity- if its unity or self- 
consistency is no more secure and self-evident? What would "Oikos" as the home-of- 
meaning "mean" if the very notion of meaning becomes infinitely complicated? 
Up to now Oikos and travel have been used in a holistic mode without 
paying attention to the discursiveness, contextuality, and historicity of the notions, 
articulations and "experiences" gathered under these headings. Do house, dwelling, 
home, at home, or voyage, displacement, the exile, the nomad, fall into the same 
totalised categories of Oikos and travel? An anthropological or cultural study of travel 
relations would probably answer negatively and would examine the contextual and 
historical specificity of these terms. It is absolutely necessary that attention is paid to 
cultural particularities and formations and to the way these delimit travel. Caren 
Kaplan in her Questions of Travel, Postmodern Discourses of Displacement calls for 
the historisation and contextualisation of the notions of "home" and "away" and of 
the mystified and universalised figure of the "traveller, " as these occur in the so- 
called modernist and postmodernist critical and literary discourses. 19 In her view, 
these discourses abundantly and uncritically use prevalent metaphors of "travel" and 
"displacement" rarely admitting to the material conditions, the specific historical, 
geographical, political and primarily colonial circumstances surrounding and giving 
rise to particular experiences. Her argument is that "although modern imperialism 
does not structure every aspect of culture in every site around the globe [... ] the 
emergence of terms of travel and displacement (as well as their oppositional 
counterparts, home and location) in contemporary criticism must be linked to the 
histories of the production of colonial discourses. " (my italics)20 The validity of this 
argument is not objected to here. "Travel" and "displacement, " which Kaplan 
designates as modernist and postmodernist metaphors respectively, do receive diverse 
historical determinations and critical delineations, whose conditions of emergence 
19 Kaplan, Caren, Questions of Travel, Postmodern Discourses of Displacement, London, Duke 
University Press, 1996. 
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need to be considered so as to reduce the danger of homogenising experiences of 
"travel" under generalised figures such as the "exile", the "tourist" and the "nomad". 
Kaplan disapproves of James Clifford's use of the term "travel" which, in her 
opinion, unwarrantedly functions as "a kind of urmetaphor"21 for all experiences of 
displacement. "Travel" cannot shake off the legacy of its European and bourgeois 
histories and traditions and, therefore, cannot incorporate "the histories of mass 
immigrations and more collective displacement. " Kaplan opts for the term 
"displacement" for the description of more recent, "post-modern" collective 
movements and dislocations, from which she wants to address the "modernist" 
experiences and articulations of "travel". Although Clifford admits that "the marking 
of `travel' by gender, class, race, and culture is all too clear" and that he struggles, 
"never quite successfully, to free the related term `travel' from a history of European, 
literary, male, bourgeois, scientific, heroic, recreational meanings and practices"", he 
hangs on to 
" `travel' as a term of cultural comparison precisely because of its historical 
taintedness, its associations with gendered, racial bodies, class privilege, ege, specific means of 
conveyance, beaten paths, agents, frontiers, documents, and the like. 
"Travel" then is used by Clifford as a "translation term", that is, "a word of 
apparently general application used for comparison in a strategic and contingent 
way .,, 
24 In this way, Clifford is able to address a continuous, "global", `broad" and 
relatively unified sense of travel, since his aim is "to make some sense, or senses, of 
people going places"'' and at the same time to take account of and to account for the 
historical, contingent and heterogeneous experiences of travel. What Clifford calls 
"translation term" or "comparative concept" is not a singular site for comparison but 
is built up of "imperfect equivalences" without being able to fully account for any of 
them: 
"My expansive use of `travel' goes a certain distance and falls apart into 
nonequivalents, overlapping experiences marked by different translation terms: `diaspora, ' 
`borderland, ' `immigration, ' `migrancy, ' `tourism, ' `pilgrimage, ' 4exile"'. 26 
"Travel" here does not refer to an original sense that has been translated, 
metaphorised, or interpreted according to specific historical contexts. One might say, 
20 Ibid., p. 2. 
2' Ibid., p. 131. 
22 Clifford, James, "Traveling Cultures" in Routes, Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth 
Century, London, Harvard University Press, 1997, pp. 31-33. 
23 Ibid., p. 39. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Clifford, Routes, p. 2. 
26 Ibid.. p. 11. 
89 
stretching Clifford's argument, that the multiple senses gathered under the term 
"travel" are translations without an original. It is through its historically specific 
experiences and inscriptions that a general notion of travel emerges, giving also rise 
to a sense of translation from the particular to the general, and not inversely. Thus, 
there is no single, unified or original sense of "travel" that would define every 
experience of travel as such. If a sense of travel is possible it is because these 
"experiences" have a certain structural continuity, a minimal identity, which is not 
pre-given but rather emerges from their historical instantiations. Any preoccupation 
with the "notion of travel" should begin with the question what is travel, that is, with 
the question of the meaning and history of travel. In seeking to write a history of 
travel, one is not doing anything else but following the trajectory of the meaning of 
"travel". However, this pre-posits an original sense, a unified and simple etymon. 
Then the question becomes: what is the origin of travel? (a question, however, which 
already presupposes that of what is the sense of origin in general. ) Since a certain 
sense of travel is already comprehended and anticipated in this question, it is the 
particular instantiations and events of travel that will always have been the guiding 
thread for a preoccupation of the sort. It is through and across history that a sense, 
with all its polysemic configurations, arises in a way that makes room for thinking 
ideality and history together. Meaning emerges across history without, however, 
being merely historical, since for there to be meaning, there has to be a certain 
ideality, a structure of repetition that creates effects of samenes. 2' A repetition, 
however, across contexts always implies alteration and difference. This structure of 
sameness and difference, which is inconceivable outside history, but even more, 
which produces a "history" of travel, is what concerns us here. 
Without dismissing Kaplan's project, this thesis proposes a re-examination of 
the notion of travel. Even in a study such as Kaplan's, which argues for the 
historisation and contextualisation of cultural formations and practices as well as of 
critical categories and bears the title Questions of Travel, the notions of Oikos and 
27 In treating any subject one should begin with the question of its origin of meaning, even if 
this proves to be something impure and always already disrupted. For instance, Derrida comes 
about the question of "what is art" in the same way. He writes with regard to the at once 
structural and historical values of meaning: "the crossing [of history] can in this case just as 
well denote historicism, the determining character of the historicity of meaning, as it can denote 
ahistoricity, history crossed, transfixed in the direction of meaning, in the sense of a meaning [le 
sens d'un sens] in itself ahistorical. " Derrida, Jacques, The Truth in Painting, translated by 
Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod, London, The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 20. So it 
is not a question of choosing between a structural or a historical approach but to ponder over the 
signifying conditions that make them both possible. 
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travel or "home and away", which is the opening phrase of the book, retain an 
organising and regulative function. We are still tackling questions of travel, of an at 
least minimally unified subject, which is oppositionally conceived to the notion of 
home. Kaplan is interested in both the continuities and discontinuities between and 
within the multiple discourses of modernism and postmodernism. She argues that 
despite the former's foregrounding of "elitist", "aesthetised" and "individualised" 
figures of the "traveller" and the "exile" and the latter's preoccupation with the 
collective but also fragmented and scattered experiences of tourism, diaspora, 
nomadism and immigration, they both taint and traverse each other. These 
continuities and discontinuities within the very notion of travel already contextualised 
in the discourses of modernism and postmodernism should be addressed, according to 
Kaplan, from a historical point of view. However, as will be argued here, these 
transformations also participate and emerge from a structure that may be itself 
historically produced but which also forms the "quasi-transcendental" condition for 
the signification of Oikos and travel, a historical rather than transcendental a priori. 
This is the structural and necessary relation between Oikos and travel, which lets 
them signify through effects of properness and metaphor, and which when 
dialecticised and gathered under definite meanings (of home and away) may and 
indeed has inflicted violence, of which a high point has been colonialism. 
If colonialism has been able to so thoroughly and indeed diversely redefine 
and change the face of the world drawing maps, giving rise to historical and political 
entities, redistributing power, this was so also due to reasons that cannot be accounted 
for solely on empirico-historical grounds. It is also of primary importance to 
acknowledge and examine the place that the notions of Oikos and travel at work 
behind the practice of colonialism hold in the history of metaphysics and in the 
systematic and enduring structures that "ensure (us of) the transmission and 
uninterrupted continuity -however highly differentiated- of all the moments of 
Metaphysics. "28 
28 Derrida continues: "If one does not acknowledge this powerful, systematic truth, one no 
longer knows what one is talking about in allegedly interrupting, transgressing, exceeding, etc., 
'metaphysics, ' `philosophy, ' etc. And, without a rigorous critical and deconstructive 
acknowledgement of the system, the very necessary attention to differences, disruptions, 
mutations, leaps, restructurations, etc., becomes ensnarled [sic] in slogans, in dogmatic 
stupidity, in empiricist precipitation -or all of these at once; and in any event lets the very 
discourse it believes it is putting into question be dictated to itself a tergo. " Derrida, Jacques, 
"Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time, " Margins of Philosophy, translated 
by Alan Bass, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982, p. 39. 
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The systematic preoccupation with the signifying conditions of Oikos and 
travel and the enduring structures that allow for their perpetuation and continuity does 
not simply pertain to a rhetorical codification or formal taxonomy. The aim here is 
not to replace historical explications by ahistorical and ever same categories, by 
virtual constructions and structural rules which do not admit to historical, political 
and ethical questions. On the contrary, these structures bring forth the general 
conditions of signification and historicity of senses of being at home and away, which 
also give rise to particular notions and representations of Oikos and travel. It is in 
language where there already lies the possibility of Oikos and travel. It is in its 
signifying movement, which is torn apart between a drive towards mastery, adequacy 
and appropriation of meaning and a counter drive towards metaphor, dissemination 
and ex-appropriation that Oikos and travel become thinkable. Language as the "house 
of meaning" is what gives the possibility and "deconstructability" of "the-at-home" 
by exposing it to an internal, so to speak, exteriority, forbidding thus the serene 
closure in the familiarity of the house but also promising the "other", the beyond, the 
still unthinkable. 
Travel is always already implicated in the appropriating and ex- 
appropriating force of meaning and far from being a neutral term is ridden with 
historical meaning. The association of the term "travel" with Eurocentric, male, 
humanistic, in short, with authoritative discourses, is not superseded here since it 
brings into play and makes more evident the semantic structures that essentially 
implicate it with imperialistic enterprises. This is also why this term is useful for a 
study of the metaphysics of "travel", the critique of presence and logocentrism. 
"Travel" is not chosen here for the specific historical determinations it has received as 
a term, but it refers to a structure that has made these determinations possible, the 
structure of semantic movement that defines and engenders senses of home and away. 
lt has to be stressed that to recognize this structure is not to produce a holistic or 
reductive definition but rather to point to the condition of possibility for both a 
general meaning of "travel" (for a concept must have generality) and its differential 
and singular instantiations (for generality is nothing outside and before "its" singular 
inscriptions). This is what gives the chance of thinking generality and singularity, 
concept and event together. We shall take up this point in the next chapter. 
What concerns us is the binary thinking of Oikos and travel as this takes 
shape within the tradition of Western metaphysics. The preoccupation with the 
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metaphysics of travel and its deconstructive challenge is not simply a matter of choice 
here. When we think of "travel" we necessarily do so in terms of a place of departure 
and arrival, even if these are not always easily determinable. In other words, "travel" 
is indissociable from a certain sense of derivation and destination or telos. Now, is it 
possible to break free from the centripetal force of home? Travel is never disengaged 
from some sense of homeliness. It is not implied here that Oikos is the negative 
condition of travel that has to be overcome. An evaluation of the sort would amount 
to no more than a reversal of hierarchy that would reaffirm its logic and would fail to 
think through the essential relation of these notions. What is proposed is a rethinking 
of the house and of travel that would disrupt their totalising effects and that would 
make room for an event of encounter with otherness that would not subordinate 
difference to sameness. If one tried to formalise how a deconstructive reading works, 
one could point to two supplementary gestures that pertain to the double or 
"doubling" movement of "deconstruction", which is, however, already at work within 
the notions themselves and not something imposed from the outside. It is through 
reversing the priority Oikos over travel and through the displacement and 
generalisation of the latter that oppositional coupling can be exceeded. Once again, 
we revert to the figure of metaphor in order to extend its Derridean generalisation to 
the notion of travel. 
From now on, the metaphor of travel, "travel as metaphor", can no longer 
appear as a metaphor in the usual sense. Its abyssal generalisation forbids this. Nor 
can home, what is known and familiar, be "at home" in the infinite detour and 
deferral of meaning. Derrida in "The Retrait of Metaphor" reflects on the 
Heideggerian quasi-metaphor of the "house of Being. " The subject of this quasi- 
metaphor is language, what allows Being to be thought, what Being inhabits and 
where Being is sheltered and cared for. 29 "It is language that tells us about the essence 
of a thing, provided that we respect language's own essence . 
5530 And it is by virtue of 
language's appropriative force that the house, property, propriety and properness 
become thinkable. 1 If this expression were taken as a metaphor in the traditional 3 
29 "Die Sprache is rather the house of Being, in which living there, man ek-sists, in that he 
belongs to the truth of Being by assuming its guardianship. " Martin Heidegger, Letter on 
Humanism, quotation from "The Retrait of Metaphor", p. 25. 
30 Heidegger, Martin, "Building Dwelling Thinking" in Basic Writings from Being and Time 
(1920 to The Task of Thinking (1964). edited by David Farrell Krell, London, Routledge, 1993, 
English translation 1977 by Harper Collins, p. 348. 
31 To suggest this is not to reduce everything involved with Oikos and thus travel to linguistic 
structures strictly regulated by linguistic norms. That would be a form of linguisticism or 
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sense, it would function as a way to approach something distant and unknown, 
"Being, " by means of something familiar, the "house. " However, this would tell us 
nothing about the subject of the expression, "language": 
"Discourse about the house of Being is not a metaphor transporting the image of the `house' toward Being, but it is by way of appropriating thinking the essence of Being that we 
will one day be able to think what `house' and `to inhabit' are. " (my italics) 
The house becomes possible by way of thinking our mode of being-in-the- 
world, by coming closer, approximating, appropriating, making proper meaning out 
of Being, out of the ways we find ourselves in the world. According to Heidegger, 
thinking Being is already a dwelling. 
In "Building Dwelling Thinking" Heidegger designates dwelling not as 
something we do but rather as what we are, as what defines Dasein, the being that we 
are. It is because we are capable of dwelling, because dwelling is proper to the 
essence of our being, that we construct buildings to dwell in. "Dwelling is the manner 
in which mortals are on the earth. " Dwelling means to remain, to stay in a place and 
to stay with the things that surround us. And to remain for Heidegger signifies to set 
free, to make room for, to spare: 
"Real sparing is something positive and takes place when we leave something 
beforehand in its own essence, when we return it specifically to its essential being, when we 
`free' it in the proper sense of the word into a preserve of peace. To dwell, to be set at peace, 
means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each 
thing in its essence. The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing. It pervades 
dwelling in its whole range. " 3 
And it is in language that the essence of dwelling, the mode of Dasein 's 
being-in-the-world and its being-with things and other Daseins, can be thought of and 
cared for. 
"Dwelling, however, is the basic character of Being, in keeping with which mortals 
exist. Perhaps this attempt to think about dwelling and building will bring out somewhat more 
clearly that building belongs to dwelling and how it receives its essence from dwelling. 
Enough will have been gained if dwellingand building have become worthy of questioning 
and thus have remained worthy of thought. 
In this sense the question of Oikos arises anew and primarily as the question 
of dwelling, that is, a more radical condition than the circumscribed locality of the 
house taken for the origin of travel. Before calling upon the properties of the house, 
logocentrism that would, moreover, imply a language in a pure and diaphanous state in full 
correspondence with the world. Proper meaning and metaphor, Oikos and travel, with all their 
related notions and their syntactic or spacio-temporal motifs, arise from what Derrida calls 
writing in the generalised sense, that is, the condition of possibility for the inscription of 
meaning, something that exceeds language in the narrow sense. 
32 Heidegger, Martin, quotation from "The Retrait of Metaphor", p. 24. 
3' Heidegger, Martin, "Building Dwelling Thinking", p. 351. 
'4 Ibid., p. 362. 
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one would have to address the question of how the house comes into being, how 
appropriation becomes possible. In order for the house to become thinkable in its 
essence, that is, in order for the Being of the house to appear, or inversely in order to 
think Being by way of the house, it would take more than a mutually illuminating 
drawing together of these notions. It is by virtue of language and its appropriative 
(and to be sure, ex-appropriative) forces that both the house and Being become 
thinkable. But this would also signify that neither the house nor Being are re- 
presented or fully manifested in language. They both become possible and desirable 
by way of their withdrawal from language. We are referring here to an originary ex- 
appropriation or exile of truth, essence and meaning from language; an exile, 
however, that opens the path to an impossible yet necessary re-appropriation, by way 
of which everything becomes thinkable. 
To return to the metaphor of language, "the house of Being" should not be 
treated as a metaphor in the Ricoeurian sense. Derrida disagrees with Ricoeur's 
reading of Heidegger's The Principle of Reason, which is also cited in "White 
Mythology, " in a passage which is at the centre of Ricoeur's critique. Ricoeur 
maintains that Heidegger's distrust of metaphor is undermined by his abundant use of 
metaphors, which defeat the thematic exposition of the notion. In contrast, Derrida's 
view is that a metaphorology of the sort would be "almost catastrophic" for 
Heidegger's text and its main theme, which is the withdrawal-of-Being-or-of- 
metaphor. The phrase "the withdrawal of Being or of metaphor" is not to be taken as 
a metaphor in the strict, intra-metaphysical sense. "Withdrawal" and "Being" or 
"metaphor" are not mutually illuminated by being drawn together in this phrase. 
"Being", metaphor and proper meaning do not pre-exist their withdrawal, nor does 
"withdrawal" have any meaning before its inscription as the withdrawal of Being. 35 
Since Being is not a determinate being, since it "presents" itself only in concealment 
and dissimulation, it is neither fully present nor totally absent, but manifests itself in 
retreating. The ontological question of Being, the thought of the essence and meaning 
of the ontic, that is, of empirical beings or entities, becomes possible and desirable by 
way of this "a priori withdrawal" that makes room for thinking in general. If the truth 
and meaning of beings were manifest in their full presence and radiance, thinking and 
language would be made redundant. It is out of the opening of the space of 
ontological difference or d ferance (though these notions are not identical), of the 
35 Derrida, "The Retrait of Metaphor", pp. 22-23. 
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discursive space where meaning comes to be inscribed, that the proper meaning of 
beings is sought for and effected. It is also through thinking this difference that 
language and the established concepts of the proper and metaphor are disrupted and 
unable to literally, properly signify. So the "withdrawal of Being or metaphor" is 
more than a metaphor (stricto sensu) and yet nothing but metaphor or metaphoricity. 
Plus de metaphore. Likewise, "the house of Being" does not open a path from the 
`house' to `Being' nor does `Being' through a tropic inversion say or promise "more 
about the house than the house about Being" but it "speaks above all of language and 
therefore in it of metaphoricity", 36 metaphor in the generalised sense. The "house of 
Being" is no more proper than it is metaphorical. 
The Heideggerian Destruktion of the proper and metaphor in the 
metaphysical sense gives way to an originary thinking of the trajectory or path (Weg) 
of language as the way to Being. The way to language and the way to Being opened 
up by the withdrawal of proper meaning and metaphor (in the intra-metaphysical 
sense), that is, by the originary ex-appropriation of meaning, already bears the 
imprints of an originary thought of travel revealing its existential condition as the 
"voyage of Being. " The withdrawal of meaning signals the "mice en chemin" 
[Geschick] of Being, another quasi-metaphorical phrase, since Being never appears as 
such but is always already imparted and dissimulated in beings. It is always on its 
way, never at home. This is also what gives the possibility of all paths, journeys and 
destinations. 37 Language then is not the house of Being, at least not in an 
unproblematic way, for it cannot gather Being in itself but only promise it. This is, 
however, language's very condition of existence: promising itself as the sheltering 
place of Being. It is through this promise that language and Being, language as the 
house of Being, begin to signify. Since nothing signifies as such in a self-revealing 
way, since language only names improperly by at once totalising and dividing 
everything involved in the signifying process, the possibility of both language and 
(the) thought (of Being) must have opened up by what is called originary trace or 
incision, that is, the totality of traits or traces, which open, split aside, hold together 
36 Ibid. pp. 24-25. 
'' "En ce sens, Heidegger serait le premier penseur du voyage originaire de I'origine. " Malabou, 
p. 125. According to Catherine Malabou, Heidegger engages in an unprecedented thinking 
about travel which opens out to all paths, destinations and destinies: "Heidegger degage donc un 
sens tout ä fait inoul du voyage: ni propre, ni litteral, comme ouverture originaire de tous les 
chemins, de tous les destinations et de tous les destins. Cet exces de la mise en chemin sur la 
metaphoricite et la litteralite du chemin ne provient d'aucune surabondance, d'aucune plenitude 
d'origine, mais du trace d'un trait [... ]" Ibid., p. 128. 
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the possibility of language. 38 Both "house" and "Being" then signify on the condition 
of this incision, for Being, what qualifies being as being, can only be thought in and 
after the fact of language, which through its re-appropriative drive becomes the 
"shelter" or the "house" of Being and thus also makes the meaning of "house" in 
general possible. The trace that opens language is not originary in the proper sense of 
origin. It is not the foundation from which everything emanates. Nor is it, as usually 
understood, a remainder, derivation (the trace is not a metaphor) or modification. 
Nothing precedes the trace and yet everything has always already begun with the 
trace. One would have to renounce any security with regard to the notion of the house 
as a place of origin, even if this entails giving up what is familiar and proximate, and 
start thinking of the house as "a place of withdrawal": "It is necessary to come back 
to where we are without properly being there. "39 If this withdrawal with no precedent 
is everything there is, if we live by it, think by it, and reside in it, in "the non-near of 
proximity" of Oikos, in the neighbourhood of home, without properly being "at 
home", then everything erupts out of a difference or incision which is more originary, 
that is, structurally older than what is called by Heidegger "ontico-ontological 
difference". Ontological difference, that is, the difference between the Being of being 
as such and present beings, is already incised by the concealed trait that makes it 
thinkable: 
"Being nothing, [the trait of the incision] does not appear itself, it has no proper and 
independent phenomenality, and in not disclosing itself it withdraws, it is structurally in 
withdrawal, as a divergence, opening, differentiality, trace, border, traction, effraction, etc. 
From the moment that it withdraws in drawing itself 
ýouot, 
the trait is a priori withdrawal, 
unappearance, and effacement of its mark in its incision. 
The opening trait of language where Being and thus ontological difference 
come to be thought does not consist of a separation between or the drawing together 
of two previously constituted presences (Being and beings) re-presented in language. 
Just as thought without being identical with language is not being said or thought 
elsewhere (thus language is not reduced to a representational function), the "mise en 
chemin" cannot be simply a passage from something familiar (the house) to 
something distant, but it is the movement in and through which both come to 
signify. " All that is drawn to the proximity of the house, regulated by the economy of 
38 Derrida, "The Retrait of Metaphor", p. 3 1. 
39 Ibid., p. 26. 
40 Ibid., p. 29. 
41 However, as Malabou points out, even though Heidegger puts forward the essential condition 
for the signification of Oikos and travel and pushes these notions to the limit of metaphysics, he 
remains within the logic of derivation and of the predestined path, on the way to the re- 
appropriation of the truth of Being or the voyage of Dasein towards its anticipated and projected 
97 
Oikos, by the desire for presence, cannot just simply be there, present in itself. We 
reside and move in neighbourliness. "42 Neighbourliness, again a Heideggerian term, 
is living in proximity with one another. It is a relation that draws together but in doing 
so also constitutes and splits the relata in themselves for it does not let them be in 
their proper selves. Oikos and travel, each in the neighbourhood of the other, are 
(with-)drawn together in a continuous movement to and from one another, along a 
path which infinitely postpones arrival, an itinerary with no premeditated telos. Oikos 
and travel a priori withdraw in order to be thought in the space opened up by this 
withdrawal. 
But what do we mean by "space" here? One cannot challenge the 
"naturalness" of the division, circumscription, or mastering of space that gives rise to 
fixed geographical entities and rigid boundaries, before and without asking what 
allows for such an inscription to "take place, " what is that in which it does "take 
place" and, indeed, what is place? 
Travel, Space and Time 
We previously touched upon Heidegger's notion of dwelling as the par 
excellence existential condition of Dasein. Dwelling essentially presupposes the 
primordial fact of being thrown into the world, of Dasein 's belonging to the world 
with which it attains an immediate and "inconspicuous" familiarity. As Heidegger 
maintains in the pages dedicated to the question of space in Being and Time, Being- 
in-the-world and in space is an existential condition for Dasein. Thus before world 
and space, within which Dasein finds and constitutes itself, become the objective 
field of epistemological cognition and inquiry, they should be addressed from an 
ontological perspective and moreover from a fundamental ontology that goes beyond 
and deeper than the preoccupation with the ontic field (ontic sciences). So space or 
rather spatiality is an existential for any entity found within the world. " What is 
determined next is the kind of spatiality pertaining to entities other than Dasein, 
which Heidegger calls equipment, and to Dasein itself. 
unity or destination. The originary trace, in the end, is not effaced in Heidegger. Malabou, pp. 
130-132. 
42 Derrida, The Retrait of Metaphor", p. 26. 
4' "[I]nasmuch as any entity within-the-world is likewise in space, its spatiality will have an 
ontological connection with the world. " Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, translated by John 
Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, p. 134. 
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Heidegger coins the expression "ready-to-hand" in order to characterise the 
entities we come by and are close to in our everyday dealings. "Readiness-to-hand" 
expresses the Being of equipment and is what allows Dasein to have access to and 
make use of it, to essentially fit it up, set up, and put to rights. 44 The ready-to-hand as 
"what is close in this way gets established by the circumspection of concern" and is 
made room for, given place, through Dasein's involvement. Ready-to-hand is 
carefully distinguished from present-at-hand, which belongs to the definite and 
objective determination of things by the ontic sciences. Things present-at-hand are 
being calculated, computed, and have their distance measured according to 
"objective" and pre-established criteria. What allows for this is the essential 
readiness-to-hand of equipment that offers itself to our circumscription. However, 
whenever the latter is not kept in mind things lose their fundamentally worldly 
character. For Heidegger, things are not simply discovered randomly in the world but 
are allotted places in accordance with our involvement. A place presents itself, makes 
itself appear, as the place of such and such equipment. Out of a multiplicity of 
possible places a thing is given directionality, what Heidegger calls the "whither", 
and is eventually allocated a place in "the context of equipment that is 
environmentally ready-to-hand" and to which it belongs at the time. 45 So space is not 
something pre-given in its pure state. It is fragmentarily discovered through 
circumspection and is nothing outside the entities that take up and make up space. 46 
However, the fragmentary, multiple and provisional character of space has its own 
unity on the level of its underlying existential condition of spatiality, "through that 
totality-of-involvements in-accordance-with-the-world [weltmässige] which belongs 
to the spatially ready-to-hand. "47 It is because of the readiness-to-hand of equipment 
and its essentially spatial dimension that things can be allotted places according to 
some context of involvement and within the range of a regional orientation 
" Ibid., pp. 135-136. 
as .. [I]n general the `whither' to which the totality of places for a context of equipment gets 
allotted, is the underlying condition which makes possible the belonging-somewhere of an 
equipmental totality as something that can be placed. " This "whither" Heidegger calls "region". 
A "region" then is that towards and within the range of which a thing is directed and oriented by 
our circumspective concern and "where" it provisionally takes up place within a context of 
possible places that "make-up the aroundness -the 'round-about-us' [das Um-uns-herum]- of 
those entities which \N e encounter as closest environmentally. " Ibid., pp. 135 and 136. 
46 "[A]II `wheres' are discovered and circumspectively interpreted as we go our ways in 
everyday dealings; they are not ascertained and catalogued by the observational measurement of 
space. " Ibid., p. 137. 
47 Ibid., p. 138. 
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encountered in advance. This, of course, presupposes the circumspective involvement 
of Dasein. 
Dasein also has an irreducible spatial dimensionality, however, essentially 
different from that of equipment. Dasein's spatiality is neither readiness-to-hand nor 
presentness-at-hand. Dasein is " `in' the world in the sense that it deals with entities 
encountered within-the-world, and does so concernfully and with familiarity. So if 
spatiality belongs to it in any way, that is possible only of this Being-in. "48 Dasein's 
spatiality has a two-fold character: that of de-severance and directionality. De- 
severance is the existentiale of Dasein that constitutes its aptitude to bring-close, to 
cross over the remoteness of the things alongside and within the range of its 
environmental ready-to-hand: "In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards 
closeness. "49 However, closeness and remoteness are not to be understood, as 
Heidegger emphasises, in terms of objective and measurable distance. A thing may 
be physically proximate and still remote if it does not fall under Dasein's 
circumspective care and, of course, the reverse is also the case. Nor is de-severing 
something which can ever conclusively cross over remoteness: 
"So little has Dasein crossed over its de-severance that it has rather taken it along 
with it and keeps doing so constantly; for Dasein is essentially de-severance -that is, it is 
spatial. It cannot wander about within the current range of its de-severances; it can never do 
more than change them. 1950 
Dasein finds itself and moves alongside and in between things within the 
ever extending boundaries of its environment. Dasein is always in-between places. Its 
constant de-severing involvement has also the character of directionality since 
through de-severing Dasein allocates places according to its a priori familiarity with 
its environmental regions. Because Dasein is constituted through being-in-the-world, 
because Being-in-the-world is its a priori and absolutely fundamental condition, the 
world must have been already presented to it giving it beforehand a sense of 
directedness. 
Through its circumspective concern Dasein discovers space and also gives 
space, makes room for, and sets free, in the sense of letting something be part of a 
context for a "totality of involvements. " As was said before, space is not something 
pre-existent or pre-given. It is an a priori for Dasein only in the sense that Dasein is 
itself spatial. "Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space. Space is rather 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., p. 140. 
50 Ibid., pp. 142-14-3. 
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`in' the world in so far as space has been disclosed by that Being-in-the-world which 
is constitutive for Dasein. "51 This does not mean that space cannot be discovered non- 
circumspectively or that it cannot be objectively measured. Yet, according to 
Heidegger, when this happens "the environmental regions get neutralised to pure 
dimensions", "spatiality loses its involvement-character", "the world loses its specific 
aroundness; the environment becomes the world of Nature. "52 Space is neither merely 
objective nor merely subjective. The circumspective discovery of space as de- 
severance is not an arbitrary interpretation of a subject but rather the ontological 
condition for the appearance of space for any subject and what "perhaps uncovers the 
`Reality' of the world at its most Real. " 
Why is an ontology of space so important for a rethinking of travel? To travel 
is to move through space relating locations and crossing boundaries. In order to be a 
traveller one has to cross a boundary, and boundaries, the division and also joining of 
spaces, take on different meanings and functions. A boundary is usually understood 
as the circumscription and enclosure of space, the safeguarding of a fixed, closed and 
homogeneous territory or field, the guarantor of the legitimacy and self-evidence of a 
geographical, political or cultural entity that also grounds its right to a particular 
historical past and destiny and regulates its relation with what lies beyond it. We now 
recognise that boundaries, which are as much constitutive of as constituted by what 
they enclose, are nothing more than inscriptions of power productive of and produced 
by forceful discourses, which tend to naturalise them concealing their artificial 
character. However, even in discourses that target precisely this artificial and most 
often brutal "naturalness", the inscription of the boundary as cultural construction 
reinstates itself anew. Syed Manzurul Islam in his The Ethics of Travel, From Marco 
Polo to Kafka urges caution in relation to the question of the boundary: "Perhaps we 
are moving a bit too fast, for hasn't the apparent innocence of the adjective `cross- 
cultural' belied its origin? Doesn't it presuppose the naturalness of cultural 
boundaries, as if the cut that divides and establishes polarities is somehow given? 
These questions must be addressed before the possible effects of various boundaries 
can be understood. "' 
51 Ibid., p. 146. 
52 Ibid., p. 147. 
53 Islam, Syed Manzurul, The Ethics of Trm'el, From Marco Polo to Kafka, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 4. 
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Islam reverts to an ontology of space mainly drawing on Heidegger. He 
maintains that such thinking can offer an insightful critique of the techniques of 
power and their accomplice discourses of knowledge and also open up the possibility 
of an "ethics of travel". Fixed and rigid boundaries are drawn by means of a collusion 
of power and knowledge, which also demarcates and defines the movement of the 
traveller. However, as long as the traveller dwells on, originates from and returns to 
fixed locations, travel as the encounter with the other cannot be effected. Travel 
always involves an encounter with something beyond the closed boundaries of Oikos. 
Closed boundaries condition, enable but at the same time resist travel. One has to 
cross a boundary to travel, nevertheless, one still dwells inside the boundary if one 
never challenges its authority. For Islam, this sort of traveller, whom he calls 
sedentary in disjunction to nomadic, is not a traveller at all. A sedentary traveller 
would fail to cross over the boundary of his/her enclosure as s/he would continue to 
push it forward, to carry it with him/her never really calling it into question. 
In order to be consistent with the terminology applied and with the notions 
that have guided us so far and also with the aim of drawing further implications, we 
will call such a figure of the traveller phereoikos or literally home-carrier (phero 
[0Epw]: to bring and to carry in Greek as in meta-phero [, usra-ckpw], and oikos: 
home or house). A phereoikos traveller burdened by the weight of home would be 
only capable of sluggish movement not going very far indeed, staying within and 
being drawn into the periphery of the house, commanded by its law, lingering on the 
inside, interiorising, thus appropriating, new meaning and succumbing to the order of 
the same. On the other hand, phereoikos already implies the instability and mobility 
of the house forbidding a distinct demarcation between sedentary and nomadic 
travel. 54 The moving house, which is still a house, pushes forward its borders, moving 
and dwelling all the same, revealing the double bind of travel. To travel is to move 
away from home yet it is also to carry, reinstate and refer back to home, a home that 
is already in motion. One cannot totally dismiss the dialectical and binary thinking of 
travel since home, in one way or another, is always implicated in any conception of 
54 "La nomadisation elle-meme, qu'elle füt discours ou experience, operait partir d'un centre ou 
d'une capitale, ou au moins de leur mirage, d'un lieu qui ne füt pas n'importe oü (any-tvhere). Or 
peut-on encore aujourd'hui parler de nomadisation? L'opposition entre nomade et sedentaire a- 
t-elle cours? Y a-t-il lieu de se referer un lieu, une unite de lieu, füt-ce la terre, depuis laquelle 
mesure une determination ou une indetermination? " Derrida, Jacques, Faxitexture, quoted in 
Catherine Malabou's and Jacques Derrida's Jacques Derrida, La Contre-. -lllee, p. 28. Derrida 
will be quoted in French in cases where English translations have not yet been published or 
were unavailable. 
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travel. What is called then into question is the location or localisation of home and the 
rigidity of its boundaries. Surely, boundaries do not ever stay the same. But what 
allows for this, besides the reinscription and redistribution of power and the 
establishing of new "knowledge"? What allows for boundaries to be drawn in the first 
place? And are there really any closed boundaries? 
We said before that Dasein's essential mode of dwelling is de-severing, that 
is, bringing closer the things that it comes across in its immediate regional 
environment and assigning them places by means of its circumspective involvement. 
Dasein, by definition in perpetual movement, extends the boundaries of its world and 
in so doing also extends itself. However, when things encountered fall under 
epistemological scrutiny, when they are objectified and assigned fixed positions, they 
lose their ready-to-hand character and their primordial spatiality is levelled off into 
homogenised spaces outlined by congealed boundaries. Objectified space is 
conceived as a passively given expanse onto which geography comes to draw its 
mark or, paradoxically through an inverse process, where it comes to ascertain and 
legitimate what is taken as a naturelike and given boundary. This conception of space 
forgets the question of the Being of space, of spatiality and Dasein's primordial 
relation to it. Dasein is dwelling but a dwelling in movement, (a dwelling-in- 
travelling), in the in-between, without resting on or assigning fixed locations. The 
spaces Dasein discovers are multiple, fragmentary, contingent and ever changing. As 
Islam argues, "one can only learn to dwell as a traveller by forgetting to ask the 
habitual cognitive question: what is `it'? Otherwise, one would remain immobilised 
in an epistemological trap. "55 An ontology of space reveals on the most primary and 
existential level the insubstantiality and groundlessness of rigid boundaries. For Islam 
it is the "fissuring of epistemology" that shows the way for an ethics of travel56 and 
for "true", non-sedentary travelling. 57 To the figure of the sedentary traveller Islam 
opposes that of the nomadic traveller. 
55 Islam, p. 10. 
56 The question of the ethics of travel will be taken up in the last chapter where it will be 
reconnected with the theme of metaphor, that is, the tropological structure of meaning, and with 
its phenomenological condition. The question of ethics is not something optionally added to the 
consideration of travel but will be posed as the most rigorous implication of what has been 
elaborated so far. It is also what gives direction and purpose in this thesis. Travel is by 
definition the event of an encounter with otherness. When it comes to "the other" the 
preoccupation with ethics is inescapable. 
57 "The possibilities of dwelling within non-rigid boundaries and becoming-traveller are 
immanent in the fundamental ontological condition of being: they loom like so many uncanny 
presences concealed in the placid uniformity of epistemological space. " Islam, p. 23. 
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The nomadic traveller moves along and through supple lines, from the middle 
and the in-between and not merely through fixed points. Released from the burden of 
the house, the nomadic traveller develops speed and travels "by intensity", breaking 
boundaries, deterritorialising fixed territories, thus suspending arrival to a definite 
and final place, to a prescribed destination. 58 However, nomadic travel does not bring 
down boundaries altogether. There are boundaries if only to be broken and if this is 
possible then it should reveal their loose and open character. The fact is that, even if 
we challenge their substantiality and before such a thinking takes place, we already 
reside within or come across boundaries at once artificial and very real. We define 
and identify ourselves along and against all sorts of boundaries, linguistic, cultural, 
national and so on. This is not necessarily a negative condition. We may hide, seek 
protection and immunity behind borders but we also break, transgress, trespass and 
push them forward. Whenever a boundary presents itself it becomes problematic in 
the sense Derrida outlines: It exposes itself to the danger of transgression, of the 
passage, and it calls for a decision on its status. A problema in Greek means at once 
projection and protection, a project, a task, a barrier to be overcome or used as a 
shield. "Every border is problematic in these two senses. "s9 
A boundary then is a site of exposition and exposure. It both demarcates and 
exposes an inside to an outside. A boundary does not only separate, it also joins. This 
is why it must assume an indivisibility and the possibility of passage at the same time. 
It is essential for the boundary to be able to be crossed over. Its double character 
divides it in itself forbidding the clear-cut demarcation of an inside (Oikos) from an 
outside (away from Oikos). We could say that the very poro-sity of the boundary 
points to its a-pore-tic nature and to a certain experience of the "non passage". Since 
the crossing of boundaries is no longer a passage from one clearly demarcated and 
58 Islam drawing on the terminology of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari describes two possible 
experiences of space and travelling: "Two kinds of space: striated (extensio, strata) and smooth 
(spatium, metastrata). Two lines of travel: rigid (inside) and supple (outside). Two fundamental 
attributes of travellers: movement (departure and arrival) and speed (intensity, plane of 
consistency, body without organ). Two secondary attributes: dimension (points, gravity, 
immobility) and direction (trajectory, flight). Two kinds of individuation: molar (subjectivity, 
black hole, faciality) and molecular (haecceities, unformed matter). Two orientations: 
representation (centred perspective, white wall, reterritorialisation, coding, root tree, mots 
d'ordre) and encounter (multiplicity, deterritorialisation, performance, chance, event, decoding, 
abstract machine, diagram, rhizome, becoming). Islam, p. 57. We cannot go into every category 
and delineation deployed above. What is important here is the emergence of a possibility of 
travel that breaks away from the fixed polarities of home and away, same and other, inside and 
outside. 
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identifiable place to another, it could be said that coming across a boundary exposes 
one to an experience of aporia, which literally means in Greek impasse or non- 
passage. "Il y va d' un certain pas. " This untranslatable phrase from and within the 
French language ["it involves a certain step/not; he goes along at a certain pace"] 
signifies the experience of an at once "impossible" and "necessary" passage. Derrida: 
"The crossing of borders always announces itself according to a movement of a 
certain step [pas]-and of the step that crosses a line. An indivisible line. And one always 
assumes the institution of such an indivisibility. Customs, police, visa or passport, passenger 
identification- all that is established upon this institution of the indivisible, the institution 
therefore of the step that is related to it, whether the step crosses it or not. Consequently, 
where the figure of the step is refused to intuition, where the identity or indivisibility of a line 
(finis ou peras) is compromised, the identity to oneself and therefore the possible 
identification of an intangible edge -the crossing of the line- becomes itself a problem. There is a problem as soon as the edge-line is threatened. And it is threatened from its first tracing. 
This tracing can only institute the line by dividing it intrinsically into two sides. There is a 
problem as soon as this intrinsic division divices the relation to itself of the border and 
therefore divides the being-one-self of anything. " ° 
A boundary in order to divide and to join must be indivisible and open; in 
order to "present itself", it must first of all intrinsically divide and efface itself and, in 
this way, what it includes and circumscribes. The boundary does not give itself over 
to intuition as such. It is not a limit that separates and juxtaposes two identifiable 
territories, cultures, domains of discourses, or two concepts according to an 
oppositional or relational logic of same and other. To define a boundary merely on 
the basis of geopolitical, historical, or ethnographical articulations would amount to 
reducing its onto-existential condition. The issue here is not to invalidate such 
discourses but to bring attention to what they presuppose and often take as self- 
evident without rigorously posing the question: what is a boundary? The boundary, 
border or edge, that allegedly separates an entity from another, is its 
phenomenological condition; it is what lets an entity be itself and appear as such. It is 
what also grounds the phenomenological motif of travel, since in order to be a 
traveller one has to cross a certain and presentable boundary. No boundary, however, 
is presentable as such for this would assign it a closed and self-determined character. 
The necessity (as impossibility) of the passage that presupposes the porosity and 
openness of the boundary gives the internal limit and double bind of the 
phenomenology of travel. It signals the self-interruption of intuition that can only 
perceive discontinuous objects. A boundary thus becomes a tracing that exceeds 
oppositional logic and "dialecticisable contradiction". It interrupts all "presentable 
determination" maintaining a "presentable" relation to the interruption and the 
59 Derrida, Jacques, . -1 porias, translated 
by Thomas Dutoit, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 
1993, p. 12. 
60 Ibid., p. 11. 
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interrupted61: A boundary as tracing never presents itself as such; yet it makes 
possible and at the same time impossible (as such) all types of limits for it gives both 
their conditions of existence and irreducible indeterminacy. Thereby, the experience 
of the passage is on the aporetic condition of an interminable and impossible 
encounter with a border one can neither stop at nor cross over but must endure and 
perpetually call into question. 62 The aporetic character of the boundary is not a 
negative condition. It does not necessarily bring about paralysis but, quite the 
contrary, it is what enables and calls for thinking. 
Let us once more turn to Heidegger: 
"a space is something that has been made room for, something that has been freed, 
namely, within a boundary, Greek peras. A boundary is not that at which something stops but, 
as the Greeks recognised, the boundary is that from which something begins its essential 
unfolding. That is why the concept is that of horismos, that is, the horizon, the boundary. 
Space is in essence that for which room has been made, that which is let into its bounds. 110 
A boundary thus conceived sets free, gives space, unfolds. It presupposes 
continuous movement and involvement. For sure, as one may argue, an involvement 
is never innocent and disinterested. However, an involvement of the sort is not 
conducted from a firm and solid position. It constantly ungrounds itself as it comes 
from "the essential position of the existence [Dasein] that questions"64, from the 
entity who asks the question of Being and for whom this very asking is the mode of 
existence. Dasein by definition always starts and departs from "the side of its here", 
from its finitude. Its being is existentially "decided" as a being-here. As Derrida 
points out, "it is on this side, on the side of Dasein and of its here, which is our here, 
that the oppositions between here and over there, this side and beyond, can be 
distinguished. In the same direction, one could say that it is by always starting from 
61 Ibid., p. 17. 
62 "It should be a matter [il devrait y aller de] what, in sum, appears to block our way or to 
separate us in the very place where it would no longer be possible to constitute a problem, a 
project, or a protection, that is, at the point where the very project or the problematic task 
becomes impossible and where we are exposed, absolutely without protection, without problem, 
and without prosthesis, without possible substitution, singularly exposed in our absolute and 
absolutely naked uniqueness, that is to say, disarmed, delivered to the other, incapable even of 
sheltering ourselves behind what could still protect the interiority of a secret. There, in sum, in 
this place of aporia, there is no longer any problem. " Ibid., p. 12. In the aporetic "experience" 
of the boundary the latter ceases to constitute a "problem" in the original sense of the word. 
Having no shield, no presentable boundary enclosing determined identities, we are no longer 
dealing with an opposition, an antinomy, or an either/or relation but rather with the absolute 
exposure to an other, an absolute and irreducible other, "un tout autre non opposable". We are 
referring to a relation beyond calculation, moral prescription and duty. We shall take these 
issues up in the last chapter. 
63 Heidegger, Martin, "Building Dwelling Thinking", p. 356. 
64 Heidegger, Martin, "What is Metaphysics? " in Basic Writings, p. 94. 
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the idiomatic hereness of my language, my culture, and my belongings that I relate 
myself to the difference of the over there. "65 Starting from a here Dasein is able to 
think the beyond and the over there. However, this does not simply amount to a 
privileging of the here and near over the far and away. Even if finitude and mortality 
decisively define Dasein, the "here" for Heidegger must remain undecided: 
"The theoretical question concerning the here, the `this side' as point of departure 
must remain here, on this side, undecided, that is to say, decided without any theoretical 
question, before any theoretical question: without proof. " 
It is a "here" rooted in Dasein's irreducible mortality and finitude, its 
essential character of being-towards-death, the ultimate limit and aporia, of which the 
meaning cannot but remain undecided. The "hereness" of Dasein marks an 
impossible (undecided and unlived as such) relation to death, which, nonetheless and 
paradoxically, is Dasein's proper and essential possibility (being-towards-death, or 
else the possibility of a being-able-no-longer-to-be-there). We cannot go into this 
here although "death" is essentially related to the theme of travel not least for being at 
the heart of the existential condition of the boundary and its radical undecidability. 
Undecidability is essentially implicated with the question of ethics when it comes to 
all "problematic" boundaries. If we were to address the issue of an ethics of travel, of 
opening up, responding and saying "yes" to the other, of an encounter which brings 
closer and still lets be, of losing and gathering oneself before the other, then this 
should not involve the deployment of a given and decided position, of a prescription 
or programme. The question of ethics (of travel) is not a simple one. We shall come 
back to this in the last chapter. 
The "hereness" and "nearness" of the house from which travel begins does 
not nPCescarily anti -, imply privilege home over travel Tclam'c notion of nomadic 
travel cannot simply preclude the notion of the house, even if this loses its authority 
as an absolute point of departure and arrival. There can be no travel totally freed from 
at least some notion of home, however loose and indeterminate. Oikos and travel 
move together infinitely dividing and reconstituting each other. However, one may 
ask, what is the nature and rhythm of this movement? What is an itinerary? Travel 
has been traditionally conceptualised as a transition between a point of departure and 
a point of arrival, \\hich according to the economy of the house coincide. Thereby, 
travel emerges as the relating of sites in view of a return to the initial point, to the 
completion of the hermeneutic circle. Travel thus conceived is a linear movement, a 
65 Derrida, Jacques, -1 porias, p. 52. 
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succession of loci that defines a route on the map. How is the construction of the 
route and its reduction to a line possible? What are the prerequisites for this drawing, 
this writing on space? We will now pursue an inquiry into the "itinerary" of travel 
along the lines of Derrida's analysis of the line in "Ousia and Gramme: Note on a 
Note from Being and Time. " This will introduce the dimension of time in the 
movement of travel, something already immanent in our discussion on space. 
Oikos understood as presence, self-proximity, immanence and self- 
containment, as interiority itself, is exposed to the exteriority of the detour. In the 
dialectics of Oikos and travel, Oikos is exceeded by the outward movement of travel, 
a movement that always implies space and time, the fundamental categories of 
exteriority. 67 One could say that Oikos before travel is pre-geographical and timeless. 
Being outside Oikos, being outside oneself, beyond the security of home, beyond the 
blissfulness and serenity of presence, of immediacy and self-sameness, travel 
introduces difference, a relation to the other, which is always already inscribed in 
space and time. Hence, it is the other that introduces space and time into the ever 
present, unchanging and immovable essence of the same. "Ousia and Gramme-" is an 
elaboration on a note that appears at the end of Heidegger's Being and Time and 
prepares the ground for a critique of the "vulgar" concept of time as it is found in 
Aristotle and taken up by Hegel. 
The question of time is essentially and indissociably related to the question of 
the meaning of Being, as time, according to Heidegger, is what opens up the horizon 
for the analytic of Dasein, of "a Being-there which comprehends Being". In the 
metaphysical tradition "time" and "Being" have been conceived on the basis of the 
"present" both in the sense of "what is now" and of an object "related to a 
representing subject" and present-at-hand. The "present" is what comes to "present" 
itself and "linger within the expanse of unconcealment". The question then is what is 
the relation of time to the thing that presents itself. Is time determined by the present 
"thing" or "being, " of which the essence must be then interrogated, or is it "being" 
that which is determined by time? In the metaphysical tradition the "present" is 
privileged as that "which endures and persists, near and available, exposed to vision 
or given by hand" and that which also gives rise to the idea of presence as 
permanence and persistence, according to which everything comes to being and to 
66 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
67 Derrida, "Ousia and Gramme, " p. 41. 
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thinking. 68 Heidegger's criticism is driven against the "vulgar concept" of time based 
on the "now" (nun) and its representation as the succession of the points of a line. 
Time thus conceived is for Heidegger a homogenising and levelling off of 
"primordial time" (that is, temporality as the essential structure of Dasein), by means 
of which what he calls the "ordinary concept of time" is produced. The conception of 
the time of the world as something fallen manifests an affinity with Hegel's 
understanding of time and history as the fallen state in which "spirit" finds itself. 
However, Heidegger wants to shatter the privilege or "extraordinary right" of the 
present, which runs through metaphysics and also conditions Hegel's thinking. Yet 
while this philosophical gesture would certainly not produce a completely different 
notion of time, it would call into question the up to then unproblematic "tie between 
truth and presence". If, as Derrida writes, "the experience of thought and the thought 
of experience have never dealt with anything but presence"69 and if "truth" is not to 
be reduced either to what is manifest and available (empiricism) or permanent and 
transcendental (idealism), then a different yet not totally other thinking that would 
bring about a decentring of the "present" and, indeed, a questioning of the value of 
truth is in order. 70 
In "Ousia and Gramme" Derrida reads Heidegger reading Aristotle and 
Hegel. The question of time, the "vulgar time of metaphysics", is posed primarily 
with regard to what it evades: the privileging of the "present" as the basis for the 
conceptualisation of time, as essential modality and form of time. The question of 
time as formulated by Aristotle consists of an aporia based on two inverse 
hypotheses: 1) that time belongs to beings/ time belongs to nonbeings and 2) that time 
is divisible into parts (nows)/ the "now" is not a part. According to the first 
formulation of each hypothesis, time is thought of by Aristotle as a succession of 
"nows, " of present moments, which divide and constitute the flow of time. However, 
Aristotle continues, if time is, if its form is that of the "now", of a being that now is 
then, in a certain sense, time is not. The present tense on the basis of which beings are 
determined (what is? ) is also the basis for the conception of past and future. Past and 
future are understood as past-presents and future-presents, as what is no more 
68 Ibid., p. 32. 
69 Ibid., p. 38. 
70 Such thinking becomes all the more pertinent with regard to the experience of the traveller 
and its articulation in the travel text since they necessarily presuppose and are centred around a 
lived present, a particular here and now, a present and given context re-present-ed presumably 
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(present) and what is not yet (present). So the present is also "what is past and what is 
to come". The present as "now, " as a fleeting, evasive moment in time, marks a 
passage from what is no longer to what is not yet, or rather it is this passage, this 
becoming. The present as "now" is the synthesis of a past-now and a future-now, the 
synthesis of two absences. Hence, the now is nothing. It is the negation of time, 
which is no-thing in itself; it is neither a being nor an essence but a relating of 
absences intuited only through movement. This formulates the aporia of time as 
delineated by Aristotle in Physics IV. Time is divided into "vows" but since "nows" 
are non-beings, nothing in themselves, time cannot consist of "nows". The "now", the 
element of time is "temporal only in becoming temporal, that is, in ceasing to be, in 
passing over to no-thingness in the form of being-past or being-future. "', However, 
even if time cannot be a being, an essence or substance as it is composed of 
nonbeings, it is still thought on the basis of the present. What is not or what is barely 
or scarcely" cannot not be thought but according to what is. Time itself cannot be 
present since it appears out of a succession of presents that are not longer or not yet. 
Conceived in this way, however, time is already determined as no-thing, as non- 
being. "Without disclosing it, one already has operated within the horizon of the 
meaning of time in order to think nonbeing as nonpresent, and being as present. 
Being has been determined temporally as being-present in order to determine time as 
nonpresent and nonbeing". 72 
Heidegger perceives a direct line from Aristotle's Physics to Hegel's 
Encyclopedia, which for him consists of a dialectical repetition or paraphrase of the 
Aristotelian aporia. In the dialectical conception of time, as designated by Hegel, time 
becomes meaningful only as a necessary detour leading back to the Idea, to pure 
presence. As mentioned before, space and time are conceived as the fundamental 
categories of exteriority, which for Hegel is the Idea being-outside-itself, that is, in 
nature and history. But what is the relation of space and time in Hegelian dialectics? 
Space, as the idea outside itself, in its absolute and abstract initial state, which is 
spatiality itself, receives its first determination from the point. The point, thus, 
as it happened. The question of time with regard to the travel narrative will be taken up in the 
next chapter. 
" Derrida continues: "Even if it is envisaged as (past or future) nonbeing, the now is determined 
as the intemporal kernel of time, the nonmodifiable nucleus of temporal modification, the 
inalterable form of temporalisation. Time is what overtakes this nucleus, in affecting it with no- 
thing. But in order to be, in order to be a being, it must not be affected by time, it must not 
become (past or future). To participate in beingness, in ousia, therefore is to participate in 
being-present, in the presence of the present, or, if you will, in presentness. " Ibid., p. 40. 
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introduces difference to the pureness of space. It "spatially negates space. "'' But the 
point is also negated in its relation to another point, "it negates itself by itself in its 
relation to itself. " The succession of points is, therefore, a succession of negations in 
which every point suppresses, retains and uplifts the previous one in the movement of 
the Aufhebung, the form of Hegel's negative dialectics. The point negates itself into 
the line and the line becomes "the truth of the point. " In the same way, the line 
negates and uplifts itself in the plane, which becomes "the truth of the line". Hence, 
the dialectical movement from absolute space to concrete and determined space, to 
space that has acquired awareness of itself, that is for-itself, completes the circle. The 
beginning coincides with the end. In this process of the Aufhenbung "time was 
requisite. " Each negation of space, each relation of a spatial determination to its 
previous one, was already in time: 
"To the extent that it is, that is, to the extent that it becomes and is produced, that it 
manifests itself in its essence, that it spaces itself, in itself relating to itself, that is, in negating 
itself, space is time. It temporalises itself, it relates itself to itself and mediates itself as time. 
Time is spacing. , 74 
So moving in space and time becomes closed in on itself in the infinite 
unfolding of the circle that is the becoming of presence for itself, of self-presence. 
The closure of this circular movement is what allows presence to manifest itself. So 
time and space in Hegel are still thought on the basis of the "point-like now, " which 
gives the very form of presence. 75 The dialectical conception of time on the basis of 
72 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
'' Ibid., p. 41. 
74 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
75 However, as Derrida points out, there is already in Hegel a difference between "the presence 
of the present" and "the present as now". The concept of presence points to something 
permanent, eternal and infinite, while the present as now is finite, singular and in Nature, 
although it is still abstract since it is also a becoming from nothing into nothing. To Derrida's 
mind, the distinction between "now" and "present" found in Hegel but also prepared for in 
Aristotle's Physics challenges Heidegger's critique and complicates things even further as it 
already makes room for a conception of time which exceeds the limitation that "now" as the 
element of time poses; it already calls upon the difference between the finite and the infinite. 
Ibid., p. 46. According to Derrida, Heidegger's decisive step was to make explicit what 
Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of time has evaded and left undecided: whether time belongs 
to beings or nonbeings, whether time is or is not. The question of time posed in these terms 
would be thought on "the basis of a being already secretly predetermined in its relation to time" 
and to a particular modality of time, that of the present. Heidegger's philosophical gesture in 
Sein und Zeit repeats the question of Being and time "in the transcendental horizon of time": 
"time, then, will be that on the basis of which the Being of beings is indicated, and not that 
whose possibility will be derived on the basis of a being already constituted (and in secret 
temporally predetermined), as a present being (of the indicative, as Vorhandenheit), that is, as 
substance or object. " Ibid., p. 47. The ordinary concept of time, that which thinks time as a 
linear succession of undifferentiated "nows", is for Heidegger a derivation or fall from the 
primordial and authentic time of Dasein's temporality. However, as Derrida maintains, the 
the "now", of punctuality, makes possible the representation of time as a line 
(gramme). Like the points of a mathematical line, successive point-like "nows" create 
a linear idea of time extending ad infinitum. Though only the points of a line co-exist, 
whereas "nows" cannot be simultaneous for this would annul time, there can be a 
certain simultaneity in the "now, " which presents itself in the continuity and synthesis 
of past "nows" and future "nows". However, unlike spatial points, the "now" cannot 
be a limit, end and beginning at the same time. The "now" cannot arrest time for time 
appears only through and with movement. Time is sensed, intuited as passage. What 
of time is given to consciousness is not the concrete "nows" of a succession but rather 
the form of succession. This break between the sensory present thing and its intuited 
form, that is, the thing as it appears to consciousness, which Heidegger attributes to 
Kant and his notion of "the non-sensuous sensuous" (that is, intuited sense freed from 
all sensuous matter), is already prescribed in Aristotle's Physics IV, in which time and 
movement is united in aesthesis, the form of inner sense. 76 Thus time is not conceived 
as ousia or predicate of beings but as the form of their intuition, which is not itself 
something graspable or determinable for time then would receive an intemporal 
essence. Time is thought on the condition of its own erasure. Time as nonbeing or as 
what is scarcely is, nonetheless, thinkable only in the horizon of essence or presence, 
that is, of what is permanent, unchanging and timeless, to which time befalls as 
something foreign, as an exterior accident, and this thought runs through metaphysics 
from Aristotle to Hegel. This is why the analogy of the gramme can be still 
preserved: "on the condition that one does not take it as a series of potential limits, 
but as a line in act, as a line thought on the basis of its extremities (ta eskhata) and 
not of its parts. "" ' 
The fragmentation of time to point-like "nows" receives its meaning from the 
linear conception of time. So time is not to be thought of on the basis of the now- 
present but as the unfolding of the line. And in order for the line to be indefinitely 
unfolded, in order for the now not to be a limit, its extremities must touch in the 
plenitude, unlimited potentiality and mobility of the circle. In dialectics, time is 
thought through movement but on the basis of its telos, completeness and closure. 
notions of "derivation", of the primordial and authentic", that is, the "proper" and "near" carry 
a metaphysical weight, which cannot be dispensed but only displaced through the shattering of 
the privilege of the "present". That time is not purely and simply a sequence of present "nows" 
is already in place in the analogy of the line to temporal succession either in its aporetic 
designation or its "dialectical manipulation". 
76 Ibid., pp. 44 and 49. 
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Then the "prime mover" is pure presence or self-presence, which animates all 
movement by the desire it inspires and which, moreover, is not something available 
but something anticipated as the anticipation of meaning. 78 Within this thinking fall 
the concepts of "act and potentiality", "essence and accident", "infinite and finite" 
and all the derivative oppositions including Oikos and travel. Thus the question 
concerning the essence or physis of time and space, notwithstanding their naive 
separation, should be turned against itself and toward what it evades: "whether 
essence, here, can be the formal horizon of this question, and whether the essence of 
essence has not been predetermined secretly -as presence, precisely- on the basis of a 
`decision' concerning time and space. "79 One would have to go back to the texts of 
metaphysics and retrace within them the "hidden passageway" that reopens the theme 
of presence as the problem of the written trace. 
What are then the implications of a thinking of space and time that pushes 
metaphysics to its limit but is necessarily intrametaphysical, for the notions of Oikos 
and travel? In the dialectics of travel, Oikos is understood as immanence, interiority 
and presence which, by being exposed to an exteriority (travel) through the 
movement of the Aufhebung, tends to its full meaning and self-presence. It takes 
relating with the other, with what is exterior, that can only happen in the itinerary of 
travel, for the categories of space and time to emerge, however, without being clearly 
separated since "relating with" essentially implies both time and space. 80 Moreover, if 
in the metaphysics of presence, the house is thought of on the basis of what is present 
and permanent, then the full meaning of the house, the house that is for itself, rises 
out of a continuity and homogeneity of place and time which is only possible and 
thinkable in the closure of a circular movement. Oikos is thus the totality of the circle, 
of an itinerary of which the point of departure reserves and elevates itself in the point 
of arrival. Travel, in its dialectical thinking -which is not just one among others but 
77 Ibid., p. 60. 
78 Ibid., p. 52. 
79 Ibid., p. 56. 
80 In the linear reduction of space and time the analogy of the spatial point to the temporal 
element (now) does not presuppose their clear distinction and separate conceptualisation and 
thematisation. The simultaneity of spatial points could not take place without temporalisation. 
The with of spatial coexistence arises only out of the with of temporalisation. As Hegel shows: 
there is a with of time that makes possible the with of space, but which could not be produced as 
with without the possibility of space. " It is through relating, through the with that time and 
space arise without existing a priori in their essence or in their parts or elements (points, vows). 
The duplicity of the simu! [... ] does not yet reassemble, within itself, either points or vows, 
places or phases. It says the complicity, the common origin of time and space, appearing 
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one which secretly predetermines every designation of travel- becomes meaningful 
only as movement away and back to Oikos, a detour that is commanded by the desire 
for presence. Travel is the truth of Oikos, at once its negation, preservation and 
rehabilitation. It is thought of on the basis of a linear course defined by its 
extremities, which touch at the completion of the circular journey revealing the truth 
of the house as self-knowledge. Yet within and despite its teleological determination, 
travel is still conceived on the basis of the present. Everything happens in a given 
place, or succession of places, where the traveller is present at a present moment. This 
is also the phenomenological condition of travel. 
Now, since the house reveals itself for what it truly is through the negation 
and reservation of what is exterior to it, by consequence, it can only be thought of 
after the fact of travel. Oikos and travel can only be thought together. But if travel is 
primarily thought as a deviation or distancing from the house then, can we still know 
what these notions signify in relation to each other? One would have to disengage 
them from a derivational logic, which is not a simple thing to do, since this would 
upset the concept of origin in general. Neither Oikos nor travel would be posed as the 
origin of meaning and this would entail the destruction of the house and thus the 
impossibility of return, the end of eco-nomy and the end of travel in the "proper" 
sense. In order to think these notions otherwise, that is, in order to push them to the 
limits of this circular and restricted economy, one would have to perform a similar 
gesture to that of the generalisation of metaphor. In this mode of thinking, Oikos 
would not be posited as the regulatory principle of travel, as its beginning and 
destination, as its prime-mover and telos, as that which inflicts the desire of the 
voyage as a desire for the return back home. Both "Oikos" and "travel" begin to 
signify along a movement or itinerary without pre-given origin or end. All there is are 
signifying effects of home and travel. The shattering of the house, however, does not 
bring about complete demolition and disorientation. It explores the possibility of a 
thinking that does not restrict itself to the teleology of Oikos, that does not revolve 
around a pre-established locus. 
In this sense, the itinerary becomes the origin of Oikos and travel, an origin, 
however, in the sense of the "originary trace", as an incision which is not preceded by 
a unity. In the same «ay as generalised metaphor, the itinerary marks the withdrawal 
together as the condition of all appearing of Being. In a certain way it says the dyad as the 
minimum. " Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
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of travel. Generalised travel engulfs its metaphysical concept, which necessarily 
draws with it that of Oikos, yet infinitely exceeding and expanding it. Of course, the 
deconstruction of Oikos does not mean that travel as actuality does not have to start 
from somewhere, from a place, home. The conceptualisation of travel does not 
disregard the physicality of travel but is what makes manifest the structures that make 
sense of it. If all experience is the experience of meaning and if meaning is produced 
through its repetition and iteration, then the senses of Oikos and travel, never cease to 
be restructured along the itinerary. The itinerary is represented as a line on a map, as 
a relation of points, of loci, a relation that is only possible in space but which also 
creates space. If space emerges through the relating of one locus to another, this 
relation is already in time. The relation to the other, to what differs and is deferred, 
entails the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space. It is the form of 
the "originary difference" or differance that constitutes and also divides the "present" 
and along with it everything thought on its basis. 8' We touched upon this previously 
and we come back to it now for the movement of differance as simultaneous spacing 
and temporisation is what displaces the house and also lets it signify by deferring, 
delaying, reserving, without, however, making a profit out of it, without re- 
appropriating or allowing it to come to itself, to come to being as such. Time and 
space are constituted together as intervals, as the possibility of iteration and 
alteration, as an infinite chain of mediations and supplements "that produce the sense 
of the very thing they defer. " If Oikos is presence thought of on the basis of the 
present, of what is near and available, then "an interval must separate the present 
from what it is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval that constitutes 
it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and for itself, "g' since it 
lets it be marked by something other than itself. Oikos and travel emerge from 
intervals, differences, distances along an itinerary, which rather than marking 
relations between fixed terms, stable referents or clearly defined identities, constantly 
divides and disseminates everything these involve. Oikos, "immediacy is derived. "83 
This is to say that Oikos and travel re-emerge in a nonsynthetic way out of the ruins 
of their phenomenological motif. Phenomenological "catastrophe" entails the blurring 
of the boundaries one has to cross in order to become a traveller. 
81 Derrida, "Differance", p. 13. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Derrida, 01Grammatology. p. 157. 
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If Oikos and travel emerge out of the iteration of meaning as effects with no 
prior cause, origin, or essence, they only become possible (and at the same time 
impossible as such) by means of an a priori withdrawal of Oikos as presence and 
travel as derivation. This originary withdrawal is not tantamount to the loss and 
promise of recovery of an initial proper meaning in a teleological manner. Oikos and 
travel do not pre-exist their withdrawal but are rather produced through and with it, in 
the "structure of delay" that suspends and defers return nondialectically, without 
synthesising and sublating differences according to an economy of telos. No 
departure and no return to Oikos can ever be possible as Oikos, once placed within 
the general economy of differance, becomes a "past" that is not an origin, that "has 
never been present, and will never be, whose future to come will never be a 
production or a reproduction in the form of presence. "84 
This is not to say that the multiple senses of "Oikos" and "travel", which 
form the semantics and polysemics of these terms, do not pertain to an economy of 
meaning. Their sense is not boundless, but neither is it confined to a closed oiko- 
nomy, to the roundness and closure of presence, though it is still only thinkable in 
relation to its metaphysical presuppositions. Moreover, the deconstruction of the 
metaphysics of travel does not preclude the notion of return, which, as was argued 
before, essentially belongs to the structure of travel. "Return" without been 
necessarily subordinated to a teleological destination is still at work in the structure of 
repetition and re-iteration that produces effects of Oikos and travel. If we insisted on 
metaphysical thinking, we did so because we still dwell within and on it, because in 
order to think beyond it "we must stay within the difficulty of this passage, and repeat 
it in the rigorous reading of metaphysics, wherever metaphysics normalises Western 
discourse, and not only in the texts of the `history of philosophy'. "85 
If we are to challenge the metaphysical delineation of Oikos and travel, we 
have to venture a thinking that goes beyond metaphysical polarities but which also 
gives place for their appearance and (re-)emergence. We have to venture thinking of a 
space that allows for the inscription of such polarities and that gives their condition of 
signification. This space is that of differance or khöra (which in Greek also means 
"place, " "region, " "location, " "country"), which opens onto the possibility for the 
inscription of the meaning of beings (entities) as well as the meaning of Being (the 
84 Derrida, Jacques, "Differance". p. 21. 
85 Ibid.. p. 22. 
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existential condition of beings) and of all metaphysical couples such as 
sensible/intelligible, visible/invisible, empirical/transcendental and so on. "Khöra" is 
a text by Derrida elaborating on the notion and place of khöra in Plato's Timaeus. Kh- 
öra in Plato is the name of the space that receives the order of the "mimeme" (copy), 
sensible, or becoming, that is, the mobile image of the order of the eternal 
"paradigm", of the idea, eidos or the intelligible. In the cosmogony of Timaeus, khöra 
is a tale about the origin of the world, a probable myth for the origin of logos, a myth, 
however, which exceeds and precedes the distinction between mythological and 
philosophical discourse. If a discourse can be uttered only from a certain and assigned 
site or place grounding its reasoning, then khöra names this unlocatable place or 
nonplace that grounds nothing per se for it exceeds the polarity of proper and 
metaphorical meaning and that analogous to it, logos and muthos. The thought of 
khöra is not that of a substance but of a structure that lets us glimpse "the silhouette 
of a `logic"', the "being-logical of logic", whether it be true, probable, or mythic, put 
en abyme. 86 
In the first chapter we insisted on the uncertain boundary between 
philosophical and metaphorical discourse, which comes down to the primary 
distinction between proper meaning and metaphor. In this chapter, aiming at bringing 
out the "existential" conditions of travel, we attempted to challenge the notion of the 
"boundary" and hence that of "place" as a circumscribed enclosure regulating 
(linguistic, cultural, national and so forth) identities. If proper meaning can only be 
uttered from a proper place or firm position (from and of which metaphor would be a 
derivation or expropriation), the radical shuddering of such oppositional and 
hierarchical thinking, would signal a different conception of space. This has immense 
implications for philosophical discourse, in fact, for discourse in general. It was 
necessary (that is, constitutive) for philosophy to disengage itself from or, rather, to 
sublate myth87 and tropology in general and to relegate them to a pedagogical or 
didactic function. But since the distinction between myth and logos constitutes 
philosophy as such and is what inscribes it in a teleological horizon, there must have 
been an "older place" or structural potency, older than muthos as opposed to logos, 
86 Derrida, Jacques, "tihöra" in On the Name, edited by Thomas Dutoit, translated by David 
Wood, John P. Leavy, JR., and Ian McLeod, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 106. 
87 "Philosophical logic comes to its senses when the concept wakes up from its mythological 
slumber. Sleep and waking. for the event, consist in a simple unveiling: the making explicit and 
taking cognisance of a philosopheme enveloped in its virtual potency. The mytheme will have 
been only a prephilosopheme offered and promised to a dialectical Aufhebung. " Ibid., p. 100. 
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that allowed for such polarities without been reduced to them. This (non)place is 
called khöra. Khöra names the possibility of the inscription of meaning, of everything 
there is for human consciousness. 88 It is a space in-between the subject and the world 
as object but in itself it is neither subject nor object. It marks a relation with (and the 
"with" always already signifies both space and time) but a relation that at once 
constitutes the subject and the object as destined to one another. 
Let us go back to Timaeus. Before khöra receives the imprint of the idea, 
khöra is nothing in itself. It is not a determined place; it receives all determination 
from what it gives place to. It is neither of the order of the paradigm nor of the 
mimeme, neither intelligible nor sensible, however, it participates in both without 
belonging to neither. It is a mythical place. But at the same time it is a probable myth 
about the origin of logos. The tale of khora gives way to the tale of logos. And in this 
way it exceeds both myth and logos; it becomes a receptacle of a succession of tales 
and substitutions with no determinable origin. Khöra, as Derrida reads it, names the 
"gap", the "abyssal chasm", the "cleavage", the milieu and difference that separates 
the order of the intelligible (meaning) from the order of the sensible (factuality), that 
is, it is what gives room to and allows for all metaphysical oppositions. At the same 
time the space of or the discourse on khöra is where all such oppositions come to be 
inscribed; it is "where" metaphysics is situated. It is the opening of "a place `in' 
which everything would, at the same time, come to take place and be reflected". 89 But 
it is also a mise en abyme of everything "it" situates since it is not a proper place, a 
base or firm ground providing the solid foundation and authorisation of logos. Khöra 
is what gives place without taking place; "it is more situating than situated". 
90 Khöra 
is the space where everything comes to be. However, it is not an origin; it disrupts 
origin as such. It is neither essence nor substance, neither sensible nor intelligible, 
neither subject nor object, neither eidos nor mimeme (copy), though it makes all these 
possible. It is a "third genus" beyond oppositions, one that shakes up all polarities and 
88 So, in a fashion, what Derrida does in Khöra is to reinscribe Plato's probable myth of 
cosmogony onto a phenomenological space. For a rigorous and inspired discussion of Plato's 
Timaeus see also Serge Margel's Le Tombeau du Dieu Artisan, precede de Avances par Jacques 
Derrida, Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1995. 
89 Ibid., p. 104. 
90 "To give place" does not mean here to offer a concrete and definite space for things to be 
installed and accommodated. "To give place here does not come to the same thing as to make a 
present of a place. The expression to give place does not refer to the gesture of a donor-subject, 
the support or origin of something which would come to be given to someone. " "Khöra", p. 
100. Khöra is neither the ground, nor base, nor the support of what she/it receives. It is not a 
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the very notion of genus or genre. Khöra bears the imprints of everything thought of, 
it receives all enunciations, interpretations, categorisations without possessing them 
as properties. "She does not possess anything as her own. She `is' nothing other than 
the sum or the process of what has just been inscribed `on' her". 91 
Khöra is not a proper place but makes room for all senses of place. It receives 
them without determining them. Being nothing in itself it gives the existential 
condition of place, reception and arrival. It thus gives the possibility of all senses of 
Oikos and travel. But at once it upsets all determined senses of place and arrival since 
nothing can derive from or arrive at a nonplace. But if khöra gives the possibility of 
nonarrival, this is at the same time the possibility of the reception and arrival par 
excellence, that is, the reception and arrival of an unforeseen and unexpected event. It 
is what promises the event. 92 
Khöra is the hospitable opening and welcome to the event not in the sense of 
a benevolent intention but in that it receives everything, and the event is always a 
(new) arrival. But for an arrival to be (new) it must not be awaited; it must not receive 
a definite content. Someone, in order to properly arrive at a proper place, must 
properly derive from a proper place. But since definite, proper places emerge out of 
an indeterminate space, since determination emanates from indeterminacy, there can 
be neither derivation nor arrival in the proper sense as the relating of fixed locales but 
only effects of them. "Arrival" makes possible all the traits of belonging (cultural, 
social, national) without being reduced to them for 1' arrivant par excellence is 
always indeterminate, unpredictable and never happens as such. Il n' arrive qu' ä 
s'effacer. It succeeds only in being effaced. However, even if it is not expected, it is 
still promised. It is the promise and expectation of an unexpected event; a promise 
without content and "an expectation without horizon of expectation". What is to come 
(ä venir) in the figure of a foreigner, a traveller, a text, a language, for better or for 
worse, is always other. And the other never comes as a revelation; s/he does not give 
her/himself up to intuition, s/he is not totally phenomenalisable. Khöra, as the general 
structure of experience, as a spacing where everything comes to be inscribed, may 
substance but rather a structure or "structural law" that opens up a space for the inscription of 
forms and schemata, thus receiving and at the same time making them possible. 
9' Ibid., p. 99. 
92 "Le non arrive est bien, si Von veut, un point de depart: depart et resource de tout evenement. 
Mais cettc' chance n'est precisement pas une origine dont derive ce qui arrive. Le non arrive 
(lesigne un non-lieu en lieu et place de 1 'origine. En un sens, ce non-lieu est principe. " 
Malabou, p. 140. 
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seem as a desert place. But as Derrida points out, it is not a given empty space for an 
onto-theological revelation: 
"Chora, the `ordeal of chora' would be, at least according to the interpretation I believed justified in attempting, the name for place, a place name, and a rather singular one 
at that, for that spacing which, not allowing itself to be dominated by any theological, 
ontological or anthropological instance, without age, without history and more `ancient than 
all oppositions (for example, that of sensible/intelligible), does not even announce itself as 
'beyond being' in accordance with a path of negation, a via negativa. , 93 
In the discourse of travel one could name three powerful metaphors of place 
that traverse and invest with meaning the expenditure of the traveller: the island, the 
Promised Land and the desert. The island or isle comes to signify a singular or 
insular place, to where everything comes from an unlocatable elsewhere. 94 For 
instance, the "island" has functioned as a trope in the sixteenth century travel 
literature and cosmographies (for example, Andre Thevet's Singularitez de la France 
antarctique and Cosmographie universelle, Paris, 1557 and 1575 respectively) that 
encapsulated the fantasies of a "new" land, self-mastery, of utopia and even of 
Paradise. 95 The "Promised Land" runs through all sort of pilgrimages and utopias 
from pilgrims' journeys to the Holy Lands to Andre Gide's Back from the USSR. The 
trope of the "desert" can occur again as utopia, receptacle, or simulacrum (sometimes 
of meaninglessness), that is, both as a place of opportunity and revelation and as a 
metaphor of deterritorialization or emptiness, as we come across it, for instance, in 
Jean Baudrillard's America. 96 But before entering the question of how tropes function 
in travel narratives: 
"Let us step up the pace in order to finish: in view of a third place that could well 
have been more than archi-originary, the most anarchic and anarchivable place possible, not 
the island nor the Promised Land, but a certain desert -and not the desert of the revelation but a desert in the desert, that which makes possible, opens, hollows or infinitizes the other. "9ý 
A difference is marked here between the "order of the `revealed "' and the 
"order of the `revealable' ", that is, between "event" and "possibility or virtuality of 
the event". 98 A "determinable" event of arrival, if such a thing exists, is preceded and 
overflowed by the promise of the event through the structures (of iteration and 
9' Derrida, Jacques, "Faith and Knowledge, The Two Sources of `Religion' at the Limits of 
Reason Alone", translated by Samuel Weber in Acts of Religion, edited and with an introduction 
by Gil Anidjar, London, Routledge, 2002, p. 58. Khöra in this translation is transcribed as 
"Chora". 
94 "Une ile est un lieu oh Von ne peut qu'attendre sans attendre ce qui vient, l'evenement 
arrivant necessairement d'ailleurs, de I'autre bord, de nulle part. " Malabou, p. 238. 
95 See Mary Baine Campbell's "Renaissance Voyage Literature and Ethnographic Pleasure: The 
Case of Andre Thevet" in Studies in Travel Writing, number I (Spring 1997), pp. 9-42. 
96 Baudrillard, Jean, America, translated by Chris Turner, London, Verso, 1988, p. 63. 
97 Denrida, "Faith and Knowledge", p. 55. Translation modified. 
98 Ibid., p. 59. 
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alteration) that make any event possible as such. In other words, this certain spacing, 
khöra, or "desert in the desert", which receives the imprints of meaning and structures 
the possibility of everything there is for consciousness, is "l'avant-premier" of space. 
Since the thought and name of khöra comes after the inscription and 
emergence of the meaning of "being", it is also necessarily "anachronistic" and 
"retrospective" with respect to "being" for it precedes and exceeds "it" and all the 
polarities which delineate "it". Khöra comes as the trace, as the possibility of the 
inscription of meaning in the entire field of the entity, what allows metaphysical 
oppositions to signify, and hence what must be thought before them. Khöra is the 
space opened up through an originary withdrawal (for instance, of the Platonic Idea 
that precedes beings or of the Heideggerian Being as the thought of the totality of 
beings; in other words, the withdrawal of presence) of something which never was 
present but was only effected through "its" withdrawal. Khöra comes as an 
"irreplaceable", "unplaceable", "anachronistic", "achronic", mobile place, a "sort of 
nonplace" without history or destiny, that, however, makes place for the inscription of 
the "tale", the myth (muthos) and logos of a proper place, of all places. It is the quasi- 
metaphorical condition of every sense of place, of the tale(s) and narrative(s) of 
Oikos and thus of travel. 
Why is such attempt of thinking khöra important here? "Is it insignificant 
that this mise en abirre affects the forms of a discourse on places [places], notable 
political places, a politics of place entirely commanded by the consideration of sites 
[lieux] (jobs in the society, region, territory, country), as sites assigned to types or 
forms of discourse? "99 If khöra offers the groundless condition of all senses of place, 
it necessarily and infinitely complicates all forms of discourse on place, Oikos and 
travel. Khöra is a nonoriginary localising process, "the structure of an overprinting 
without a base", the nonbase of meaning and the unlocalisable expanse (because it 
neither belongs to a transcendental being, nor simply to consciousness or to the 
world) in which everything comes to take place. 10° Khöra hence "is" an improper 
"place" that embeds, that places "place" and "displacement", Oikos and travel, as 
their condition of inscription, as the condition of a writing and iteration that does not 
99 Derrida, "Khöra", p. 104. 
100 "En tant qu 'elle designe, donc, daps la langue grecque, le lieu habite, le poste, la position - 
depart et destination de tout vovage- khöra pourrait dire 1'origine, la source de ce qui est; eile 
pourrait designer le. fbnd meme de 1'etre, la cause, le principe, l'avoir ou 1'etre de tout lieu. " 
Malabou, p. 141. 
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unfold teleologically but rather lets them appear and signify in the self-erasing 
structure of the trace. 
Travel as Writing 
In Of Grammatology Derrida speaks of writing as the possibility of the road: 
"One should meditate upon all the following together: writing as the possibility of the 
road and of difference, the history of writing and the history of the road, of the rupture, of the 
via rupta, of the path that is broken, beaten, fracta, of the space of reversibility and of 
repetition traced by the opening, the divergence from, and the violent spacing, of nature, of the 
natural, savage, salvage, forest. The silva is savage, the via rupta is written, discerned, and inscribed violently as difference, as form imposed on the hyle, in the forest, in wood as matter; 
it is difficult to imagine that access to the possibility of a road-map is not at the same time 
access to writing. "10 
We said before that the senses of "Oikos" and "travel" along with those of 
properness and metaphor, or identity and difference, rather than being predetermined 
and already given, are engendered through the movement of iteration and belong to 
the structure of the trace. The trace, this irreducible structure that always already 
announces the other in the same, emerges as the "nonoriginary" origin of meaning, an 
arche without plenitude and purity, an "originary synthesis not preceded by an 
absolute simplicity". Then the trace as the opening of the same to the other, of a 
present to a nonpresent, an inside to an outside, of "the first exteriority in general" is 
already a spacing that by now should be understood as the becoming-space of time 
and the becoming-time of space. Again, if the opening of sameness to otherness is not 
preceded by predetermined categories, if the present is already marked by and retains 
the nonpresence of the other (and thus cannot present itself as such), then the trace 
also institutes what it is supposed to relate: it becomes the very opening of a space for 
the inscription of meaning (however, a space that appears through and simultaneously 
with its inscription). Derrida calls the possibility of all inscription writing. 
Writing is the possibility of the road and of the itinerary, of a movement that 
relates places and lets them signify in relation to one another. "Travel" and "writing" 
in the conventional sense share the character of linearity, of the succession of 
signifiers or loci related through movement, either semantic or physical, if this 
distinction can be upheld. Both movements are reduced to a linear representation and 
progression that receives teleological orientation aiming at the recuperation of what 
was posited as their prioritised counterpart, that is speech in terms of writing and 
Oikos in terms of travel. However, in our analysis of the line we saw that the telos or 
closure, on the basis of which the line is thought, are "effects" rather than 
101 Derrida, O_f'Granmiatolok,, pp. 107-108. 
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transcendental principles and are produced through the movement of iteration. Out of 
this approach to linearity a radically different thinking of writing and travel emerges, 
one that disrupts and inscribes them anew, one that generalises them in a way that 
exceeds foreseeable or calculated closure. Writing in Derrida's generalised sense 
precedes the opposition between "writing" (in the colloquial sense) and "speech", in 
the same way that generalised travel precedes "Oikos" and "travel" in their 
metaphysical determination. The structural affinity of the generalised notions of 
travel and writing allows us to speak of travel as writing, which far from being just 
another metaphor of travel, brings out its essential inscriptive force. The possibility of 
inscription on space cannot be simply reduced to the demarcation of something given. 
It is rather a spacing in the sense previously elaborated. Reading or drawing a map 
has never been a simple operation. 
In fact "travel" and "writing" have been traditionally closely associated and 
not simply with regard to the narrative genre of "travel writing", which will be our 
focus in the next chapter. "Travel as writing" as well as "writing as travel" are 
prevalent metaphors occurring in all sort of discourses, literary, philosophical, 
theological and so on, that address the textuality of travel as a process of 
configuration of cultural and natural signs and draw from its inexhaustible conceptual 
resources and all its attached themes (Oikos, itinerary, boundary, arrival, return, etc. ) 
for the elaboration of their respected projects. "Travel as writing" is far more than a 
rhetorical figure, a metaphor in the conventional sense, with didactic or explanatory 
purposes. The "metaphor" or theme of travel can prove a disrupting element in the 
texts that "innocently" deploy it. "Travel" always exceeds its thematic exposition. 
One may say that as soon as there is writing there is travel, and inversely, as soon as 
there is travel there is writing. 
Recent theory on travel extends the association of travel to writing beyond 
the preoccupation with the poetics and the history of the genre. Michel Butor, 
Normand Doiron and Georges Van Den Abbeele explore the relation of travel to 
writing not solely with regard to its historical designations and symbolic functions but 
also drawing further implications from the structural affinity or, one may say, mutual 
structuration of these notions. 102 For Michel Butor travel is a kind of writing, as 
102 Butor, Michel, "Le Voyage et l'Ecriture" in Romantisme 4,1972, Revue de la Societe des 
Etudes Romantiques, Doiron, Normand, "De l'Epreuve de 1' Espace au Lieux du Texte, Le 
Recit du Voyage Comme Genre" Biblio 17, Voyages, Recits at Imaginaire, Actes de Montreal, 
edites par Bernard Beugnot, 1984, and "L' Art de Voyager, Pour Une Definition du Recit de 
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writing (and reading) is also travelling: "Pour moi voyager, au moms voyager d'une 
certaine facon, c'est ecrire (et d'abord parce que c'est lire), et qu'ecrire c'est 
voyager. " 103 For this, there are obvious reasons. Even if the text is not a travel 
narrative, the process of reading (which is always also a writing and a rewriting) 
registers a movement, a trajectory the eye follows from sign to sign that is often 
"grossly" simplified as the progression along a line linking a point of departure to a 
point of arrival. In another "obvious" way, the text becomes a journey by taking the 
reader to another place, "be it the writer's room". Through reading "one finds 
him/herself elsewhere". Moreover, following the trajectory of signs or the story line 
even in the most conventional and linear plots always involves the traversing of a 
blank space, a gap, the milieu, the in-between that separates and joins one sign from 
and with another, a scene or a place from another. The blank space surrounding the 
sign upsets the linear movement of the signifier and its reduction to a progressive 
succession of interrelated signs, not only because each sign is referred and deferred to 
another sign but because it is exposed to an irreducible and nonpresentable 
exteriority. In the same way that travel cannot be reduced to a succession of loci, 
reading and writing cannot be simply reduced to a succession of signs. There is 
always a certain residue of meaning not accounted for. One may go so far as to say, 
there is an essential travel motif operating in any reading or writing. The opposite is 
also true. There is an operation of reading and writing in any expenditure of travel. 
The travel text may manifest this better. On the one hand, by juxtaposing and joining 
different places in the same phrase or itinerary, making them signify together and in 
relation to one another, it reinscribes them by creating a new sense of place. On the 
other hand, as Butor points out, it "enforces" the grammar of the book on the 
restitution of that of the trajectory. 104 So the traveller may read a map, repeat and 
retrace a path or an itinerary, read travel texts, follow the footsteps of other travellers, 
make his/her own mark, add new places, avoid, reinscribe and efface visited ones, 
associate and dissociate them, make them signify anew. The possibility is always 
there. Travel is a mode of inscription which is not simply restricted to the writing of a 
travel book. In turn, the experience of travel is also largely shaped by the 
Voyage ä l'Epoque Classique" in Poetique 19,1988, Abbeele, Van Den, Travel as Metaphor, 
from Montaigne to Rousseau, Oxford, University of Minnesota Press, 1992. 
103 Butor, Michel, "Le Voyage et I'Ecriture", p. 4 
104 "Les termes Rome, Athenes, Jerusalem, disposes dans un certain ordre par la phrase de mon 
voyage, comme je puis les faire varier, instruit par celui-ci, dans le recit que j'en propose, que 
de souterrains, que d'obliques, il m'est alors possible de decouvrir. " Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
124 
commonplaces of travel narrative. Travel must be always able to be written about. In 
this sense, there is no travel without writing. 
For Normand Doiron a traveller is someone who re-marks: 
"L'operation propre au voyageur consiste ä remarguer. La marka, c'est la marque de la frontiere, le signe de la limite, les empreintes laissees sur le sol, la marche. Entre les deux 
mots (marque/marche), la contamination s'effectue rapidement dans I'histoire de la langue. 
Re-marquer, a nouveau imprimer les marques du voyage, non plus sur le sol, non pas sur la 
toile, macs sur ]a page, re-faire le chemin, re-passer un ä un les lieux visites, au fur et ä mesure les `faire voir' ä celui qui maintenant nous accompagne, qui suit pas ä pas les meandres qu'on decrit. "105 
Re-marking or reinscribing then reveals the essential affinity of travel and 
writing. The traveller comes to add his/her mark, to retrace, to repeat, to rewrite and 
not to represent a given reality. '06 Since the traveller traces and retraces, s/he moves 
beyond the limits of representation. The traveller does not pass from one place to 
another, from one present locus to the next, without retaining the trace of the previous 
one and, indeed, the traces of previous travels. No itinerary would be possible without 
this tracing, which cannot be represented or reduced to the simplicity of a present. 
However, what Doiron calls the mutual "contamination" between the "mark" and the 
"march" in the "history of language" is an essential possibility of meaning that is at 
the origin of history and language. It is the structure of the trace, or better, it is the 
movement of the becoming-trace-of-the-mark, whether by it we understand a vestige 
or not, that has always already made the "mark" and the "march" thinkable. And this 
is what has allowed for the marking and naming of places, a process intrinsically 
related to colonial travel and also to the travel of discovery. 
If one is to explore the notion of travel as writing one has to go back to the 
notion of the travel book, which best manifests the metaphysical conception of travel. 
The book signifies a totality and a closure, the metaphysical exigency for a return to 
properness according to the economy of the house. It is through rethinking the 
linearity and closure of the book of travel that travel as writing, in the Derridean 
sense, becomes thinkable. We will leave the consideration of travel as narrative for 
the next chapter. What concerns us here is the affinity of the notion of travel to the 
concept of the book precisely in the sense of a closed totality that corresponds to the 
completion of travel upon return, to the telos of the circular journey. Actually, the 
collusion of "the book" with "travel" is a very old one. 
105 Doiron, Normand, "De I'Epreuve de I' Espace au Lieux du Texte, Le Recit du Voyage 
Comme Genre", p. 23. 
106 "II ne s'agit pas de representer. Le voyageur se deplace aux limites de la representation. " 
Ibid. 
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In seventeenth century France the genre "fart de voyager" makes its 
appearance with the aim of instructing the traveller. The publishing of these volumes 
coincides with the emergence of the genre of travel writing. 107 The method or art of 
travel, as prescribed in the Classical age, links the rules of physical displacement to 
the poetics of the travel genre. 108 The traveller of the Classical age had to follow a 
route that was well-ordered and regulated. He had to take pains not to "wander 
instead of travelling". The prescribed journey then had to comply with the exigency 
of the return home, if it were to be an instructive and profitable one. The danger of 
errance or error had to be eliminated. 109 This exigency conforms to and also 
reproduces the classical episteme of ordering and representation. Travel in the 
Classical age is part of the search for the right route and the right method aiming at 
the ordering of a chaotic and fragmentary world, at its unification and representation 
in a comprehensive map, in a totalising discourse. Classical discourse produces a new 
type of knowledge, one that has to succumb to the test of proof, one based on 
experience. 
During the Renaissance knowledge was intrinsically related to divinity, the 
signature of God on every natural thing that humans had to decipher and interpret. 
This was possible because all signs were considered in relations of resemblance and 
analogy with the secret content or signified they were the mark of. "Visible" and 
"invisible" were linked by similitude. The world was envisioned as a book, the liber 
mundi, that one opens and reads in order to access the "sovereignty of an original 
Text. "' 10 Words and things, language and nature, are intertwined with one another "to 
infinity, forming, for those who can read it, one vast single text", "' amenable to 
infinite interpretation. So in the sixteenth century "the fundamental configuration of 
knowledge consisted of the reciprocal cross-reference of signs and similitudes, " 
whether these were natural signs inscribed on things or words. 
' 12 So what is the 
107 Doiron, Normand, "L' Art de Voyager, Pour Une Definition du Recit de Voyage ä l' Epoque 
Classique", pp. 85-86. 
pos "Cela parait d'autant plus suprenant que les arts de voyager prescrivent aux voyageurs les 
regles specifiques d'une forme non seulement de mouvement mais de recit. " Ibid., p. 86. 
109 "Le voyageur lui-meme ne peut se deplacer qu'ä condition de revenir regulierement au point 
fixe du depart, au foyer. " Ibid. 
10 Foucault, Michel, The Order of Things, An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, London, 
Routledge, 1970, p. 41. 
Ibid., p. 34. 
112 "There is no difference between the visible marks that God had stamped upon the surface of 
the earth, so that we may know its inner secrets, and the legible words that the Scriptures, or the 
sages of Antiquity, have set down in the books preserved for us by tradition. The relation to 
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function of the Renaissance traveller as an agent of knowledge? It is to collect, write 
down, account and recount what must then fall under the workings of interpretation. 
"Scriptural commentary, commentaries on Ancient authors, commentaries on the 
accounts of travellers, commentaries on the legends and fables: none of these forms 
of discourse is required to justify its claim to be expressing a truth before it is 
interpreted; all that is required of it is the possibility of talking about it. "' 13 
The figure of the traveller in the Classical age, by contrast, is not that of an 
interpreter of signs. He is in search of an exemplary language and method that would 
properly name and order the fragmented reality that falls under his scrutiny. 14 He no 
longer tries to discover relations of kinship and resemblance between things but 
rather to compare, analyse and classify in terms of identity, difference, measurement 
and order. However, he still does so in view of reconstituting the book of the world. 
The epistemological revolution against bookish knowledge in favour of a model 
based on observation and experience keeps with the notion of the liber naturae or 
liber mundi, "the great metaphor of the book", that now receives a new meaning 
which reconciles practical knowledge with the authority of the written word. The 
world is now a book that the traveller has to inscribe. "5 So the classical traveller 
returns to the book. ' 16 The age of "rationalism, " however, with its belief in the 
possibility of the formation of a universal method of mathesis and analysis that would 
reveal the fundamental order of things also expresses a belief in unlimited progress 
and in the power of human reason to create and reinscribe new relations between 
signs. Signs are no longer simply there as the manifestation of the divine but are 
reorganised and redistributed. 
For the classical traveller then the "Great Book of the World" still exists. But 
now it is no longer a question of reading it. The traveller has to write within its space. 
He has to describe it, hence write it, in a way that would also submit it to the test of 
these texts is of the same nature as the relation to things: in both cases there are signs that must 
be discovered. " Ibid., p. 33. 
113 Ibid., p. 40. 
114 -Le voyageur renaissant collectionne, enumere, recense des cas, des curiosites que le 
voyageur classique ensuite ordonnera", Doiron, 'L' Art de Voyager", p. 98. 
115 , Le monde continue d'etre un livre oü s'inscrira l'itineraire du voyageur. " Ibid., p. 102. 
116 "Ainsi voit-on ('experience du voyageur qui s'opposait ä l'autorite des livres devenir elle- 
meme une autorite, un livre. Ce nouveau livre du voyageur ou du philosophe ne fait plus 
obstacle au monde mais 1'embrasse ainsi que la carte l'englobe. Il ouvre un espace mediateur oü 
se reconcilient I'autorite et l'experience, ob sont egalement compris le livre et le monde. " Ibid., 
p. 102. 
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proof 117 A descriptive act is also an inscriptive act. The Classical traveller searches 
for the right (and virtuous) path to truth but in order to reach it, that is, in order to 
accurately and precisely describe the world, he must have at his disposal an equally 
accurate language. However, the language of truth, proper language, must always 
efface itself before the plenitude of the thing it denotes. Its ultimate end is to become 
redundant. "L' ecriture, comme la nature, devient transparente. " The aim of travel is 
to return to its original place, to the point of departure. A finality is prescribed to it. 
After having put to the test the realm of doubt, the empirical field, the traveller must 
regain certainty and stability, in a word, properness. The exigency of return that had 
to be regulated by specific rules (fart de voyager) can only be thinkable through the 
prepositing of a fixed and transcendental point of reference, that of Oikos. A traveller 
is not supposed to endlessly wander; s/he must be contained within "the limits of 
truth". 
This directly takes us to Rend Descartes' Meditations and Discourse on 
Method, which with their abundant use of metaphors of travel show how deeply 
intertwined is this notion with the philosophical thinking and writing of the period, 
although writing and travel are implicated in ways that cannot be simply reduced to 
their historical articulations and associations. Descartes, as Georges Van Den 
Abbeele demonstrates in his Travel as Metaphor, from Montaigne to Rousseau, 
resorts to the metaphor of travel in order to formulate the right method (methodos in 
Greek means also pathway) that would restore the certitude of the cogito that has 
been shaken by hyberbolic doubt. However, the wanderings of the doubting subject 
must be restrained within "an economy of error" and what is put into doubt and under 
test is watched over and bounded by the truth of the cogito that is thus preposited as 
the beginning and end of the intellectual journey, again prescribed as a circular one. 
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As we shall see later, the metaphor of travel and the "topography" of the cogito in 
Descartes can be read against the text's own pronouncements and destabilise "the 
truth of the cogito. " 
." As Normand Doiron points out, by travelling one performs an act, which is also a discursive 
one. By enunciating the proposition "I travel" the traveller accomplishes what s/he says, what 
this act describes. - 'Je voyage' est une expression performative; le voyageur l'enoncant, 
accomplit cette action qu'elle decrit. Non seulement il dit voyager, mais ce faisant il voyage. " 
Doiron, "De l'Epreuve de 1' Espace au Lieux du Texte, Le Recit du Voyage Comme Genre", p. 
19. 
'18 The positing of the cogito provides the Cartesian coordinates for the discursive meanderings 
of the doubting subject, that is, it provides a transcendental referent point (oikos) in relation to 
which he can always locate himself. " Abbeele, Travel as Metaphor, from Montaigne to 
Rousseau, p. 44. 
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The systematic presentation of classical travel would not be efficient if it was 
not placed within the more general syntax of metaphysics. The exigency of return and 
the teleological notion of travel and writing, which are not relevant only to the 
classical period, ' 19 manifest an instance of their inherently metaphysical structures 
and if one is not attentive to this fact one runs the risk of reducing a powerful and 
enduring structure to a historical configuration that fails to account for the 
continuities that make them possible. Doiron and Butor are aware of this fact when 
they acknowledge the complicity of travel with metaphysics and the pervasive and 
compelling structures that inscribe travel in a dialectics of return and recuperation, in 
an economy of metaphor that gives rise to the "myth" of properness, of Oikos. 120 
Hence, travel and writing must (and can only) be reconsidered within the powerful 
system of thought that has commanded the "styles" of their historical movements and 
within which they received their condition of signification and thus became 
meaningful: the historico-metaphysical epoch of what Derrida calls logocentrism. 
Logocentrism is neither the transcendental origin of history, science, and language 
nor something prior or exterior to them, though it has produced their concepts as we 
understand them. It is a historical epoch (but one that "has controlled [its field of 
vision] for a few millennia, especially in the West"121) that has "assigned the origin of 
truth in general to the logos, "122 at the heart of which lies a determination of a concept 
of the sign that presupposes the existence of a signified, of an ideal meaning, giving 
rise to hierarchical oppositions such as transcendental and empirical, nature and 
culture, speech and writing, inside(-Oikos) and outside(-Oikos) and so on. 
119 "Toutes les grands voyages romantiques sont des aller et retour [... ] A ces voyages dans 
notre histoire que sont les pelerinages romantiques, nous permettant de relire autrement ce qui 
nous avait ete transmis, il faut en opposer d'autres, egalement aller et retour dans leur principe: 
les voyages d'exploration. [... ] Le voyage de decouverte manifeste de la facon la plus 
saississante les phenomenes de marquage et d'ecriture. " Butor, pp. 12-13. 
120 "Aussi est-il tres difficile, sinon impossible, quand on veut degager les regles du discours de 
voyageur, et qu'on utilise pour ce faire un discours forcement metadiscursive, d'eviter le double 
sense, c'est-ä-dire la metaphore qui continuellement traverse la methode classique d'analyse des 
discours. Ce vertige tient au cercle que trace toute metaphysique. C'est la marque du voyageur. " 
Doiron, 'L' Art de Voyager", p. 91. "Nous avons l'impression qu'il n'est qu'un Beul type de 
voyages, ä savoir ('aller et retour. Etant donnee la fonction metaphorique fontamentale du 
voyage dans tout ce qui est lecture et correlativement ecriture, par consequent dans notre 
connaissance du reel et notre action sur lui, il est certain qu'une teile reduction va developer des 
puissances mythologiques d'autant plus trompeuses que nous y accordons moins d'attention. " 
Butor, p. 7. However, with regard to Butor's position, we may add here that it is not simply a 
question of overthrowing a prevalent (and false) view of travel but of probing into the structures 
that made it possible and to recognise that the notion of Oikos is not something one must discard 
of (for it would return even more persistently) but what one must rather explore in a way that 
would show its integral and essential discontinuities, its own self-erasure. 
121 Derrida, Of Gramniatology, p. 4. 
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In the first chapter of Of Grammatology, which is entitled "The End of the 
Book and the Beginning of Writing", Derrida contends that the epoch of logocentrism 
is inaugurated with a certain privilege accorded to the voice (phone) and thus to 
speech over writing. Living speech enunciated in the present of discourse was 
considered (from Plato to Saussure) closer to truth than writing, which by definition 
implies the absence of the thinking subject and submits to the danger of "usurpation". 
Hence, logocentrism, which is a phonocentrism, structures itself around a notion of 
the sign that is determined as the "absolute proximity" of the voice or spoken 
signifier to the signified or ideality of meaning. Writing or rather phonetic writing 
(for instance, the alphabet), according to this designation of the sign, is the graphic 
representation or figuration of the phonetic element, the signifier of a signifier, and is 
thus secondary and derivative. This logic assumes the pre-existence of a 
transcendental signified that is represented in the element of the voice, the signifier, 
that is, what is closest to consciousness since it always appears in the "self-presence 
of the breath", in hearing(understanding)-oneself-speak [s 'entendre parier], " in the 
subject's auto-affection and relation to itself in the element of ideality. The phonic 
signifier is privileged over the written because it is detached from materiality and can 
be elevated to the immanence of consciousness. It reduces the sensible, spatial and 
exterior to a form of time that is consciousness itself, to an interiority that "does not 
borrow from outside of itself. " The phonic element in proximity to the ideality of the 
signified erases itself before the full-presence and plenitude of the latter. The exterior 
no longer inflicts or contaminates meaning, the purity of logos. And it could not be 
otherwise in the metaphysics of presence that is motivated by the desire for return to 
the origin of a "primum signatum": 
"The privilege of the phone does not depend upon a choice that could have been 
avoided. It responds to a moment of economy (let us say of the `life' of `history ' or of `being 
as self-relationship'). The system of `hearing (understanding)-oneself-speak through the 
phonic substance -which presents itself as the nonexterior, nonmundane, therefore 
nonempirical or noncontingent signifier -has necessarily dominated the history of the world during an entire epoch, and has even produced the idea of the world-origin, that arises from 
the difference between the worldly and the non-worldly, the outside and the inside, ideality 
and nonideality, universal and nonuniversal, transcendental and empirical, etc. "'Z 
Now, for Derrida the issue is not overthrowing metaphysical notions. They 
are necessary to the extent that "nothing is conceivable for us without them. " What he 
wants to demonstrate, taking into account the systematic and historical grounds of 
these notions, are the conditions and the limits of this powerful and encompassing 
'" Ibid., p. 3. 
123 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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discourse. He argues that the privileging of speech over writing would not be possible 
if it were not guaranteed by the assumption of the prior existence of a transcendental 
signified, a sense preceding and independent of language. This is why the signifier 
must have as its end its own erasure before the signified. This is the condition for the 
very idea of truth. ''' The truth of the infinite logos does not depend on its 
representation or figuration. Its image is excessive and accessory. Moreover, the 
graphic signifier is more remote from truth; it is born out of "a primary expatriation" 
and condemned to wandering; 125 it has no life; it is a dead letter. It must be submitted 
to the teleology of the spoken word. Derrida reconstructs major gestures of the 
movement of logocentrism from Plato to Rousseau, Levi-Strauss126 and Saussure. He 
demonstrates how these discourses that exclude writing from their internal 
constitution (for instance, Saussure's langue as the internal system of language) are in 
fact inaugurated by means of this exclusion and presuppose a certain concept of 
writing (for example, the divine writing on the soul or writing as natural law). The 
debasement of writing in the colloquial sense and its subordination to the teleology of 
the living speech that traverses and constitutes logocentrism is not simply exposed 
and challenged on the premise of what is called "performative contradiction", as all 
these thinkers do write if only to deplore and warn against the dangerous effects of 
writing. As Geoffrey Bennington points out, "it would be necessary to show that 
philosophy is essentially written if we wished to make this a serious argument. "127 
Derrida makes manifest the common structural root of speech and writing by 
showing that what has been specified as the essential properties of writing equally 
predicates speech. Writing has been traditionally identified with the absences of the 
intending subject, addressee and primary context. According to its metaphysical 
designation, writing has no claim to properness for it is always exposed to the danger 
of confusion and misunderstanding. Its function is to inscribe, reproduce and iterate, 
that is, to supplement for the absence of speech but as its weak and dangerous 
substitute. However, insofar as repeatability and iterability are the main properties of 
writing, one has to acknowledge that the same goes for speech since no meaning 
would be possible in general if it were not supported by a structural consistency that 
124 Ibid., p. 20. 
125 Ibid., p. 39. 
126 In the final chapter we will have the chance of considering Derrida's critique on Claude 
Levi-Strauss, who performs an instance of ethnocentrism, the way this is implicated with 
colonialism and also with the question of an ethics of travel. 
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would allow for its repetition and identification as such. The singularity of the present 
of living speech would not be possible if it were not assigned repeatability, a certain 
ideality and transcendentality (and thus translatability). Moreover, with respect to 
modern linguistics and specifically Saussure, who inscribes another instance of 
phonocentrism, one can perceive a metaphysical background that unsettles his very 
theory of the sign. Saussure privileges the phonetic signifier and warns against "the 
tyranny of writing". 128 However, if according to Saussure writing is the signifier of a 
signifier, then it inevitably receives the same definition as all signs, which, as we 
know, are not positive terms but always refer to other signs and take on their value 
from their differences rather than a substance. Accordingly, the hierarchy of the 
phonic over the graphic signifier is unwarranted. Derrida shows the inconsistencies of 
the "theoretician of arbitrariness, " who, nonetheless, assumes a "natural bond" 
between sense and sound. 129 How could the determination of the sign as "instituted" 
and "unmotivated" come to terms with the presumption of a "natural bond" between 
sense and the phonic signifier? For Derrida, it is not simply a question of resolving 
this contradiction but of dislocating the very distinction between the "natural" and the 
"instituted". 130 We will not persist here on this point. We are simply sketching out a 
gesture that reinscribes the prominent and metaphysical notions of speech and 
writing. According to this gesture, writing becomes the possibility of all inscription, 
of all meaning spoken or written. Writing in this sense constitutes the essential 
scriptability and iterability of meaning, what confers meaning an ideality that makes 
it repeatable and identifiable; what permits the emergence of effects of properness but 
also of metaphor, since repetition always implies displacement and difference. This 
newly inscribed term that keeps with the metaphysical terminology, for one has to 
remember that deconstruction necessarily operates from the inside, "borrowing all the 
strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure", 131 precedes 
and also displaces the metaphysical coupling of speech and writing and is, therefore, 
132 called arche-writing. 
127 Bennington, Geoffrey, Jacques Derrida, London, University of Chicago Press, 1993, 
translated from the French by Geoffrey Bennington, p. 48. 
128 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 38. 
129 Ibid., p. 35. 
130 Ibid., p. 42. 
"' Ibid., p. 24. 
132 The notion of arche-writing also involves the eruption of an originary violence. The 
indictment of writing in the usual sense as a usurpation that befalls speech has its root in "a 
primary usurpation" that involves both speech and writing. It is the originary violence of 
language in the function of naming and assigning "fixed" and "proper" meanings to words and 
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To recapitulate: there is a structural affinity between travel and writing with 
regard to their designation as the essential possibility of inscription that is extended 
beyond the notion of the travel book. The notion of the book, which has acquired 
different functions with respect to travel and travel writing and to which travel 
offered its inexhaustible metaphorical resources, was traditionally conceived on the 
premise of a totality, infinite or finite, on the assumption of the origin and telos of a 
unified meaning. The signalling of the end of the book and the beginning of writing, 
which is nothing else but a rereading and rewriting of the text of metaphysics 
according to an organization of space that refuses to be reduced to linearity, the 
weaving of a "thread" in the text of metaphysics that sends "down roots among 
roots" 133 in a way that uproots them, cannot but signal the end of the teleological 
thinking of travel and the beginning (a beginning, however, which has always already 
begun) of a thinking that disrupts its metaphysical premises. Once again, such a 
gesture would not do away with the traditional notions of Oikos and travel but would 
rather reinscribe them working from within and paying metaphysics its dues. This is 
why "the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own 
work, " 134 for better or for worse and, one may argue, for better, since this "defect" is 
its very force of subversion. 
Van Den Abbeele offers an example of deconstructive reading of travel 
narratives and philosophical texts that employ the "travel motif'. He refers to the 
generalised notion of travel as prototravel showing in this way its essential affinity to 
Derrida's notion of arche-writing. He designates travel as text, as a structure of 
iteration and relating of loci. 135 His aim is not to offer solely a historical and 
contextual reading of texts but to explore "the travel motif as such at the more 
things. We have touched upon this before and we will come back to it in the last chapter where 
we will examine travel writing with regard to colonialism and post-colonial discourse. 
133 "And if a text always gives itself a certain representation of its own roots, those roots live 
only by that representation, by never touching the soil, so to speak. Which undoubtedly destroys 
their radical essence, but not the necessity of their racinating function. To say that one always 
interweaves roots endlessly, bending them to send down roots among the roots, to pass through 
the same points again, to redouble old adherences, to circulate among their differences, to coil 
around themselves or to be enveloped one in the other, to say that a text is never anything but a 
si, stem of roots, is undoubtedly to contradict at once the concept of system and the pattern of the 
root. " Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
134 Ibid., p. 24. 
135 Not only, however, do both text and voyage raise the same set of problems, but one finds 
with surprising frequency that the problems associated with one are posited and described in 
terms of the other" and further on "the voyage is somehow already a kind of text, that is, if there 
is already in place a differential structure of relationships that allows the `voyage' to be 
cognised or recognised as such. " Van Den Abbeele, pp. xx-xxi. 
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abstract level of its general epistemological presuppositions". 136 He focuses on four 
classical French philosophers: Montaigne, Descartes, Montesquieu and Rousseau and 
explores the motif of travel underpinning travel journals, philosophical as well as 
literary texts. The pivot of his analysis is the dialectical relation of Oikos and travel 
that runs through these texts taking various forms which include questions of 
authorship, ethnocentrism, gender, the proper name and signature, in short, categories 
that fall under the general notion of Oikos. Van Den Abbeele shows how these 
discourses are extensively determined by the travel motif whether this receives 
thematic treatment or not. "Travel" is examined within the tight fabric of each text 
and within the philosophical system of each author as well as within the general 
syntax of metaphysics. In this way, the writer of Travel as Metaphor keeps with the 
deconstructive exigency of not choosing between a systematic and historical 
approach by attentively and closely studying the internal organisation and 
argumentative structure of the texts, locating them within the enduring structure of 
metaphysics and within their contextual determinations. 137 
Van Den Abbeele defines Oikos as "a transcendental point of reference that 
organises and domesticates a given area by defining all other points in relation to 
itself. "138 This does not have to be the point of departure but it can be any point of the 
itinerary as long as it posited as the organising and teleological principle of the 
journey, as long as it safeguards the economy of travel. However, as he argues, the 
positing of Oikos "can only occur retroactively" as an effect of the itinerary. "The 
voyage has always already begun. "139 The restructuring of Oikos via the detour of 
iteration forbids the coincidence of the point of origin with that of return, "for the 
point of return as repetition of the point of departure cannot take place without a 
136 Ibid., p. xiii. 
137 Van Den Abbeele formulates his reading strategy by combining systematicity and 
historicism: "It might well be argued, at this point, that such an analysis would be in no way 
historical. The figure of travel is so generally implicated in Western metaphysics that it becomes 
difficult to grant any kind of historical specificity to the texts or analyses that appropriate that 
figure. The deconstructive potential of the voyage would be lodged in that figure itself and not 
in any particular or historical uses of it", however, "it does seem pertinent to reintroduce a 
certain historicism into my reading of the problem of travel. There is a particular force to such 
an analysis when it is carried out in the context of French Classical thought. A deconstructive 
opportunity is provided by that era's strong and insistent representation of the thinker as 
traveller, concretised in such literary stereotypes as the picaro, the knight errant, and the prudent 
navigator, or more abstractly in the Baroque theme of the homo viator. " Ibid pp. xxv-xxvii. 
138 Ibid., p. xviii. 
1`9 The concept of home is needed (and in fact it can only be thought) only after the home has 
already been left behind. In a strict sense, then, one has always already left home, since home 
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difference in that repetition. " Hence travel becomes an "infinite detour" at risk of 
losing, erasing its very origin and destination. "The voyage, it would seem, can only 
be thought at its own risk. "140 But then again this enables travel to exceed the 
circumscription of Oikos, the boundaries of the house, which prescribe an end to it. 
For Van Den Abbeele the priority traditionally given to Oikos over travel is 
concomitant to "the decision of Western metaphysics to privilege presence over 
absence, voice over writing, and hence the near over the far", 14' a decision with 
devastating implications. 
Van Den Abbeele reads Rene Descartes' Second Meditation, Discourse on 
Method and Meditations by using the figure of travel both as weaving thread and 
incisive trait. Descartes tormented by doubt embarks on a discursive voyage with the 
aim of finding the right path (methodus) to truth that would dispel "false opinions" 
and anxiety. However, for this goal to be achieved one must not let oneself aimlessly 
wander but has to limit and direct oneself, instead, along guidelines that would secure 
one's destination, in this case, the certitude of an unshakable position. The journey 
embarks from the doubting in view of the self-asserting cogito. 142 Wandering is thus 
inscribed in an "economy of error" in a way that, finally, "neutralises" and impedes a 
radical questioning of the cogito's truth. The "topographical" metaphor of the cogito 
functions as a strategy of circumscription of error as deviation. It reduces the 
meditative journey to a methodos, to a "straight and narrow" path. But such reduction 
comes in turn and despite Descartes to disrupt itself since it is articulated in terms of a 
recuperative logic (of travel). Insofar as travel is inscribed in a general economy of 
meaning that forbids return and recuperation, the cogito is doomed to endless erring 
without assured origin or telos. "The labyrinthine topography of error in its threat of 
an infinite wandering figures Descartes' predicament as one that is inextricably 
textual. -143 
can only exist as such at the price of its being lost. The oikos is posited apres-coup. Thus, the 
voyage has always already begun. " Ibid., pp. xviii-xix. 
140 Ibid., p. xviii. 
"' Ibid., p. xx. 
142 However, Van Den Abbeele points out, "the very act of positing certainty as a destination 
already puts the philosopher on firm ground and keeps him from slipping into the drift of 
aimless nomadism. " Ibid., p. 43. Then the speculative journey has from the start a prescribed 
telos which coincides with its point of departure. And if the mind "enjoys wandering off 
[s'egarer; aberrare], and it cannot yet contain itself within the limits of truth" the philosopher 
chooses to allow such meandering or erring as long as it is eventually and inevitably disciplined 
by good reasoning. The purpose of erring thus ascribed warrants Van Den Abbeele's 
reformulation of Descartes' famous proposition: J'erre doncje suis. 
14 ' Ibid., p. 53. 
135 
The "travel motif' is not just a literary commonplace or metaphor found in all 
sorts of discourses. It permeates discourse to the extent it can prove to be a disruptive 
and complicating element in the literary, theoretical, and philosophical texts that 
deploy it. 144 Travel has always signified a transgression, the crossing of a boundary, 
the passage to a beyond that institutes a relation with the other. This movement, 
whether one refers to travel in the "literal" or "metaphorical" sense, is a spacing that 
already bears the trace of the other, an other that in a way has not yet arrived, an other 
before and with(in) the same and yet an other to come. In every discourse that 
attempts to establish itself by drawing a boundary between an inside (itself) and an 
outside (other discourses), a boundary that has to be transgressed and acknowledged, 
the spatial metaphor of travel is at work. However, as was argued, travel is not 
simply a deviation in view of recuperation, that is, peaceful reintegration. We have 
noted how the apparently "innocent" use of the travel motif can prove a disruptive 
force in philosophical texts, how the theme of travel employed as an explanatory 
device can be turned against those texts or rather against their dominant and instituted 
interpretations. As Van Den Abbeele maintains, "discourse on travel is thus 
inexorably contaminated by its object. " 145 The metaphor of travel unsettles claims to 
any definite and proper meaning. It reveals its essential ambiguity and undecidability, 
or literariness. And when it appears in philosophical texts it raises the question of 
their "problematic" boundary with literature. The question of the genre as well as the 
indissiociable issue of the open boundary between fact and fiction will concern us in 
the next chapter. 
What we have been pointing to is a glimpse at this closure which is an 
opening at the same time: closing the book of travel and opening onto travel as 
writing: 
"The question of writing could be opened only if the book was closed. The joyous 
wandering of the graphein then became wandering without return. The opening into the text 
was adventure, expenditure without reserve. And yet did we not know that the closure of the 
book was not simply a limit among others? And that only in the book, coming back to it 
unceasingly, drawing all our resources from it, could we indefinitely designate the writing 
beyond the book? 
144 Van Den Abbeele goes as far as to say that the theme of voyage "in some way or other raises 
the question of the status of literary discourse itself. " "If literature returns with such frequency 
to this topos (if it can still be considered to be one), the theme of the voyage must not be simply 
one literary theme among others but one that in some way or other raises the question of the 
status of literary discourse itself. " Ibid., p. xiv. 
145 Ibid., p. xxx. 
146 Derrida, Jacques. "Ellipsis" in Writing and Difference, translated by Alain Bass, London, 
Routledge, 1978, p. 294. 
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This chapter has attempted to reinscribe what was held as the hermeneutic 
exigency of travel, that is, its enclosure in the restricted economy of the house, into a 
general economy of travel. In the generalised notion of travel the chance of no return 
is no longer an accident befalling the course of the journey, but its essential and 
structural possibility. Return now takes the form of infinite regression or repetition of 
the same, of the same in the other. For in the itinerary of travel Oikos is also moving 
along the way nourishing the myth and the dream of origin; an origin, however, that 
is unceasingly divided and doubled. Travel always carries with it a certain sense of 
home (phereoikos), a sense of a proper place from which travel must have begun. As 
we saw, however, this sense of place never appears as such but instead emerges as the 
effect of the very movement of travel. Because there is no place like home, travel 
must infinitely return to this nonplace called home as writing must after a certain 
fashion return to the book in order to repeat, traverse and exceed it. 
Let us close with a flight. The flight of Icarus. Icarus flies away towards 
freedom, towards the sun (the sun returns here to reclaim its privilege) after having 
escaped his prison-mansion, the labyrinth, and pays no heed to the prudent warnings 
of his father, Dedalus, not to carry himself too far. Icarus disobeys paternal advice, 
the law of the house, the proper name of the father in his self-destructive desire for 
the sun. But the sun, like the house, is an impossible destination. Icarus is trapped 
between two powerful metaphysical metaphors, the house and the sun, and is finally 
brought down. The illusion of an escape from the labyrinth, from the textual labyrinth 
of the book, and the impossibility of return to what was thought to be escaped plunge 
him even deeper into the abyss of textuality. Self-presence, properness, the sun, the 
house were untenable from the start. Always already. And the myth of Icarus' 
impossible journey was always already silently inscribed in white ink. A white 
mythology. 
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Part H 
Chapter III 
Metaphors of Writing: 
Travel as Narrative 
There is no story without narration, no experience without recounting, and no 
travel without writing. There is no travel without some sort of marking, inscribing, 
traversing the dense text of culture. What is claimed by this is not a privileging of the 
text, at least in the restricted sense of a closed and self-contained totality, over the 
experience of the world and the actual experience of travel. It is to say that the 
experience of travel becomes recognised as such as it is formed and articulated through 
the signifying structures of thought and language. What will be here called narrative 
and writing does not coincide with, even though it engulfs, the very act of narrating and 
writing and their final product in the form of a story. Narrative and writing receive here 
a broader sense that moves beyond and also precedes narrating and refers to the 
essential readability and scriptability of experience, to the received universe of cultural 
signs and the linguistic patterns of thought that turn lived experience into something 
meaningful, recountable and memorable. 
This chapter will examine the notion of travel as narrative and writing both in 
their broad and narrow senses and will attempt to explore the way these interconnect 
and are reinscribed onto each other. It will attempt to draw implications of the previous 
discussion about the semantic, spatio-temporal, and scriptural conditions of travel onto 
the space of the travel text. Our discussion of metaphor has already laid down a path 
(but is that not what metaphor essentially does? ) for entering into an issue that has 
occupied central stage in the consideration of travel texts as far back as the emergence 
of the genre, although we should be careful here not to bestow retrospectively any 
generic unity, especially as we have yet to define travel writing. This issue concerns the 
essentially problematic distinction between factual and fictional or literary travel 
writing and will be the focus of this chapter. This division within travel writing has 
taken many forms and has been addressed under different headings and according to 
various concerns (moral, epistemological, etc) throughout the history of the genre that 
had also to circumscribe the cases of imaginary voyages, pseudo-travel texts and 
plagiarism. In the present, when these issues are taken up in the ongoing discussion on 
the antinomy of fact and fiction and the inextricably related problematic of the (open) 
boundaries of genres. the case of travel writing acquires de nouveau a particular 
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significance. Travel writing could prove an interesting case in point and contribute 
considerably to the aforementioned discussion not only because the problematic of 
factual and fictional representation is inherent to it (as it has to be to discourse in 
general if the related debates are to have any currency at all), not only because it is an 
issue that has been thematised, parodied, attacked and defended within travel texts 
themselves but mainly because travel literature more than other "literary" genres (with 
the obvious exception of autobiography) has a claim to experience; it recounts 
something that really happened and was witnessed by the traveller/writer and, what is 
more, something that usually implies a crossing over to the unfamiliar. What is at stake 
in the travel text is the claim to the authority of a truthful experience, if not as its raison 
d'etre at least as its excuse. ' However, even in texts that aspire to give "straight" 
reports of facts, the very matter of travel writing, which presupposes a process of 
figuring out something that appears distant and alien (sometimes in the form of the 
marvellous, supernatural, or exotic depending on the discourse it occurs in), necessarily 
conflates the "factual" and the "figurative". 
One could object that the antinomy of fact and fiction is more pervasive and 
exemplary with regard to texts that do not challenge or make an issue of it, as it has 
been traditionally the case with historiography, philosophy and ethnology, which have 
a claim to reality, to truth and to objective representation. Recent studies that centre on 
the exposition of the tropological construction of texts regarding these disciplines, draw 
attention to poetics and rhetoric to show that writing is far from a controlled and self- 
transparent activity'. In fact, as will be suggested later, historiography and ethnology, 
which bear close links to travel writing, constitute themselves on the basis of the 
disjunction between factual and fictional representation. The case of travel writing 
retains its exemplary force and is all the more pertinent in an age when intercultural 
relations are being addressed on an unprecedented scale, for it belongs to a tradition 
long in the making that has built upon instances of encounters of European subjects -it 
is European travel (writing) that concerns us here- with worlds exceeding their 
"reality". But it is not solely for historical or even for inherently structural reasons 
1 As we shall later see, however, generic conventions do not presuppose the truthfulness of any 
such claim, actually, the opposite is structurally requisite. What is "generically" requisite is the 
claim itself and this implies that lie and perjury must be always possible. 
2 See Hayden White's Aletahistory, The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, 
London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, James Clifford's and George E. Marcus's 
(eds) Writing Culture, The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, London, University of 
California Press, 1986 and Paul de Man's Allegories of Reading, Figural Language in 
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imposed by its very matter that travel writing is an important case in point. It is a 
unique case for the exemplification of how historical and rhetorical categories, how 
factual circumstance and textual convention, interlace or rather emerge together. 3 What 
is principally at stake in travel writing is the representation or figuring out of the 
"cultural" other. This (tropological) force or function, however, does not solely regard 
textual configurations and rhetorical typologies, but is already at work in the 
experience of travel, allowing us thus to speak of a general rhetoric of travel and not 
merely of travel writing. Rhetoric should be viewed as a shaping force of cultural 
encounter (if such a thing ever takes place), which is both structurally and historically 
determined. ' 
The previous chapter explored the "existential" conditions of travel in order to 
readdress its metaphysical notion by raising the questions of space, time, the itinerary 
and the boundary. This questioning leads us back to the phenomenological conditions 
and motif of travel, which are premised upon the metaphysical concept of the present, 
and through their deconstruction to a reinscription of travel essentially as an experience 
of aporia or of the non-passage. The disruption or fracture in (the) experience (of 
travel) is tantamount to its tropological constitution. In this sense, travel writing 
becomes the textual figuration of what is already a figurative experience for a 
consciousness exposed to otherness. It becomes the figure of a figure. In Mary B. 
Campbell's words, "in the travel book we have developed a literary instrument of 
consciousness, a genre of cultural translation". 5 If a sort of correspondence or analogy 
between the rhetoric of the travel text and the essentially figurative character of 
Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust, London, Yale University Press, 1979, which we will be 
discussing later in this chapter. 
3 This is not to say that fact and fiction are two distinct categories even though they conflate and 
are hard to separate. If something of the sort has been implied so far by the juxtaposition of 
these terms, it was so for the sake of introducing the problematic. It will be argued that this 
problematic either with regard to discursive representations or, indeed, with understanding in 
general does not simply involve the synthetic merging of factual and imaginary elements that 
one would then assume the task of delimiting. The semantic values of literalness and metaphor 
and, by extension, fact and fiction, do not exist separately and prior to their interlacement. 
4 Mary B. Campbell in The Witness and the Other World, Exotic European Travel Writing, 400- 
1600, London, Cornell University Press, 1988, discusses the force of figuration manifested in 
travel writing not simply as a device of describing the "other", something that calls for a "new" 
language, but as a shaping process of perception. For Campbell, the "literary situation" of the 
travel book is "an inherently interesting one -a limit case for such intertwined literary issues as 
truth, fact, figure, fiction, even genre. " Ibid., p. 2. A similar vein of thinking is that of Hayden 
White, who has argued with regard to historiography that tropes are not simply constitutive of 
discourse but are "transformational patterns in conceptual thought". White, Hayden, Tropics of 
Discourse, Essays in Cultural Criticism, London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 
14. 
5 Campbell, p. 11. 
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experience is suggested here, as one has to bear in mind, this is a far more complicated 
relation than any typology of tropes could delineate. Travel and travel writing are 
always in excess of such schematisations and, what is more, they are always in excess 
of each other for it is impossible to delimit what pertains to the text and what to 
experience, as it is also impossible to reduce either way the one to the other. 
It would be interesting to view the history of European travel writing with 
regard to the shifts of tropes in use at different instances. Changes, for instance, in the 
symbolical or allegorical functions or shifts in the focal themes that organise these texts 
(for example, emphasis may shift from the destination on the journey itself, or the 
traveller) can be registered from the spiritual journeys of pilgrims, to the medieval 
accounts of marvels, the narratives of exploration and conquest, the romantic flight and 
modernist nostalgia, which become manifestations of a world becoming larger and 
smaller again from the European perspective. One could argue that the history of this 
genre dramatises and testifies to the opening of "European" consciousness to the world 
and to a process of self-awareness and self-formation at once painful and celebratory. 
And again this would presume that a largely Eurocentric attitude has been at work 
throughout the history of European travel (the term "European travel" already implies 
this). Although such homogenising claims are inherently problematic and should be 
cautiously handled, it is safe to argue that across the particularity of events of travel 
one can trace a relatively unified "European" perspective, which we propose to explore 
on the level of its conceptual premises. The latter can be formalised in the polar couple 
Oikos and travel that constitutes the at once structural and historical a priori of 
"European travel" and is manifested in its most devastating effects in various forms and 
instances of colonialism (as diverse, multi-level and antagonistic as these may be). The 
encounter of Europe with what was dreamt, imagined and constituted as its other 
induced and enhanced notions of home and away, fostered ideas of humanity and of the 
teleology of Western civilization, of which the dreadful implications are largely known. 
Cultural encounter, in fact, the theme of encounter in general, that is, the moment that 
instigates a relation with the other, immediately and necessarily introduces the question 
of ethics. In a fashion, what we have been elaborating so far and shall extend now to 
travel narrative and the genre of travel writing, has paved a way for addressing the 
question of an ethics of travel. In this way a passage will be made from the 
consideration of the phenomenology, to the rhetoric and, finally, the ethics of travel, 
three themes that are inextricable related and emerge from the common root of a 
disjointed present or trace. But we shall leave this for the moment. 
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Travel writing, even more explicitly than other genres, presents immense 
difficulty in defining. This, besides the inherently problematic character of any attempt 
at generic definition in general, is also due to the fact that it is necessarily connected to 
the immensely varied practice of travelling that forbids travel writing to be considered 
on its own terms as a particular mode or field of human creativity and expression. 
When it comes to such an archaic and primitive practice as travel that has so largely 
affected the history of humanity as much through the immediate and long-term effects 
of displacement, exploration and conquest, as through its various symbolic forms that 
permeate and orient singular and collective destinies and, furthermore, when it comes 
to writing about the experience of travelling and, subsequently, codifying it into a 
literary genre, any definition is bound to be either too schematic or too exclusive. 
However, it is safe to argue that, although it is hard to agree upon a definition, one can 
still have a fairly accurate idea of what travel writing by and large is, without even 
addressing the specificities and particularities of the questions and problems it raises. 
Although travel writing as a literary genre cannot be defined on the basis of traditional 
criteria pertaining to formal, modal or thematic unity at least in a strict sense, it cannot 
but dispose a minimal or loose thematic identity by the simple fact that it is a writing 
about travel. And then again, this is saying too much and too little at once. For travel as 
a theme can appear in all sorts of texts; it can be or rather has been the subject of essays 
(Montaigne's, for instance, On Travel), it has provided the mise-en-scene of novels 
(Lawrence Sterne's Sentimental Journey is one of the countless examples), the 
constitutive trope of genres like the picaresque and the Bildungsroman, the matter of 
romances, the object of satire (Lucian's True History). At the same time "travel" may 
not be thematically exposed or at least foregrounded in texts that "legitimately" belong 
to travel writing, such as early accounts of pilgrimages like Egeria's Peregrinatio, 
where the focus is neither on the journey itself nor the place visited but on its Scriptural 
significance instead. 6 And, of course, there is always the surrounding literature on the 
"art of travel" and travel writing, that is, treatises and manuals with the necessary 
exhortations and warnings, moral directions and practical advice for travellers (for 
instance, what was called apodemic literature in the sixteenth century), as well as, 
guidebooks, for many the successors of the medieval itinereria. So writing about travel 
6 Or as Paul Fussell suggests, travel books of the interwar period when "the genre is a device for 
getting published essays, which without the travel `menstruum' (as Coleridge would say), 
would appear too old fashioned for generic credit, too reminiscent of Lamb and Stevenson and 
Chesterton. " Fussell, Paul. Abroad, British Literary Travelling Between the Wars, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 204. 
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can hardly provide the criterion for a thematic unity of travel writing. Neither is form a 
self-evident category for a genre that can appear both in prose and verse' (for instance, 
Lord Byron's Childe Harold's Pilgrimage"), that participates in and draws from other 
genres or modes of writing such as letters, journals, memoirs, chronicles, 
hagiographies, etc. It is not suggested here that genres can be defined on solely formal 
or thematic grounds. Travel writing is, of course, an admittedly "impure" and hybrid 
genre, but it is also a "clear" example of the "impurity" and impossible demarcation of 
genres on solid and constant criteria. 
In The Architext, Gerard Genette retraces the history of the theory of genres 
and tries to show the impasses and confusion that inevitably arise from the formulation 
of reductive and inclusive taxonomies. 9 The consideration of the theory of genres, with 
its charts and tables, constantly "refined", altered, and challenged is proof enough that 
genres do not display a self-evident or self-sufficient character that would establish 
them as such. Genres do not possess properties peculiar to them; there is not such a 
thing as essentially generic qualities that would allow for the demarcation and 
systematic representation of genres. Of course, generic charts retain a heuristic and 
7 Percy G. Adams enumerates four forms of travel literature: 1) the letter 2) the diary or journal 
3) the simple narrative and 4) the "atypical" forms such as dialogue (wholly or partly), 
autobiography or biography, and poems. Adams, Percy G., Travel Literature and the Evolution 
of the Novel, Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 1983, pp. 43-44. 
8 There has been a considerable amount of travel poetry. See, for instance, The Faber Book of 
Poetry and Place, edited by Geoffrey Grigson, London, Faber & Faber, 1980 or The Oxford 
Book of Travel Verse, chosen and edited by Kevin Crossley-Holland, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1986. It is very interesting to consider the criteria by which editors select their material 
since these underline the inherent difficulties of this project imposed by travel writing itself. 
Kevin Crossley-Holland in his introduction specifies that he has taken travel verse to mean both 
verse about the nature of travel and verse occasioned by it. Another preoccupation and matter of 
choice was form for, even if his is an anthology of verse, the boundaries between forms are still 
undecidable: "I have to the last remained in two minds about whether it is also proper to include 
dramatic monologues. In what sense, for instance, is Robert Browning's `Up at a Villa -Down 
in the City' a travel poem? The result is that a few monologues are included, and do perhaps 
vary the anthology's texture, but only a few. " Crossley-Holland, The Oxford Book of Travel 
ferse, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv. 
9 Genette spells out the fallacious attribution of the tripartition of literature into the three major 
genres, or archigenres of the epic, drama, and lyric to Plato and Aristotle that, in his view, lead 
to the erroneous establishment of genres as "natural", "ideal" and overarching categories that 
form highly hierarchical systems. Genette insists that Plato's and Aristotle's poetics, which have 
served as a basis for everything that came later, do not consist of a theory of genres but are 
instead grounded primarily on the basic division among modes or situations of enunciation, 
namely the narrative and dramatic modes, that is, essentially linguistic and pragmatic 
categories, and are therefore "somewhat" structurally superior to romantic and modern poetics, 
which reinterpret the system of modes into a system genres, that is, at large thematically defined 
categories. Genette, Gerard, The Architext, An Introduction, translated by Jane E. Lewin, 
Oxford, University of California Press, 1992, originally published as Introduction a 
l'Architexte, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1979. 
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guiding function since they can account for the relative continuity in the unstable field 
of literature with all its "occasional surprises", "sudden mutations", and "capricious 
decisions". 10 But no such thing as "final generic position" outside all historicity 
exists. ' 1 
Genette proposes a theory of genres that challenges the romantic and modern 
poetics' systematic and hierarchical charts that are built around and under the three 
"arch igenres". 12 Genres are "empirical classes" that are irreducible to tabular models. 
On the other hand, genres can neither be simply reduced to historical determinations. 
Genette is indeed a formalist but one who tries to overcome the impasses of 
hierarchical and exhaustive charts by exposing form to the effects of history and 
adhering at once to a set of "relatively constant and transhistorical" thematic, formal 
and modal elements that assure the continuity and transformative capacity of literature. 
Gennete introduces the notion of the architext, which he designates as "that 
relationship of inclusion that links each text to the various types of discourses it 
belongs to", for instance, to genres that with all their "thematic, modal, formal, and 
other (? )" determinations form part of an unstable network of inter-, trans-textuality 
"everywhere -above, beneath, around the text". 
13 This notion is extremely important 
for a reconsideration of generic theory because it shows that texts may simultaneously 
or successively participate in and cut across multiple genres or types of discourses and 
it is this principle of inclusion (which is, however, never a simple one) rather than an 
immanent generic property that allows for such and such text to be allocated (if only 
provisionally) to such and such genre. Of course, there are genres and they receive 
'0 Ibid., p. 78. 
H in surreptitiously (and unconsciously) backing both the modal definition and generic 
definition, the attribution sets up these archigenres as ideal or natural types, which they are not 
and cannot be: no archigenre could totally escape historicity while at the same time retaining a 
generic definition. There are modes (for example, the narrative); there are genres (for example, 
the novel); the relationship between genres and modes is complex and doubtless not, as 
Aristotle suggests, one of simple inclusion. " Ibid., pp. 70-71. Genette later clarifies the 
intentionally "ambiguous construction" of the last sentence of the passage cited above with 
regard to Aristotle's position. The relationship between modes and genres is not one of simple 
inclusion but one of intersection. Genette realises "after the fact" that "the category of genre (for 
instance, tragedy) is included in both the category of mode (dramatic) and the category of object 
(superior), where it belongs for a different reason but to the same degree. " Ibid., p. 73. This 
realisation of the complexity of relationships of inclusion brings him closer to the notion of the 
architext. 
12 "The whole history of the theory of genres is imprinted with these fascinating patterns that 
inform and deform the often irregular reality of the literary field -patterns whose designers 
claim to have discovered a natural `system' precisely where they are constructing a factitious 
symmetry with the help of a copious supply of false windows. " Ibid., p. 45. 
IS Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
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thematic, formal, modal and other (? ) determinations but none of these essentially 
belongs to them, none of these is generic. 14 
This conclusion, nonetheless, Genette reaches somehow paradoxically by 
insisting on keeping the distinction between modal and thematic criteria in the 
definition of genres though he admits to the complexity of their relation. 15 Modal and 
generic criteria must remain heterogeneous in defiance of romantic poetics, which 
brought about their confusion. He maintains that modes or enunciative situations are 
properly linguistic categories and have the status of "natural forms", while genres are 
"properly literary categories" or, "to be more precise, we should say `properly 
aesthetic, ' for as we know, the fact of genre is common to all the arts. Here, therefore, 
`properly literary' means proper to the aesthetic level of literature, the level literature 
shares with other arts, as opposed to the linguistic level, which literature shares with 
the other types of discourse. "16 Modes are natural forms in a "wholly relative sense and 
only to the extent that language and its use appear as facts of nature vis-ä-vis the 
conscious and deliberate elaboration of aesthetic forms. "" 
Two points at least arise from this: the first is that according to Genette genres 
as "properly literary categories" do not manifest a properly literary form, that is, a form 
particular to literature, since modal or "natural" forms are essentially linguistic. Genres 
inevitably include in their definition thematic elements and so they cannot be 
designated on purely formal grounds. However, neither does thematics have a purely 
literary function since it bears on and intersects with extraliterary elements. The second 
point concerns the distinction between the linguistic and the literary, which are played 
against each other through what is a typically formalistic gesture largely suggesting (as 
all formalisms by definition do) that there is a level of language that is natural or literal 
onto which aesthetic elaboration comes to graft its mark. Genette assumes or 
presupposes here the fundamental distinctions between nature/art (techne, artifice) and 
14 We will come back to this notion of nongeneric determination of genres when we will discuss 
Jacques Derrida's "The Law of the Genre" a bit later in the chapter. 
15 Although, as Genette himself shows, there are thematic elements also in Aristotle's generic 
definitions that suggest that form is "contaminated" by extraformal categories, he contends that 
Aristotle's poetics is structurally superior, since it does not subordinate the one to the other and 
does not lead to hierarchical and univocal inclusions. Ibid., pp. 20-21. In Genette's view, what 
happens later in romantic and postromantic poetics, is the elevation of the epical, dramatic and 
lyrical to "natural", "ideal", all-encompassing genres, which form highly hierarchical systems 
and are no longer thought on the basis of modal (and formalistic categories) but inevitably admit 
to their definitions "thematic elements, however vague. " Ibid., p. 62. 
16 Ibid., p. 64. 
17 Ibid. 
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literal/figurative and the prioritisation of the former, something that largely 
compromises the notion of the architext. ' 8 The Architext is not free from contradiction, 
although it is undoubtedly a very important addition to the theory of genres. 19 
Let us come back to travel writing. We touched upon the essential 
impossibility of the definition of genres and, in our case, of travel writing. We said that, 
although it can be neither formally nor thematically defined, we do have a sense of 
what travel writing is, as indeed we must if we are about to define anything, even if the 
definition is bound to fall short. What allows for this gathering of texts under the same 
heading is a fact that is extraneous to the literary genre "properly" speaking. It is the 
experience of travelling. And then the question is, whose experience? Does a travel 
book worthy of its name necessarily communicate the travelling experience of the 
writer? What if it is about someone else's experience? What if it recounts something 
that never actually took place? In fact, most scholars seem to be in agreement that an 
enabling definition, one that, however, mostly adheres to the modern conception of the 
genre, is that travel writing is a first-person narrative that recounts what is claimed to 
18 Jacques Derrida in "The Law of the Genre" critically addresses two "motifs" in Genette's 
text. The first one relates to Genette's critique of romantic poetics for formulating a tripartite of 
"natural" and "ideal" archigenres. Derrida maintains that romanticism should not be understood 
simply as an epoch, a moment or stage located in the trajectory of a "history", of which the 
concept would be assured. For Derrida, romanticism, if such a thing can be identified, bears 
within it simultaneously both a "naturalising" and a "historicizing" logic, which is the repetition 
of all the broaches and breaches that cut across, bring together, divide, assemble and 
disseminate the notions of physis/nature or genos (in the Greek sense of generation) that 
traverse in their turn all genres assembling them and dividing them. In this sense, and if the 
romantic "naturalisation" of genres needs to be addressed, we carry still a romantic load. The 
second motif has to do with the distinction between the mode and genre, which amounts to a 
distinction between "natural" form and content, for Derrida, something of questionable 
legitimacy and, moreover, uncertain efficacy in the reading of texts, especially of those that 
challenge modal and generic limits. This critique is comprised in the French original and has 
been omitted from the English translation, which we are going to use later when we discuss 
Derrida's text more extensively. Derrida, Jacques, "La Loi du Genre" in Parages, Paris, 
Editions Galilee, 1986, pp. 256-262. 
19 Suzanne Gearhart in The Open Boundary of History and Fiction extensively discusses this 
text and brings out inconsistencies and weaknesses, which are, however, evaluated within the 
more general context of the formalist standpoint. Just as literature cannot be defined on its own 
terms, form cannot be determined on solely formal grounds. And just as genres possess formal 
and modal properties, form also and necessarily bears on the thematic, rhetorical, historical and 
so on. As Gearhart sustains, "there is no purely formal definition of form [... ] form is always in 
some sense extraformal; it is always defined by rhetoric, by linguistics, and by philosophy, and 
implicated in politics and history. The distinction between form and its 'others' is, like all 
distinctions within formalism, never neutral. It is inextricably linked to the historical, 
philosophical, and political hierarchies which are themselves repeated `within' the formal 
system as hierarchies among genres, tropes, and so on. " Gearhart, Suzanne, The Open Boundary 
of History, and Fiction, A Critical Approach to the French Enlightenment, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1984, p. 72. 
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be the true and actual experience of a journey made by the author him/herself. 20 So in 
more technical terms, travel writing is that genre that consists of narratives written in a 
direct autodiegetic mode (author, narrator, hero blend in one person), mostly in the 
form of prose, and is thematically organised around the claim to a true experience of 
travel. This definition is admittedly restrictive, one that Percy G. Adams would 
probably not be too happy about, 21 for it pertains to the modern sense of travel writing 
as the self-conscious activity of a fully-present narrator, which as Campbell reminds us 
was "still barely thinkable in the sixteenth century". 22 Studies on travel writing include 
chapters on, for example, Herodotus or the Alexander Romances that, even though they 
are texts grounded on "real" experiences of travel, they do not fit the modern idea of 
the genre as representation of the journey itself as lived by the travel writer. It is 
claimed, in fact, that travel writing, as we now understand it, is a relative recent literary 
phenomenon that came to be established as such in the sixteenth century, 23 although it 
emerged from a tradition long in the making that reaches back to antiquity, to the first 
reports of foreign cultures that already bore the traces of what later became the 
"pilgrimage" (Philostratus's Life of Apollonius written in the AD 220s or 230s), the 
20 "Travel writing" is often interchangeably used with the terms "travel narrative" and 
"travelogue", which are in fact the most prominent forms of the modem genre. In the foreword 
of the journal Studies in Travel Writing, number 1, Tim Youngs takes on a broad definition of 
travel writing -"travel writing will be interpreted broadly to encompass not only travel 
narratives, letters, diaries, and so on, but also texts such as tourist brochures and guidebooks: 
whatever is written, is about travel, and is interesting", Studies in Travel Writing, number 1, 
spring 1997, p. v). In the introduction of the same journal, however, Peter Hulme states that 
"like autobiography, with which travel writing shares some features, travel narrative is always 
controlled by the first-person singular" and refers to other forms such as letters, notebooks and, 
diaries as "pre-existing the `official' travel narrative itself. " Hulme, pp. 3-5. Mary B. Campbell 
defines travel literature "as a kind of first-person narrative, or at least a second-person narrative 
(as in the travel guide: "thence you come to a pillar near the chamber of the holy sepulchre"). " 
Campbell, p. 5. Barbara Korte defines the genre of travelogue as consisting of "accounts of 
travel [that] depict a journey in its course of events and thus constitute narrative texts (usually 
composed in prose). They claim -and their readers believe- that the journey recorded actually 
took place, and that it is presented by the traveller him or herself. " Korte, Barbara, English 
Travel Writing from Pillgrimages to Postcolonial Explorations, translated from German by 
Catherine Matthias, MacMillan Press LTD, 2000, p. 1. 
21 Adams' idea of travel writing is more inclusive: "in fact the majority of literature about real 
travels has been written in the third person, and without doubt much of that portion has always 
been thought of as 'travel literature' ", although he acknowledges that "while there is no typical 
travel account any more than there is a typical novel, for many readers the first-person journal 
or letter, that pristine document, is still the archetypal form of the recit de voyage. " Adams, pp. 
162-164. 
22 Campbell, Mary Baine, "Renaissance Voyage Literature and Ethnographic Pleasure: The 
Case of Andre Thevet" in Studies in Travel Writing, number 1, p. 10. 
23 In the sixteenth century we have also the appearance of the first great collections of recits de 
%'ol agc by Peter Martyr, Theodore de Bry, Richard Hakluyt, Samuel Purchas and Andre Thevet, 
which signalled the codification of the genre and which along with the new atlases and 
cosmographies contributed to its reorientation and re-evaluation. 
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"ethnographic" (the pre-socratic philosopher Xenophanes, Herodotus in the fifth 
century BC, Ctesias in the fourth century BC, Strabo and Pausanias in first century 
AD) and "satiric" (Lucian in the second century AD) models. 24 The fact that there was 
a parody of "travel writing" as early as the second century AD shows that there was at 
least some level of awareness of a kind of writing that pertained to a body of texts on 
travel, although in no way did that consist then of a distinct genre. Furthermore, one 
cannot leave out from the consideration of the (pre)history of this genre the archetypal 
travel text of Homer's Odyssey, the epical narration of the par excellence journey that 
epitomises the powerful and all pervasive allegorical function of the theme of travel. 
It is, however, both legitimate and enabling, and to a great extent unavoidable, 
to address travel writing from the standpoint of the modern sense of the genre as a first- 
person narrative. And if we do have this sense to begin with, this has emerged out of 
the singular instances and repetitive occurrences of what we now call travel writing 
with all their shifts, breaks, and surprises that make both a sense of continuity and a 
sense of change possible. In other words, if we can speak today of the genre of travel 
writing, it is because of the singular and iterable inscriptions that have given to it both a 
relative identity and a history. It has to be clear here that we are using the term 
"history" not in the sense of a linear progression, evolution or transformation of 
something given and shaped in advance. We rather refer to a sort of movement that is 
both assembling and disassembling, that both brings together and tears apart texts, 
genres, contexts in and between themselves, however, not in the sense of succession of 
different stages in the "history" of travel writing, for example, from the medieval travel 
texts, which aspired to be comprehensive and to live up to the idea of the liber mundi, 
to the Renaissance demarcation of scientific travel writing and the modern division of 
the genre into literary and factual. Of course, we necessarily speak of shifts and 
paradigms in the "history" of travel writing and one cannot deny that there have been 
relatively unifying forces and trends at different phases in what is assumed as its 
historical trajectory. But one, nonetheless, must be attentive to the problems that such 
periodisations and generalisations by definition pose. Linear representations cannot 
help being reductive even when they make room for discontinuities and disruptions. 
Travel texts cut across and intersect with, as they also participate in the formation of 
other genres, some of the most evident examples are the novel and ethnography, which 
had to define itself in disjunction to travel writing and was forced to consider most 
24 See the introduction in Voyages & Visions, Towards a Cultural History of Travel, edited by 
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recently de nouveau their close affinity. 25 And within the genre itself it would be too 
reductive and simplistic to retrospectively map out a passage from pilgrimage to the 
chronicle, to narratives of discovery, conquest, scientific observation and so on. These 
formulations represent and assemble forces and possibilities that at some level and to 
some extent are constantly at work within what we now call travel writing. And, of 
course, some of these possibilities are also realised somewhat separately (yet not 
wholly independently) from what is considered "mainstream" travel writing - 
pilgrimages are still being written today. There are traces and recurrences of many 
different elements and functions that make a history of the genre conceivable and it is 
true that at different historical instances some of these have been in the foreground as 
most representative. But to simply reduce this fact to contextual determination would 
be to overlook the enduring structures (the iterations and alterations) that make this 
genre possible. To put a text back into context necessarily means that one has first 
taken it out of context. 
Contextualisation presupposes a previous distinction between text and context 
In truth, we always read in and out of context(s). A text by definition can be detached 
from the context of its initial inscription and be read in infinite number of contexts. 
What is questioned here is by no means the legitimacy of the demand for 
contextualisation. We cannot help but contextualise and recontextualise texts and this is 
indeed what we must do -limitlessly. However, this precisely amounts to saying that 
there is no closed, final or total context. There is no context that can exhaust or 
establish a meaning for the text in a definite mode. What is called into question here is 
rather a notion of the context as something cohesive and stabilised and a certain limit 
that is often uncritically drawn between text and context. Text and context traverse one 
another and, as Geoffrey Bennington remarks, to be able to have a certain 
understanding of a text implies that one is, however minimally, part of its context. 26 A 
simple distinction cannot be upheld for texts are always contexts bearing the imprints 
of other texts/contexts and contexts are also texts and more broadly cultural formations 
bearing the imprints of texts. Texts and contexts emerge out of sheaves and grids of 
forces and differences that cannot be reduced to closed and circumscribed entities. To 
say that "there is nothing outside the text [il nya pas de hors-texte]", the much quoted 
Jas Eisner and Joan-Pau Rubies, London, Reaktion Books, 1999. 
25 Levi-Strauss' Tristes Tropiques, for instance, is considered a classical ethnographic study and 
one of the masterpieces of twentieth century travel writing. 
'`' Bennington, Geoffrey and Derrida, Jacques, Jacques Derrida, London, University of Chicago 
Press, 1993, p. 91. 
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and largely misunderstood phrase of Derrida, amounts to saying that "there is nothing 
outside context. "27 Text here is obviously used in the broader sense of "writing". 
However, it should be clear that this is not another use or another meaning imposed on 
the term. It is not a matter of terminological choice. Any text in the conventional sense 
is already interrupted by its generalised notion. 
This chapter began with the phrase: there is no travel without writing. "Travel" 
and "writing" are both inscriptions in a generalised sense and, as Barbara Korte also 
points out, fundamentally intertextuah8. Here we make use of the term intertextuality 
coined by Julia Kristeva in a way that goes beyond the narrow concept of the text and 
points to the Derridean generalised notion of textuality, although precisely because of 
its generality it renders the prefix "inter-" redundant. 29 Travel writers read, quote, or 
plagiarise other travel writers or texts about travel such as guidebooks. But beyond this, 
what is implied here is that there can be no rigid separation between the experience of 
travel, as the surrounding context and situation of inscription, and the travel text. 
Experience itself occurs as a structure of writing within which "travel writing" is 
27 "The phrase which for some has become a sort of slogan, in general so badly understood, of 
deconstruction ("there is nothing outside the text" [il n'y a pas de hors-texte]), means nothing 
else: there is nothing outside context. In this form, which says exactly the same thing, the 
formula would doubtless have been less shocking. I am not certain that it would have provided 
more to think about. " Derrida, Jacques, Limited Inc, Evaston, IL, Northwestern University 
Press, 1988, p. 136. 
28 "Texts read during the journey contribute in large measure to the travelling experience, as 
they mediate the travelled world for the traveller; the experience of travel is thus fundamentally 
intertextual. " Korte, p. 146. 
29 The notion of "intertextuality" has been widely applied with regard both to the formation of 
travel texts and to the experience of travel on the whole. For instance, Philippe Antoine attempts 
to read travel texts by Chateaubriand according to the "horizontal" and "vertical" axes of 
intertextuality as designated by Kristeva. Antoine, Philippe, Les Recits de Voyage de 
Chateaubriand, Contribution ä1 'etude d'un genre, Paris, Honore Champion Editeur, 1997. 
Christine Montalbetti, again with regard to travel writing, uses "intertextuality" in a broader 
sense that brings together and mediates between the world and the text. Montalbetti, Christine, 
"Entre Ecriture du Monde et Recriture de la Bibliotheque, Conflicts de la reference et de 
l'intertextualite dans le recit de voyage au XIXe siecle" in Miroir de Textes, Recits de Voyage et 
Intertextualite, Etudes reunies et presentees par Sophie Linon-Chipon, Veronique Magri- 
Mourgues et Sarga Moussa, Nice, Publications de la Faculte des Lettres, Arts at Sciences 
Humaines de Nice, 1998. Montalbetti undertakes to produce a tropology and typology of 
intertextual relations and operations such as "mediation", "comparison", "inclusion", 
"coincidence", "contiguity" that mediate and structure the relation between the experience of 
the world and the text, the text and the library, the text and the world as text. The problem with 
such typologies and formalism in general is that they tend to produce reductive explications of 
texts that compromise the complexity of the notion of textuality and largely presuppose, often in 
spite of themselves, a prior demarcation between a fundamental level of literalness and the 
tropological figuration of texts. In other words, they ultimately presuppose the core distinction 
between proper meaning and metaphor. 
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implicated. In this sense, experience, what is posed as the outward and unifying 
condition of travel writing, comes in turn to divide and disseminate it. 30 
So one cannot simply delimit historical contexts, such as the time of 
pilgrimages and the age of discovery, in order to write a history of travel. For sure, 
travel texts are read in contexts, and some contexts are more pertinent than others, but 
this cannot alter the fact that in doing so one, even unknowingly, divides and multiplies 
differences within them, even when one reduces them to definite meanings. If one is to 
write a history of travel writing one must, of course, assume a certain sense and a 
certain beginning. But no such effort would amount to the assembling of a total history. 
There are many histories to be told and one can, as indeed one must, start from and 
justify a somewhat arbitrary or "imaginary" point of origin, as Mary B. Campbell 
does. 31 One may even, like Campbell, guided (legitimately and unavoidably) by the 
modern notion of the genre consider everything written before the seventeenth century 
as the "prehistory" of travel writing. There can be multiple origins, that is to say there 
is no origin, of travel writing and these are always posed after the fact. So rather than 
advancing in a linear progression, travel writing assembles (and disassembles) itself in 
a zigzag movement (mouvement en vrille) that in moving forward turns back to repeat 
and divide, thus, to multiply its origin. Starting with the modern sense of travel writing 
as a first-person narrative we can look back to the forces that made it possible, to the 
genealogies of the (European) subject that inscribe instances of the opening of 
consciousness to the "other world", of the antinomy of fact and fiction, and 
colonialism, themes that are inextricably woven and constitute the main concerns of 
theorists today. However, in so doing, and this is the undertaking here, and in order to 
avoid both historicist reduction and textual or structural substantiation, one must take 
into account the at once historical and structural movement (or d ferance) that makes 
travel writing possible, a movement that gives rise to singular and repeatable instances, 
outside which it would be nothing in itself. 
This chapter will consider travel writing as an inter-textual experience both in 
a strict and a broader sense. It will attempt to explore both the way diverse genres and 
textual elements are interconnected and woven in the formation of this genre and how 
10 As we shall see later, it is not the actual experience of travel that gives the travel text its 
authority but the "claim" to an experience that might as well not have occurred. Here, the 
intertextual experience of travel acquires an even more obvious and conventional sense. 
"Our point of origin, though, needs justifying: it is, like any point, imaginary. [... ] The simple 
answer [... ] is that travel literature is defined here as a kind of first-person narrative". Campbell, 
The 11'itflc'sS and the Other World, p. 5. 
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these are implicated in the radical textuality of experience itself. We are going to look 
at how the structures and existential conditions of experience both formulate and are 
illustrated in the primarily historical category of the narrative. This is not to say that 
existential conditions precede the experience of travel and the act of writing about it 
and that the latter is simply their actualisation and articulation. Existential categories 
mean nothing outside the historical instances they make possible. If today travel 
writing increasingly receives attention, it is mostly because it consists of a historical 
"sequence" that uniquely dramatises the formation of Europe's relation to its cultural 
other(s) and the emergence of the theme of representation, a largely modernist theme. 32 
Starting with travel narrative as a working and enabling notion (and bearing in 
mind what was previously argued about such delimitations) we will endeavour to 
explore what we assume to be the essential figurality of experience both in relation to 
its textual inscription or "figuration" and to its "figured out" cultural object. Extending 
what has been elaborated so far on metaphor and the existential conditions of travel to 
the historical category of travel narrative, we hope to bring another insight into the 
problematic of fact and fiction and genre formation. Keeping in track with our previous 
discussion of what was held as the "hermeneutic premise" and the aporetics of travel, 
we will proceed to the consideration of the travel narrative with regard to three central 
themes and functions: mimesis, allegory and testimony. These themes are unfailingly 
implicated in any discussion of travel writing, which is defined as a sort of witnessing 
that both represents or imitates and allegorises. Mimesis is usually understood as 
representation and description and is considered as the constitutive operation of the 
travel text at large. Allegory usually pertains to the diegetic function or the "purely" 
narrative parts of the travel text, since the latter is necessarily placed and occasioned 
within symbolic and semiotic networks that imbue it with a meaning that exceeds in 
large, let us say, the "thin description" of a cultural experience or configuration. To 
these "conventional" preoccupations we hope to bring three powerful and radicalising 
insights. We will begin with Paul Ricoeur's Time and Narrative, which ascribes to 
narrative a primarily mimetic function with regard to the "reality" it points to and also 
refigures, in view of exploring the "representational" function of travel writing. Then 
we will proceed to Paul de Man's exploration of the aberrant and essentially allegorical 
structure of narrative, which we shall discuss with regard to the "allegorical" motif of 
32As Campbell sustains, "it is a genre that confronts, at their extreme limit, representational 
tasks proper to a number of literary kinds: the translation of experience into narrative and 
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travel. Finally, we will consider Jacques Derrida's elaboration on the theme of 
testimony and its fundamentally "impure" or literary character in connection to the 
"authenticising" claim to a true experience at the centre of the travel text. Any 
discussion of the notion of narrative necessarily involves the question of time, which 
will also be a major concern throughout the rest of this chapter. 
Paul Ricoeur: Travel as Mimetic Narrative 
We mentioned above that travel writing is bestowed with a fundamentally 
mimetic function, that takes on the sense of imitation, description and representation. 33 
This term is also used in disjunction to the narrative function of travel writing, which 
brings attention to the journey itself, to the sequence of events from the point of 
departure to the point of return. But on the whole, travel narrative, as the articulation of 
the experience of "the other" as lived and brought to writing and thus to reading by a 
representing subject, is understood as a discourse of representation. Representation 
essentially means making or rendering present; it is something that by definition 
involves repetition and hence alteration. Now, it would be unfair to suggest that the 
notion of representation is used uncritically at a time when so much is written on the 
discourses of power and knowledge and the way these (de)form and nuance the gaze of 
the traveller, even more so if s/he is looking with "imperial eyes". And there is 
probably not a single theorist who would uphold the idea that a lucid and diaphanous 
representation is possible, especially at a time when the distinction between fact and 
fiction has never been more uncertain. However, such deliberations that challenge, and 
rightly so, the value of representation and attempt to reveal the politically and ethically 
submerged rhetorical constructions of texts more often than not tend to largely 
presuppose what they call into question, that is, the distinction between literal and 
metaphorical meaning, and continue to assume that behind the forces of power and 
figuration there lies a core of meaning to be brought forth, a truth to be restored. The 
endeavour to dispel the mystique of figurative formations by constructing tables and 
taxonomies of prevalent rhetorical operations always implies that there is something 
like a literal meaning lurking behind the former (Genette, White, and Ricoeur, as we 
have seen or as we shall see, are no exceptions). Mary B. Campbell, in her otherwise 
formidably lucid and well-argued book, presupposes to some extent the distinction 
description, of the strange into visible, of observation into the verbal construct of fact". Ibid., p. 
6. 
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between factual and fictional representation, when she warns us not to confuse the 
modern antinomy with the function of figuration in the middle ages' semantically 
denser and symbolic universe. In the last chapter of The Witness and the Other World 
we are introduced to the figure of a sympathetic traveller, Sir Walter Ralegh, of a fully- 
present narrator who is aware of the rhetoric of his own text and is able for the first 
time to distinguish fact from fiction. 34 This is the turning point, the beginning of the 
end of what Campbell calls the longue duree of the prehistory of travel writing. Travel 
writing in the modern sense could then begin. Yet, does this not insinuate a slow and 
gradual process of rationalisation that leads up to the epoch of representation, to the 
modern idea of the representing subject, a subject that places him/herself on central 
stage, as the very scene of representation, the world now being there before and for 
him/her? For sure, the operation of what we now call representation did not start with 
the self-assured subject, 35 as also the antinomy of fact and fiction was not effectuated 
with the exigency for their separation. They have been always at work as essential 
33 Although mimesis, as we have seen, is not identical to imitation and representation, it is often 
used in this sense. See, for instance, James Duncan's and David Ley's (eds) 
Place/Culture/Representation, London, Routledge, 1993, pp. 1-5. 
34 "Ralegh's account of his quest for Guiana is among the very best of the sixteenth-century 
English travel relations: it is the most intricately constructed and entertaining, and also the 
fullest, the most knowledgeable and accurate. Although it explicitly rejects the informational 
imperative, it is in fact better at conveying information without distortion than most other 
English accounts of the period. " Campbell, p. 253. 
35 It has to be clear here that the critique of the notion of "representation" does not imply that 
representation is something distorting and malign that should be over and done with. We cannot 
but reside in representation in the broad sense, which also takes on the senses of metaphor and 
translation in general. The issue is to critically address an essential premise involved, which 
presupposes that something as a presence or essence precedes and destines itself to re- 
presentation. The notion of destination or "sending" of a thing gathered in its essence to re- 
presentation, that is, of its rendering present by virtue of repetition, is what "allowed" Heidegger 
to envision a "history of metaphysics in its presumed unity as the indivisible unity of a 
sending". This history is divided into epochs according to the rhythm and unity of this 
"sending" that presupposes presence or a notion of Being gathered in itself. This is what has 
allowed for the modern, post-Cartesian epoch of representation, that of the representing and 
representative subject, which was already prescribed, announced and prepared for in the "great 
Greek epoch", when representation was yet inconceivable and the world was understood as 
presence (Anwesen). In the modern epoch of representation the subject takes central stage and 
becomes itself the process and scene of representation but also a calculating and calculable 
subject. As Derrida remarks, according to Heidegger, "it is toward the incalculable that the 
limits of representation can be transcended. " Derrida, Jacques, "Sending: On Representation", 
translated by Peter and Mary Ann Caws, in Social Research, 49, no2, Summer 1982, p. 315. 
Derrida challenges Heidegger's notion of the unity and destiny of Being that structures the 
history of metaphysics on the whole as something consistent and divisible into epochs. For 
Derrida, the notion of "sending" (envoi or rather envois in the plural) is already a sending back; 
it is a movement that cannot gather itself together in/as the destiny of Being but rather proceeds 
through its multiplications in traces or renvois without preposited origin. The sense of origin 
comes after the fact as a prosthesis and, moreover, it is infinitely divisible; it is a past that has 
never been present as such. 
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forces in the figurative structure of experience, 36 though these have taken on and 
manifested different functions (and Campbell is right to point this out) at different 
historical instances. But a genealogy of fact and fiction (which, however, Campbell 
does not claim she is doing) leaves these notions untouched because it precisely 
presupposes them without investigating the structures that make them possible (or 
impossible). 
In our effort to do exactly that we will begin with Paul Ricoeur's theory of 
narrative, which also constitutes a major contribution to the problematic of fact and 
fiction and which he discusses with regard to the historical and fictional types of 
narrative. In order to explore the consequences of such a thinking with regard to travel 
writing, we will have to persist on the distinction between historiography and fiction. If 
in the first two chapters we persisted on the relation of philosophy and literature, this 
was so for the purpose of exploring the binary couple of proper and metaphor, and by 
extension the signifying structures of Oikos and travel, on the fundamental level of 
their conceptual premises as these operate and are formulated in two paradigmatic 
discourses. In a similar way, historiography and literature are held here as exemplary 
discourses for the consideration of the problematic of fact and fiction. If we are to look 
at how fact and fiction operate within travel writing, we would first have to think them 
through according to discourses that pose these questions in a more acute and pressing 
way, for these belong to their own mode of coming to being. Historiography and 
fiction, although in a way that proves to be increasingly problematic, rest on the 
distinction between the factual and the fictional. So a disjunction which is inherent to 
travel writing acquires its most acute formulation and elucidation through the 
comparative discussion of two discourses that constitute themselves on the grounds of 
a largely unwarranted and mutually exclusive division between an inside and an 
outside. This, however, is what brings out the aporia of factual and fictional 
representation. One must first think in and then challenge oppositional terms. 
Drawing on Ricoeur's thinking on narrative has also a considerable advantage 
for the exploration of travel as an "inter-textual" experience that exceeds travel writing 
stricto sensu. For, as we shall see in a moment, narrative for Ricoeur is a broad notion 
that runs through and structures the whole range of hermeneutic experience. Ricoeur 
36 As Derrida maintains "as soon as there are words -and this can be said of the trace in general, 
and of the chance that it is- direct intuition no longer has any chance". Derrida, Jacques, 
"Passions", translated by David Wood, in On the Name, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 
1995, p. 30. 
155 
ultimately presupposes the distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning. His 
hermeneutics rests on the notion of re-appropriation or return to the proper. Yet his 
extremely rich and extensive elaboration will bring us to the end of that road and to the 
point of no return and, hence, of no re-appropriation, that is, to the premises that Paul 
de Man and Jacques Derrida bring forward. In view of this, Paul Ricoeur's theory of 
narrative is an excellent point of departure. 
Paul Ricoeur formulates his theory of narrative in his three-volume work Time 
and Narrative. 37 This work constitutes an extension and completion of his other major 
work The Rule of Metaphor, which was extensively discussed in the first chapter. 38 
Indeed, Ricoeur's theory of metaphor, which reaches its impetus and full potential on 
the level of discourse as work and the hermeneutics of the text, attains its complete 
formulation and effectiveness in his theory of narrative. It is through narrative that the 
dynamic of the metaphorical process manifests its most significant realisations. 
Ricoeur's passage from metaphor to narrative is made by way of the notion of 
mimesis. Mimesis is used in its Aristotelian designation as creative imitation or 
innovative redescription. Even though Aristotle subordinates metaphor to mimesis that 
is a broad category comprising both lexis (diction) and muthos (plot), he restricts it to 
the level of the "noun" in his famous definition. Ricoeur unfolds the dynamics of 
metaphor by elevating it to the level of the text. The schematisation of productive 
imagination that played a principal role in the metaphorical process, as we saw in the 
first chapter, reaches now its full potential in the synthetic structure of the text called 
emplotment. 39 So narrative for Ricoeur is the configuration of human action (praxis) in 
'' Ricoeur, Paul, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David 
Pellauer, London, The University of Chicago Press, 1984, originally published as Temps et 
Recit, Editions du Seuil, 1983, Time and Narrative, vol. 2, translated by Kathleen Blarney and 
David Pellauer, London, The University of Chicago Press, 1985, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, 
translated by Kathleen Blarney and David Pellauer, London, The University of Chicago Press, 
1988. 
38Ricoeur states in the preface to the first volume of Time and Narrative: "The Rule of Metaphor 
and Time and Narrative form a pair: published one after the other, these works were conceived 
together. Although metaphor has traditionally belonged to the theory of `tropes' (or figures of 
discourse) and narrative to the theory of literary `genres, ' the meaning-effects produced by each 
of them belong to the same basic phenomenon of semantic innovation. " Ricoeur, Time and 
Narrative, vol. 1, p. ix. 
390ne should remember that in Aristotle's Poetics the definition of tragedy, which for him 
constitutes the literary genre par excellence, involves the mimesis of human action in a work 
that has coherence and magnitude, in other words, that constitutes a structured and complete act. 
Aristotle ascribes six elementary features or parts to tragedy: plot (muthos), language (lexis), 
thought (dianoia), characters (ethos), melody (melos) and spectacle (opsis). While Aristotle 
examines metaphor only on the level of lexis, Ricoeur establishes its pertinence primarily on the 
level of muthos: "There is no doubt that the prevalent sense of mimesis is the one instituted by 
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the structured totality of the text. Narrative organises the chaotic and disordered flow of 
the events of the life world into a coherent whole giving it in this way a concrete form 
and meaning. Emplotment, the prime category of narrative, is an art of composition that 
enables the representation of human action in an ordered fashion. It is a principle of 
concordance that interrelates the disconnected episodes of action into an event of 
meaning that is characterised by "completeness, wholeness, and an appropriate 
magnitude"40. However, narrative is not granted a purely unifying and totalising 
function beyond the threat of fragmentation and disruption. It also includes and sustains 
a principle of discordance. Narrative then has to balance between a drive to coherence 
and a drive to disintegration, which is represented by the reversals (peripeteia), the 
surprises, twists and turns that a plot may contain. While Aristotle restricts the principle 
of discordance to what he calls "complex plots" in disjunction to "simple plots", 
Ricoeur elevates it to an essential component of narrative, which he consequently 
designates as a model of discordant concordance41. 
So for Ricoeur narrative is a synthesis of the heterogeneous, the bestowal of 
order to what is scattered and incongruent. Narrative always involves conflict and 
tension between meanings because it brings together semantic fields previously loosely 
connected. This attests to its close ties with metaphor. As we have already seen, 
metaphor, for Ricoeur, is the linguistic process of creation of new meaning that erupts 
out of the tension produced by the clashing between two formerly distant and alien 
semantic fields, finally resolved through the workings of productive imagination and 
interpretation. In a similar way, narrative by bringing sameness and difference together 
produces a schema, a plot that unfolds its dynamic by projecting the world of the text 
enlarging thus our experience of belonging to the actual world. At this point it is 
necessary to bring attention to a crucial distinction between the broad and narrow 
senses of narrative. Ricoeur distinguishes between narrative as a mimetic action and 
diegesis as the particular mode of organisation and presentation of events in a singular 
text. Mimetic action involves the "what" of the text and it is much broader than the 
specific composition that identifies a text as such. "What happened" or "what could 
its being joined to muthos". This is how metaphor becomes a constitutive category of narrative. 
Ibid., p. 45. 
40 Ibid., p. 38. 
41 ., Emplotment is never the simple triumph of `order'. " Ibid., p. 73. Discordant concordance is 
a theme that runs through Time and Narrative and is explored, as we shall see, in relation to 
Ricoeur's major concern and pivot theme for the consideration of narrative, that of time. Plot for 
Aristotle is a logical and causal structure. For Ricoeur it manifests an essentially temporal 
character. 
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happen" is the object and reference of narrative, which precedes and also exceeds the 
complete product of writing. Narrative exists only because there is something to be 
narrated in the first place, because the field of action, where human agents act and 
suffer, calls for it. As unregulated and loose as it may be, the world of action offers 
narrative stricto sensu its vast semantic resources and conceptual networks that can be 
recapitulated in the phrase semantics of action. Human action, for Ricoeur, is an 
inchoate narrative for it already disposes a pre-narrative structure. Therefore, the 
notion of narrative or better narrativity "can be taken in a broader sense than the 
discursive genre that codifies it"42. 
Ricoeur discerns three levels of narrativity: prefiguration, configuration and 
refiguration. These levels correspond to each phase of his notion of threefold mimesis. 
We said before that mimesis is defined as the creative imitation of an action. 
Accordingly, the field of human action may be grasped as an interaction between three 
strata of experience shaped by three mimetic mediations: mimesis], the pre- 
understanding or prefiguration of praxis granted on the semantics of action, mimesis2, 
the organisation or configuration of this praxis in the form of a discursive work, and 
mimesis3, the unfolding of the potentialities of praxis or its refiguration through the act 
of reading. Mimesis2 is located at the centre of Ricoeur's analysis. One must bear in 
mind that Ricoeurian hermeneutics is a hermeneutics of the text. However, 
hermeneutics is also "concerned with reconstructing the entire arc of operations by 
which practical experience provides itself with works, authors, readers. "43 Textual 
configuration carries out the central task of mediating between the prefiguration of the 
practical field and its refiguration through the reception of the work. 
However, according to Ricoeur a preoccupation with configuration or 
emplotment would amount to no more than a formalistic theory of poetics, an 
abstraction of rules of composition, lacking the force and scope of the hermeneutics of 
action, if it failed to take into account the temporal character of human experience and 
its mediation and refiguration through narrative. According to Ricoeur, there is an 
essential interconnection between time and narrative, the investigation of which could 
offer valuable insights into both the immense philosophical question of time and the 
poetics of discourse. Ricoeur emphasises: time becomes human to the extent that it is 
articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning ii'hen it 
4' Ricoeur, Time and ; Narrative, vol. 3, p. 260. 
4' Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, p. 55. 
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becomes a condition of temporal existence. , 44 In the same way that emplotment 
mediates between the prefiguration and refiguration of action, it also functions as the 
mediation of a configured time between a prefigured and a refigured time. To 
Ricoeur's mind, the temporal dimension is not an optional consideration but a 
constitutive feature of narrative, which is realised as a meaningful event of language in 
the present of discourse. To lose sight of this and to centre solely on formal and 
semantic concerns would undermine the scope of Ricoeur's project. 
Hence, the inquiry on the mediation between the three mimeses cannot be 
complete without taking into account their temporal character. Mimesis] is designated 
by three seminal features: a structural, a symbolic and a temporal one. Human beings 
find themselves within the world and within time, to which they primordially belong 
and of which they have an immediate grasp. Being-in-the-world and in time confers 
upon humans a preliminary familiarity with the field of action and the competence for 
understanding, i. e., for practical understanding. This is so because the practical field is 
already constituted through conceptual networks that allow human agents to understand 
events, motives, circumstances, etc., in a "relation of intersignification". The practical 
field offers its symbolic resources, i. e., systems of signs, sets of norms and rules, and 
cultural processes that enable the articulation of experience. These sets of cultural 
norms and processes, which Ricoeur opts to call symbolic mediations, is what makes 
meaningful action possible. Anthropologists like Clifford Geertz have maintained that 
culture is a totality of symbolic systems, 45 i. e., sets of patterns, rituals, conventions, 
beliefs and institutions that ascribe to it, in Ricoeur's words, an "initial readability". In 
this way culture is granted a prenarrative form, an immanent texture presupposed by 
narrative. Finally, the field of human action is characterised by a prenarrative structure 
of temporal experience, what allows for the immediate and primitive experience of 
time conferred upon humans simply by the irreducible fact of being thrown into the 
world among the objects of their circumspection and care. It is preoccupation with the 
things of this world, the time of "our everyday acting and suffering" that calls for their 
measuring and dating. MimesisI corresponds to the structure of pre-understanding of 
44 Ibid., p. 52. 
u "Undirected by culture patterns -organised systems of significant symbols- man's behaviour 
would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and exploding emotions, his 
experience virtually shapeless. Culture, the accumulated totality of such patterns, is not just an 
ornament of human existence but -the principal basis of its specificity- an essential condition 
for it. " Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures, Selected Essays, London, Fontana Press, 
1993. P. 46. 
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our experience of the world, which is consequently made explicit in narrative 
configuration. 
Mimesis2 is the plane onto which our experience of the world is grafted in an 
explicit mode. Time and action are figured out, made manifest, by means of their 
inscription and structuration in narrative form. So it is through emplotment that the 
heterogeneous factors of the practical field are mediated and synthesised in a complete 
and coherent story. This synthesis also involves the elevation of the temporal features 
of reality to "one temporal whole. " The temporal aspect of narrative is not reduced to a 
sequence of episodes but always presupposes, even in the most "humble" of narratives, 
an act of configuration. 46 Configuration is what transforms a sequence of events into a 
story, into a temporal unity. It is also what makes the storyfollowable and repeatable. 
It imposes on it "a sense of ending" which governs the act of reading by connecting 
parts to an anticipated whole. 47 
Mimesis2 is the central stage and focal point of the hermeneutics of discourse. 
Ricoeur builds on it a poetics that carries and delivers the effects and driving forces of 
history, tradition and innovation. As mentioned above, configuration corresponds to a 
schematisation and concretisation of our rough and "naked" experience of the world. 
This action resonates the work of productive imagination at the kernel of the 
metaphorical process. As Ricoeur points out, with mimesis2 we enter "the kingdom of 
the as if . 
"48 So configuration constitutes a dynamic schema with the power to 
imaginatively (re)produce reality. However, this schema is not detached from reality 
but rather belongs to and draws from it. Emplotment has its own history and tradition, 
which Ricoeur describes as a dialectic of innovation and sedimentation. A narrative 
establishes itself as such by means of its formal features, the most radical of which, 
according to Ricoeur, is that of discordant concordance. Formal paradigms are nothing 
but sedimentated innovations. For Ricoeur, this accounts for the evolution of genres 
46 Ricoeur criticises semiotics and in particular the literary school of narratology represented 
mainly by Vladimir Propp, A. J. Greimas and Gerard Genette for de-chronologising narrative 
and reducing it to a logical structure and to its underlying formal properties. Structuralist literary 
criticism relegates time to the surface structure of narrative and pays attention exclusively to the 
"achronic" features in the deep structure. However, a synchronic analysis of narrative fails to 
account for its irreducibly diachronic element, which more than a structural "residue, " as 
Greimas would have it, is what brings narrative together in a meaningful totality. Ricoeur, Paul, 
"The Narrative Function" in Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, edited & translated by John 
B. Thompson, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 282-5. 
4' Reading forwards and backwards is an essential operation of interpretation, which is a process 
of mediation between the pre-understanding of the text and its final comprehension by relating 
its parts to the whole. 
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and for the particularity of individual works. Innovation preserves the formal principle 
of narrative even if it reforms or deforms it. This is so because "innovation remains a 
form of behaviour governed by rules"49 and is realised as deviation from an already 
established order. In this way, it retains narrative under the sway of the rule of 
metaphor. 50 
The third level of mimesis, refiguration, refers to the actualisation of narrative 
in the act of reading and interpretation. This corresponds to what Ricoeur calls, 
following H. -G. Gadamer, application. Mimesis3 fulfils and also unfolds the dynamic 
of narrative by projecting a new and inhabitable world before the reader, who is offered 
the occasion for new insights into reality and alternative modes of being-in-the-world. 
Mimesis3 stages the intersection of the world of the text with the world of the reader. 
Thus, with refiguration the circle of mimesis, the hermeneutic circle is completed. In 
the end, mimesis consists of a mediation between what precedes and what follows the 
text. For Ricoeur, what has been so far outlined is by no means a vicious circle. The 
hermeneutic circle "is not a lifeless tautology" but rather a "healthy circle", 51 which 
enlarges and deepens our experience of the world and provides the conceptual means 
for tackling the complex issues that it involves in all its phases. 
Ricoeur's meditation on mimesis is subordinated throughout his voluminous 
work to the notion of mediation between time and narrative. He maintains that the all- 
important philosophical question of time, which is recapitulated in the central aporia of 
cosmological confronted with phenomenological time, receives a response from poetics 
and can be better formulated through the investigation of the refiguration of time by 
narrative. 52 In this way, not only is the aporetics of time brought to light but the 
hermeneutic quest into the effectiveness of narrative also attains its fuller scope. The 
phenomenological reflection on time, especially that of Augustine, Husserl and 
Heidegger, provides Ricoeur with the conceptual tools for probing into the ontological 
48 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, p. 64. 
49 Ibid., p. 69. 
50 It is clear, therefore, that Ricoeur accounts for the formation of genres and also for disruption 
and difference within them in terms of deviation from already established generic orders. 
However, what he calls the dialectic between sedimentation or tradition and innovation cannot 
but totalise and reduce to a linear progression what precisely resists such reductions and 
totalisations: the assembling and disassembling forces that only give rise to confounded and 
inherently disjunctive generic formations. 
51 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, p. 76. 
52 "Temporality cannot be spoken of in the direct discourse of phenomenology, but rather 
requires the mediation of the indirect discourse of narration. " Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 
3, p. 241. 
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presuppositions and imports of narrative and, reversibly, the poetics of narrative offers 
its resources for the articulation of the experience of time. Ricoeur's aim is "to discover 
what resources a poetics of narrative possesses for, if not resolving, at least making this 
aporia [of time] work for us. "53 To do that, Ricoeur focuses on two types of narrative: 
historiography and fiction. 
We will not follow closely the "long and difficult threeway conversation 
between history, literary criticism, and phenomenological philosophy" that unfolds 
Time and Narrative. The purpose here is to explore the question of the intertwining of 
historical and literary narrative, which, to the extent that it reaches the core of the 
problematic of fact and fiction, is extremely pertinent for the consideration of travel 
writing. There are similar operations in the travel text and in its decisive separation 
from the discourse of ethnography. For sure, travel writers are neither historians nor 
ethnographers (though historians and ethnographers can be travel writers) but they 
necessarily share with the latter premises, claims and operations of representation. In 
such "representations" the theme of time is all-important since it is essentially 
implicated with the constitutive questions of "how things were" in the historical past, 
"how things could be" in the untimely and possible world suggested by literature, and 
"how things are" in the descriptive discourse of the "ethnographic present. " The 
phenomenological motif of travel writing by definition roots it in the experience of a 
present, nevertheless, a present that bears the imprints of a past (the traveller's cultural 
past, the historical past of the culture visited, the span or division of time between and 
throughout perception and inscription) and of a future (the impending return and 
reintegration to the home culture, which is at once a past and a future). These can never 
consist of successive episodes in a journey; they are far more complex and implicated 
with one another. 
Narrative as the articulation of human action is primarily a historical category. 
It is the configuration of time above all as human time. Any thinking on narrative or 
historical time would lack in depth and grounding if it did not put forward the 
philosophical questions: "what is time? " and "what is history? " Ricoeur addresses the 
concept of time through its primary aporia concerning the confrontation of 
cosmological (or else objective, or physical) time with phenomenological (or 
subjective, or psychological) time. Cosmological time is designated as the time of the 
universe within which we find ourselves, the time of the regular movement of heavenly 
53 Ibid., p. 4 
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bodies, and phenomenological time as that of the soul, lived time as constituted by 
consciousness. Cosmological time can be measured and represented as a line of 
undifferentiated instants, while phenomenological time is constituted as a synthesis of 
multiple and diverse intentionalities, as discordant concordance. These, however, are 
not two separate modalities of time. Physical time would not be measurable or 
intelligible if it were not for a constitutive and measuring consciousness. Ricoeur 
maintains that these two approaches "mutually occlude each other to the very extent 
they imply each other. , 54 
Ricoeur follows this aporia from the legacy of Aristotle's and Augustine's 
meditations on time up to Kant, the phenomenology of Husserl and the hermeneutics of 
Heidegger. Aristotle and Augustine represent respectively the cosmological and 
psychological traditions. 55 The comparative consideration of their work could be 
outlined in the major aporia of time concerning the duality of the "now" as instant and 
present. An "instant" differs from the "present" in that it functions like a point in a line, 
homogeneous to other points with which it is related in terms of the points "before" and 
the points "after, " while the "present" is always the present of discourse, the living 
present of an intentional act gathering in its periphery past-presents and future-presents. 
The instant, therefore, is the unit of a time objectively conceived, while the present is 
the source of subjective time. For Ricoeur, the impasse that these two approaches 
towards time run up against could be escaped or at least made productive by means of a 
poetic solution. Before proceeding to this he considers the immense input of Husserl 
and Heidegger into the aporetics of time. 
54 Ibid., p. 14. 
ss Aristotle defines time as "the number of motion in respect of `before' and `after' " (Physics 
Ii', 219b2), as the measurement of the intervals in between the succession of `nows'. Time, 
however, for Aristotle, does not coincide with movement even if it depends on it. Time acquires 
unity and continuity because it is conceived as a line, at rest by definition. Time as continuum is 
grounded on the paradoxical function of the point-like instant to both divide and connect, by the 
line's endless divisibility. Aristotle, who is interested in designating the principles of physis, 
leaves out of his analysis the psychological aspect of time even though he admits that the 
measurement of movement presupposes the noetic act of a consciousness. For him time before 
and above humans is in physis. This is why Aristotle thinks of time as an objective succession 
without any differentiation or determination of the instants it is composed of. "Past" and 
"future", in Aristotle, coincide with "before" and "after". 
For Augustine time is primary constituted as the time of the soul, it exists as far as it is 
constituted by a consciousness. This is why he is able to discern between the "instant" and the 
"present", which is conceived as the living present of a meaning intending consciousness. For 
Augustine, time is measured by the intentio and distentio animi, that is, the shortening of 
expectation for what approaches and the extension of the memory of what recedes. Yet, Ricoeur 
points out, confining time to the mind does not allow for a fixed unit for measurement neither 
can it explain its objectification into a common, singular time. 
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Husserl's phenomenological project is to make time appear as such, to achieve 
a direct description of internal time-consciousness. To do this he excludes objective 
time, the time of the world, from the scope of his study. Husserl pursues his quest with 
a set of reductions from perceived time to sensed time, in which objects are being 
constituted as temporal unities, and then to time as duration in the sphere of pure 
immanence that corresponds to the flow or flux of consciousness as such, to the purely 
formal substratum of time. 56 Time is described according to a principle of continuity 
and a principle of multiplication. Thus, on the one hand, the phenomenological present 
is designated by Husserl as the source point of series of retentions, protentions and 
modifications of past-presents, as an enlarged present. On the other hand, retention and 
recollection allow Husserl to represent phenomenological time as a serial order which 
relates its composing units by means of a principle of coincidence between retained and 
repeated presents. 
For Ricoeur the most significant contribution to the phenomenological 
question of time is formulated in Heidegger's Being and Time. Here we witness a 
shifting of ground since Heidegger's meditation on time is centred on the analytic of 
Dasein, which rather than an entity opposed to the world (allowing thus for a 
distinction between the psychological and the physical) is primarily a being-there, the 
world belonging to its very constitution. According to Ricoeur, Husserl's antinomy 
between internal time-consciousness and objective time receives a response from what 
is called hermeneutic phenomenology, for which time cannot be separated from the 
worldliness of the only entity that makes an issue of it. The time of Dasein is outlined 
above all as a structure of Care, that is, a structure of coming-towards-Being-a-whole, 
towards an authentic mode of existence that resists dissimulation into our ordinary 
56 According to Ricoeur, "the two great discoveries" of Husserlian phenomenology are "the 
phenomenon of retention and its symmetrical counterpart, protention, and the distinction 
between retention (or primary remembrance) and recollection (or secondary remembrance). " 
Retention is the fundamental capacity of the present "now" to retain or hold on to recent 
"nows, " which form its "comet-tail" running-off into the depths of the past. The repetition of a 
present-now in the successive present, and therefore its retention in it, ensures the continuity of 
time and of temporal objects. Temporal objects or tempo-objects (zeitobjekt) are defined by 
Husserl as immanent unities which are constituted by the repetitive perceptions of an object, of 
which the sense is retained in a way that enables its identification each time as such. Tempo- 
objects are durations that ascribe to the perceived objects of the world (transcendent objects) a 
temporal rather than logical identity. They pertain to an intermediate level of time between 
objective time (level one) and absolute time (level three), that is, the immanent and grounding 
time of absolute flux. Protention refers to the anticipation of the future-present in the present- 
now, to the openness of the present towards the future, and recollection denotes the repetition of 
a past-present that no longer belongs to the recent past, that is not still retained, but appears once 
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concern with the things of the world, with what is present-at-hand. 57 The time of Care, 
according to Heidegger, is a primordial time, from which all temporal levels and 
modalities derive. The emphasis, thus, is shifted from the present, which was 
considered up to now the source-point of time, to the future in the form of anticipatory 
resoluteness, Dasein 's coming towards being a whole according to its ownmost 
possibilities. According to Ricoeur, the originality of Heidegger's project lies in his 
effort to "seek in Care itself the principle of the pluralising of time into future, past, and 
present. "58 Accordingly, being is perceived as a "projected unity", which is brought 
together through the transmission and repetition of received potentialities. Repetition, 
here, is the principle of continuity which gathers together what is received, actualised 
and projected. And it is Dasein's preoccupation with the things of the world, with what 
is present-at-hand, what is measurable and datable that makes objective time (which is, 
however, an inauthentic and derivative time) or, as Heidegger calls it, the ordinary 
concept of time possible and desirable. 59 
Ricoeur maintains that the aporia of time brought forth by phenomenology can 
receive a reply from a poetics of narrativity. According to him, phenomenology need 
not fall into silence for lack of words for describing time as pure immanence, but 
should instead resort to the metaphorical mediations and innovations of language: 
more as a quasi present (since it does not belong to the present of a perception). Ricoeur, Time 
and Narrative, vol. 3, pp. 24-26. 
57 "Here already, what seems closest in the eyes of direct phenomenology turns out to be the 
most inauthentic phenomenon, while the authentic is what is most concealed. " Ibid., p. 64. 
58 With Heidegger, Being-in-the-world receives a history of its own. It is the history of coming- 
towards, which, nevertheless, always turns back upon "the condition of finding itself already 
thrown into the world. " The being that we are is a lot of potentialities, which we receive as 
heritage and hand down to ourselves, to which we go back, which we reopen and actualise. 
59 The main criticism Ricoeur levels at Husserl concerns the exclusion of objective time, which, 
in any case, is the starting point of his phenomenological project: "Without some prior 
familiarity with the objective world, the reduction of this world would lose its very basis. " Ibid., 
p. 25. According to Ricoeur, Husserl could not but borrow "from the determinations of 
objective time that are known before its exclusions" in order to describe time as such. We are 
already in time before we think and phenomenologically articulate it. The main arguments 
Ricoeur addresses against Heidegger, though he admits that his debt to him is immeasurable. 
concern first the encapsulation of history as exclusively the history of Dasein marked by its 
incommunicability and untransmissability. What Dasein hands down, it hands down to itself. 
And what it moves forward to is its own death, Being-towards-death being its essential, 
absolutely incommunicable structure and internal limitation. Secondly, Ricoeur emphasises that 
Heidegger's analytic of Dasein is a labour of language and interpretation that is necessarily 
rooted in worldly time and ordinary experience. He asks: "How could the public character of the 
historising fail to precede in its own manner the most radical temporality, inasmuch as its 
interpretation itself comes out of language, which has always preceded the forms of Being- 
towards-death reputed to be untransferrable? " Ibid., p. 94. At this stage of his analysis Ricoeur 
reintroduces the notion of narrative. 
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"Words are not always lacking. "60 The two perspectives of time, the cosmological and 
the phenomenological, do not form an alternative choice but rather a relation of mutual 
dependence. Time makes itself manifest neither solely through the movement of stellar 
objects nor in the deep substratum of consciousness but through a third time that 
Ricoeur calls human, historical, or narrated time. Time is configured and objectified in 
the structure of narratives and consequently refigured through the process of reading, 
which completes the production of historical time as a reinscription of lived time onto 
cosmic time. 
Mimesis3, which constitutes the last phase of the hermeneutic process, places 
narrative under the aegis of a general theory of effects. What is ultimately at stake, 
what finally comes out of narrative function, is the refiguration of time and praxis in a 
way that raises it to the level of historical consciousness. 61 The hermeneutics of 
historical consciousness describes how the immediate experience of belonging, which 
exposes us to the effects of history and tradition, is mediated, concretised and totalised 
through the text and, finally, transformed into meaningful action. In Ricoeur's view, 
this process would not be possible without the connivance of the resources of both 
history and fiction. The intersection of the world of the text and the world of the reader 
on the level of refiguration is the outcome of the interweaving of the references of 
history and fiction, which points to a possible and inhabitable world wherein our 
ownmost possibilities could be reopened and unfolded. 
Ricoeur perceives a common structure between historiography and fiction on 
the level of their formal properties. Historiography and fiction, prior to their 
identification as such, are principally narrated stories. They both conform to the rules 
and paradigms of narrative composition. They both dispose a plot that configures the 
scattered and fleeting events of the field of action into coherent and structured 
totalities. They are both examples of discordant concordance in the sense that they 
elevate a mass of heterogeneous elements into a complete and followable story. 62 In 
other words, historiography and fiction have a deep affinity on the level of explanation 
or mimesis2. However, this is not the level at which their interrelation reveals its true 
significance and potential. Historical and fictional narratives correlate also with regard 
60 Ibid., p. 27. 
61 Ibid., p. 102. 
62 Historical and fictional narratives both demonstrate a sense of continuity, direction and 
ending, and structural features like order, characters (real or fictional), point of view, and 
narrative voice (implied or manifest), which organises the work in a way that makes it 
communicable. 
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to their reference to reality on the level of refiguration. Though they are driven by 
different intentionalities, the former intending the reconstruction of an actual past and 
the latter the "imaginative" representation of reality (thus they ultimately refer to a 
shared condition of historicity), they both borrow from each other's resources for the 
concretisation of their respective objects in a way that allows Ricoeur to speak of the 
interweaving of their references. Indeed, Ricoeur maintains that the extensive exchange 
between them legitimates such expressions as "the historisation of fictional narrative" 
and "the fictionalisation of historical narrative". 
According to Ricoeur, narrative or historical time is produced as a hybrid time 
through the intimate exchanges between history and fiction. Historical time arises as 
the reinscription of phenomenological time onto cosmological time integrating the time 
of human action with the time of the universe in a way that allows for the 
objectification of time as collective singular, for the datability of events, and for the 
construction of meaningful historical totalities. Historical time then functions as a 
bridge over a numerical and anonymous time, the mortal time of individual fates, and 
the public or social time of communities. It is the temporal situation that envelops us, 
within which we find and understand ourselves as historical agents without necessarily 
examining its conditions of signification. 63 Ricoeur maintains that the ontological 
ground common to historiography and fiction, which is the primordial experience of 
belonging to the world, can only be accessed and articulated on the condition of the 
interpenetration of the fixed terms of history and the imaginative variations of fiction. 
The extent to which historiography is a reconstruction of and fiction a rupture with 
reality is what remains to be seen. 
Historiography, according to Ricoeur, exhibits its creative force initially 
through the invention of "certain reflective instruments" that also function as 
"connectors" between lived time and universal time: the calendar, the succession of 
generations, and the trace. The notion of the trace for Ricoeur, which is significantly 64 
63 Our participation in a collective time and in a common historical situation creates the notion 
of a shared reality, which historians intend as their object, often failing to acknowledge the 
import of imagination to the outcome of their labour. Inversely, literary theorists, formalists in 
particular, often disregard the resources of historisation at work in the production of the 
"unreal" object of fiction. 
6' The calendar represents time as a linear continuum computed, on the one hand, on the basis 
of the periodicity and regularity of astral movement while, on the other, imbued with meaning 
according to the interconnections and intersignifications that historical agents as intending 
subjects bring to the otherwise undifferentiated axial moments. The second connector between 
cosmological and psychological time, that is, the succession of generations, far more than 
stating a biological fact, that is, the replacement of the dead by the living, assumes a powerful 
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different from Derrida's trace, has immense epistemological and ontological value 
because not only does it allow for but also makes the way we stand in relation to things 
of the past thinkable. 65 
The trace in general signifies the vestige of the past, what of the past is still 
preserved in the present. The idea of the vestige involves both a static aspect, the mark 
or thing that still remains and is visible to us, and a dynamic aspect which signifies a 
passage and a "pastness", in other words, something that happened in the past, an 
activity or a situation that no longer is but can be traced back through the marks it has 
left. 66 The essential function of the trace, in Levinas' expression quoted by Ricoeur, is 
to "signify something without making it appear. "67 The trace stands for something that 
once was but no longer is; it becomes a sign-effect for something absent. The structure 
of standing for, that is, of substituting for, reveals the essential connection of the trace 
with the notion of metaphor and everything this brings along. The trace enters into a 
tropological relation with the past and, according to Ricoeur, should be thought under 
the sign of the analogous, which, as we know, is the par excellence type of metaphor 
and involves a synthesis of identity and difference. Accordingly, the analogical 
structure of the trace is what enables access to the historical past, with which 
historians, in order to make sense of and lay claim on, engage by way of prefiguration 
and configuration, that is, tropological understanding. 
symbolic function through the elevation of the phenomenological notions of present, past and 
future from the private and mortal time of Dasein to the public and limitless time of 
contemporaries, predecessors, and successors. The passage from private to public time also 
corresponds to the passage from concrete intersubjective relations to the construction of the 
anonymous "we" of the realm of contemporaries, whose interconnectedness with the realms of 
predecessors and successors in the form of memory (retention and recollection), hope and 
expectation (protention) gives rise to such concepts as heritage, destiny, and progress, but also 
to the construction of a "they" or Other which evokes the immemorial, infinity, eternity, 
immortality, that is, the "wholly Other than mortals. " Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, p. 
115. 
65 The trace, according to Ricoeur, is an overarching historical category that both includes and 
exceeds documents, i. e., collections of data according to a theme or question posed by 
historians, archives, i. e., the organised and institutionalised body of documents, and monuments, 
what is handed down intentionally for the purpose of commemoration. 
66 Ricoeur's definition of the trace as sign-effect is grounded on its double-sidedness, that is, on 
the one hand, its "thing-like" character pointing to a relation of cause to effect between the mark 
and the conditions of its production and, on the other, its semantic dynamic as something past 
but still lingering. Ibid., p. 120. The trace is designated by Ricoeur as an "overlapping" of the 
empirical, i. e., the materiality of the mark and the causal relations it involves, and the 
existential, i. e., the signification it receives as part of the time of Care of a Dasein that already 
has-been-there. The trace signifies through its existential characteristics of datability and of 
stretching-along in time but also by means of its necessary grafting onto the time of the 
calendar. Databilih- is the concern of the philosopher. Dates concern the historian. For Ricoeur 
the trace conflates the two. 
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Ricoeur's thinking is very close to Hayden White's, who argues in his 
Metahistory that historians in order to represent or rather produce an icon of the past in 
a coherent and comprehensible mode necessarily advance by first prefiguring sets of 
events in terms of linguistic protocols, which he identifies as the four primary tropes of 
metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony, then by configuring or "encoding" these 
sets into what he calls archetypal or pregeneric plot structures that are, finally, 
exemplified or sublimated into narratives as stories of a particular kind: Romance, 
Comedy, Tragedy, and Satire. 68 It is configuration or emplotment into distinct and 
limited types of narrative that enables the work of the historian to have a meaning, 
moreover, a meaning to which his/her audience can relate to, and an explanatory 
value. 69 Of course, the process outlined above is not by necessity a conscious one, 
neither does it consist of distinct and successive stages. It is however always at work in 
the writing of history whether historians acknowledge it or not. Historians then, 
according to White, by configuring events (which are neutral in themselves and have 
no intrinsic meaning) into recognisable plot types adhere to "specific processes of 
sense-making" that enable their audience not only to follow the story but also to 
understand it, that is, to understand it in a specific manner. 70 In other words, the past is 
rendered familiar and comprehensible by means of the mediative function of a 
particular kind of emplotment available to the historian, and more importantly, 
immanent in language itself, "that permits us to speak of a historical narrative as an 
67 Ibid., p. 125. 
68 White, Hayden, Metahistory, The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, 
London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 
69 "I will consider the historical work as what it most manifestly is -that is to say, a verbal 
structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of past 
structures and processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing them. " 
Ibid., p. 2. 
70 The reader, in the process of following the historian's accounts of those events, gradually 
comes to realize that the story he is reading is of one kind rather than another: romance, tragedy, 
comedy, satire, epic, or what have you. And when he has perceived the class or type to which 
the story that he is reading belongs, he experiences the effect of having the events in the story 
explained to him. He has at this point not only successfully followed the story; he has grasped 
the point of it, understood it, as well. The original strangeness, mystery, or exoticism of the 
events is dispelled, and they take on a familiar aspect, not in their details, but in their familiar 
functions as elements of a familiar kind of configuration. They are rendered comprehensible by 
being subsumed under the categories of the plot structure in which they are encoded as a story 
of a particular kind. They are familiarized, not only because the reader now has more 
information about the events, but also because he has been shown how the data conform to an 
icon of a comprehensible finished process, a plot structure with which he is familiar as a part of 
his cultural endowment. " White, Hayden, "Historical Text as Literary Artifact" in Tropics of 
Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism, London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 
86. 
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extended metaphor". " This for White is by no means a negative condition. 72 It 
empowers and enriches rather than compromises the explanatory and representative 
task of the historian: 
"History-writing thrives on the discovery of all the possible plot structures that might 
be invoked to endow sets of events with different meanings. And our understanding of the past 
increases precisely in the degree to which we succeed in determining how far that past conforms 
to the strategies of sense-making that are contained in the purest forms in literary art. "73 
Historiography and fiction seem very close at this point. However, this affinity, 
according to Ricoeur, does not collapse these discourses altogether. He points out that 
one must not forget "the kind of constraint that the past event exercises on historical 
discourse by way of the known documents"74. It is recourse to documents and their 
subjection to the rules of verification that marks a dividing line between historiography 
and fiction, which, for Ricoeur, are still separated by their referential intentions. Fiction 
has the power to detach itself from and challenge the authority that the calendar and the 
document exercise on historiography and to explore limit-experiences that dissolve 
linear and fixed formalisations of time. 75 But having argued this, Ricoeur recalls that it 
is still a thin line that separates historiography from fiction, since the latter is bounded 
by and has a hold on reality. 76 Both historiography and fiction have a claim to truth, 
and they are both being worked on by the creative powers of imagination. As White 
claims, "all written discourse is cognitive in its aims and mimetic in its means. "" Or in 
Ricoeur's words: "the `really' is signified only through the 'as'. "78 
71 Ibid., p. 91. 
72 However, the problem with White, as with formalism in general, is that although he goes 
against conventional conceptions of historiography and in this way he breaks new ground as a 
historian, his project is fundamentally premised upon hierarchical oppositions that by necessity 
presuppose a level of literalness beneath tropological formations that could be demystified 
through analytical explications and classifications. As Suzanne Gearhart remarks, "underlying 
White's formalism -indeed, I would claim, underlying all formalisms- is a theory of literal 
language whose dream is to dominate `metaphorical' language by reducing it to a system of 
categories in which metaphor can be literally presented. " Gearhart, p. 63. 
73 White, "Historical Text as Literary Artifact", p. 92. 
74 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, p. 154. 
75 According to Ricoeur, fiction pushes phenomenological questions to the limit by giving them, 
on the one hand, a distinct content and linking them, on the other, to the unreal, to myth, to the 
inscrutable. And it is because of the inexhaustibility of its metaphorical resources that fiction is 
able to articulate the experience of time when the discourse of phenomenology retreats into 
silence. 
76 Ricoeur has advanced considerably in illustrating this point, particularly in the last stages of 
The Rule of Metaphor in which he argued, as we saw in the first chapter, for the ontological 
import of metaphorical discourse. 
77 White, Hayden, "The Fictions of Factual Representation" in Tropics of'Discourse, p. 122. 
78 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, p. 155. 
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So although historiography and fiction are separated by distinct intentionalities 
(the real and the likely or possible), according to Ricoeur, they both fall under the 
broad category of narrative and into the realm of the "quasi"79 or the "as if" that is, of 
metaphor. They both point to things "as they might have been" either in the past or as a 
probability. They both ultimately share and refer to the condition of historicity 
grounded on the primordial facticity of belonging. Furthermore, they share the same 
resources and mode in coming about their intended object, namely, their mimetic or 
hermeneutic action upon it. It is on the plane of reference much more than on the level 
of configuration that exchanges between history and fiction display their dynamic 
character. Ricoeur's lengthy conversation between historical and fictive discourses can 
only be completed in a theory of reading. It is through the hermeneutics of discourse 
ultimately concerned with application and refiguration that the function of narrative 
and, more importantly, its ethico-political dimension is effectuated. What we finally 
arrive at is a notion of history necessarily as "a history of the potentialities of the 
present. "80 This kind of history can only be quasi-fictive for it involves the imaginative 
reproduction of the past and the reactivation of its unrealised possibilities worked on by 
the retentions and protentions of the present, within which they are repeated. In a 
similar way, fiction is quasi-historical since it explores potentialities inherent to reality, 
to a historical situation, which acts as a point of departure. If fiction's domain is the 
probable, this can only have meaning on the condition of verisimilitude, at least to 
some extent. What "might have been" cannot be completely unrelated to "what is" or to 
"what has been". 
Now, if, to Ricoeur's mind, historiographers and fiction writers ultimately 
share a point of departure, that is, reality -and at a more radical level the ontological 
condition of belonging- and a mediating process, that is, the mimetic fashion of coming 
about it, finally resulting in the interweaving of their references, then the sole principle 
of their differentiation necessarily becomes a distinct, unified intentionality. The 
relative pluralism of forms and levels of discourse for which Ricoeur pleads in the 
eighth study of The Rule of Metaphor can only be illustrated by a "phenomenology of 
79 The "quasi" character of both discourses resonates the phenomenological notion of quasi- 
present, that is, the recollection of a past that has been distanced from the thickness of present 
and, therefore, needs the labour of imagination in order to be repeated, for it is simply not there. 
The notion of "quasi-present, " of a present that is real and unreal at the same time recalls what 
Ricoeur has designated as the split reference of metaphor, that is the creation of new meanings 
out of the interaction of those already established. 
80 Ricoeur, Paul, "The Narrative Function", p. 295. 
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semantic aims". 8' So would one not be justified in assuming that, according to Ricoeur, 
what finally makes a narrative historical or fictional is that its author or reader intended 
it as such? Then again the question that immediately comes up is who and on what 
grounds decides what counts as history and what as fiction? " A lot has already been 
said, and particularly by Ricoeur himself, that shakes those grounds and a unifying 
semantic intention, however honest and competent, cannot suffice as the ultimate 
criterion for their separation. But having argued that, one cannot conflate 
historiography and fiction and wholly renounce the investigation into the 
epistemological requirements, social conventions and ethico-political determinations 
that institute them. There are conceptual apparatuses, empirical and contextual 
delimitations (though these are hardly distinguishable and unified forces) at work and 
at play in generic articulations but none of these confers upon them unity or rigorous 
demarcation, nor do they possess an inherent principle that could ground their self- 
justification. Amongst and traversed by all these, nor can a semantic intention function 
as a unifying and organising centre, for it is already divided by its uncertain and 
unstable referent. The notion of reality is too loose and problematic to be invoked as 
something self-evident. That is to say, that the notion of the trace as the underlying 
analogical structure that, according to Ricoeur, allows us to enter in a relation with the 
historical past and make sense out of it, is a far more general condition; it is what 
makes meaning in general possible. What we come across at any given moment is 
already a trace for it resists reduction to a fully signifying present and this is why it 
also resists analogical and synthetic representation and, in turn, by necessity disrupts 
everything involved with it and thus any claim to a unified signifying intention. There 
is always a residue of meaning that cannot be assimilated in analogical synthesis but 
comes instead to intercept such configurations from within. We are here once again 
evoking the self-disruption of the phenomenology of the present, the essential 
incapacity of anything signifying fully, which is also a principal motif of the 
82 experience of travel. 
8' Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 295. 
82 Christine Montalbetti makes use of the notions of the trace and of the ruin with regard to the 
traveller's encounter with elusive cultural and historical objects in a similar way to Ricoeur. 
Thus the trace receives a tropological and analogical structure that submits to the operations of 
metonymy and synecdoche. Montalbetti, p. 13. It is here maintained, however, that the trace is 
not a signifying condition of the dialecticisable or apocalyptic type but rather signifies on the 
condition of its self-erasure, that is, as Catherine Malabou points out, on the ruins of its 
phenomenological motif. This condition by extension disrupts the totalising drive of the travel 
narrative: "La ruine du 'motif phenomenologique' provoque du meme coup celle du recit de 
voyage'. " Malabou, p. 34. 
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Accordingly, there is simply no way of rigorously demarcating between the 
factual and fictional elements in the travel text. One must rather show its inherent 
limitations and discrepancies and this amounts to saying that once claims to purity are 
put in abeyance infinite possibilities are opened up. Why is this discussion so important 
today? If we go back to travel writing this is for the purpose of illustrating the way 
these narratives, which played such an active part in the formation and regulation of 
Europe's encounter -if such a thing ever took place- with its cultural others, constantly 
undermine their own claims to objectivity, the very claims that fostered ahistorical, 
static, and hence colonial perceptions of the other. To take measure of this historical- 
linguistic fact, one must look into the structural conditions that both subvert and make 
these claims possible, or else, that let them emerge in a self-subversive mode. 
According to Ricoeur, narrative involves a process of prefiguration, configuration and 
refiguration that unfolds the centripetal movement of the hermeneutic circle. Its 
mimetic or metaphorical function is driven along a course that constructs analogies, 
brings identity out of difference and builds upon it totalities, albeit open ended ones. 
Analogy or similitude is, as Campbell remarks, a "crucial trope of travel literature and 
its epistemological weak spot". 83 Campbell painstakingly analyses the way this trope 
was implemented and implicated in the experience of and writing about travel in texts 
that cover a long period of the history or rather prehistory (400-1600 AD) of travel 
writing. 84 We follow Egeria, the nun, in her pilgrimage to the Holy Lands, to a place 
more allegorical than real, a place where the Scriptures and the phenomenal world 
merge, where present time becomes illo tempore. We see how in the Middle Ages' 
mappae mundi and Christian cosmographies the boundaries of the known world 
become margins of real and imaginary geographies, beyond which and the more one 
distanced oneself from the divine centre, Jerusalem, one were to encounter the 
monstrous and marvellous. 85 Later on, Christopher Columbus reaches the earthly 
Paradise and with a rhetoric reminiscent of romance heroes embarks on an interpretive 
83 Campbell, The Witness and the Other World, p. 249. 
84 For an analysis of the fact and fiction antinomy and the intertextuality of travel writing also 
see Zweder Von Martels' (ed) Travel Fact and Travel Fiction, Studies on Fiction, Literary 
Tradition, Scholarly Discovery and Observation in Travel Writing, New York, E. J. Brill, 1994. 
85 The recounting of monsters and marvels in medieval travel texts, according to Campbell, 
fulfilled a conceptual need. Wonders were envisioned as proofs of God's existence, as data with 
a truth value, the truth of belief in a world, however, that perceived all things as figurative and 
as divinely significant. Tropological constructions were then part of a rhetoric deployed to 
describe the actual. When it comes to the unknown: "the effect of hybridisation is technically 
inescapable: in the context of describing the unknown, similitudes based on features of the 
known inevitably result in such perverse collages, destroying the coherence of the alien subject 
in order to transmit a visualisable image. " Campbell, p. 70. 
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description carried out by a drive "to translate the Other into a distortion of oneself -in 
a word to domesticate" and hence to metaphorise. 86 We, finally, arrive at Ralegh's use 
of similitude as a link between different realities rather than "a dangerously deluded 
perception of identity between actually diverse natures" . 
87 All these inscriptions are 
historically differentiated instances of an essential structure that enables and conditions 
every encounter with the unfamiliar. The tropological relation of "the same" with "the 
other", and as long as these are necessarily thought together, reveals the tropological 
condition of both. 
There is always a question of identity and difference when we speak of cultural 
encounters. According to Ricoeur, identity and difference are made visible through 
metaphorical interaction that, finally, results to a fusion of meaning and to a 
reintegration with the order of the same, albeit an enriched same. It is mimetic 
convergence that also produces senses of the factual (that is, meaningful events) and 
the fictional. Facts are constructed as a way of coming to terms with things; fictions 
always involve evasive and disruptive elements. To interweave factual and fictional 
references is to reintroduce disruption and continuity in both, although, as we have 
seen, Ricoeur subordinates this operation to a synthesising and sublating economy, that 
is, a restricted economy. Studies of cross-cultural relations alternatively deploy the 
rhetoric of identity or difference as a way out of the predicament of the encounter that 
always unsettles and challenges "well-formed" identities. To champion a "politically 
correct" cultural relativism and syncretism that privileges difference over sameness 
(but is not difference the formation of an "other identity"? ) is to disregard the 
conditions that give rise to the notion of difference. As Clifford points out, "difference 
is an effect of inventive syncretism. "88 Senses of identity and difference are both 
produced and tested in cultural encounters and in ways that cannot be reduced to a 
demarcation of culturally distinct entities. 89 In order to move away from an 
s6 Ibid., pp. 177-178. 
87 Ibid., p. 252. 
88 Clifford, On Ethnographic Authority", p. 23. 
89 Neil L. Whitehead in "Monstrosity and Marvel: Symbolic Convergence and Mimetic 
Elaboration in Trans-Cultural Representation: An Anthropological Reading of Ralegh's 
Discoverie... " in Studies in Travel Writing, number 1, pp. 72-95, proposes the notion of 
symbiotic identity that is effected through a mimetic convergence occasioned by cultural 
encounter. He shows, for instance, that the rhetoric of the monstrous and marvellous in the 
sixteenth century discovery narratives of America, rather than a convenient projection of 
European imagination was the outcome of a "convergence of symbolic usages" largely fed on 
native lore and mythology that Amerindians in turn used as "potent indigenous symbol of 
political autonomy" and Spaniards drew on in a process of self-fashioning. Identity and 
difference are inter-textually produced and thus infinitely complicated. 
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oppositional, relational and reductive logic, one must venture the thought of the 
essentially aporetic character of experience (and experience is always the experience of 
the other). One must think the trace otherwise, that is, removed from the arch of 
analogy. 
Travel and travel writing are caught up in an essentially temporal predicament. 
And this involves much more than the temporal distance that might separate the 
experience of travel and the act of writing about it and the distortions of memory that 
travel writers commonly try to minimise by evoking a writing on the spot, in the 
immediacy and authenticity of a present. The aporetic thinking of time precisely denies 
to the experience of travel any immediacy or transparency. It takes time to travel, it 
takes time to write a book and it takes time to read it. It is true that one engages in 
processes of prefiguration and configuration and that the travel book can only acquire a 
certain unity as a narrated time. But these processes involve the totalisation and 
reduction of what precisely resists them. Travel as writing manifests that both travel 
and writing are effected through a movement or iteration that produces senses of 
identity and difference without letting them appear as such or synthesise without a 
disruptive residue. There can be no intuition of a present thing (not to mention a 
foreign culture) disclosed in its radiance and plenitude. Each moment of the cultural 
encounter is worked on by memory and expectation, by the retentions and protentions 
that allow for this fleeting instance, but which also already divide it in itself. And this, 
to be sure, is not a deplorable sign of modern times. It is an essential condition of travel 
and its self-interrupted phenomenological motif (that is, the impossibility of a unified, 
fully signifying present) that, as long as it was reduced and unacknowledged, has 
indeed occasioned many things to be deplored both in past and modern times. Levi- 
Strauss' longing for the time of "real journeys" is characteristic of such reductions: "I 
wished I had lived in the days of real journeys, when it was still possible to see the full 
splendour of a spectacle that had not yet been blighted, polluted and spoilt" (his 
emphasis). 90 
Travel and travel narrative can be ascribed a unity only on the condition of 
what Derrida designates as the "movement of the reduction of the trace". As long as 
they are understood in this way they remain deeply implicated with metaphysics. It has 
to be clear that was is proposed here is not a way out of this inescapable condition but a 
90 Levi-Strauss, Claude, Tristes Tropiques, translated by John and Doreen Weightman, New 
York, Penguin Books, 1992, first published in French in 1955, p. 43. 
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rethinking of the metaphorical totalisation that narrative is in a way that brings out its 
internal discrepancies and thus radically disrupts authoritative claims to representation. 
From this metaphor of writing we are now going to pass onto an allegory of reading, to 
a thinking that endures rather than tries to overcome the aporia of travel and travel 
writing. 
Paul de Man: Travel as Allegorical Narrative 
We previously mentioned that travel writing apart from a mimetic also displays 
an allegorical function. This function may be deployed in an explicit or implicit fashion 
but it is, either way, necessarily implied as a structural component of the travel 
narrative. We said that the allegorical mode pertains to the "properly" narrative parts of 
the travel text, while mimesis is usually considered in relation to its descriptive parts. 
In Ricoeur's thinking, however, mimesis becomes the constitutive trope and mediative 
function of narrativity in toto. The implication, we argued, is a conceptualisation of 
narrative according to an analogical, dialectical and totalising logic. This, however, 
inscribes narrative in a restrictive economy, which in view of displacing and exceeding, 
we are now going to consider in terms of a mode of figuration that precisely resists 
dialectical synthesis. Allegory is traditionally defined in disjunction to metaphor, which 
is designated as a single word trope established on the grounds of natural resemblance. 
Allegory, on the other hand, pertains to a longer sequence and, rather than inducing and 
resolving semantic incongruence in favour of a new meaning, maintains two meanings, 
a literal and a figurative one without conflict. Allegory does not depend on a 
resemblance or exchange of properties between two things but is rather produced as a 
contingent effect of interlinguistic interpretation. So in the theory of tropes, allegory (as 
well as irony) acquires the value of a metatrope, since it is produced by verbal means 
and disrupts metaphorical mystification. The mimetic notions of metaphor and 
narrative, which have been our pivot themes so far, now run up against the dense yet 
breached tissue of their own textuality. They now run the risk of being read against 
themselves, of becoming an allegory of themselves, the figure of a figure. 
No«, in an inter-textual conception of travel allegory proves to be an at once 
mediating and disruptive figure. What is proposed here is the reinscription of the three 
phases of the mimetic circle (prefiguration, configuration, refiguration) in an allegorical 
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mode, in accordance to Paul de Man's designation. It will be maintained here that 
allegory is that figurative force that lays out the passage, detour, or mouvement en vrille 
from sign to sign, trope to trope, reading to reading, and in our case from the textual 
experience of travel to its grafting onto a narrative form capable of endlessly 
engendering meaning. Allegory's essentially narrative, that is, performative mode will 
reintroduce here a problematic that was already implied in our discussion of Ricoeur's 
mimetic model and which is intrinsically related to that of fact and fiction: the 
operation of constantives and performatives in the travel text. When one travels and 
writes about it, one performs an act. When travel writers make a claim to the 
description or representation of a foreign culture they perform constative speech acts, 
by means of which they constitute or configure their referent and themselves as 
representing subjects. This operation, of course, is neither simple nor obvious 
especially in travel texts that purport to constitute themselves through the self- 
effacement of the subject such as, for instance, the Grand Tour narratives in the 
eighteenth century which made a point of not being too "egotistical". We will argue 
that defacement is an essential function and not simply a historical or conventional 
requisite in travel texts, which always bear an autobiographical element. Travel 
narratives may be essentially performative yet, as de Man demonstrates, performatives 
not only constitute fictional referents and subjects but are radically disrupted acts. 
Before proceeding to this analysis we will take up some of de Man's deliberations on 
allegory, rhetoric, time and narrative. 
Allegory is for de Man the paradigm of all figures and not simply the 
privileged trope in a rhetorical typology. Allegory points to the general tropological 
condition of language beyond traditional classifications, to the immanent aberrations 
and tensions within linguistic structures themselves, which are far more than a 
deviation from a structural norm. As we have seen, both Ricoeur and Derrida, though 
in essentially different ways, employ the notion of metaphor in order to explore the 
figurative forces of language. De Man designates allegory instead as the figure of 
figures, as the "most general version of metaphor. "91 Metaphor in its classical 
designation consists of a semantic deviation occasioned through an exchange or 
substitution of attributes or properties between polarities on the basis of resemblance 
and in view of a recuperation of proper meaning. Allegory is the figure that radically 
disrupts metaphorical totalisation for it transposes substitutive, that is, paradigmatic 
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relations onto the syntagmatic plane. Allegory does not rest on relations of resemblance 
between things or meanings; it is an intra-linguistic operation in which signs come 
together in relations of contingency and contiguity and not by necessity. The allegorical 
sign does not imitate a meaning or a referent but signifies only in relation to another 
sign on the basis of mere association, which suspends synthesis, whereas, the 
analogical universe of metaphor is driven by a dialectical and totalising force, which 
aims at reinstating a lost but retrievable proper meaning. Time is the constitutive 
category of allegory since "it remains necessary, if there is to be allegory, that the 
allegorical sign refer to another sign that precedes it" and repeat it in a noncoincidental 
mode. 92 The allegorical sign is caught in "a truly temporal predicament" for it cannot 
recapture the "unreachable anteriority" of the sign it originates from and also points to. 
Allegory 
"designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin and, renouncing the 
nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this temporal 
difference. "93 
The successive mode of allegory creates a sense of time merely by verbal 
means, a time that bears no essential resemblance with what is thought as the time of 
the natural world and, hence, cannot exchange properties or synthesise with it. Allegory 
demystifies the "organic world postulated in a symbolic mode of analogical 
correspondences or in a mimetic mode of representation in which fiction and reality 
could coincide. "94 Allegory, which can only exist in a narrative mode, also reflects 
language's "tendency towards narrative. " "From the recognition of language as trope, 
one is led to the telling of a tale, to a narrative sequence. "95 Thus, narrative becomes 
the allegory of narrative and allegory the narrative of allegory infinitely narrating or 
allegorising their own impossibility of totalisation. As Derrida says in his Memoires for 
Paul de Man, "here totalisation is exactly what an account, a story, and a narrative are 
denied. "96 
9' De Man, Paul, Allegories of Reading, Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and 
Proust, London, Yale University Press, 1979, p. 73. 
92 De Man, "The Rhetoric of Temporality" in Blindness and Insight, Essays in the Rhetoric of 
Contemporary Criticism, second and revised edition, introduced by W lad Godzich, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1983, p. 207. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., p. 222. 
95 De Man, Paul, "The Epistemology of Metaphor" in Aesthetic Ideology, edited and with an 
introduction by Andrzej Warminski, London, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 44. 
96 Derrida, Jacques, Memoires for Paul de Man, revised edition, translated by Cecile Lindsay, 
Jonathan Culler, Eduardo Cadava, and Peggy Kamuf, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1989, p. 13. 
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For de Man allegory is not just another trope, even a privileged one, but 
language's proper way of coming to being. De Man generalises allegory -in a gesture 
reminiscent of Derrida's generalisation of metaphor- to the irrefutably tropological 
condition of language. Rhetoric, as de Man understands it, puts into unrest established 
patterns of grammatical readings and hermeneutic enterprises. To recognise this at once 
productive and disruptive allegorical condition is to distance oneself from conceptions 
of language grounded on intuitive or referential models that establish correspondences 
between linguistic patterns and the world. According to such approaches, literature 
assumes a primarily aesthetic function that nourishes the division between literary and 
non-literary uses of language. For de Man, the advent of literary theory, which by 
drawing on linguistic and semiotic models inaugurated the consideration of literature in 
its own terms, that is, according to specifically linguistic and not historical or aesthetic 
aspects, established a common trait between linguistics and literature, a trait, however, 
which came to disrupt the former's established grammar: literariness. 97 
Literariness does not circumscribe a self-contained and autonomous discourse, 
that of literature. It designates an immanent condition of language from which literature 
emerges as a prominent instantiation. We came across before a prevalent view that 
considers the suspension or epoche of the referential function of language as 
literature's instituting moment. For de Man, the suspension of reference is a 
constitutive condition for literariness in general, for language's coming-to-being that 
could be explored by means of rhetorical readings. Language, to be sure, is not denied 
reference altogether. De Man does not disclaim language's drive towards reference but 
rather puts into question "its authority as a model for natural or phenomenal 
cognition. "98 He objects to the assimilation of a merely verbal effect to a substantial 
correspondence between the natural world and linguistic structures. Language and the 
world are not bound by an essential resemblance. Their relation is neither phenomenal 
nor mimetic. Though de Man admits that "the notion of a language entirely freed of 
referential constraints is properly inconceivable" and that "any utterance can always be 
read as semantically motivated", 99 he postulates that "by allowing for the necessity of a 
non-phenomenal linguistics, one frees the discourse on literature from naive 
oppositions between fiction and reality, which are themselves an offspring of an 
97 De Man, Paul, The Resistance to Theory, foreword by Wlad Godzich, London, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 9. 
98 Ibid., p. 1l. 
99 De Man, . 
Allegories of Reading, p. 49. 
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uncritically mimetic conception of art. "100 Literariness, one has to remember, is the 
predicament and also the essential condition of language in toto and not a distinctive 
quality of literature. 101 Literary theory does not advance in its task without "some" 
resistance. 
For de Man, "resistance to theory" does not ensue only from adversary 
approaches to rhetorical reading or from overlooking the rhetorical structures of 
language. It might as well be a "built-in constituent of its discourse". To his mind, "the 
resistance to theory is a resistance to the use of language about language. It is therefore 
a resistance to language itself or to the possibility that language contains factors or 
functions that cannot be reduced to intuition. "' 02 De Man foregrounds rhetoric in a way 
that proves unsettling to the equilibrium of the classical trivium of the sciences of 
language, logic, grammar and rhetoric, 103 by bringing attention to the linguistic fact 
that "there are elements in all texts that are by no means ungrammatical, but whose 
semantic function is not grammatically definable, neither in themselves nor in 
context. " 104 There is always a residue of indeterminateness that grammatical 
elaborations cannot help leaving untouched. The foregrounding of rhetoric reverses 
what was called "grammatisation [i. e., codification] of rhetoric" to a "rhetorisation of 
grammar. " To understand this better we have to examine how a rhetorical reading 
100 In de Man's view, language creates the effect or illusion of reference, which can be enhanced 
by the likely confusion of "the materiality of the signifier with the materiality of what it 
signifies. " This confusion grounds the false belief in a continuity between language and nature 
and, hence, establishes the possibility of a literal or proper language in relation to which 
literature would stand as a deviation or imitation. De Man, The Resistance to Theory, p. 11. 
10' De Man does not treat the suspension of reference in favour of a formalistic model or of a 
celebration of the aesthetic function of literature. Formalistic approaches and codifications do 
not succeed in reading through the aberrant rhetorical structures of language more than, for 
instance, a hermeneutic model, which postulates "a single originary, pre-figural and absolute 
text. " Neither do aesthetic concerns constitute the primary categories of literature for they 
cannot account for its integral structural discrepancy. Moreover, if one is to pay heed to the 
affinity of aesthetics with phenomenalism (aesthesis in Greek also means perception or 
intuition) then one might say with de Man that "literature involves the voiding, rather than the 
affirmation, of aesthetic categories. " Ibid., p. 10. 
102 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
10' In the history of the classical trivium, rhetoric, traditionally defined as the art of persuasion 
and eloquence, was relegated to the affective plane and to perlocution, a less grammatical or 
essential property of language. Grammar and logic have formed, instead, a relatively 
unproblematic couple essentially connected by relations of natural affinity and correspondence. 
Logic and grammar established a smooth passage from the cognition of the phenomenal world 
to its articulation in language. Rhetoric was subordinated to grammatical and logical patterns, 
for which it was both a servant and a threat that could be, nonetheless, warded off or diminished 
through the meticulous codification and taxonomy of figurative functions. The conception of 
classical rhetoric lies in a certain continuity with the new rhetoric" of Greimas, Genette, and 
Todorov, who attempt to formulate a general grammar of rhetoric that would reduce or 
neutralise the element of indeterminateness in language and reach the degree zero of figurality. 
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works. It is shown that a perfectly grammatical and readable proposition might be 
subverted by its rhetorical mode in a way that upsets its logical structure and suspends 
decision on its meaning. The example used by de Man in the beginning of the 
Allegories of Reading is that of the rhetorical question. It demonstrates that the same 
grammatical sequence may engender at least two incompatible meanings, one asserting 
and one denying the sentence's illocutionary mode. According to de Man, "the 
grammatical model of the question becomes rhetorical not when we have, on the one 
hand, a literal meaning and on the other hand a figural meaning, but when it is 
impossible to decide by grammatical or other linguistic devices which of the two 
meanings (that can be entirely incompatible) prevails. "'05 
In his close readings of Proust, Rilke, Nietzsche, and Rousseau, de Man 
examines how the texts' own pronouncements are continuously subverted by their 
rhetorical mode, how grammatical structures are undone in a way that produces more 
text and, hence, imposes the endless task of reading. For a truly rhetorical reading 
never achieves the closure of the text but undoes its own totalising explications (for 
instance, metaphorical readings are subverted by metonymic ones and vice versa). It 
disrupts the text's figurative movement; it rhetorically reads the trope. Rhetorical 
reading also presupposes a "rhetorical model of the trope". What has to be clear here is 
that a rhetorically aware reading is not one that privileges figures over thematic 
exposition. Even if figurality continuously undermines claims to univocal and 
referential meaning, the latter returns to haunt figurative meaning and thus allegorise it 
in its turn. One should remember that rhetoric for de Man is about undecidability. 
Furthermore, since undecidability emerges from the text's own resources, since it is 
already contained in the text, one could argue that it is what the text is ultimately 
about. 106 The text refers to its allegorical mode in an endless self-reflection. This 
reflexivity is also its condition of referentiality. However, since the text's referential 
and semantic potential is continuously played out by its rhetorical undoing, the text 
becomes the narrative of its own impossibility of reading. It becomes an allegory of its 
own reading, for de Man "the irreducible component of any text. " It is in this sense that 
104 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
105 De Man, AIlegorres of Reading, p. 10. 
106 "Since any narrative is primarily the allegory of its own reading, it is caught in a difficult 
double bind. As long as it treats a theme (the discourse of a subject, the vocation of a writer, the 
constitution of a consciousness), it will always lead to the confrontation of incompatible 
meanings between which it is necessary but impossible to decide in terms of truth and error. If 
one of the readings is declared true, it will always be possible to undo it by means of the other; 
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the text engenders more text. "Rhetoric is a text... "; it is a narrative about the 
movement of meaning. 
So the allegory of reading is a story of success in "failing" to achieve a 
complete and final reading which would annul the text's radically rhetorical mode. A 
rhetorically aware reading succeeds in not achieving. The allegory of reading is the 
self-deconstruction already "at work in works, especially in literary works. [... ] Texts 
deconstruct themselves by themselves, it is enough to recall it or to recall them to 
oneself. "107 And furthermore, deconstruction ceaselessly undoes or "deconstructs" 
itself since it resists producing a totalising explication of the text. 108 Self- or auto- 
deconstruction gathers the text's totalising forces (whether logical, figural, thematic, 
etc. ) in order to detotalise them but also, and more importantly, to detotalise in turn the 
very movement of their detotalisation, which for de Man is a new rhetorical 
mystification. As Rodolphe Gasche describes it, deconstruction for de Man is a process 
of continuous and unsymmetrical (because it suspends ultimate synthesis) relapse from 
"retotalisation" into "detotalisation" and vice versa. 109 "The reversal from denial to 
assertion implicit in deconstructive discourse never reaches the symmetrical 
counterpart of what it denies. "' 10 
The disjunctive or aporetic structure of the text, however, does not bring about 
its self-destruction. Far from it, it is what grounds the text's "coherence" and "stability" 
and, at the same time, what ensures its generative powers by holding together aberrant 
meanings without allowing them to synthesise. This disjunction or aporia is the 
irreducible structure, "fact", or "defective model" of language, which still bears the 
if it is decreed false, it will always be possible to demonstrate that it states the truth of its own 
aberration. " Ibid., p. 76. 
107 Derrida, Memoires, p. 123. 
108 The de Man and Derrida reader has to be also attentive apart from their close affinities to the 
subtly distinct ways these thinkers use the term "deconstruction". Even though Derrida seems to 
be in complete agreement with de Man in his Memoires for Paul de Man and de Man himself in 
the preface of Allegories of Reading acknowledges an association with Derrida's use of the 
term, of which "the power of inventive rigor" he "certainly" does not wish to erase, there is a 
considerable difference between the two, which Gasche discusses with reference to their 
preference respectively for the terms writing and reading. This is not the place for such an 
elaboration. For further discussion see Rodolphe Gasche's The Wild Card of Reading, On Paul 
de Man, London, Harvard University Press, 1998, especially the chapter on Derrida entitled 
"Giving to Read". 
109 "In other words, the process of self-deconstruction constitutive of the literary text is an 
endless process in which all deconstructions turn into retotalisations which consequently need to 
be deconstructed again. Such deconstructions to the second degree, deconstructions of the 
unifying effects of the prior deconstructions, take place through precisely these retotalisations. " 
Gasche, The Wild Card of Reading, p. 25. 
110 De Man, Allegories of Reading, p. 125. 
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name of "allegory", or one should say quasi-allegory (or quasi-metaphor in Derrida's 
sense), exactly because it is not something more original than language. ''' The aporetic 
structure of the text is principally an aporia of time. The text, in de Man's sense, finds 
itself in a temporal predicament or double bind, which nevertheless is what grants it a 
temporal continuity. The text emerges as a temporal process from reading to reading, as 
the deferral of closure. For at the moment the text gathers or totalises its semantic 
potential in a present meaning, this metaphorical effect is suspended and laid out in an 
allegorical mode. The text becomes an allegory of metaphor, an allegorising narrative 
of metaphor. Narrative is the unrolling, "the diachronic version of a single moment", 12 
a moment also re-emerging (or promised) by its deferral. Thus, the aporia of narrated 
or allegorical time is the paradoxical condition of meaning. Language is on/in this 
condition. 13 If we fail to acknowledge this, even if this means resigning ourselves from 
the possibility of a final and complete meaning, we are in risk of not reading at all. ' 14 
"' This "strategy" of keeping the "old" name of a concept in order to reinscribe it anew is called 
by Derrida paleonomy and it consists of the double gesture of "deconstruction" that reverses 
and displaces metaphysical polarities generalising what was up to then held as secondary and 
derivative (for instance, writing, metaphor, translation) beyond the rigorous metaphysical order 
and hierarchy. See Positions and Dissemination. Having outlined this movement, we must be 
cautious of such formalisations. "Deconstruction" is neither a specific approach to texts, nor a 
reading strategy, or an explicatory device. Even if we cannot avoid some sort of abstraction and 
generalisation for the purposes of introduction, we must keep in mind that what is called 
"deconstruction" is an intrinsic effect of texts and certainly not an exterior force or a well- 
regulated enterprise. De Man's and Derrida's "deconstructive" readings take effect on the text's 
own terms, which then become the bearers of their self-deconstruction. 
112 De Man, Allegories of Reading, p. 68. 
113 As Derrida maintains, aporia, which literally means "an absence of the path, a paralysis 
before roadblocks, the immobilisation of thinking, the impossibility of advancing, a barrier 
blocking the future" in de Man's work becomes exactly what "gives or promises the thinking of 
the path, provokes the thinking of the very possibility of what still remains unthinkable or 
unthought, indeed, impossible. " Derrida, Memoires, p. 132. 
114 In a way this gesture, that is, the radical allegorisation of narrative, reverses the project of 
Ricoeur's The Rule of Metaphor, which constitutes a passage from rhetoric as the discourse of 
persuasion via semiology and then semantics to the hermeneutics of the text. In the end the text 
becomes, for Ricoeur, an answer to a question addressed by the reader, a question which is also 
pertinent to his/her historical vantage point. This is the hermeneutic function of application or 
refiguration, which, it has to be clear, is not annulled or invalidated by de Man's or Derrida's 
critiques but is rather put into question in terms of its dialectical and totalising orientation and 
its postulation of referential meaning as the telos of language. Of course, Ricoeur understands 
rhetoric in a completely different way than de Man. Ricoeur does not put into radical scrutiny 
the polar couple of the proper and the metaphorical, which he takes to an extent for granted. 
This opposition lies as an unexamined presupposition throughout his otherwise diligent and 
expansive analysis and becomes more explicit at the last stage of his work in his argument for 
the autonomy of philosophical discourse. While Ricoeur draws a line between philosophy and 
literature which is safeguarded by the rigorous conceptual order of the former, de Man speaks of 
their common tropological condition, of their literariness as was described above. Both 
philosophy and literature are caught up in the matrix of undecidability and indeterminateness, a 
breached linguistic structure being their "nonoriginary" origin. Their difference lies in the 
degree of explicitness and mode of thematisation of this linguistic predicament. "Finally". 
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Let us now proceed to the consideration of allegory with regard to travel 
narrative. We said that travel texts are structurally allegorical in ways that exceed the 
explicit or implicit treatment of an allegorical theme. The allegorical register of travel 
texts has been conventionally recognised as the transfiguration of the secular journey 
into an overt or covert narrative of self-growth, spiritual ordeal, humanistic utopia and 
so on. These are familiar stories that constitute the allegorical motif of travel. To 
reinscribe allegory in a "radical" way as a constitutive trope rather than a generalising 
interpretation is by no means to disengage it from its spiritual or moralising function. 
Deconstructing the generally accepted or conventional designations of allegory or 
metaphor does not amount to their relegation in favour of a novel meaning. Far from it, 
"generalised" notions bear all the traces and functions of their classical definitions. If 
we were to admit that allegory permeates travel writing to the extent that there could be 
no history of the genre that would not recount a second, allegorical story, then we 
would have to look into the structures and forces that make the consideration of 
allegory not simply a matter of choice. Allegory has always been at work in travel texts 
or, generally speaking, in writing about travel. Odysseus's journey back home is a 
deeply rooted, powerful allegory of longing for an origin and desire for salvation. The 
allegorical (and moralising) function of the theme of travel that more often than not 
implies a certain irony has been to the foreground of such texts as Lucian's True Story, 
Thomas More's Utopia, Bacon's New Atlantis, Swift's Gulliver's Travels and Defoe's 
Robinson Crusoe. One might argue that travel or writing about travel become allegories 
of their specific goals and purposes. Even in cases where travel is done for its own sake 
and celebration, travel becomes an allegory of itself. One could write indeed a 
writes de Man, "our argument suggests that the relationship between literature and philosophy 
cannot be made in terms of a distinction between aesthetic and epistemological categories. All 
philosophy is condemned, to the extent that it is dependent on figuration, to be literary and, as 
the depository of this very problem, all literature is to some extent philosophical. The apparent 
symmetry of these statements is not as reassuring as it sounds since what seems to bring 
literature and philosophy together is [... ] a shared lack of identity and specificity. " De Man, 
The Epistemology of Metaphor", p. 50. 
According to what has been argued so far, the possibility of establishing rigorous 
epistemological criteria, on the basis of which a rigid demarcation between different types of 
discourses would be achieved, seems more dubious than ever. The all-important distinction 
between philosophy and literature best illustrates this problematic, which extends to any 
separation between the cognitive or factual and the figurative. Philosophy and literature rather 
than being separated by a mutually constitutive limit that would regulate the relation between 
what is contained in (interior) and what is excluded from (exterior) their discursive fields are 
instead traversed by this limit that they fold back upon themselves. The blurring of the boundary 
between philosophy and literature (and the same goes for history and ethnography as cognitive 
discourses and literature) upsets the fundamental premises of these discourses, which come 
down to the opposition between the literal and the figurative. 
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"supplementary" history of allegorical travel, a history of quest and desire that would 
recount the pilgrims' journey to "celestial" Jerusalem, the chivalric quest for the Holy 
Grail, the moralisation of marvels and monsters as proofs of God's creative powers in 
medieval "wonder books" that also contributed to forging the fable of Europe's 
historical destiny of carrying out and fulfilling Divine Providence. One could go onto 
Marco Polo's discovery of the Orient as a screen for the projection of European dreams 
of splendour, fertility and plenty, Columbus' newly discovered Edenic surroundings 
and Renaissance's humanistic utopias, another of Europe's self-imposed task that was, 
however, nourished by descriptions of distant "exotic" lands. One could address the 
allegorical theme of the quest for primitiveness and prelapsarian innocence reflected in 
Bougainville's accounts of Tahiti, which he found appropriate to call "New Cythera, " 
or the romantic nostalgia for lost authenticity and wholeness underlying Levi-Strauss' 
tropic sadness. And again this would be a reductive history guided by specific interests 
and purposes for it would fail to acknowledge the complexity of the allegorising 
function of those texts. It would be an allegorical history indeed, of which the only 
hope of succeeding would be to fail, that is, to fail to produce a totalising narrative. 
These stories register and engender stories of their own, stories under stories, upon 
stories, across stories, and one more would be their configuration in a historical 
narrative. Most of these relate a story of colonialism and this can never be the whole 
story as some post-colonial theorists would assume. This is not to say, of course, that 
colonialism is an allegory. But it is certainly caught in and to a great extent fashioned 
by allegorical registers. 
The allegorical mode of narrative is what suspends synthesis and resists 
totalisation. There are always more stories to be told and these come to subvert and 
disrupt but not to erase or brush aside those that have engendered them. For instance, 
the description of the particularities of a place may be subverted by generalising 
assumptions about humanity that in turn may register and justify colonial intervention. 
Sympathy for the cultural other most of the time rests on humanistic ideals that, while 
celebrating primitiveness and an authentic past, at the same time, establish the moral 
grounds for intrusion and appropriation. These multi-level stories are neither linked by 
temporal or causal succession, nor do they coincide but rather refer to and repeat one 
another in a noncoicidental mode. They cannot be synthesised in a certain present and 
if they refer to an anterior moment this is a past that has never been present as such; it 
is an absolute, unrecoverable anteriority. This is allegory's temporal and inter-textual 
predicament or aporia, \\ hat negates the chance of a final and total story, what allows 
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for more stories to be told, for the condition of undecidability. Travel narrative then 
becomes a narrative of its own aberration, an allegory of travel or should we say the 
travel of allegory, since the latter is infinitely carried away in/through texts. If allegory 
retains its traditional moralising function, then this is perhaps what it may ultimately 
relate to us. Something without specific content: the impossibility of a final decision or 
choice. 115 Travel narrative thus becomes an impossible relation. 
James Clifford considers the function of allegory in ethnographic texts and in 
particular with regard to the structure of the "ethnographic pastoral" and "salvage". "6 
Clifford maintains that ethnographic theory, interpretation or explanation should be 
viewed as "privileged allegorical" registers that have the function of subordinating and 
accounting for other levels and voices in the ethnographic text. Hence, the abstract and 
generalising theoretical level rests in an allegorical relation to the descriptive parts of 
the ethnographic text. This relation does not ensue from the addition of abstraction and 
interpretation to the original "simple account" but is rather the condition of its 
"meaningfulness": "Ethnographic texts are inescapably allegorical, and a serious 
acceptance of this fact changes the ways they can be written and read. "'" The 
prominent "pastoral" function of ethnography acutely illustrates the temporal 
predicament of allegory. The theme of vanishing primitive, pure and simple societies, 
to the "textual" rescue of which the ethnographer comes, testifies to a cultural "present- 
becoming-past", to allegory's unreachable anteriority. The ethnographer's quest for the 
authentic attains only an elusive and instantaneous gratification because it immediately 
becomes a thing of the past in need of rescue. Thus the allegory of primitiveness, of the 
European cultural past, becomes a story of redemption for the ethnographer's guilty 
conscience and intrusive presence. Of course, the search for authenticity and innocence 
and the feelings of disappointment, resignation and guilt are pervasive motifs in travel 
narratives as well and they also fall within the temporal and allegorical predicament. 
The function of "textual salvage" at work in ethnography and travel writing can be 
designated at its most fundamental level as the very act of textualisation: "Whatever 
115 This is also the most significant ethical implication of the allegorical structure of narrative, 
that no decision or pronouncement upon the other is ever adequate or final. Thematic closure is 
suspended from reading to reading in a way that shows that otherness, what the travel text is by 
definition about, can never be totally manifest or present in the text but is instead promised by 
virtue of the repetitive and noncoincidental structures of allegory. 
116 Clifford, James. "On Ethnographic Allegory" in Writing Culture, The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography. 
1" Ibid., p. 99. It is plausible then to argue that ethnographic descriptions enter into an 
allegorical relation with anthropological abstraction and totalisation. Anthropology as the 
"science of man" is an ethnographic allegory. 
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else an ethnography [or travel writing] does, it translates experience into text. "' 18 This, 
however, does not confer upon the ethnographer and the travel writer the privilege of 
being the ones who write. ' 19 Writing always involves a process of reading, in this case, 
the reading of cultural inscriptions. This, for Clifford, constitutes ethnography's 
"intertextual predicament". 120 For cultural inscriptions are themselves texts on texts 
under texts coming together and pulling apart without ever constituting a total text or 
context. Allegorical textualisation bears on this discrepancy and disjunctive function, 
which is the text's mode of coming to being. This is also what effectuates the process 
of configuration that works by metaphorical synthesis and reduction and gives rise to a 
sense (or illusion) of textual and referential unity. But as soon as this takes effect 
allegory already comes to haunt and lay out metaphorical totalisations by bringing into 
play metaphor's semantic residue (what dialectical synthesis fails to incorporate and 
what lies there as another possibility), thus disrupting and suspending synthesis. From 
now on the destiny of the text is uncertain. ''' And this is not simply due, as Clifford 
maintains, 122 to history's open-ended character that provides texts with more contexts 
and occasions for new interpretations. If reading is not simply something imposed on 
the text but something that arises from and traverses it -at least in the sense that it 
pertains to the text's resources- this implies the inherent possibility of many different 
readings that simultaneously cut across, refer to and subvert one another in an 
allegorical mode. These may arise at particular historical instances but are already 
ingrained on the text's structural possibilities, however, not as possible contents but as 
the text's essentially aberrant structure. Internal aberrance, by leaving the text forever 
... Ibid., p. 115. 
119 We will have the chance of further analysing this in the next chapter with regard to Jacques 
Derrida's critique of ethnography and ethnocentrism. 
120 Clifford, "On Ethnographic Allegory", p. 117. 
121 This is not, however, what Clifford maintains. While drawing on de Man's notion of allegory 
he also levels a critique: "Whereas the free play of readings may in theory be infinite, there are, 
at any historical moment, a limited range of canonical and emergent allegories available to the 
competent reader (the reader whose interpretation will be deemed plausible by a specific 
community). These structures of meaning are historically bounded and coercive. " Ibid., p. 110. 
De Man, at any rate, does not deny that historical determinations are at work in any process of 
reading but rather challenges a certain tendency towards totalising explications. To say that 
there are always more stories to be told and that this is an immanent and structural possibility of 
the text is not to nourish the idea of free play. It does not imply that anything goes. Readings are 
always historically pertinent but this in turn confers upon them only a minimal unity; it does not 
pin them down to a cohesive meaning and context. To acknowledge the internal aberrance of 
texts is to have a glimpse at the structure that allows for their repetition and iteration, that makes 
historical readings possible; that is indeed a historical force. 
122 "Meaning is indeterminate only to the extent that history itself is open-ended. " Ibid., p. 120. 
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(in)determinate, is also its positive condition of historicity, for it is what promises more 
text and more meaning, even if this meaning is ultimely unreadable. 
Is this to say that travel texts can receive, or better, engender infinite number of 
readings? Essentially, yes. Though this neither precludes the pertinence of particular 
contexts (no text produces its own context since it is already in context(s), yet it also 
disposes resources that may call for specific types of reading, though these are never 
simply available there), nor does it suggest that all texts have equal semantic potential 
that should be infinitely unfolded. It suggests, however, that texts, hence travel texts 
also, have the structural potential of being infinitely read, even if this does not actually 
happen. What interests us here is the immanent disjunctive structure of the text, what 
both enables its repetition (hence its relative continuity) and tears it asunder, what 
allows for the constant self-denial and undoing of the travel text's own assertions. This 
discrepancy and aporetic condition already in operation regardless of context we will 
consider with regard to the constantive and performative functions of travel texts. But 
first we have to see what constantives and performatives are and how de Man proposes 
to read them. 
J. L. Austin in How to Do Things With Words envisions a philosophy of 
language as action that would restore the primacy of ordinary or "real" life language 
over theoretical abstractions and structural explanations. 123 The domain of Speech Act 
Theory is that of utterances, of signifying events of language organised and made 
meaningful according to sets of conventions (of which Austin tries to produce a 
typology) that cannot be accounted for solely on the grounds of grammatical edifices, 
which only have a virtual existence. Austin's major contribution consists of the reversal 
of the presumed priority of constative statements, that is, statements of primarily 
cognitive, referential, and descriptive function, over performatives, that is, statements 
that perform and are committed to what they state and are now granted a privileged 
place. However, this overturning acquires the status of a decisive philosophical gesture 
only within the restricted context of analytical philosophy, of which Austin is one of 
the most prominent exponents. Austin launches his "revolution" by proclaiming that it 
was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a `statement' can 
only be to `describe' some state of affairs, or to `state some fact', which it must do 
either truly or falsely. "' 24 Austin argues instead that constative statements are only a 
123 Austin, J. L., How to Do Things With Words, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1976. 
124 Ibid., p. 1. Analytical philosophy proposes a theoretical model of language that foregrounds 
and considers exclusively constative statements of the type S is P that pertain to a 
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species of a more general class, that of performatives, which engulfs and enables the 
possibility of reference without limiting itself to the criterion of truth or adequacy and 
which brings into play the forces and conventions that constitute the total speech act 
situation, that account for the full meaning of the event of language. Thus Austin 
reinscribes the constative, which pertains to the locutionary mode of the statement, 
onto the performative, that is, its illocutionary force. In a theory of language as action 
no statement is conceivable without the presence of an utterer, without the pronoun "I". 
Even in cases where the subject is not obvious, it is necessarily implied. Every 
constative is an implicit performative. The true force of the performance of a speech act 
is located in its illocutionary mode, in what the statement actually does. So illocution, 
onto which a set of conventions (the specificity of a context, social norms, established 
patterns of behaviour, circumstances, etc. ) is grafted and which is animated by the 
present intention of the utterer, is for Austin the par excellence speech act. 125 
However, despite his initial intention not to privilege intentionality as the 
organising principle of the total speech act, which he tries to explain through the 
delineation of possible criteria for it to be successful or "happy, " Austin is forced to 
reintroduce this notion at a late stage of his analysis. Even if an exhaustive typology of 
the contextual conventions of a speech act were possible, Austin's project was bound to 
falter if a solid criterion for the commitment and engagement of the utterer were not 
established. Thereby, Austin posits as the model of a "serious" speech act an explicit 
performative uttered in the "first person singular present indicative active form". 126 A 
total speech act is above all a signifying verbal act of a subject fully present to 
him/herself and to the act s/he performs. Speech acts -and Austin admits this is most 
often the case- that do not meet the criterion of a fully present intentionality due to a 
"mistake" or by "accident" or because they were made "under duress" are considered 
"infelicitous" and are a priori excluded from the domain of Speech Act Theory. 127 
Austin constitutes his field of objects by dividing speech acts into "normal" or 
"serious" and "nonserious" or "parasitic" and by excluding the latter from it. Literature, 
representational and referential logical grammar and are evaluated according to the principles of 
truth or falsehood. 
125 Austin bans perlocution from his study of speech acts, thereby, stressing their exclusively 
verbal character, which he seeks to "detach from its consequences". 
126 Austin, p. 61. 
127 "Now I suppose some very general high-level doctrine might embrace both what we have 
called infelicities and these other `unhappy' features of the doing of actions -in our case actions 
containing a performative utterance- in a single doctrine: but we are not including this kind of 
unhappiness -we must just remember, though, that features of this sort can and do constantly 
obtrude into any particular case we are discussing. " Ibid., p. 21. 
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according to him, falls under the category of nonserious speech acts, "under the 
doctrine of the etiolations of language". And it is naturally not pertinent to Speech Act 
Theory. 
Austin's philosophy of language is premised on a series of exclusions that 
allow him to demarcate his discursive field. However, these exclusions can be said to 
be unwarranted as they lack justification from a theoretical or methodological point of 
view. Indeed, how could a "comprehensive" theory of language lay claim on its object 
if it reduces it to a specific part by performing an act of purification (which can only be 
an ethico-political gesture), which, in turn, attempts to use as model for the description 
of the totality of the field? What Austin postulates as the domain of Speech Act 
Theory, that is, "normal, ordinary" language turns out to be an ideal and fictive object, 
a pure theoretical construct. '28 
How does then a theory that by definition rules out literature have a place in 
literary theory? Rodolphe Gasche addresses this question especially with regard to de 
Man's extensive use of the notions of constatives and performatives in Allegories of 
Reading. We saw that Austin's difficulties in establishing rigid criteria for the 
description of the "total speech act" forced him to retreat to the notion of a fully present 
intentionality of a signifying consciousness as the organising principle of a successful 
utterance. This gesture reinstates the subject as the source of meaning in the event of 
language. The primary function of a performative is to refer to its very agent, to act out 
an instance of self-referentiality and self-reflexivity, something also effected by 
grammatical markers or indicators (adverbs, pronouns, tenses) that point to the actual 
conditions of the act. "What the act communicates is, first of all, itself as act. It is a 
fully present act of a self-asserting subject that is fully present to itself. "129 If the 
primary function of constatives is that of reference (description, denomination, 
cognition), the primary function of performatives is that of self-reference and self- 
128 One could also perceive an affinity between Austin's Speech Act theory and the 
hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur also defines language primarily as action and meaning as 
an event which takes place in the present of discourse according to a dialectic of the locutionary 
function and the illocutionary force, as the meaning intending act of a present subject. In a way, 
Ricoeur in The Rule of Metaphor repeats Austin's philosophical gesture in his elaboration of the 
passage from semiotics to semantics and finally to hermeneutics, which reinstates the 
interpreting subject as the source of meaning and reference. However, Ricoeur in contrast to 
Austin, who is often accused of a lack of familiarity with Continental Philosophy, avoids the 
pitfalls of unwarranted or at least blatant separations and purifications. For the relation of 
Ricoeur to Speech Act Theory see Ricoeur's Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus 
of'Meaning, pp. 1-23. 
129 Gasche, The Wild Card of'Reading, p. 15. 
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reflection and since constatives are implicit performatives then the implication is that in 
order for a statement to refer to anything it first has to refer to itself. Referentiality 
always presupposes self-referentiality, an act of self-constitution. The relegation of 
reference to a secondary effect of the speech act is the major attraction of literary 
theory to Speech Act Theory, since, as was said before, the former comes to being 
through a suspension of the referential moment. 
So performatives are grounded on subjectivity, on a subject that posits itself 
before positing anything else; on a subject that is fully present to itself and to the act it 
performs as act, that is conscious first of all of the factum of the act. This is why 
Austin's philosophy is "tributary to the metaphysics of subjectivity", 130 to a philosophy 
of the self-present subject as the regulative principle and origin of meaning and this is 
also why, according to Gasche, the applications of Speech Act Theory to literary texts 
remain "within the psychological horizon of romantic hermeneutics. "131 So what is the 
place of Speech Act Theory for a thinker like de Man who puts into question and into 
unrest monistic explanations and reductions? The notions of constatives and 
performatives occupy central stage in the last chapters of Allegories of Reading. 
However, as one might suspect, de Man does not take these notions at face value. On 
the contrary, he submits them to a radical reinscription with far-reaching implications 
for the notions of subject, reference and text. 132 
We are now going to see how constatives and perfomatives undo and 
reproduce one another through de Man's readings of Nietzsche and Rousseau also in 
view of extending this problematic to travel writing. It is important to go into these 
analyses here because they expose principal functions of the travel text, that is, a claim 
to cognition and to authentic experience, at their most fundamental level. 
De Man's reading of Nietzsche shows how his claims are caught in the 
unreconcilable discrepancy of constantive and performative functions. 133 Nietzsche's 
pronouncements on the impossibility of knowledge -which for him is an act of 
130 Ibid., p. 40. 
13' Ibid., p. 41. 
1'' Gasche outlines de Man's critique as threefold: 1. de Man discredits the totalising explicative 
power of the concept of the act claimed by Speech Act Theory. 2. He interrupts the notion of 
literal reference, of the possibility of reference and reintroduces it as the possibility of the 
referential illusion of language. 3. He "deconstructs" the totalising figure of self-reflexivity and 
self-referentiality. Ibid., pp. 36-38. 
13' De Man focuses here particularly on The Birth of Tragedy, The Gay Science, A Genealogy of 
Alorals, Human all too Human, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, Thus Spake 
Zarathustra, Un_eitgeässe Betrachtungen, The Will to Power. 
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predication, or else a positional act that obeys the human, all too human imperatives of 
logic and noncontradiction and can have no claim on things themselves- necessarily 
have both a referential and positional function that disrupts them in its turn. 134 Logic, 
according to Nietzsche, consists of positional and hypothetical speech acts, of which 
"truth" is an effect. However, as de Man points out, denying the possibility of 
affirmative knowledge does not amount to replacing it by performance. Nietzsche's 
text discredits the principles of noncontradiction and identity and proves them to be 
positional acts by means of another positional act, that of his own, which, however, 
cannot but relapse to the "fallacy" of affirmation and reference. It cannot show itself as 
act as it cannot erase its own referential mode. "The text", writes de Man, "deconstructs 
the authority of the principle of contradiction by showing that this principle is an act, 
but when it acts out this act, it fails to perform the deed to which the text owed its 
status as act. " 135 Performative and constative acts continuously undo one another; they 
are both irreconcilable and indissociable. 136 By consequence, the performative function 
of language, which was formerly pronounced as the condition of reference, appears to 
be no less ambivalent or fictitious than the constative one. Nietzsche proclaims that 
performatives, which are self-reflective acts, not only constitute a fictive "doer" but 
that the "deed" they perform is itself also a fiction. 137 The verbal act of thinking "as 
epistemologists conceive of it, simply does not occur" for it consists of metonymic 
displacements and metaphorical totalisations that devoid it of any authority. One 
cannot longer claim to know for sure what one does or whether one is doing or not 
doing something in the "act" of thinking. 138 And an epistemology of tropes, however 
134 According to Nietzsche knowledge is an imperative of logic and not a pronouncement 
adequate to and comprehensive of entities. Nor are the axioms of logic adequate to reality as 
they assume a priori the existence of such and such entity and proceed to predicating it 
according to a "principle of noncontradiction" (an entity cannot receive opposite attributes). 
Thus for Nietzsche "logic (like geometry and arithmetic) applies only to fictitious truths that we 
have created. Logic is the attempt to understand the actual world by means of a scheme of 
being posited by ourselves, more correctly: to make it easier to formalise and to compute[... ]" 
(Nietzsche's italics). Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Will to Power, translated by Walter Kaufmann 
and R. J. Hollingdale, quoted in Allegories of Reading, p. 121. So knowledge is a process of 
predication, that is, a constative act. Furthermore, since it depends on an a priori knowledge of 
the being of entities, it cannot contain a "criterion of truth, but an imperative that should count 
as true". 
135 De Man, Allegories of Reading, p. 125. 
136 Nonetheless, this by no means invalidates Nietzsche's critique of constatives: it does not 
follow that, if it cannot be said of language that it is an act, that it has to be a knowledge. The 
negative thrust of the deconstruction remains unimpaired; after Nietzsche (and, indeed, after any 
`text'), we can no longer hope ever `to know' in peace. " Ibid., pp. 125-126. 
137 Ibid., p. 127. 
138 Ibid., p. 13 1- 
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rigorous, could not succeed in erasing the radical ambiguity of verbal acts. More 
precisely, it cannot do away with rhetoric as de Man understands it: 
"If the critique of metaphysics is structured as an aporia between performative and 
constative language, this is the same as saying that it is structured as rhetoric. " 139 
To de Man's mind, the asymmetrical relation between the constative and 
performative functions attests to the text's structure as "a dynamic system of excess 
and lack. "140 If we opt to use one of them as a totalising explicative device it will 
always be too much, excessively charged with the other thus lacking too much of itself. 
After having thrown them off balance de Man has now to reinscribe them onto a 
"supplementary" structure that would reinstate their unbalanced relation as the essential 
condition for the production of text and meaning. It is with respect to Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau that de Man reaches the most radical level of his critique. The legal and 
contractual text of the Social Contract serves him here as model. 
The Social Contract, like any legal text, is torn apart by an exigency for 
generality and impersonality, which is effected by the text's grammar, its "machinelike 
systematicity", and an exigency for application, for particular reference. These two 
exigencies are both mutually constituted and destructed. "There can be no text without 
grammar: the logic of grammar generates texts only in the absence of referential 
meaning, but every text generates a referent that subverts the grammatical principle to 
which it owed its constitution. "141 De Man calls this discrepancy between grammar and 
referential meaning "the figural dimension of language. " It is the rhetorical structure 
that engenders incompatible meanings within the same text regardless of context. 142 A 
text may be impossible as closed and ever same entity but it is possible as the iteration 
of its disjunctive constitution, as the series of readings from which it re-emerges. 143 In 
terms of constatives and performatives, the legal text, which is here evoked as a 
''9 Ibid., p. 131. 
140 Ibid., p. 180. 
'4' And de Man continues: "What remains hidden in the everyday use of language, the 
fundamental incompatibility between grammar and meaning, becomes explicit when the 
linguistic structures are stated, as is the case here, in political terms. " Ibid., p. 269. 
142 Hereby, "we call text any entity that can be considered from such a double perspective: as a 
generative, open-ended, non-referential grammatical system and as a figural system closed off 
by a transcendental signification [i. e., by something pointing beyond it] that subverts the 
grammatical code to which the texts owes its existence. The "definition" of the text also states 
the impossibility of its existence and prefigures the allegorical narratives of this impossibility. " 
Ibid., p. 270. 
l4. However, as Gasche points out, this does not mean that a text in the colloquial sense actually 
narrates its own impossibility of closure, that it is a narrative about that. What we have here is 
the allegorised notion of the text and narrative is to be understood primarily in a structural 
fashion. Gasehe, The l1 'i! d Card of Reading, p. 44. 
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paradigmatic instance of the law of the text in general, claims to be a theoretical 
description of the State. But as soon as it is set in motion, as soon as it is applied to 
concrete situations, it becomes a narrative of praxis, thus passing from "constative 
theory to performative history". One has to remember that according to Speech Act 
Theory constative statements have a cognitive and referential structure, which, 
moreover, in order to signify has to be inscribed onto a performative act. "If a text does 
not act, it cannot state what it knows. "144 The "text of the law", which explicitly 
manifests the nondialectisable relation of constatives and performatives, coincides with 
the "law of the text", the law of the law, which in this case forces the theory of politics 
to turn into history, into "the allegory of its inability to achieve the status of a 
science. " 145 This is the general law of the text, which is constituted as a machine for the 
production of meaning. The text is always capable of engendering more meaning in 
any given situation, to be read and be meaningful in different contexts. 146 
The discrepancy between constatives and performatives is explicated by de 
Man in temporal terms. It reflects the noncoincidence of "the theoretical statement with 
its phenomenal manifestation. " The performative speech act of the legal text may be 
necessarily pronounced in a concrete present but it always points towards a 
hypothetical future. "All laws are future-oriented and prospective; their illocutionary 
mode is that of the promise", "' of the par excellence performative. Furthermore, a 
present promise cannot be but the past of its realisation. When I promise to do 
something I commit myself to the necessity of a future action, which when I actually 
perform, exactly because I am committed to it, points back to a past promise. A 
promise is an expression of a present will, which necessarily fails to coincide with what 
it pledges and depends on "a metaleptic reversal of cause and effect"; the moment at 
which a promise is given is already anachronistic and self-disruptive. In this sense the 
"lawgiver", in this case Rousseau, becomes an "impostor" in spite of himself, a 
rhetorical figure caught in and produced by the text's own figural status. 148 For sure, 
144 De Man, Allegories of Reading, p. 270. 
145 Ibid., p. 271. 
146 However, any attempt to determine meaning solely from the perspective of context faces the 
risk of becoming an overdetermination as it would fail to acknowledge what enabled the text to 
signify in the first place, the same structure that enables it to exceed any context and that allows 
for recontextualisation. 
147 De Man, . Allegories of Reading, p. 
273. 
148 According to de Man, the Social Contract here reaches an impasse and is forced to take 
refuge in a transcendental principle of signification. It has to "invent" a principle exterior to it (a 
"subterfuge", which "can only be God") that would place it within "a teleological system 
oriented toward the convergence of figure and meaning. " Ibid., p. 274. 
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the Social Contract will continue to legislate: "what the Social Contract keeps doing 
however is to promise, that is, to perform the very illocutionary speech act which it has 
discredited and to perform it in all its textual ambiguity, as a statement of which the 
constative and performative functions cannot be distinguished or reconciled. "149 
Before reaching the final and most crucial phase of de Man's critique, we will 
endeavour to show the relevance of what has been elaborated so far with regard to 
speech acts to travel narrative. We previously said that travel writing draws its 
authority from a claim to a true experience as lived by the travel author. In other words, 
it establishes itself on the grounds of a commitment or promise to tell the truth about 
something that really happened, a journey made, an act of travelling performed by the 
author, whose signature confers upon it unity and validity. But before and beyond this, 
the travel text is fundamentally a narrative and should be treated as such. We must 
never forget that it is texts that we are considering, laborious configurations, and not 
events and experiences, to which we can have no access. So primarily what a travel 
narrative does is to "promise" a story, a recit de voyage, of which the truth value 
remains open to verification. The travel text is trapped in the fundamental discrepancy 
of its constative and performative functions. It constantly registers a forward and 
backward movement between constative and performative, reference and self- 
reflection, the general and the particular, a movement that also constitutes its temporal 
double bind. Even though in travel texts descriptive and narrative parts seem to be 
more balanced, their relation remains highly complex since they both presuppose and 
undo one another. One cannot separate a purely denotative, referential and informative 
discourse from the positional, self-reflective and autobiographical elements of travel 
texts. One cannot simply distinguish between place and event, actuality and experience, 
between the observed object and the act of observation. In other words, one cannot 
draw a line between what of the object and what of the subject is found in the travel 
text. The relation between the cultural or natural object and the representing subject not 
only gives rise to the travel text but more importantly it is what constitutes both 
referential object and reflective subject. This is to say that textual objects are not 
something pregiven and simply available at the traveller's discretion. As Barbara Korte 
remarks, not until the journey is textualised does it become an experience; only as text 
does the journey gain significance for the traveller. ""' Thus it is through this very 
textualisation, here used in its broad sense, that the figure of the traveller also emerges. 
149 Ibid., pp. 275-276. 
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Every representation presupposes a representing subject which, however, must 
constitute and define itself as the agent of this representational act. This is why 
acknowledging the implicit performative in every descriptive or constative act does not 
simply collapse the latter into the former. Performance does not totally displace or 
replace reference. 
To be sure, description and narration have taken on different functions and 
values throughout the history of travel writing. But their aberrant and unstable 
character is not merely due to historical circumstance. We previously said that it is 
accepted at large that what is now called the modern genre of travel writing came to be 
through a re-evaluation and foregrounding of private experience, which became more 
and more significant. 151 Is it without any significance that the travel narrative which, 
according to Mary B. Campbell, signals the emergence of the modern genre, namely 
Sir Walter Ralegh's The Discoverie of the Large, Rich and Bewtiful Empire of Guiana, 
with a Relation of the Great and Golden City of Manoa (which the Spaniards call El 
Dorado), etc. Performed in the yeare 1595... includes the word "performed" in its title? 
Yes and no. Yes, if it even marginally implies the figure of a traveller who is aware of 
his personal involvement in relating an account. No, in the sense that structurally 
performance is already at work even in the most "impersonal" descriptions. 
It was argued before that a genealogy of the function of the subject in travel 
writing would "perform" a reduction of the multiplying forces that both give rise and 
disseminate all the features that are now said to pertain to the modern genre. For sure, 
one could reconstitute a linear progression on the condition that one selected and 
isolated what one assumed or set up as prominent features. Undertakings such as these 
are not without merit as long as one recognises their inherent limitations. Moreover, 
one cannot speak of a linear development with regard to the inscriptive subject of the 
discourse of travel, of an increasing self-awareness and confidence, since there have 
been periods also in modern travel writing in which the subject was relegated to a 
secondary function. For instance, the humble journey of pilgrims to the Holy Lands is 
supposed to involve a process of self-effacement before the glory of God's 
manifestations, as does the crusaders' participation in divine and eschatological history. 
However, the overt pronouncements of such texts are being subverted by 
150 Korte, p. 146. 
151 "[n Europe, more specifically in England, our contemporary understanding of the travelogue 
as the account of authentic, autobiographical travelling experience does not emerge until the 
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autobiographical and anecdotal elements as this is clearly seen also in the chronicles of 
crusades that introduce secular experience. The medieval secular, profane and 
iconoclastic curiositas and Renaissance's emphasis on empiricism that reinstates the 
experience of the world as source of knowledge, of course, do not constitute a clear 
break with what precedes. On the other hand, neither do they foreshadow or secure the 
self-establishment of a powerful representing subject that could later fulfil the 
modernist dream of mastery and autonomy as we can now retrospectively judge from a 
time that has recently evidenced the prominence of Foucauldian discursive models, 
widely held with regard to travel writing, 152 and declarations of "the death of the 
author". 
The eighteenth century travel literature, according to Charles L. Batten Jr, is 
structured around a "clearly defined" convention: "a travel writer must not talk about 
himself. " 153 Batten is concerned with "the nonfiction travel account, " which is still held 
as a literary genre in the eighteenth century by the fact that travel literature then widely 
conforms to the Horatian doctrine of utile dulce, that is, to a mixture and balance of 
pleasure and instruction, to an artful representation of information that elevates the 
genre "to the rank of poesy". 154 Although eighteenth century generic demands, as 
described by Batten, who focuses mainly on English travel writing, cannot be as 
"clearly defined" as he suggests -and one could detect a certain uneasiness with regard 
to the designation and separation of the fictional and nonfictional account' 55- they are a 
Early Modern period, and many earlier texts are not compatible with the modern conception of 
the genre. " Ibid., p. 21. 
152 We will discuss the Foucauldian framework of recent theory on travel writing in works such 
as, for instance, Sara Mills' Discourses of Difference, an Analysis of Women's Travel Writing 
and Colonialism, London, 1991 in the next chapter. 
153 Batten, Charles L., Pleasurable Instruction, Form and Convention in Eighteenth-Century 
Travel Literature, London, University of California Press, 1978, p. 13. 
15' Ibid., p. 25. 
155 It is form and convention rather than content that in the eighteenth century, according to 
Batten, qualifies a travel account as a nonfictional one. Readers expected to recognise well- 
established conventions that pertained to what was then demanded from "an authentic account". 
In an age that travel writing enjoyed immense popularity but was all the same constantly 
suspected and attacked for not being enough factual and truthful, travel writers established their 
credibility and defended their reputation by resorting to artistry, to the literary conventions that 
their audience was familiar with. Although this was also an age anxious for novelty and 
knowledge it was not without a certain uneasiness that the unprecedented amount of incoming 
information on foreign lands was received. One could not possibly disagree with Batten that the 
student of travel literature must have a comprehension of generic conventions and of the 
tradition in which travellers write. However, his adherence to a formal definition of 
"nonfictional" travel literature does not escape the pitfalls that those whom he criticises for 
attempting at distinguishing factual and fictional representations on the basis of content run up 
against. For Batten, such "attempts to discern fact from fiction [... ] reduce critics to petty 
detectives" and are "difficult if not impossible" since they presuppose "omniscience", whereas 
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good case in point for the consideration of the constative and performative functions. 
For here we have narratives that purport to deny or at least to diminish their own 
narrative mode and thus to achieve a balance between their constative and performative 
functions in favour of the former: "the eighteenth-century travel writer tried to achieve 
a `golden mean': he had to include a sufficiently detailed record of his experiences to 
prove that he actually visited the countries he described, but he could not tell too much 
about himself and his adventures. If this narrative appeared too circumstantial, he 
would usually be attacked as an egoist; if it seemed too contrived, he would frequently 
be criticized as a writer of fiction, primarily interested in entertaining readers at the 
expense of their instruction. A properly handled narrative, therefore, not only provides 
entertainment but also certifies the truthfulness of the book. " 156 
By then the modern antinomy of fact and fiction was clearly formed and 
evaluated on moral grounds. In medieval times the conflation of fact and fiction did not 
pose a moral threat since every sign or thing manifested by analogy a divine truth. In 
the scientifically sophisticated eighteenth century the exigency for accuracy put in the 
foreground referential and descriptive discourses that pertained to truthful 
representation, while personal engagement presented the danger of compromising 
cognitive aims. So the performative mode of narrative, on the one hand, served as a 
condition of validity and, on the other, if used out of proportion, undermined the 
validity of the travel text (designated as pleasurable instruction) on the whole. While 
accurate and objective observation produced general and educational information, 
autobiographical and anecdotal parts pinned down the travel account to useless 
particularities and had to be minimised. This much sought balance which rested upon a 
relation of excess and lack could not be and was not sustained for there were enough 
exceptions to this rule of ideal standards to form a counter-law, whence the need for 
rigorous conventions. 
"classifications based on form [... ] usually avoid practically insurmountable problems. " Ibid., 
pp 21-24. Form can hardly be disengaged from thematic elements, although it may offer an 
insight to the accepted patterns for the production and reception of knowledge at a particular 
time. But it fails to constitute a criterion for the distinction between fictional and nonfictional 
travel writing since it precisely bears the possibility of both. The distinction between fact and 
fiction (as well as between form and content) remains highly problematic. Batten seems to 
presuppose what he explicitly rejects: a division of fact and fiction according to content that an 
awareness of rhetorical conventions would help to overcome. Any attempt at considering 
separately the vehicle or medium of a discourse from its content essentially presupposes the 
independent existence of the latter. If the truth value of eighteenth century travel accounts was 
largely premised upon but not wholly secured by literary conventions then such distinctions 
rather than avoiding come up against "insurmountable problems". 
156 Ibid., p. 63. 
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The unbalanced relation between constatives and performatives is not a matter 
of proportion within the text but rather an inherent instability of these functions, a 
question of excess and lack within themselves. For the cognitive or referential act 
points back to the thinking subject and so, being too self-referential, lacks in objectivity 
and the self-reflective subject constitutes itself through its pronouncements and 
affirmations, which it fails to think as positional acts. This instability within the travel 
text is not, of course, put to rights with the advent of romantic, sentimental and 
modernist travel from the nineteenth century onwards that shifted attention to private 
experience, emotion and reflective mood. These texts may manifest an increased 
awareness of self-engagement and a liberty on the travel writer's part, which amounts 
to the celebratory aestheticisation of travel, but they are also caught in the disjunctive 
and tropological structure of speech acts since they continue to describe, to affirm and 
to produce reference and knowledge about the other, as Edward Said elaborates with 
regard to Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Nerval and Flaubert in Orientalism. 157 By this 
time, it is often assumed that factual and literary travel writing are clearly divided. To 
challenge this separation is not to collapse every travel text into the category of 
literature, especially not if this is defined in disjunction with the so-called factual and 
cognitive discourses. If it has been suggested that the experience of travel and travel 
writing are essentially "figurative, " it was done so according to the radical sense of 
literariness, that is, with reference to the internal condition of undecidability that 
already (re)marks the inherent possibility of any text to become literature. We will have 
more to say on this in the following section of the chapter. But still travel texts that 
display a literary self-awareness bring to the fore in a more acute way the structures 
underlying travel writing in general. It is not without a certain irony that Gustave 
Flaubert, a figure of the traveller as voyageur maudit according to Dennis Porter , 
158 
recounts his experience of the Orient. Ironic overtones are effected by the traveller's 
incapability to produce a just and "adequate" image of the other, which he will 
continue to describe and lay claim on all the same, and by the self-doubt and self- 
reflection inflicted by the encounter. 159 Flaubert on Egypt: 
157 Said, Edward, Orientalism, Western Conceptions of the Orient, London, Penguin Books, 
1995. The theme of "orientalism" will be taken up in the next chapter where it will be 
considered with regard to colonialism and post-colonial theory and the question of the ethics of 
travel. 
158 Porter, Dennis, Haunted Journeys, Desire and Transgression in European Travel Writing, 
Princeton, New Jersey. Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 168. 
159 The figure of irony has similar function and structure with allegory. They are both 
considered metatropes because they manifest an awareness of their figurative mode and imply a 
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"What can I say about it all? What can I write you? As yet I am scarcely over the initial 
bedazzlement. It is like being hurled while still asleep into the midst of a Beethoven symphony, 
with the brasses at their most ear-splitting, the basses rumbling, and the flutes sighing away; 
each detail reaches out to grip you; it pinches you; and the more you concentrate on it the less 
you grasp the whole. Then gradually all this becomes harmonious and the pieces fall into place 
themselves, in accordance with the laws of perspective. [... ] Anyone who is a little attentive 
rediscovers here much more than he discovers. The seeds of a thousand notions that one carried 
within oneself grow and become more definite, like so many refreshed memories. [... ] The 
dances that we have had performed for us are of too hieratic a character not to have come from 
the dances of the old Orient, which is always young because nothing changes. Here the Bible is 
a picture of life today. [... ] You can see that there is much to enjoy in all this, and plenty of 
opportunity to utter stupidities about it -something which we abstain from as much as possible. 
If we were to publish anything it would be on our return. But between now and then, let nothing 
transpire. " 160 
The passage begins with what is called the "inexpressibility topos" in travel 
writing that tries to convey the traveller's amazement and "bedazzlement" in the face 
of the other. This is articulated here through the resort to a familiar scene for the 
Western traveller that would help to orchestrate and harmonise the fleeting and forceful 
impressions into a coherent whole, a sort of symphony. The traveller moves forwards 
and backwards between the particular and general, detail and wholeness, past and 
present, which is, however, an eternal and static present "because nothing changes". 
rupture from the meaning to which they refer and which they repeat and, more importantly, 
have as function the thematisation of this rupture. Allegory and irony then emerge from the 
same temporal void, of a "temporality that is definitely not organic, in that it relates to its source 
only in terms of distance and difference and allows for no end, for no totality. " De Man, "The 
Rhetoric of Temporality", p. 222. Like allegory, irony is a figure that can be said to pertain to 
the very semantic structures of travel and travel writing. To be certain, irony is not solely a 
feature of the modern, "self-conscious" genre of travel writing. Mandeville, the untravelled 
travel writer of the Middle Ages, as Campbell points out, used multiple ironies in his 
plagiarisms. According to Donald Howard this is an effect of the essential link between travel 
and irony: "If this book is ironic, it is because travel itself is ironic: things are other than what 
we expect at home, and the contrast turns us back upon ourselves. " Quoted by Campbell, pp. 
149-150. Campbell does not want to generalise the workings of irony in travel writing and asks 
to what extent pilgrimage and missionary accounts betray expectations. She ventures the 
thought that over the millennium between Egeria and Mandeville it was as if the mentality of 
the West sought to protect an archetypal imago mundi designed in a way that rejected the 
possibility of real surprise in the experience of travel. Ibid., p. 150. Is not denying the possibility 
of surprise in the experience of travel to deny travel altogether, for what is travel if not the 
eventuality of an encounter with the other? Perhaps this is the deep ironic structure underlying 
these texts, which in a way subvert their own purposes. Of course, one could object and, indeed, 
Andrew Palmer has with regard to the suggestion that Egeria was an exotic traveller implied by 
the title of Campbell's book that this is a retrojection since pilgrims were not visiting foreign 
lands but were travelling to the centre of their scriptural universe, to a spiritual home. Palmer, 
"Egeria the Voyageur, Or The Technology of Remote Sensing in Late Antiquity" in Travel Fact 
and Travel Fiction, p. 52. Palmer also remarks that "Egeria is willingly deceived; but she only 
`deceives' in the sense that she idealizes, and then she deceives herself as much as her 
correspondents. " Ibid., p. 45. Seeing only what the law of the house commands and allows to be 
seen, which essentially is never the house itself for it does not show itself for what it is, that is, a 
law, is one of the greatest ironies of travel. 
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Memory is a past expectation becoming present reality, a reality that is "young" and 
vibrant and at once "old", ritual, and mythical. What Flaubert's "attentive" gaze 
ultimately leads to is a rediscovery of himself. He is awaken, brought to conscience by 
the "loud" images of the Orient, which is there as a stage for his own growth and, of 
course, pleasure. But at the same time the Orient is the testing ground for his own 
"refreshed memories" and assumptions. His own mystified and blurred past only 
attains a short-lived moment of resolution for there cannot truly be a reconciliation or 
synthesis with the present. He is bound to relapse to inauthenticity. Flaubert constantly 
moves between assertion and doubt (the dances "are of too hieratic a character not to 
have"...? ) ending up with self-sarcasm (there is "plenty of opportunity to utter 
stupidities") that disrupts all that was affirmed before. He will, however, give himself 
more time to better orchestrate, "if' he does so. The passage ends with the promise of a 
travel account. The Orient then becomes at once at this transient and deafening moment 
a past, a present, and a future. But between then and now, nothing should transpire and 
everything should be reserved for the book on the Orient that would bear his proper 
name. 
Travel texts, like all texts in a certain sense, can be said to be more or less 
autobiographical. They manifest a specular structure that allows for the emergence of 
the figure of the author which becomes the text's referent, and which, in its own turn, 
acquires a degree of referential productivity. Paul de Man in "Autobiography as De- 
facement" explores the tropological condition of the genre of autobiography, which is, 
however, extended to all types of writing, and addresses the problematic of the 
distinction between actuality and fiction in those texts. 161 If we replaced in the 
quotation that follows the term "autobiography" by "travel writing" the relevance of 
this thinking becomes obvious: 
"Autobiography seems to depend on actual and potentially verifiable events in a less 
ambivalent way than fiction does. It seems to belong to a simpler mode of referentiality, of 
representation, and of diegesis. It may contain lots of phantasms and dreams, but these 
deviations from reality remain rooted in a single subject whose identity is defined by the 
uncontested readability of his proper name". 162 
But the very act of self-restoration and salvage in the travel text that 
purportedly secures the author's proper name, which in turn functions as a warranty for 
160 This is an extract from a letter Flaubert wrote to Dr Jules Cloquet in Cairo, 15 January 1850. 
Flaubert, Gustave, Flaubert in Egg pt, A Sensibility on Tour, translated and edited with an 
introduction by Francis Steegmuller, London, Penguin Books, 1996, pp. 79-81. 
161 De Man, Paul, "Autobiography as De-Facement" in The Rhetoric of Romanticism, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1984. 
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the place's proper name, inflicts a split on the writing subject between its empirical self 
(author of the text) and a figurative self (author in the text). The historical self is 
immersed in textuality, in a figurative structure that both lets him/her emerge by means 
of tropological substitutions, exchanges, totalisations and by the same token disclaims 
the possibility of a unified and consistent signifying subject. What is referred to here is 
not, of course, a historical existence, but the specular structure of self-understanding: 
"The specular moment that is part of all understanding reveals the tropological 
structure that underlies all cognitions, including knowledge of self. The interest of 
autobiography, then, is not that it reveals reliable self-knowledge -it does not- but that it 
demonstrates in a striking way the impossibility of closure and of totalisation (that is the 
impossibility of coming to being) of all textual systems made up of tropological 
substitutions. " 163 
This redoubling and multiplying force constitutes the tropological condition of 
autobiography and, by extension, travel writing that is split along a movement towards 
prosopopeia (the emergence of a face, prosopo in Greek) and a counter and 
simultaneous movement towards defacement. Performative function cannot act as a 
unifying and authenticising factor because as soon as it takes effect, "it is at once 
reinscribed within cognitive constraints. "164 This is to say that as soon as the 
performing subject institutes itself as the agent and signatory of the text it is folded 
back upon itself, however, not "in mirror like self-understanding" but in a way that 
displaces (without overcoming) the specular pair according to which the author is both 
the performer and the cognitive referent of the text. "The study of autobiography is 
caught in this double motion, the necessity to escape from the tropology of the subject 
and the equally inevitable reinscription of this necessity within a specular model of 
cognition. "165 There is always too much performance in cognition and too much 
reference in performance for either of these to constitute a pure or total speech act and 
it is in this sense that the latter is essentially disjunctive and figurative. There can be 
neither coincidence nor reconciliation between what the text claims it does and what it 
actually does. Moreover, this is the condition for the productivity of the text, for what 
the text does is to promise more meaning and more reference. 
We have now reached the most crucial phase of de Man's critique, which 
consists of the reintroduction of promise as the irreducible fact and rhetorical model of 
language. If Austin reverses the priority of constatives over performatives, de Man in 
162 Ibid., p. 68. 
163 Ibid., p. 71. 
"'4 Ibid. 
165 Ibid., p. 72. 
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his turn reverses the primacy of performatives, however, not by opposing them to 
constatives but precisely in order to displace this metaphysical opposition. The 
performative function is generalised as language's own mode of coming to being as a 
promise for truth and meaning. Here, of course, promise is not to be confused with an 
actual speech act. The promise of language is an open structure generative of more 
meaning and more reference, which is unable to gather itself as such, to be adequate to 
what it promises. This is because the text's semantic potential is never fully present to 
any of its instantiations. Every reading necessarily has too much referential meaning, 
an excess of cognition, which extenuates the text's promise for more meaning. But the 
promise for meaning, like any promise, is also excessive. It always promises "too 
much, " more than it can deliver, constantly deferring its fulfilment and closure. ' 66 The 
promise of language is an aporetic, an impossible yet inevitable promise. The grammar 
of the text as a promise of meaning cannot coincide with any of its actual meanings for 
it is a promise with no telos. And if the text performs an impossible promise which no 
reading is able to control, "the error", de Man writes, "is not within the reader; 
language itself dissociates the cognition from the act. Die Sprache verspricht (sich); to 
the extent that it is necessarily misleading, language just as necessarily conveys the 
promise of its own truth. "167 
Die Sprache verspricht (sich). Language promises (itself). Language misleads. 
De Man deforms Heidegger's phrase Die Sprache spricht (speech speaks, language 
speaks) revealing promise as the essential but also defective condition of language. If 
for Heidegger it is only language that can speak of language and it is only by language 
that language can be spoken of ("language speaks of and by itself, '68) without being 
exhaustively controlled by speaking subjects, for de Man, as Derrida explicates, 
language already promises as soon as it speaks. Promise reveals "a structure or 
destination of the Sprache which compels us to say Die Sprache verspricht (sich) and 
no longer simply Die Sprache spricht. "' 69 What language essentially promises is itself. 
When I speak I promise to say what I mean and to mean what I say and that what I say 
will mean the same thing when I repeat it again and again. What enables me to 
166 As Derrida explains, "without this essential excess, it would return to a description or 
knowledge of the future. Its act would have a constative structure and not a performative one. 
But this `too much' of the promise does not belong to a (promised) content of a promise which I 
would be incapable of keeping. It is within the very structure of the act of promising that this 
excess comes to inscribe a kind of irremediable disturbance or perversion. " Derrida, Memoires. 
p. 93. 
167 De Man, Allegories of Reading, p. 277. 
168 Derrida, Memoires, p. 97. 
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promise, or rather what promises in my stead (since we are not referring to a voluntary 
promise with concrete content), through me and in spite of me, is the repeatable and 
iterable structures of language, which allow for an utterance to be identified as such 
and be meaningful in more than one contexts, indeed, in infinite number of contexts. 
The promise of language is thus necessarily excessive. It is an impossible promise, a 
promise it cannot keep since any utterance will mean more or less in different contexts. 
And this is not by accident; it does not befall language from the outside but it is always 
already inscribed in its differential structure, in the essential possibility of meaning to 
be repeated as same and other at the same time. Nor is this difference or excess simply 
reducible to context, which is always open and nonsaturable. It is the iterable and 
differential structure of language that which engenders effects of truth (sameness, 
ideality) and history (as the history of meaning -from which ensues the sense of history 
in general). "To the extent that it is necessarily misleading, language just as necessarily 
conveys the promise of its own truth. This is also why textual allegories on this level of 
rhetorical complexity generate history. "10 The rhetorical structure of language that 
affects its readability and unreadability at the same time is already found in the 
versprechen, in the promise at the origin of history. ""' 
So what does the travel text essentially do? It promises. It promises a self, a 
place, home. It pledges to the other and must excuse itself for doing so for the other can 
never be (re)present(ed) in the text; the other can never be the object of cognition. This 
promise inherent to the travel text is what enables the generation of more meaning and 
cognition (referential meaning), which it has in turn to repress and suspend (in order for 
the text to keep on signifying): 
"there can never be enough guilt around to match the text-machine's infinite power to 
excuse. Since guilt, in this description, is a cognitive and excuse a performative function of 
language, we are restating the disjunction of the performative from the cognitive: any speech act 
produces an excess of cognition, but it can never hope to know the process of its own 
production (the only thing worth knowing. )" 172 
This is why the travel text has to excuse itself for being excessive in giving and 
promising too much and, inversely, for knowing and performing too little. If we are 
now able to readdress these texts, to read them anew this is possible due to their 
inherent promise to interminably speak of the other, of an encounter which is 
constantly postponed. In the most authoritative, affirmative and guilty of travel texts 
169 Ibid., p. 97-98. 
170 De Man, . 
Allegories of Reading, p. 277. 
171 Derrida, Memoires, p. 99. 
172 De Man, Allegories of Reading, pp. 299-300. 
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there are always destabilising elements, the texts' own power to excuse, that radically 
disrupt and reduce any claim on the other to impotence. And this is not an interruption 
that comes from outside, from a scholarly or political will that assumes the task of 
doing justice. If allegory teaches us something this is that no one ever says only and 
simply one thing. The travel text will continue to narrate the story of its own aberration 
and in this sense it will always be true to itself. It will continue to promise the house 
and that other place, that is to say, it will continue to allegorise them. And "we know 
this to be the case from empirical experience as well: it is always possible to face up to 
any experience (to excuse any guilt), because the experience always exists 
simultaneously as fictional discourse and as empirical event and it is never possible to 
decide which one of the two possibilities is the right one. " 173 Travel then is an allegory 
of the house and this amounts to saying that the house is an allegory of travel since 
they constantly refer to, repeat, and disrupt each other. This is the only chance for an 
ethics of travel, an ethics that promises without delivering the other, the other being 
thus an absolute arrivant, the one to come. Derrida asks: "What are we, who are we, to 
what and to whom are we, and to what and to whom are we destined in the experience 
of this impossible promise? Henceforth: what is experience? "174 And what is it if not 
the experience of the other, of someone awaited but not prepared for, the experience of 
an expectation "without horizon of expectation", without prior decision. It is the other 
that must decide when and if to come in the travel text, in us. The travel text must 
remain open to this promise, to undecidabilty. In this sense, what it essentially does is 
to pledge to secrecy. 
Jacques Derrida: Travel as Testimony 
So far we have tried to explore the themes of metaphor and allegory and to 
argue that, beyond their recurrent and varied use in travel narratives, they pertain to the 
essential functions and constitutive forces of such texts -and of the experience of travel 
on the whole- in a way that exceeds their thematic exposition and reinscribes them as 
generalised conditions of travel and travel writing. The metaphorical and allegorical 
functions of travel texts therefore re-emerge as essential and essentially aporetic 
173 Ibid., p. 293. This is not to say that the text's inherent mechanism to self-excuse by way of 
its radically figurative mode is an act of self-absolution. In excusing itself the text repeats its 
guilt as it must without resolution or reconciliation. To give oneself up to the jurisdiction of an 
other and to ask for forgiveness is something that perhaps one must do but it is all the same a 
guilty act for it denies itself the responsibility for what one does. One must endure, dwell in 
guilt and excuse oneself for doing so. One must stay in this impossible and terrible situation. 
174 Derrida, Alemoires, p. 149. 
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conditions, the preoccupation with which is not simply a matter of choice. We are 
going to be concerned now with another constitutive function of the travel text, which 
is essentially implicated with its metaphorical and allegorical functions, with the 
antinomy of fact and fiction and that of performative engagement and constative 
reference: travel writing as testimony. In The Witness and the Other World Mary B. 
Campbell designates the travel book as "a kind of witness: it is generically aimed at the 
truth .,, 
175 The traveller is commonly perceived as a sort of witness drawing on and 
evoking his/her own experience of a distant culture as the legitimate and legitimising 
ground of his/her discourse. A traveller testifies to the truthfulness of an experience of 
travel or rather makes a claim to truthfulness. This claim -explicit or implicit, truthful 
or not- is a constitutive condition of the travel text. However, as will be argued, the 
evaluation or verification of such claims are generically requisite neither for the 
composition nor the reception of the travel text as such. Quite on the contrary and like 
all attestations the travel text is structured on the aporetic and paradoxical condition 
that it can always not say the "truth", that it can always lie, become a perjury and a 
fiction. 
Indeed, what happens when the attestation to a "truthful" event of travel takes 
the form of a narrative, of a structured work that furthermore pertains to a "literary 
genre" and conforms to conventions and rules of composition? And still this is saying 
the least for, as has been suggested so far, writing about an experience of travel does 
not simply amount to representing or shaping in narrative and communicable form the 
contents or the raw and hard facts of experience as lived by the traveller. Although 
representation, which we previously discussed under the aegis of mimesis, is presumed 
to be a constitutive function of the travel text, to the extent that it is organised around 
the theme of presence (a fully present subject intending a present thing or situation that 
is re-presented in turn in the travel text), it cannot help reducing or totalising in order to 
make available what precisely is not: otherness. Experience is not something 
previously constituted and meaningful in itself that is later simply brought to writing; it 
is already a kind of writing. It bears a structure of scriptability and repeatability or else 
a structure of overflowing that disseminates from the start the basis on which 
experience is generally thought: a fully present moment in which an event occurs and 
to which the traveller comes to attest. If the present of the experience of travel is 
always already divided by its essential repeatability, which necessarily disrupts its 
175 Campbell, pp. 2-3. 
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unity and uniqueness, then to what does the traveller "truthfully" testify? What is the 
value of travel as testimony? 
Undoubtedly, the question of veracity and adequacy of travel writing to the 
place or culture under description has been a major axiological criterion throughout the 
trajectory of this genre, one that also concerned the very status of the travel text as 
such. Travel writing has been a major source of information on foreign lands and an 
important agent for intercultural relations for millennia. Of course, as we have already 
seen, travel texts assumed different functions and purposes at different times, which 
also had a bearing on the question of adequacy and were largely determined by the 
expectations, conceptual and material needs of the home culture. For instance, the 
accounts of pilgrims established their validity on the grounds of their adequacy to the 
Scriptures rather than on the basis of private experience. The medieval books of 
wonders responded to the spiritual need for the circumscription of the boundaries of the 
Christian world as the geographical containment of God's providence. The 
epistemological requirements established from the Renaissance onwards and the 
demand for accurate information, especially in view of commercial exploitation and 
conquest, created a new ethos for travellers, put more pressure for exactness and at the 
same time raised more suspicion against travel books. The travel book was offered as a 
sort of evidence that only the traveller could provide from his/her unique experience 
and point of view but at the same time had to be put to the test according to established 
criteria and already received and accepted knowledge. As private experience and 
scientific sophistication were increasingly recognised as the source of truth and 
knowledge, so were the principles of truth and error as the ultimate axiological criteria 
of travel books. As Charles L. Batten explains, the more popular did travel writing 
become, the more did its reputation suffer. 
We previously touched upon the generic exigencies and particularities of travel 
writing in the eighteenth century, a period that has been extensively studied and indeed 
provides a good case in point for the discussion of the factual and fictional elements in 
travel writing. Percy G. Adams in his Travellers and Travel Liars 1660-1800 attempts 
to establish the grounds for the distinction between real, imaginary and pseudo-travel 
writing. 176 The eighteenth century, Adams observes especially with regard to Britain, 
was "the age of gold for travellers, both real and imaginary. And as a result, it as the 
176 Adams, Percy G., Travelers and Travel Liars 1660-1800, New York, Dover Publications, 
Inc, 1980, first publ. 1962. 
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age of opportunity for travel lies. "177 Now, it would be difficult if not impossible to 
draw a line between what would count as erroneous information due to ignorance and 
lack of insightful observation and intentional lies. For Adams then, one would have to 
detect a suspicious motive behind inaccuracy and, actually, he produces a threefold 
typology of lies according to their dubious motivation: 1) vanity, 2) cupidity, 3) 
prejudice. By setting one traveller against another one could enable oneself to detect 
lies and also cases of plagiarism performed by the so-called "fireside travellers". 
Adams relates stories and legends nourished by travel books, for instance, about the 
giants of Patagonia or the Northwest passage, and attempts to measure their effect on 
the reading public and their reception by scientific communities and administrative 
authorities. Fantasy and, indeed, private ambition that triggered the sometimes 
immensely popular as well as deceptive "tall tales" of travellers fostered long lasting 
images and ideas of exotic lands, affected foreign policy, occasioned expeditions, 
found their way into cosmographies, atlases and even school books. The enormous 
input of information called for more control and rigid demarcation between what was 
regarded truthful and fictitious. The eighteenth century, according to Adams, was 
unique in the wholesale production of a variety of "fictitious travel literature, " which 
could be distinguished between the kind that "was designed to be believed" and "that 
other prolific variety of the period, the imaginary travel accounts, such as the fantastic, 
the utopian, the lunar literature, which were not intended to fool the general reader. "' 18 
Of course, the so-called pseudo-travel writing, the utopias, and imaginary voyages did 
not first occur in the eighteenth century. For Philip Babcock Gove the imaginary 
voyage, which he defines as a deviation from "truth", is inextricably woven with travel 
writing from its incipience: "Always there have been travellers who have lied, and 
always man has been interested in the far places where others have been. The 
combination sufficiently explains the simple elements constituting the basis of all 
imaginary voyages. "179 Neither scholar, however, is able to provide a criterion for the 
demarcation between imaginary and "real" travel writing. The question of the 
truthfulness of travel books no matter how competently it is scrutinised, no matter if 
this results in the exposure of hoaxes and lies, and, accordingly, to the reallocation of 
texts within generic subdivisions, it cannot provide the measure for the separation 
177 Ibid., p. 9. 
18 Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
179 Gove, Philip Babcock, The Imaginary Voyage in Prose Fiction, A History of Its Criticism 
and a Guide for Its Study, with an Annotated Check List of 215 Imaginary Voyages from 1700 
to 1800, London, The Holland Press, 1961, p. 13. 
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between the actual and the fictional at least in generic and structural terms. 
Circumstantial evidence or scholarly work may discard a travel text's claims to 
truthfulness or detect plagiarism but there is no such thing as a textual quality or 
property that could establish a generic boundary between what is held as actual and 
what as imaginary. As much as it is essential for the travel text to make a claim to truth, 
it is also essential and structurally requisite for it to be able to lie. Both possibilities 
must be there if travel writing is to attest to anything. 
It is essential that there is no structural difference between "imaginary" and 
"real" travel writing. The concern here for the study of this genre is its function as 
testimony and not an interest in the restoration of truth, which is at any rate a dubious 
and wilful task. One may ask to what precisely must the travel book be truthful and 
whether do not such claims imply that there is something like a measurable and 
calculable reality available to the traveller's gaze. When erroneous observation is 
attributed to prejudice does not this suggest that travel writing is fundamentally and 
inescapably false? The evaluation of travel writing along the principles of truth and 
error in the name and in the service of objective truth is a doubtful task and one that 
fails to effectively challenge the authority of the house. Hermeneutics teaches us that 
"prejudice" can also be a positive and enabling condition and one that in any case is 
impossible to do away with since it is constitutive of understanding. This however is 
neither to invalidate travel writing as necessarily prejudiced nor to level off every 
single claim that travel texts make. Even more subtle approaches than that of Adams, 
who tries somewhat crudely to separate truth from lie, which undertake a critique of the 
ideological fashioning of travel texts (a tradition that, as we have seen, is incorporated 
in the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur), to a large extent presuppose that something like 
truthful representation should be possible. These also imply that one should be able to 
designate such entities as the "house" and other cultures and circumscribe them in 
terms of identity and difference. Thinking in a deconstructive mode radically disrupts 
the assumptions that still underlie such notions like Oikos, difference, representation, 
mediation even in discourses that attempt to challenge them. Before one undertakes to 
test out the truth claims of travel texts and their value as testimonies one should first 
think through the notions and conceptual tools one is bound to put into effect. In other 
words, one should look into the essential conditions that allow for such a thing as a 
testimony to take place. And these do not depend on any rules of verification. A travel 
text retains its function of testifying as well as that of reference even if it pertains to the 
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imaginary or fictional travel literature in the conventional sense. In fact, as we shall 
see, every travel text bears the possibility of becoming literature or false testimony. '80 
Now, travel writing is admittedly inter-textual even more explicitly than other 
genres. One of its topoi is that a traveller directly refers to, quotes from, credits or 
discredits other travel texts. The travel text as testimony must occasion from a unique 
and irreplaceable position but at the same time it must not differ substantially from 
other travel narratives on the same place, if it is to be believable. This condition of 
verisimilitude became a generic convention that allowed for the enormous production 
of pseudo-travel books and was in many cases parodied. Mandeville 's Travels, a 
fourteenth century text that was considered a genuine travel book for centuries and was 
even a source book for Columbus, is exemplary for that matter. A travel text that is 
now known as fictional at the time of its production and for much longer still testified 
and was an acclaimed authority. Since Mandeville's credibility, as Campbell points 
out, "was founded neither in personal experience nor for the most part in the 
transmission of accurate facts, it must be a literary credibility, a sort of intertextual 
verisimilitude. "' 81 Imaginary travel writing, utopias and parodies such as Lucian's True 
History, Bacon's New Atlantis, Thomas More's Utopia, and Jonathan Swift's 
Gulliver's Travels not only share the same structure and form with "real" travel texts 
but, precisely because of this, they challenge and ridicule the latter's premises offering 
themselves as the best examples for the study of the genre. Lucian attacks the credulity 
of readers by admitting that his True History is more truthful in overly and overtly 
lying, Thomas More calls his hero "Raphael Hythlodaeus, " literally meaning "bringer 
of salvation through nonsense, " and Mandeville omits the conventional prefatory truth 
claim and by artfully mixing fact and fantasy and at the same time casting himself 
doubt to some of his descriptions creates "an imaginative freedom" for his readers and 
stimulates contemplation and sympathy. 182 In Jenny Mezciems' words, this sort of text 
challenges authoritative claims on the other and has a moral function in "showing that 
deception, at the level of art beyond that of the plain-speaking liar, may nevertheless be 
180 As Derrida points out, "a testimony can be false, that is, mistaken, without being false 
testimony -that is, without implicating perjury, lie, a deliberate intention to deceive. " Derrida, 
Jacques, Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, translated by Elisabeth Rottenberg, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 2000, first published as Demeure: Maurice Blanchot, Editions 
Galilee, 1998, p. 36. 
181 Campbell, p. 126. 
182 Ibid., p. 146. 
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used to undeceive. " 183 Whether the writer's aim is to attack deception and naivety, like 
Lucian, to promote humanistic ideals, like More, 184 and to induce faith and tolerance 
into a morally and spiritually impoverished and fallen world, like Mandeville, the 
foregrounded allegorical and ironical register of these narratives, which undo their 
constative mode and make this undoing their theme, bring out the general aporetic 
condition and inner discrepancy of travel writing. 
It is not, however, through their openly satiric and ironic mode that these texts, 
which hold an influential part in the tradition of travel writing, cast doubt on the latter's 
assumptions and claims. At a more fundamental level, travel emerges as an effect of 
the sedentary practice of writing, as the dream of Oikos, at the same time that Oikos is 
destroyed and reconstructed through travel as this ideal nonplace. Then the discourse of 
Oikos and thus of travel loses its ground and basis and re-emerges as an effect of the 
trajectory of (travel) writing, which hence cannot any longer be a sedentary practice but 
rather assumes the function of attesting to the condition voyageuse of every notion it 
involves and of language itself. Since the testimony of these texts has no definite or 
"real" content, since their central function is to disrupt their referential mode, what they 
essentially attest to is a secret promise: a secret longing, the dream of utopia, of the 
ideal "nonplace", to which there can be no path and no passage (a-poros) but still 
haunts travel texts and gives their impossible condition of possibility. "Utopia" may 
designate a place, a theme, become a title and a book, the object of desire, hope (as in 
Andre Gide's Back from the USSR) or nostalgia (as in Tristes Tropiques); it may 
receive everything, every enunciation, determination, function for it is not a proper 
place. It is neither a place of derivation nor of destination; it grounds nothing for it has 
no essence, no properties of its own, while bearing and suffering everything. Like 
183 Mezciems, Jenny, "' 'Tis not to divert the Reader': Moral and Literary Determinants in 
some Early Travel Narratives" in The Art of Travel, Essays on Travel Writing, edited by Philip 
Dodd, London, Frank Cass, 1982, p. 3. 
184 Thomas More makes use of familiar devices of travel writing in his Utopia (1516) such as 
prefatory claims to truthfulness, the modesty topos, detailed descriptions and information on the 
land of Utopia. Utopia takes the form of a testimony, that of Ralphael Hythlodaeus, an 
imaginary traveller who is, however, surrounded by real persons, More, Peter Giles and claims 
to have travelled with Vespucci. For the knowledgeable reader of the time, one who would be 
able to detect the ample use of puns in the Greek language, More's satiric attitude immediately 
comes to the fore. More, in view of criticising and deprecating what is to him the lamentable 
state of Western European civilisation, parodies travel narratives and their aptitude for the 
grotesque and marvellous: "But as for monsters, because they be no news, of them we were 
nothing inquisitive. For nothing is more easy to be found than be barking Scyllas, ravening 
Celaenos, and Laestrygons, devourers of people, and suchlike great and incredible monsters. 
But to find citizens ruled by good and wholesome laws, that is an exceedingly rare and hard 
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khöra. Or literature. Yet it is still what promises more meaning, what opens up the 
space of inscription, what awaits for the unpronounced arrival of the other. Utopia is 
the condition of travel, its nonplace of origin and impossible destination. Utopia as an 
ideal place either of the past or of the future, which is none other than the past or future 
of Oikos, a past which never was present, a future that will have always already 
happened, is a theme that more or less runs through travel writing. The promise of 
travel, what puts it in motion, however, need not have a concrete content. U-topia or A- 
topia as the condition of travel and the promise of the other does not receive here an 
eschatological content announcing the coming of the other as fulfilment, that is, as 
modification of Oikos. Utopia or atopia here refers to the nonplace that Oikos always 
already "is" in order to receive the other -another whose identity no one can foretell or 
foreclose, the borderless non proper place that exceeds the law of the house and its 
rules of hospitality. If utopia is a promise without content yet, as Derrida reminds us, 
the event of a promise is significant in itself. A promise is not nothing. But let us leave 
it at that for the moment. 
We previously discussed the essentially allegorical function of travel writing 
that exceeds the implicit or explicit allegorical themes occurring in or generated by the 
travel text. We said that travel texts are caught within the fundamental discrepancy of 
their rhetorical mode and the irresolvable conflict between their constative and 
performative functions. It was maintained that this aberrant structure, or else radical 
literariness, destabilises not only the texts' pronouncements but also disrupts the 
representing and cognitive authority of the travel writer. Thus, in a more essential way 
than any challenge to a purported deviation from truth, deliberate or not, literary in the 
conventional sense or not, the allegorical function of travel writing brings forward its 
condition of fictionality, one that exceeds the division of fact and fiction stricto sensu. 
Fictionality here does not refer to a deviation from truth but it rather points to the 
impossibility of something such as "truth" to be ever told. This is a secret, and one 
often well guarded, behind the authoritative pronouncements of travel texts. 
Nevertheless, it is not a secret in the sense of a concealed, elusive or undecipherable 
content but the secret of there being no secret, no hidden source of meaning either 
profane or mystical, but that which is non phenomenal and non noumenal. The secret in 
this sense that Derrida delineates is heterogeneous to truth and to the vocabulary of 
veiling and unveiling. It is the trace, the remainder, what cannot be accounted for, what 
thing. " More, Thomas, Utopia, translated from the Latin by Ralph Robinson, with an 
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can be neither reduced to language nor be separated from it. A travel writer assumes 
the task of giving an account of a place, a culture, in other words, of making it 
available to his/her readers. 
"But who", Derrida asks, " would ever determine the proper extent of a thematization 
so as to judge it finally adequate? And is there any worse violence than that which consists in 
calling for the response, demanding that one give an account of everything, and preferably 
thematically? ""' 
Travel writing, by definition a discourse on the other, on the phenomenal and 
infinitely secret other, would find its exemplarity in fiction, there where there is respect 
for the secret: "There is in literature, in the exemplary secret of literature, a chance of 
saying everything without touching upon the secret. "' 86 There is a chance in literature 
of saying everything without pretending to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth, of testifying without producing knowledge, without reducing the other to 
forms and norms of cognition. And this chance that literature is is already remarked in 
every text as the possibility of its becoming literature. In this way, there is a chance in 
every travel text of its becoming a fiction or, by common standards, a lie and a perjury. 
We will now have the chance to turn once more to the question of the generic 
definition of travel writing this time in view of readdressing the constitutive division 
between fact and fiction with regard to its testimonial condition and function. Travel 
writing is largely designated as an autobiographical discourse to the extent that it is 
occasioned by and based upon a private experience. 187 It is in this sense that it is 
qualified and authorised to function as a testimony, to have a claim on the reality that is 
called upon to give an account of. One testifies from the singular, unique and 
irreplaceable position of one's experience, which one is summoned up to render public. 
Furthermore, in order to testify, one must have a certain competence, one must 
conform to the norms of attestation. One must appear before and appeal to a law, to a 
system of reference and validation; one must enter into a relation with what demands 
that a story is told and, moreover, that it is told in compliance to a certain type of law, 
let us say, a textual and generic law. A travel text, as singular, unique and idiomatic as 
Introduction by Jenny Mezciens, London, Everyman's Library, 1992, p. 20. 
185 Derrida, Jacques, "Passions: "An Oblique Offering" " translated by Davis Wood in On the 
Name, edited by Thomas Dutoit, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 25. 
186 Ibid., p. 29. 
187 This condition does not preclude the event of massive displacement. Undoubtedly, one has to 
be attentive to historical circumstance and to the particularities of each experience of travel and 
be careful not to collapse, for instance, the bourgeois traveller with the refugee and the 
immigrant. One cannot deny, however, the singular and private character of each experience as 
well as its phenomenological and biographical motif. In the next chapter we will have the 
chance of reflecting upon what "travelling" and "travelling with" might signify. 
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it must be, in order to be recognised as such it must also be an example of travel 
writing. But what is an example an example of? And if, as was argued so far, there is 
no generic essence or definition of travel writing, what is a travel text an example of? 
It was suggested in the beginning of the chapter that our current sense of travel 
writing has emerged out of the multiple instantiations/examples and functions of texts 
concerned with the theme or the experience of travel. Even if one were able to subtract 
the properties that would bring forward the essence of this genre, one would hardly 
come across a text that would totally realise and fulfil all the possibilities of what travel 
writing should purportedly be. In other words, no such thing as the example of travel 
writing exists, while there are only examples of travel writing. As Derrida maintains, 
"the exemplarity of the example is clearly never the exemplarity of the example. "188 
This is to say that, while travel texts as performative acts that bear an irreplaceable 
signature, are dated, and refer to particular places and events (whence their function of 
attestation), are singular and unique, as an example must be, their exemplarity 
essentially consists of their structural ability to overflow their particular reference and 
be infinitely repeated and iterated in other contexts. An example, as Derrida points out, 
is at once singular and universalizable. 189 It does not exhaust its exemplarity in itself 
but maintains it on the paradoxical condition that its irreplaceability is replaceable, 
repeatable at another instant, by another text and testimony. A travel narrative attests to 
the singularity of an event or experience of travel. However, a travel narrative is also a 
writing, by definition repeatable or else always already a repeatability. This is its 
condition of readability, what confers upon it its ideal character and what gives rise to 
the notion of "travel writing". This condition that at once enables and disrupts 
testimonial function does not solely pertain to writing in the conventional sense. It 
structures -"but with a fracture"- experience itself, that is to say, it divides the instant 
of the occurrence of the event in and of itself already inflicting it with the possibility of 
fiction. This is what we called the radical inter-textuality of travel and not simply the 
inter-textual constitution of travel writing. 
The essential possibility of any (travel) text to be repeated and assume 
different functions and statuses in different contexts is already marked within it as its 
iterability. The actual or fictional status it may assume then does not belong to it as 
generic or stable property but is rather fixed each time by a categorical authority, i. e., a 
188 Derrida, "Passions", pp. 17-18. 
189 Derrida, Demeure, p. 41. 
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literary institution, before which it is summoned up according to a movement of 
"framing" and "referential ity"190. In order for genres to exist there must be a certain 
principle or trait that grants them a certain identity and that circumscribes them as such. 
There must be a certain generic law that establishes and regulates generic boundaries. 
Yet, Derrida asks, 
"What if there were, lodged within the heart of the law itself, a law of impurity or a 
principle of contamination? And suppose the condition for the possibility of the law were the a 
priori of a counter-law, an axiom of impossibility that would confound its sense, order and 
reason? " 191 
Every text participates in one or more genres -there is no genreless text- and 
this necessarily means that there should be a distinctive and identifiable trait that would 
precisely allow for such and such text to participate in such and such genre. One must 
note that what is referred to here is the possibility of participation and not strictly of 
belonging. This is to say, that if a text can be placed under different generic headings 
then it must bear a trait that need not be a thematic or explicit element of the text, that 
need not essentially belong to a particular genre, but that would nonetheless allow for 
this "overflowing". This is the open structure and law of textuality, or else the re- 
marking trait that does not present itself in the text, that does not essentially belong to it 
or to any of the genres the text participates in as a specific and distinctive property, 
though it is not simply heterogeneous to them. In the same way that a definition must 
not belong to the defined object yet without being of a totally different order, "genre 
designations cannot be simply part of the corpus. " The designation of the novel is not 
novelistic neither is that of poetry poetical and so on. That generic designations are not 
part of the texts they nominate signifies that no taxonomy can ever be closed, for texts 
have no stable identities. However, this is also what allows for taxonomies in the first 
place. The trait of participation is the condition that enables at once inclusion and 
exclusion, the gathering of a corpus and its overflowing. Derrida calls it the genre- 
clause signifying both the institutional act and the condition of forming a genre and at 
the same time a "closing that excludes itself from what it includes", from the class of 
texts it brings together since it does not essentially belong to it. This is the lacy of 
190 Texts are assigned a certain frame, i. e., generic and contextual determinations, and a certain 
reference in any of their instantiations that also ascribe them a particular function and status. 
This takes effect according to what is called by Derrida the movement of framing and 
referentiality, i. e., a possibility already inscribed in the text as its trait of re-markability, which 
constitutes the general law of textuality. 
19' Derrida, Jacques, The Law of Genre", translated by Avital Ronell in acts of Literature, 
edited by Derek Attridge, London, Routledge, 1992, first published as "La loi du genre" in 
1980, p. 225. 
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impurity, the counter-law within the heart of the law of genre that from the moment of 
its incipience signals the beginning of degenerescence. 192 So what is called generic law 
is nothing present in the texts it, nonetheless, brings together nor is it anything outside 
them but becomes thinkable on the paradoxical condition of the counter-law of the 
general and limitless field of textuality. The law is a universality that is nothing out of 
singularity. In effect, if a text is commanded by or appeals to a generic law, this is 
possible on the condition that it can always disobey it and be read otherwise. A text, 
literature in general, is on the condition that it can always be read as other than itself 
for it has no self-identity, no eternal essence. In this sense, "literature is not. " It is not 
itself. Therefore, in its instituted sense literature is already a fiction. 
Generic norms, even the most enduring ones, do not foreclose the immanent 
possibility of any text to be read eventually as literature: 
"The possibility is always there. This does not constitute a text ipso facto as 
`literature', even though such a possibility, always left open and therefore eternally remarkable, 
situates perhaps in every text the possibility of its becoming literature. "193 
It must be clear that what was just said does not address simply a probability 
but the necessary condition for the constitution of "what we call art, poetry or 
literature. " If it is possible, however, to eventually read any text as literature, who and 
what decides when this possibility takes effect? Who decides and according to what 
criteria whether a text is literary or not? 194 
A text in order to establish the law of its singularity must always appeal to "a 
more powerful system of laws" that would guarantee and legitimate it. This is the set of 
social conventions and its guardians, the author, publisher, critics, translators, lawyers, 
librarians, academics, archivists and so on. 195 So what would establish a text as 
literature would not be an essentially literary property -"there is no such thing as a 
literary essence"- but an extraneous yet not simply heterogeneous principle, which 
192 Ibid., pp. 230-231. 
193 Ibid., p. 229. 
'`'' Derrida enumerates a set of axioms or "axiomatic trivialities" that conventionally enable and 
safeguard the singularity of texts. In this case he refers to Franz Kafka's "Before the Law": 1. 
This text must have its own identity and unity 2. It must have an author, a signatory 3. It must 
have a narrative form in which events are being related 4. It must have a title to name and 
guarantee its unity and identity. Derrida, Jacques, "Before the Law", translated by Avital Ronell 
and Christine Roulston in Acts of Literature, pp. 184-188. This system of framing. however, as 
Derrida points out, became established between the late seventeenth and early nineteenth 
centuries in Europe. In other cultures or in previous times the ownership of works would be 
guaranteed by different institutions and conventions. But texts would anyway appeal to a sort of 
law or authority. In other words, independently of the institutions they appealed to, they 
manifested the structure of being-before-the-law. 
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would enact a possibility already inherent and re-markable within the text, the 
possibility of its becoming literature. And again, on the basis of which criteria would a 
text be considered literary, if there are always "fictions, allegories, myths, symbols, or 
parables that are not specifically literary"? "Surely one could not speak of `literariness' 
as a belonging to literature, " understood as a pure and closed domain. 196 Literariness is 
not simply a quality proper to literature in the conventional sense. It is the general 
condition of the field of textuality and here we have to be alert to the difference 
between "the law that literature can be" that infinitely exceeds "the law to which 
literature submits. "'9' In other words, literature as instituted fiction is circumscribed 
according to established criteria that determine each time whether a singular 
performance pertains to it or not. However, the possibility of literature is something 
that already haunts every text as its condition of iteration without assured and 
foreclosed destination. Each textual performance is summoned up by a generic law 
which assigns it a frame or boundary and a reference. But this law never appears as 
such in the text -it "manifests" itself in withdrawal- although the latter constitutes itself 
according to a structure of being-for-the-law and before-the-law. Texts bear a structure 
of referentiality allowing them to overflow, to be in excess of and thus disrupt in 
advance particular reference. 198 This is what grants their readability and unreadability 
at once in the sense that no text can assemble its semantic and referential potential in 
any of its actualisations or readings and that this incapacity or "defect" is precisely 
what allows it to signify in an infinite number of contexts and be read otherwise. 
195 Ibid., p. 214. 
196 Ibid., p. 215. 
197 Ibid., p. 216. 
198 Ibid., p. 191. Derrida considers two literary texts that refer to their own mode and law of 
production: Maurice Blanchot's The Madness of the Day" and Franz Kafka's "Before the 
Law". It was mentioned before that the distinctive trait of the genre, in the Derridean sense, 
need not be thematically or explicitly exposed. However, here we have two texts that take issue 
with their own law of coming to being and its essential unreadability and unaccountability. In 
the "Madness of the Day" the representatives of the law demand that a story is told. This is the 
only way for them to exercise their authority, to be recognised for what they stand for. 
However, a story is precisely what is denied in this text and in the "recit" included in it. What is 
given to them is an impossible narrative about the impossibility of narrative. In this way the 
"narrative" that forms part of the text and brings to light the law of impurity of the genre of 
"story" becomes at the same time more general and exemplary than "The Madness of the Day", 
an "internal pocket" larger than the whole. This impossible encounter or relation with the law 
(for the law is not seen), which is engendered by the author -for the law is nothing outside the 
text- forbids him to ever tell a story again. There is no place from which to tell a story, no 
definite origin, no singular or proper position but only on the condition of their overflowing, 
that is to sa\. on the condition of their dissemination and divisibility. "A recit? No, no recit, 
never again. " This rccit as an example of counter-law becomes a "counter-example" for the 
rech as a ww hole. 
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Let us now turn back to the testimonial condition of travel writing. We said 
that travel writing is structured around a truth claim to an actual experience of travel. 
We also argued that travel texts, like any text, bear within themselves a trait that 
already remarks the possibility of their becoming fiction or else, in terms of their 
testimonial function, a perjury. It is not implied here that travel writing does not testify. 
Travel texts (like all texts in a certain sense) by definition have an autobiographical 
function and thus also emerge from and point to a historical situation. However, since 
their truth value is not an inherent property, it must necessarily appeal, like literature, to 
a system of conventions and beliefs. Testimony and literature -and this is their 
common condition- do not have an essence of their own but only functions. And the 
function they each time assume depends "on a precarious juridical status. "199 In strictly 
juridical contexts, for instance, a testimony is admissible when it is submitted by a sane 
and credible witness in person, who pledges him/herself to offer a truthful and adequate 
account of events that occurred in his/her presence. In Austin's terms, a testimony 
should be performative of the type of oath or promise to tell the truth, a commitment 
and engagement to be truthful, uttered in the first person and met by all the necessary 
conditions and conventions that constitute a "serious speech act. " However, what 
remains unrecognised and inadmissible even and especially in the "happiest" instances 
of such acts is, as Derrida elaborates, that "there is no testimony that does not 
structurally imply in itself the possibility of fiction, dissimulation, lie, and perjury -that 
is to say, the possibility of literature". 200 Even if this possibility is never realised, it is 
always there. 
A testimony is a narrative that relates real events in view of giving a full 
account of the "truth, " of "what really" happened. A reliable testimony is necessarily 
offered at a present and must testify to a present, that is, to the present of an experience 
that confers upon it unity and gathers it in itself. Thus, "for testimony there must be the 
instant. "'01 The temporal condition of testimony is a present, indivisible moment to 
which, let us say, the traveller comes to attest. The narrative form of testimony, 
however, also involves temporal sequences, for instance, sentences, which moreover in 
order to have a meaning must be repeatable and reproducible. This repeatability 
introduces difference and divisibility to the very structure of testimony. It "carries the 
199 Derrida, "Passions", p. 28. 
200 Derrida, Demeure, p. 29. 
201 Ibid., p. 33. 
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instant outside of itself. "20' Regardless of whether a testimony is false or true, its 
condition of possibility remains the same. The linguistic structure that engenders and 
infinitely divides testimony leaves open "for better and for worse" the possibility of 
literature. It interrupts the instant revealing fiction's and testimony's common source. 
This interruption is the "proper" place of literature and that which the testimony 
"properly" attests to. For testimony, according to Derrida, essentially attests to its 
impossibility of ever being adequate to itself; it primarily attests to a fact of language. 
Travel writers often evoke a writing on the spot in order to make a claim to 
immediacy, authenticity and spontaneous expression, a validating factor that is also 
crystallised into a generic determination. Of course, if travel writing, mostly from the 
nineteenth century onwards, is a kind of impressionistic writing, this somehow 
paradoxically qualifies it as a discourse that is both based on the experience of a 
present -a unifying principle- and on fragmentation, 
203 that can take the form of an 
episodic or loosely structured account. This style of writing Wendelin Guentner calls 
the "rhetoric of spontaneity" precisely in view of underlining that the impression of 
immediacy and thus authenticity and veracity is often the effect of a thought through 
form, of a conscious choice on the author's part and of generic convention. 204 
Discontinuity hence does not necessarily appear adverse to adequacy, as a matter of 
fact, it can prove to have quite the contrary effect. However, on the level of experience 
and of truthful attestation instantaneity is the only thinkable and acceptable form. What 
we are here interested in, however, is a discontinuity within the experience of travel 
itself, which exceeds stylistics and inflicts its core with fictionality. This has to do with 
the division of the instant and hence with a sort of interval or else spacing that 
introduces difference within the unity of the present. 
202 Ibid. 
203 See Dennis Porter's Haunted Journeys, Desire and Transgression in European Travel 
Writing, and Wendelin Guentner's Esquisses Litteraires: Rhetorique du Spontane et Recit de 
i'oyage au XIXe Siecle, Saint-Genouph, Librairie Nizet, 1997. 
204 Wendelin Guentner explores the aesthetic of the fragment and what he calls "esthetique de 
I'esquisse" with regard to French travel literature in the nineteenth century. He considers travel 
writing an exemplary genre for the examination of the romantic aesthetic in literature, an 
aesthetic that also pertained to the arts in general and painting in particular, that came to 
challenge classical poetics and its taste for decorum and for the idea of the "finished" work. The 
genre of travel writing, according to Guentner, offered to nineteenth century authors a 
discursive space in which they could test out the technique of spontaneous writing. He argues 
that travel writing, more particularly than other genres, is characterised by a tension that is 
found in literary texts in general, that between a drive towards the fragmentary and a drive 
towards totality. He wants to show that travel writing contributed significantly to the fostering 
of the modern conception of art. 
219 
What is referred to here is not an anachrony or a temporal distance between the 
act of writing and experience, which is deemed as an invalidating factor, but rather to 
an anachrony within experience itself, an "anachronistic simultaneity" that prevents the 
present of experience from gathering in itself, from coinciding with itself. Beyond the 
condition of iterability of writing stricto sensu, there is, at a more fundamental level, 
what could be called the iterability and divisibility of the event, the structure of 
eventuality qua writing in a generalised sense. And it is in this disjointed or interrupted 
present where the event, testimony, literature, language have their common origin. In 
this sense, an event never fully occurs, never entirely takes place, for what makes it 
possible are the signifying structures (an event must have a meaning) which already 
carry it along a graphematic drift that divides in and of itself everything involved with 
experience: the intending subject, the intended object, the context, the event. The 
notion of iterability enables us to think the singularity and the concept of the event, 
particularity and generality, chance and necessity together by virtue of its identificatory 
and altering effects. 
An event in the course of travel must, of course, be unique, irreplaceable and 
singular. No one can experience what someone else experiences in someone else's 
place. Even if there is more than one witnesses to the same event, each witness presents 
a singular point of view, s/he must speak from a unique place, from a place only s/he is 
entitled to attest. But this is not enough. In order to have a claim to truth, a witness has 
also to assert that the testimony would remain the same, that it would be repeated 
inalterably, if anyone else happened to be and speak in his/her place. A witness must 
say: "I was there. This is what I saw and heard. I am telling the truth and if you were in 
my place you would say exactly the same thing. " The exemplarity of the "instant" of 
testimony that makes it an "instance" lies in the fact that "it is singular, like any 
exemplarity, singular and universal, singular and universalisable. The singular must be 
universalisable; this is the testimonial condition"; it must be replaceable and 
irreplaceable at the same time, a replaceable irreplaceability. 205 A testimony must be 
thus "infinitely secret" and idiomatic, for its essence "cannot necessarily be reduced to 
narration, that is, to descriptive, informatively relations, to knowledge or to 
narrative"106 without a nonaccountable remainder and also "infinitely public", that is, 
repeatable, iterable and readable for and by a limitless number of subjects. From his/her 
singular position thus a witness/traveller "invents" the norms of his/her attestation and 
205 Derrida, Demeure. p. 41. 
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at the same time s/he has to comply with specific sets of conventions and juridico- 
political institutions. 
The traveller testifies to his/her being exposed to an unaccountable otherness 
and to the extent that s/he is able to do so, since it is no longer a matter of knowledge or 
imparting information, s/he essentially testifies to the miraculous: 
"Any testimony testifies in essence to the miraculous and the extraordinary from the 
moment it must, by definition appeal to an act of faith beyond any proof. When one testifies, 
even on the subject of the most ordinary and the most "normal" event, one asks the other to 
believe one at one's word as if it were a matter of miracle. Where it shares its condition with 
literary fiction, testimoniality belongs a priori to the order of the miraculous. "207 
This is also the condition shared by the so-called "real", fictional, and pseudo- 
travel writing. Belief -and also fear- is what has allowed for the popularity of 
travellers' tall tales and for the attraction to the wondrous, marvellous and monstrous 
that we are now in position to rationalise and smile about but which in truth testify to 
an essential condition of travel writing. 
We are now going to touch upon a story about the marvellous, a recit de 
voyage to an impossible place and also upon an impossible recit de voyage to the same 
place. 
In 1936 Andre Gide paid a visit to the USSR about which he wrote an account 
with the title Retour de l'UR. S. S (Back from the USSR)208 followed by Retouches Ä 
mon "Retour de Z'U. R. S. S. " (Afterthoughts, A Sequel to Back from the USSR). 209 In 
1990 with the occasion of his travel to Moscow Jacques Derrida wrote a text entitled 
Back from Moscow, in the USSR. 210 Gide's text opens up with a commitment and a 
promise: the promise of a "promised land", of a utopia. Derrida's text begins with an 
impossible promise: the promise of a recit about Gide's promised land. 
This is how Gide embarks on his journey to and on his recit about USSR: 
"Qui dira ce que I'U. R. S. S. a ete pour nous? Plus qu'une patrie d'election: un example, 
un guide. Ce que nous revions, que nous osions ä peine esperer mais ä quoi tendaient nos 
`206 Ibid., p. 38. 
207 Ibid., p. 75. 
208 Gide, Andre, Retour de 1'U. R. SS, in Souvenirs et Voyages, edition presentee, etablie et 
annotee par Pierre Masson, avec la collaboration de Daniel Durosay et Martine Sagaert, 
Editions Gallimard, 2001, first published by Editions Gallimard, 1936. 
209 Gide, Andre, Retouches .4 mon " Retour de 1'UR. S. S. ", in Souvenirs et 1 rages, 
first 
published in 1937. 
2'0 Derrida, Jacques, Moscou aller-retour, Suivi d'un entretien avec N. . -l vtonomova, 
l'. 
Podoroga, M. Rvklin, Saint-Etienne, editions de I'aube, 1995. 
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volontes, nos forces, avait eu lieu lä-bas. Il etait donc une terre oü l'utopie etait en passe de 
devenir realite. "21 
This is a utopia, however, in "process of becoming reality", "in labour" and "in 
the making"; it is a promise that could always not be fulfilled but, without which 
neither the journey to nor the return from the USSR would have been possible. The 
promise that the USSR came to embody for Gide and for many left wing intellectuals 
of his time was "the parturition of the future" of humanity. 212 At the time Derrida 
writes, when perestroika was in full swing and the USSR was already collapsing, the 
possibility of this sort of travel texts, which he brings together under a heading, which 
takes on Gide's "exemplary" title, "Retours de l'URSS", is exhausted. This "type of 
works" that also include texts such as, for instance, Walter Benjamin's Moscow Diary 
and the journal of Etiemble's visit to USSR, which Derrida also discusses, pertains to a 
closed historical sequence that begun in 1917 and that had recently ended. This corpus 
primarily consists of political testimonies to this "unique" historical sequence and 
forms part of what is called recit de voyage, that is, a type of discourse that exemplarily 
relates literary form to history. 213 This is why it offers itself as fertile ground for the 
exploration of the relation between singularity and generality, autobiography and 
fiction, literature and referentiality, and of exemplarity in general. Nonetheless, Derrida 
wants to avoid the establishment of direct analogy between what he calls "returns from 
the USSR" and the texts that one would be inclined to draw comparisons with, like 
pilgrimages, utopias and so on. His aim is to isolate the singular traits of this corpus 
also in view of taking the measure of a fact that henceforth impedes, that has destroyed 
in its root the possibility of such narratives. Derrida asks: Why would one write a recit 
de voyage on the USSR at that particular time he himself writes, if not to take into 
account and give an account of the cataclysmic events that shook the whole world, to 
reflect on the annulled possibility of "returns from the USSR", if not to say something 
new about the subject in a narrative that would be otherwise confined to a private 
journal of which the singular instance would bear no essential relation to the world's 
21Gide, Retour de I'U. R. S. S., p. 751. 
212 "L'U. R. S. S. est `en construction', il importe de se le redire sans cesse. Et de Iä I'exceptionnel 
interet d'un sejour sur cette immense terre en gesine: il semble qu'on y assiste ä la parturition du 
futur. " Ibid., p. 750. 
213 "Il me semble bien qu'il n'y ait pas d'autre exemple, dans I'histoire de la culture humaine, de 
type d'oeuvres qui, comme ces Retours de I'URSS entre octobre 1917 et avant-hier, se lient ä 
une sequence unique et finie, irreversible et non repetable d'une histoire politique; et se lient ä 
cette sequence dans cela meme qui soude le fond ä la forme, la semantique ou la thematique ä la 
structure du recit de voyage ou du temoignage autobiographique. " Derrida, . 
1loscou aller- 
retour, p. 18. 
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political history ? ''4 This question can be raised to a central problematic with regard to 
travel writing: in terms and in the name of what sort of travel, expedition, or 
pilgrimage, of what kind of journey and return (tour et retour) is a traveller (touriste) 
prepared to avow? 215 To what sort of goals, concerns and tasks is a traveller committed 
and what sort of story does s/he want to relate and to whom? 216 The traveller is called 
upon to respond from his/her unique position to a complexity of issues that bear on 
historical and political circumstance, private situation, the literary institutions and 
generic law s/he is summoned up before. The question must remain pressing and open: 
what would constitute responsible writing? At least, a historically responsible writing, 
since we are dealing with texts that explicitly have a claim to representation? 
Historical reference and private experience, fiction and testimony, singularity 
and universality, promise and utopia, expectation and disillusionment are some of the 
general themes and functions that traverse and operate in these texts imposing the 
infinite task of their contextualisation and formalisation. 21 The corpus of "returns from 
the USSR, " more explicitly than other travel texts, utopias and pilgrimages, is 
characterised by a disruption of the "natural" order of travel as the displacement from a 
place of origin to a place of destination. In Gide's case, displacement signifies from the 
start a return home, to a "patrie d'election". Moreover, this chosen home is a singular 
and exemplary place, unique in its becoming universal. The USSR incarnates the 
promise of the future, both history and utopia in the making and a universal quest and 
cause. His is thus a journey to a culture in transition, the experience of an experiment, a 
testimony to a process with unforeseeable future. What differentiates such texts from 
"traditional" pilgrimages and utopias is a sort of secular reverence pointing to a 
214 Ibid., p. 20. 
215 Ibid., p. 57. 
216 Gide expresses uneasiness in view of his return to Paris. He knows that a travel account is 
expected of him and, moreover, an account that would express concrete views and respond to 
the expectations or reservations of people at home with regard to the USSR. But this sort of 
reductions and general isations make him extremely uncomfortable for they would do disservice 
both to the USSR and to the cause it stands for; they would be the calculated result of an 
irresponsible position: "Et dejä commencait ä m'etreindre une angoisse encore inconnue: de 
retour ä Paris que saurais-je dire? Comment repondre aux questions que je pressentais? L'on 
attendait de moi certainement des jugements tout d'une piece. Comment expliquer que, tour ä 
tour, en U. R. S. S., j'avais eu (moralement) si chaud, et si froid? En declarant ä nouveau mon 
amour allais-je devoir cacher mes reserves et mentir en approuvant tout? Non: je sens trop qu'en 
agissant ainsi je desservirais ä la fois I'U. R. S. S. meme et la cause qu'elle represente ä nos yeux. 
Mais ce serais une tres grave erreur d'attacher I'une ä l'autre trop etroitement de sorte que la 
cause puisse eire tenue pour responsible de ce qu'en U. R. S. S. nous deplorons. " Gide, Retour de 
1'U. R. S. S., p. 785. 
217 Derrida, Moscou aller-retour, p. 96. 
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provisional situation pregnant with future and uncertainty and not to events that 
occurred in illo tempore. 
The main body of Gide's text is preceded by a Greek myth that recounts 
Demeter's godly project and experiment to raise a child she immensely loves to a 
superhuman and divine status by secretly putting it through a painful ordeal. The 
project is called off by the mortal intervention of his mother, who, terrified by its 
apparent cruelty, "in order to save the child, loses the God". The exergue opens up a 
mythical space for the inscription of everything that follows. It thus becomes a sort of 
receptacle for a traveller's tale, for a visionary's quest, for the ideal of a future society. 
At the same time it brings forward the possibility of the end of the myth and the 
beginning of history that would also, nevertheless, signify the end or telos of history 
through the parturition of an absolute place or utopia that would henceforth be the 
prototype of all places, the embodiment of an international cause, a home that would 
put an end to all travels: 
"L'espace nouveau dans lequel s'avance le Retour de l'URSS est un champ mythique 
(anhistorique, in illo tempore) et eschatologique (mosaique ou messianique) dans la mesure 
meme oü il reste ä venir, comme la terre promise et le future d'une patrie d'election. Mythe, 
religion, pelerinage, esperance, mais aussi fin du mythe et origine (promise, voire en cours) de 
l'histoire meme. Ce qui repond, direz-vous, ä la structure meme du messianisme (et certains 
texts de Benjamin, comme Zur Kritic der Gewalt, pourraient correspondre au meme schema : 
destruction du mythe (grec) pour accoucher de l'histoire ä travers une revolution messianico- 
marxiste). Ce qui -au depart, je dis bien au depart -inspire ä Gide `amour' et `admiration pour 
I'URSS', c'est une "experience sans precedents" et par lä-meme la singularite d'un lieu 
determine, assigne par l'avenir d'une promesse. Autrement dit, comme tous ceux qui font alors 
cet aller-retour, Gide ne quitte pas son pays, il ne part pas de chez lui pour 1'URSS comme on 
irait ä I'etranger, dann un pays lointain ou excentrique, pour ensuite revenir chez soi et donner 
des nouvelles de `lä-bas'. Non, Gide va chez lui, son voyage, faller de son voyage est dejä un 
retour (back home) vers ce qui devrait eire un `chez soi' ou mieux vers un lieu, 1'URSS, qui est 
`plus qu'une election: un exemple, un guide' (p. 18/15). Le `lä-bas' est l'avenir de I' 'ici' absolu 
vers lequel se tend se voyage. , 218 
The traveller is driven by hope to a place to come, a utopia in the making, 
through a movement that both destroys and promises Oikos. However, Oikos, the 
desired place or patrie d'election, is nothing present in itself but rather a process, the 
event of a promise. Oikos is announced in a mythical space as an absolute nonplace, to 
which the traveller never stops returning and never succeeds in arriving at. In moving 
towards he moves backwards and through this drifting between nonplaces (France, the 
home that is no longer and USSR, the home that is not yet) the sense of Oikos 
reemerges and is constantly restructured. Although Gide is disillusioned by the course 
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of the revolution in the USSR, he still dwells upon the promise of the place to come. 
This movement in-between places, in truth all that abides, that cuts across the "returns 
from the USSR, '" signals both the impossibility and the necessity of return. 219 Gide 
admits having read too many travel books before going to the USSR, which had 
perhaps raised too much expectation in him. 220 So returning from afar (the USSR) is 
nothing in comparison to the place of disillusionment (utopia/nonplace) he had to 
return from or, what amounts to the same, stop returning to. 221 A drama is played out 
throughout the whole movement, theme and structure of the text. Through the 
singularity (and exemplarity) of this "impossible experience" -impossible in the sense 
that it never takes place in a here and now, for the place is in transition and time (and 
history) has yet to begin- perhaps we can have a glimpse of the conditions of possibility 
and, to be sure, of impossibility of travel writing in general with regard to its 
testimonial function. 
We have argued before that travel writing is a discourse that is par excellence 
organised around a phenomenological motif. This is to say that the experience of travel 
is based upon "the proximity of a present", upon the intuition of a present thing and 
situation. To have a claim to re-presentation the traveller presupposes that what s/he 
comes across phenomenalises itself in its essence and, moreover, that this 
phenomenality is accessible to him/her, even when the traveller does not speak the 
language of the visited culture, as was the case with Gide and Benjamin. 222 Walter 
Benjamin after his return from Moscow wrote a letter to Martin Buber with regard to 
the essay he was in process of writing. This is how he describes the way he is coming 
218 Ibid., pp. 63-64. 
219 "Mais, autant que le plus lumineux, ce que je pouvais voir ici de plus sombre, tout 
m'attachait, et doulouresement parfois, ä cette terre, ä ces peoples unis, ä ce climat nouveau qui 
favorisait l'avenir et ob l'inespere pouvait eclore... C'est tout cela que je devais quitter. " Gide, 
Retour de l'UR. S. S., p. 785. 
220 "J'avais, depuis trois ans trop macere dans les ecrits marxistes, pour me trouver, en U. R. S. S. 
tres depayse. J'avais, d'autre part, trop lu de recits de voyages, de descriptions enthousiastes, 
d'apologies. Mon grand tort etait de trop croire aux louanges. " Gide, Retouches, mon " Retour 
de l'U. R. S. S. ", p. 831. 
221 Particularly in French, as Derrida explains, "retour" can be charged with connotations 
deriving from its uses in the phrases: "ne pas en revenir, " which means "amazed", astonished, 
and "en revenir, " which signifies "losing one's faith", disillusionment, "enduring the cruelty of 
a deception": "Et le moment oü I'on `en revient' est ici d'autant plus grave qu'on 'revient de 
loin', comme dit une troisisieme expression francaise, et qu'on revient d'un moment et d'un lieu 
ob l'on n'en finissait pas de `ne pas en revenir'. Au fond, c'est peut-etre la trajectoire de la 
plupart de ces 'retours de Moscou en URSS' : on y va pret ä expliquer, au retour, aux amis et 
sympathisants, pourquoi et comment on n'en est pas revenu tant c'est admirable. puis on en 
revient et il faut 'retoucher' et dire ä quel point il a bien fallu en revenir en revenant de loin. " 
Derrida, Moscou aller-retour, pp. 44-45. 
222 Derrida, Moscou aller-retour, p. 54. 
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about his subject, "Moscow". The passage is quoted from Gershom Scholen's preface 
to the Moscow Diary: 
"My presentation will be devoid of all theory. In this fashion I hope to succeed in 
allowing the creatural to speak für itself inasmuch as I have succeeded in seizing and rendering 
this very new and disorienting language that echoes loudly through the resounding mask of an 
environment that has been totally transformed. I want to write a description of Moscow at the 
present moment in which 'all factuality is already theory' and which would thereby refrain 
from any deductive abstraction, from any prognostication, and even within certain limits from 
any judgement -all of which, I am absolutely convinced, cannot be formulated in this case on 
the basis of spiritual `data' but only on the basis of economic facts of which few people even in 
Russia, have a sufficiently broad grasp. Moscow as it appears at the present reveals a full range 
of possibilities in schematic form: above all, the possibility that the Revolution might fail or 
succeed. In either case, something unforeseeable will result and its picture will be far different 
from any programmatic sketch one might draw of the future. The outlines of this are at present 
brutally and distinctly visible among the people and their environment. 11223 (my emphasis) 
Bearing witness to a "totally transformed environment", echoing a "very new 
and disorienting language" of a politico-economic-social revolution imbuing and 
restructuring all things, would amount to no more than the description of the present 
moment. The traveller withdraws to let "the creatural speak for itself. " All he needs to 
do is to attentively observe. There is no need for judgement and interpretation since "all 
factuality is already theory". Derrida calls this attitude of the voyageur-voyeur 
"phenomenologico-marxist". Both motifs lay claim to the lucid intuition of presence, to 
seeing and foreseeing the thing itself, that is, a socio-economic fact, beyond 
speculation, interpretation, ideology, etc., that this exceptional and unique present in 
Moscow makes possible. 224 However, this present moment consists of "a range of 
possibilities" that one should neither prognosticate nor predetermine by submitting 
them to a teleological program. Then what is given to intuition in the form of the 
present is a promise, an anticipation that breaches and inflicts experience, and thus the 
225 discourse that is based upon it, with indeterminateness within its very heart. 
It is not, however, simply the particularity of an "exemplary" culture allegedly 
in the process of realising the future of humanity that makes of the present a transient 
and breached moment. "Returns from the USSR" could also give the measure for the 
impossibility of all recits de voyage to render the experience of the other measurable 
and accountable. The encounter with otherness (another culture, language, or another 
person), that to which or to whom one opens oneself up, receives, visits and intends to, 
can never happen in a transparent and self-gathering present. The encounter with 
223 Benjamin, Walter, Moscow Diary, edited by Gary Smith, translated by Richard Sieburth, 
preface by Gershom Scholem, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 6-7. 
224 Derrida, Aloscou aller-retour, pp. 78-79. 
225 Ibid., p. 82. 
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otherness, if such a thing is possible, that defines the experience of travel is not of an 
apocalyptic type. The other, if it is to remain or respected as other, that is, if 
assimilation, appropriation and reduction to sameness are to be resisted, must also 
remain infinitely secret. The secret of the other, however, is not something well 
guarded and hidden waiting to be discovered. Secrecy in the experience of travel does 
not point to a concealed and more authentic meaning, something like the spirit or the 
heart of the place that the perceptive traveller could grasp or penetrate. The secret here 
is not a determinable hidden content but what evades consciousness as such, what 
resists reduction and totalisation or else, the disruptive remainder that disallows full 
thematisation and production of knowledge and certainty about the other. If the other is 
to be respected, it/s/he must remain elusive. However, this does not mean that the 
question of the other, as we shall see in the next chapter, is to be set aside, that it calls 
for no response and thus discharges one of all responsibility. Everything happens and is 
awaited and promised through this impossible encounter or else through the infinite 
encounter with the other. Since the phenomenological motif of travel writing and its 
essentially aporetic character precisely precludes the availability of and adequacy to a 
fully present moment, since at the moment one turns one's gaze upon the other one also 
blinds oneself to it, especially if one claims the opposite, travel writing is essentially 
turned towards the future of a place to come, of a promised land, of another arrival. 
However, not in a messianic sense: the promise of the other must not receive a definite 
or teleological content. It is an open structure, the space of a promise which must fail in 
order to succeed, for ever promising without delivering. An infinite task of travel, an 
enduring encounter (and sometimes conflict, to be sure) without resolution. 
Writing on these "returns" and on the question of travel Derrida "succeeds in 
failing" to produce an account of his trip to Moscow. His text both thematically and 
structurally drifts along the movement and rhythm of the promise of an impossible 
rech. At various instances in the text this (im)possibility is re-marked: "Ce que je 
voudrais vous propose sous ce faux-titre, sera-ce une sorte de recit? " (15), "Phesite 
encore ä proposer un recit de voyage... " (16), "Je me demande si j'ai quelque chose ä 
dire qui merite d'etre lu ou entendu" (22), "peut-etre la forme ne m'en est-elle pas 
encore accessible" (22), "si j'arrivais ä raconter mon proper voyage... "(49), je 
pourrais, si j'y etait pret, enchainer ici avec mon proper `recit de voyage' et dire ä mon 
tour [... ] mais je ne suis pas prei ä commencer un tel recit, ni meme ä decider si et 
comment je le ferait" (61), "c'est ma perplexite ä ce sujet qui me paralyse au moment 
de parler de coon voyage ä Moscou" (72). "j'hesiterais toujours a ecrire de moil voyage 
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A Moscou" (93), etc. In the preamble to this text Derrida points to at least three reasons 
why he would hesitate to produce an account of his journey to Moscow. The first two 
concern the "risks" involved with every "reasoned" travel account (tout recit de voyage 
raisonne): 1) selectivity 2) rationalisation. The first necessarily involves a process of 
filtering and screening what is considered most important and worthwhile and thus 
signals the beginning of censure. The second one in the service of intelligibility 
imposes apres coup an order even where there is none, often resulting in an 
overinterpretation. 226 A third reason for hesitating is related to the particularity of this 
type of texts that form the corpus of the Retours de 1'URSS, which his account would 
necessarily follow up and of which the possibility had been recently exhausted. If he 
were to write a travel account about Moscow and, moreover, a historically responsible 
account in the wake of a new era, he would be facing another immense challenge: 
Gide, Etiemble and Benjamin were travelling to an exemplary place, to which the 
intellectuals of the time had set their eyes on filled with expectations for the future of 
humanity, for which USSR appeared to offer at the time a new opportunity. At the time 
of Perestroika, however, the situation is reversed and at least in the dominant Western 
discourse, shared by many travel writers, it is a matter of how and to what extent is the 
process of democratisation successful in the former Soviet Union and in the East in 
general, assuming that Western democracy is something already realised and self- 
proven. 227 This discourse, as well as its aversive one, Derrida wants "at all costs" to 
avoid. Yet, what is one to do? Should one be paralysed in the face of such difficulties? 
Not at all. A travel account may be what is denied to us here but what is given is more 
than an account, for it raises the question of possibility and impossibility of such 
accounts. It seeks to reinscribe travel writing with regard to both reading and writing 
onto the space of a promise made in the name of the-other-to-come, of future readings 
and writings and of the necessary failure to account for, allocate and speak of/for the 
other from predetermined, authorised positions. This, of course, cannot amount to a 
prescription or a program of what a responsible writing should be. These issues must be 
raised again and again always in regard to the singularity of each text, its history and 
formal structure but also to the conditions that leave it open and infinitely re-markable. 
Derrida's text ends with an open promise and anticipation: "si j'ecrivais un jour... ", a 
promise, however, that would only succeed in failing, as it does. A recit? A recit de 
voyage? No, no recit. Never again. 
2o Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
227 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
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Part HI 
Chapter IV 
Colonialism, Hospitality, Ethics and Travel 
A stage has now been reached in the deliberation of our focal themes, namely, 
travel, writing and metaphor, that allows us to consider some of their crucial implications 
with regard to the discourses of/on colonialism, ethics and hospitality and their relevance 
to recent and current historical configurations. The discussion was centred on the polar 
couple of Oikos and travel, the systematic and semantic structures that make it possible and 
constitute the historical a priori for the emergence of senses of home and away. These 
semantic structures move along a drive to appropriation or totalisation, which enables 
authoritative and colonising notions of the house, and a drive to ex-appropriation, which a 
priori and from within disrupts such reductions or metaphorisations. This is to say that 
totalised notions of the house or Oikos, of which, as will be argued, a high point and severe 
historical manifestation has been colonialism, can be challenged by the deconstructive 
critique of their conceptual premises that brings out internal antinomies and discrepancies. 
It will be argued that the self-subversive mode of emergence of senses of Oikos and travel, 
which forbids closure and already interrupts the notions of origin and telos, which exceeds 
while making possible the restricted economy or law-of-the-house, also makes possible and 
thinkable a radical sense of hospitality, that is, of an unconditional opening and welcoming 
towards the other. The question of the other, which is essentially an ethical one, can thus be 
posed de nouveau. It will be maintained that this is the only chance for an ethics of travel. 
The first two chapters attempted to investigate the signifying structures of the 
notions of "metaphor" and "travel". In the third chapter this discussion was extended to 
consider the general conditions of the travel narrative connected to their historical 
manifestations and realizations. Systematic and historical considerations are not of a totally 
different order. To explore signifying structures is neither to reduce or essentialise nor to 
foreground a structural centre that could account for any transformation and historical 
substantiation. Systematic and historical considerations are neither adverse nor mutually 
exclusive approaches and do not exhibit a relation of derivation or causality either way. 
To explore the historical conditions and delimitations of travel is to look into 
historical structures or what can be called its historical a priori. This is to say that, while 
acknowledging the contextual determinations and the particularities of instances of travel 
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and travel writing, we must simultaneously pay attention to the structures that make them 
possible and allow these notions and practices to have both a meaning and a history. There 
is no attempt here to delimit two separate or synthesisable processes, but rather to reflect 
upon the movement of signification that is nothing outside history and outside which, 
moreover, history would not appear at all. Sameness (sense) and difference (history) arise 
from a nonoriginary movement or differance, that is, a difference that is structurally 
"older" than the polar couple of identity and difference. The reference here is to general 
conditions of signification, to the general condition of "historicity" as the essential 
possibility of sense to be endlessly repeated in infinite number of contexts and thus 
engender more meaning and more reference. This general condition or structural law is 
neither present nor presentable and becomes thinkable only through its instantiations; it 
gives a chance to think of a generality which is nothing outside singularity and, inversely, 
of a singularity that is unthinkable outside generality. 
Rather than positing an ideal or transcendental sense of travel before, beyond and 
at the origin of all travels, we are referring to a quasi-ahistorical condition that is, 
however, neither a primum signatum nor a regulatory idea, an Idea in the Kantian sense 
(infinitely removed, always inadequate to itself and unrealisable as such), but arises instead 
from its empirical inscriptions, in which it is never gathered or present as such. Still, we do 
have a general sense of travel, however vague, even if or precisely because each person 
may also have a particular sense of travel. Even in highly determined situations, one 
presupposes a generalising sense of travel. Far from suggesting here a principle of 
relativity, we are referring to the movement of idealization, to the emergence of 
unconditionality (transcendental meaning) out of conditionality (historical and empirical 
designation). As Derrida sustains, unconditionality and conditionality are heterogeneous, 
irreducible to one another but also indissociable. 1 
Travel, along with all its related themes, has dramatically changed in the course of 
the twentieth century, which has witnessed the phenomenon of "massive" displacements 
on an unprecedented scale and the deployment of high technology in transportation and 
telecommunication. Nowadays, one is able to travel and be constantly in contact with 
home, something which considerably alters one's experience of travel. Insofar as travel is 
essentially the opening of the house towards what lies beyond it, one can only begin to 
imagine the infinite possibilities and implications that are realised and brought about, for 
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instance, by the internet and the accelerated deployment of electronic means in 
communication in general for the formation of the spaces of both Oikos and travel. Many 
would argue, of course, that sitting in front of a PC is a sedentary practice that only enables 
a virtual encounter with the other. This makes recourse to the primarily phenomenological 
motif of travel, which presupposes the intuition of something or someone available in 
person in a given present to the traveller's gaze. However, as we saw, the critique of the 
notion of the phenomenological present and its reinscription as trace manifest that the 
experience of travel already bears an element of virtuality and indeterminacy. 
Obviously, telecommunication and travelling are two separate things although they 
mutually condition one another. They both employ technology with the purpose of 
overcoming distance and of making the encounter with the other possible. Moreover, they 
are implicated in a more essential way. The electronic reproducibility of the voice, the 
image, and writing rests upon a structural possibility of meaning to be repeated, iterated, 
hence, reproduced essentially by detaching itself from its initial context of emergence or 
inscription. Now, travel writing - the form of letters or postcards is the most evident 
example- already bears the possibility of communicating at/from distance. It necessarily 
brings news from afar. Iterability and reproducibility then are common conditions for 
technology and travel. The question of technology becomes all the more pertinent today for 
obvious reasons entailing a restructuring of the space of home and travel. If the space of 
home is also constituted by the phone line, the fax, the email and the internet then it has no 
absolute control of its interior, which is intercepted by its exterior. Interior and exterior are 
confounded. But this also resonates and calls upon the deconstructable relation of what was 
posited as Oikos (interiority, familiality, familiarity) and travel (exteriority, foreignness). 
This problematic grafts itself de nouveau in the age of high technology. One would have to 
go back to the aporetic condition of Oikos and travel, to what allows for the space of home 
to be constructed and thus deconstructed, in order to draw implications for what is 
happening today. This is to say that in order to think what we consider "matters of 
urgency, " we must do so also with regard to the traditional notion of the house and its 
aporetic condition. 
For Derrida the ancient question of the foreigner (which is indissociable from that 
of travel) as it is formulated in the Apology of Socrates or in Sophocles' Oedipus at 
Colonus both lingers on and is restructured by techno-political-scientific mutation: 
Derrida, Jacques, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, translated by Mark Dooley and Michael 
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"Today, and on that basis, let us broach the meaning of etranger, this time from the `Greek 
world' (to presuppose provisionally its unity or self-identity), but always doing our best, since it isn't an easy thing, to multiply the two-way journeys, a to-and-fro between matters of urgency that 
assail us at this end-of-millennium, and the tradition from which we receive the concepts, the 
vocabulary, the axioms that are elementary and presumed natural or untouchable. It is often techno- 
political-scientific mutation that obliges us to deconstruct; really, such mutation itself deconstructs 
what are claimed as these naturally obvious things or these untouchable axioms. "2 
It has to be emphasised that in insisting on generality, that is, on the signifying 
conditions of travel and travel writing, we are not proposing a reductive explication. Far 
from it, we are hoping to raise an awareness of and promote the critical necessity of the 
notions and conceptual presuppositions that are always involved with any attempt to 
analyse and historically locate experiences of travel and intercultural contact. Every such 
experience is singular, even when we are dealing with phenomena of "massive" 
displacement, and must be always situated and examined within its particular context. If, 
however, one believes one knows what "home" and "travel" mean without pausing to think 
these notions through, then one would take for granted kernel and established senses, the 
contextualisation of which would not amount to more than semantic derivations and 
modifications. Even in critiques that put forward hybridity, difference, discontinuity as the 
constitutive forces of culture and intercultural relations and challenge monistic and 
hierarchical conceptualisations, there is always the danger of compromising critical rigour 
due to the failure of reconsidering not solely historical circumstance but also conditions of 
signification in general. For instance, to merely challenge Edward Said's formulations in 
Orientalism as ahistorical, homogenising and highly hierarchical, without scrutinising the 
conditions that have allowed for the binary thinking of West/Orient, comes short of 
drawing significant implications and continues to presuppose such distinctions, if only to at 
all costs overturn them. The world has recently witnessed the revival of such thinking and 
rhetoric (West Vs East) and its devastating effects. These issues will be addressed both 
with regard to the way they are dealt by post-colonial criticism and are implicated in travel 
writing. 
It is the contention here that a radical thinking of travel relations and colonialism 
would have to bring attention to their structural conditions of emergence. This thesis 
attempts to respond to this need, which is why the focus is shifted from particular examples 
of travel writing to a reconsideration of its signifying structures. It is true that one cannot 
think of travel writing outside particular examples but this is precisely the point here, to 
show that singularity is made possible and traversed by repetitive structures that give rise 
Hughes, with a preface by Simon Critchley and Richard Kearney, London, Routledge, 2001, p. 44. 
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to exemplarity or generality. One cannot think the one without the other and, moreover, in 
order to think them together, exactly because of their simultaneous and irreducible 
emergence and reoccurrence, one must have first paid heed to the conditions that forbid a 
singular event to be considered on its own terms without addressing its structure of 
overflowing, what we have called the structure of eventuality. 
One has to remember that uniqueness is not unicity. To challenge unistic or 
monadic formulations is to think in a deconstructive mode, which does not consist of a 
critique from a predetermined and stable standpoint. It has to be pointed out that the notion 
of dissemination is neither at odds with singularity nor with generality; it is the thought of 
the eternal reinscription or re-markability upon the body of irreplaceable singularity, a re- 
markability, moreover, which is unthinkable outside its singular instances. It divides and 
folds the singular instant (as well as itself) back upon itself while infinitely unfolding 
it(self): "For it is in the form of the unique, precisely, and not of the plural, as it was too 
often believed, that a thought of dissemination formerly introduced itself as a folding 
thought of the fold -and as a folded thought of the fold. "3 
If we were to overthrow binary and hierarchical, that is, metaphysical thinking, 
aphorisms would certainly not be enough. One must meticulously expose the way this 
permeates and lurks behind singular texts and attitudes in general. In other words, one must 
stay within metaphysics. Oikos and travel are, to be sure, indissociable from one another. 
But this does not entail that they cannot be thought in a way that exceeds their delimitation 
as oppositional counterparts. What is at stake is a reinscription of the metaphysical notion 
of travel and its displacement from the restricted economy and periphery of the house. The 
house, however, can never be disengaged from any notion of travel, for at the moment it 
ceases to be posited as its origin, it already returns as a phantom haunting travel. 4 
2 Derrida, Jacques, Of Hospitality, Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond, 
translated by Rachel Bowlby, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000, p. 45. 
Derrida, Jacques, The Monolingualism of the Other or The Prosthesis of Origin, translated by 
Patrick Mensah, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 26. 
Along the course of travel the sense of Oikos in the form of memory, anticipation, expectation, fear 
and hope never ceases to hauntingly return. Oikos, thereby, reemerges as its own phantom, never 
quite present, never quite absent, an elusive, "inapparent apparition, " an "invisible visibility". In the 
movement of iteration/idealization the house becomes a ghost that phenomenalises itself, that takes 
various shapes and forms along the way. But the house, which is nothing before travel, that is, 
before an encounter with otherness that can also be oneself as another, is never secure in its interior. 
It already haunts itself in the sense that it is never quite itself, never quite there as/for its own 
evidence. This is what is called the "phenomenological fold, " the essential disjunction of anything 
manifesting itself or signifying fully. "The most familiar becomes the most disquieting. The 
economic or egological home of the oikos, the nearby, the familiar, the domestic, or even the 
national (heimlich) frightens itself It feels itself occupied, in the proper secret (Geheimnis) of its 
inside, by what is most strange, distant, threatening. " Derrida, Jacques, Specters of Marx, The State 
of the Debt, The Work of Mourning, and The New International, translated by Peggy Kamuf, with 
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The displacement of the house and its re-emergence as an effect of iteration 
allowed for the reinscription of travel as writing. Travel as writing is neither to be 
confused with nor disengaged from the narrow sense of travel writing. It was claimed that 
the latter is inscribed and given shape within the general structures of the former. Travel 
narrative necessarily takes shape through the totalisation of what it relates, through the 
reduction of the multiplying forces and possibilities that constitute it (either historical, 
rhetorical, generic, autobiographical and so on) as a homogenised ensemble. Travel as 
writing is what forbids the closure of the "book of travel", what suspends the end and 
completion of travelling and makes travel writing impossible as a finished project. 
To travel, to write and read about travel is always a singular and unique 
performance or testimony. A testimony, however, is not simply reducible to private 
experience or contextual determination but must be always structurally capable of 
overflowing itself towards a new event of meaning and reference. To the extent that it is 
singular and irreplaceable, it is also infinitely secret and to the extent that it is 
communicable, it also complies with general rules, which allow it to be rendered public. It 
always balances itself between invention and conformity. Insofar as a testimony is secret it 
must appeal to trust and belief. This is the common condition of all travellers' tales, high or 
not, miraculous or ordinary, which is not simply shaken and overcome by the 
establishment and refinement of means of observation and techno-science. A testimony 
about the (cultural) other, however, cannot and should not claim adequacy to what it relates 
as truthful representation. Because the other is not apocalyptic, because it is not 
phenomenalisable in its entirety, because it does not easily give itself to thematisation 
without a remainder or surplus of meaning, it is infinitely secret. Travel writing as the- 
promise-of-the-other-to-come must pledge itself to secrecy, to a promise of u-topia as that 
nonplace, that is, as the groundless ground that prepares for the event of the arrival of the 
other without foreclosure or calculation. It is in this sense that travel writing bears the 
possibility of an opening up and of hospitality towards the event, to an unaccountable 
surprise. 
an introduction by Bernd Magnus and Stephen Cullenberg, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 144-145. 
Oikos and travel, dwelling and travelling, haunt each other in a way that forbids their separate 
occurrence. The difference between inhabit and haunt becomes here more ungraspable than ever. " 
Ibid., p. 158. What appears as a frightful condition, however, is what dives the chance for the 
opening of the house, for the hospitable welcoming of the other and of itself as other. It is what 
gives place to the house and what promises the event of the coming of the other; it is the condition 
of heritage, urgency and imminence, what is called by Derrida the messianic, and the atheological 
structural a priori of all messianisms. 
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Probing into the metaphysics of travel and its hermeneutic exigencies allowed us to 
formalise always to an extent the structural law-of-the-house, from which all conditional 
laws (of houses, nations, states and so forth) emanate and attest to. The deconstructive 
challenge to the restricted eco-nomy of the house allowed us to formalise a counter-law, a 
law before the law, that both enables and intercepts any law and any sense of legitimacy, 
regulatory space and rightful belonging. This counter-law emerges then as the condition of 
all laws, which in turn become instances or inscriptions of a radical pervertability but also 
of a promise. They testify, yet always inadequately, to an unconditionality, to a structure of 
overflowing any particular instance or condition, that lets everything signify on the 
condition of its self-erasure. 
In order, moreover, to get a better grasp of this (counter-)law, we have to consider 
it on the level of its most pervasive and acutely felt historical implications. It was claimed 
that the metaphysical coupling of Oikos/travel prioritises the former over the latter,. which 
is deemed derivative and secondary. This is to say that in Western metaphysics nearness 
has always been hierarchically favoured in disjunction to distance. Oikos here is not simply 
a geographical entity; it involves all semantic and discursive structures and configurations 
that make up, senses of closed spaces of familiarity and proximity, which are by 
consequence separated from distant and alien ones. Oikos thus has everything to do with 
the notions and practices of ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism, of which it-names here the 
structural and historical a priori. From a European perspective, assuming there is a 
relatively unified one, the structures of Oikos and travel can be said to correspond to those 
of the West and its Others. In spite of the risks and objections that such divisions raise with 
regard to the oversimplification and generalisation they necessarily entail, one cannot push 
them aside and discredit them as obsolete and inaccurate but must rather consider what 
allowed them to operate -and they still do on many levels- and be effective in the first 
place. Post-colonial theory that was more systematically established as a disciplinary and 
politically combative field during the last decades, critically and polemically discusses the 
profound and pervasive effects of such divisions from the colonial subject's point of view 
and has gone a long way in challenging essentialising and oppositional conceptualisations 
of the metropolitan and the colonial. But it is necessarily articulated in that discursive 
space opened up by such divisions as the West and the Orient, which it continues to 
presuppose, even if it proves them inadequate. 
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Edward W. Said's Orientalism5, which was published in 1978, was the first 
attempt to address the phenomenon of colonialism on a conceptual and discursive level in a 
systematic way and inaugurated post-colonial theory as an academic field. 6 Orientalism, in 
spite of the controversy, objections and criticism it has provoked, is indisputably a 
milestone book. Said defines Orientalism as "a style of thought based upon an ontological 
and epistemological distinction made between `the Orient' and (most of the time) `the 
Occident. ", 7 In this "style" of thought "the relationship between Occident and Orient is a 
relationship of power, domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony, "8 which 
Said proposes to review drawing on Michel Foucault's model of discourse analysis of 
cultural formations at the intersection of power and knowledge. 9 For Said, Orientalism 
manifests an "internal consistency" and has the "self-containing, self-reinforcing character 
of a closed system"10 constituted by a will-to-power over the Orient. It is, therefore, a 
coherent and analysable subject matter. In his analysis of the discursive "surfaces" of 
various types of texts (philosophical, literary, administrative, travel writing and others) on 
the Orient, he distances himself from Foucauldian "archaeology" by stressing "the 
determining imprint of individual writers upon the otherwise anonymous collective body of 
texts constituting a discursive formation like Oriental ism. "11 The orientalist's Orient may 
arise as a mixture of "private fantasy", personal experience and received knowledge, which 
gradually became fossilised, schematic and abstract. This accounts for Orientalism's 
"textual attitude", which Said illustrates with reference to the travel book: 
5 Said, Edward, Orientalism, Western Conceptions of the Orient, reprinted with a new Afterword, 
London, Penguin Books, 1995. The separate discussion of Orientalism here serves the purposes of 
the chapter to the extent that it is a good case in point for the exploration of the conceptual 
dichotomy between West and Orient and its discursive articulation. Although it is not plausible to 
detach a single work from a thinker's oeuvre and examine it on its own terms, the particularity of 
Orientalism, which has had a "destiny" of its own with regard to post-colonial studies to a great 
extent independently of Said's later work, allows for its separate consideration. 
"[Said] demonstrated that the habitual practices, and full range of effects of colonialism on the 
colonized territories and their peoples, could be analysed conceptually and discursively, and it was 
this that created the academic field of post-colonialism and enabled such a range of subsequent 
theoretical and historical work. " Young, Robert J. C. Postcolonialism, An Historical Introduction, 
pxford, Blackwell, 2001, p. 18 
Said, Orientalism, p. 2. $ Ibid., p. 5. 
"Therefore, Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by 
culture, scholarship, or institutions. nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; 
nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious `Western' imperialist plot to hold down the 
`Oriental' world. It is rather a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, 
economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic 
geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also 
of a whole series of 'interests' which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological 
reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates 
but also maintains; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some 
cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and 
%ovel) world" Ibid., p. 12. 
Ibid., p. 70. 
Ibid., p. 23. 
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"Travel books or guidebooks are about as `natural' a kind of text, as logical in their 
composition and in their use, as any book one can think of, precisely because of this human tendency to fall ba, k on the text when the uncertainties of travel in strange parts seem to threaten 
one's equanimity. " ' 
Textual authority fostered a tradition and an enduring "structure of attitudes" 
towards the Orient that can be systematically analysed, although individual input is not 
disclaimed. 13 Hence, Orientalism is understood as "a system of representations" and a sort 
of consensus. 14 Orientalist discourse on the whole is formed through the tension and 
convergence of what Said calls latent and manifest Orientalism, the former referring to 
doctrinal and scholarly discourses and the latter to descriptions of a present, modern, 
"manifest" Orient articulated by travellers, pilgrims, statesmen, and the like. " In other 
words, Orientalism, according to Said, involves a conflict between schematic authority and 
circumstantial evidence that is resolved in favour of the former through a process of 
appropriation by interpretation, nonetheless without, as one would assume in this context, 
self-reflection and renovation: "The relation between Orientalist and Orient was essentially 
hermeneutical [... ] Yet the Orientalist remained outside the Orient, which, however much 
it was made to appear intelligible, remained beyond the Occident. "16 
His study, Said admits, is of a primarily descriptive and initiatory character, 
lacking the dimension or proposition of something alternative to Orientalism. " However, 
his main orientation is towards a libertarian, nonrepressive, humanistic perspective that 
would also favour dialogue and direct encounter. In his afterword of the 1995 edition he 
writes: "I would repeat that this was very much a procedure of crossing, rather than 
maintaining, barriers; I believe Orientalism as a book shows it, especially when I speak of 
12 Ibid., p. 93. 13 Said at some point recapitulates the principal dogmas of Orientalism: "one is the absolute and 
systematic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the 
Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior. Another dogma is that abstractions about the 
Orient, particularly those based on texts representing a `classical' Oriental civilization, are always 
preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. A third dogma is that the Orient 
is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself; therefore it is assumed that a highly generalized 
and systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and 
even scientifically `objective'. A fourth dogma is that the Orient is at bottom something either to be 
feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by 
pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible). " Ibid., pp 300-301. 4 "Certain things, certain types of statements, certain types of work have seemed for the Orientalist 
correct. He has built his work and research upon them, and they in turn have pressed hard upon new 
writers and scholars. Orientalism can thus be regarded as a manner of regularized (or Orientalized) 
writing, vision, and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly 
suited to the Orient. The Orient is taught, researched, administered, and pronounced upon in certain 
ý, iscrete ways. " Ibid., p. 202. 
Ibid., pp. 222-223. 16 
17 
Ibid. 
"Perhaps the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary 
alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, 
or a nonrepressive and nonmanipulative, perspective. But then one would have to rethink the whole 
complex problem of knowledge and power. These are all tasks left embarrassingly incomplete in 
this study. " Ibid., p. 24. 
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humanistic study as seeking ideally to go beyond coercive limitations on thought towards a 
non-dominative and non-essentialistic type of learning. "'8 
Orientalism has raised a lot of controversy and criticism and, in this sense, it is one 
of the most productive and groundbreaking books of the last decades. We will attempt to 
sketch out the main objections to this particular work by Said. The central and most 
recurrent argument against Orientalism is that it is organised around a polar division 
between Occident and Orient, which is too schematic, abstract and generalising. 19 The 
result of this is the (re)production of a monolithic, essentialising, and homogenising mega- 
discourse, which collapses a wide variety of texts into a unified and continuous ensemble 
that spans millennia failing to historise adequately, paying no attention to particularities, 
contradictions and inconsistencies and leaving no room for counter-hegemonic reaction. 
Said has been accused of not taking into consideration prominent trends of Orientalism 
such as the German scholarly tradition towards the Orient, of sticking to a franglais (and 
American) mixture20 making unwarranted exclusions and favouring material that fit his 
argument. 21 Despite his own pronouncements, according to many scholars, Said fails to 
consider individual voices, which are subsumed by the uniform and univocal discourse of 
Orientalism, which levels instances of metropolitan dissonance and colonial insurgency. " 
18 Ibid., p. 337. 19 See, for instance, James Clifford's "On Orientalism" in The Predicament of Culture, Fred 
Dallmayr's "Exit from Orientalism" in Beyond Orientalism, Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter, 
New York, State University of New York, 1996, Dennis Porter's "Orientalism and its Problems" in 
Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, A Reader, edited and introduced by Patrick Williams 
and Laura Chrisman, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993 and Bernard Lewis' "The Question of 
Orientalism" in Islam and the West, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993. Lewis' criticism is 
particularly austere and intemperate and sometimes arguably beyond the limits of academic 
propriety but is still interesting to the extent that it constitutes an orientalist's response to the 
cJallenge of his conceptual premises. Z Young, p. 18. 21 It has been argued that one of these "conspicuous" exclusions is the case of Greece, which 
unsettles Said's hierarchical and oppositional equilibrium. Robert Shannan Peckham maintains: 
"Greece is ignored because it fails to fit in with a history that is defined solely in terms of colonial 
occupation of the Orient by the West, just as German Orientalism is dismissed because unlike 
British and French Orientalisms, it was not so directly enmeshed in colonial domination. [... ] 
Modern Greece is jettisoned from the argument precisely because it disturbs the notions and 
continuity upon which Said's diachronic reading of a European Greece rests. Greece unsettles the 
binary oppositions promoted in the book and exposes the inconsistency of Orientalism as a 
discourse that is characterized by its systematic nature and by a `knitted together strength' (Said 
1978,6). Christian Greece, however, as an indeterminate space between, calls into question many of 
the assumptions behind Orientalism, and disturbs Said's attempt to balance a genealogical 
conception of intellectual history, indebted to humanist scholars such as Erich Auerbach, with a 
Foucauldian concern for discourse and the discursive field. " Peckham, Robert Sharman, "The 
Exoticism of the Familiar and the Familiarity of the Exotic, Fin-de-Siecle Travellers to Greece" in 
Writes of Passage, Reading Travel Writing, edited by James Duncan and Derek Gregory, London, 
ýoutledge, 1999, p. 171. 
"Thus although Said claims that what interests him as a scholar is the detail and that he intends to 
be attentive to individual voices, virtually no counter-hegemonic voices are heard". Porter, pp. 152- 
153. Porter proposes an attentive reading of the "hybrid products of travel literature" in order to 
demonstrate the conflicting and self-subverting elements that characterize what are often assumed as 
strong cases of orientalist writing. 
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To this argument is also attached criticism of Orientalism's overtly textual attitude that is 
dehistoricizing, treats all texts as synchronic and not as historical documents providing 
evidence. This, according to Robert J. C. Young, compromises the notion of discourse by 
estranging it from material circumstance and constructs Orientalism as the transmission of 
the representation of an unchanging Orient from text to text. 23 Said, without disclaiming 
that there is such a thing as a real Orient ("it would be wrong to conclude that the Orient 
was essentially an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality"24), focuses on the 
value of representation as representation and not with regard to correctness or adequacy to 
actuality. On the one hand, he maintains that "Islam has been fundamentally 
misrepresented in the West" and, on the other, that such a thing as "truth" is inaccessible 
because it is itself a representation. 25 
However, as Peter Childs and Patrick Williams point out, critics may be producing 
themselves a monolithic Said, failing to grasp the complexity of his work. 26 It is indeed 
unfair to suggest that Said produces a homogenising discourse that designates Orientalism 
as an unchanging and ahistorical structure and pays no attention to cultural particularities 
and material circumstances. In this aspect, Said has been also criticised for a restricted and 
compromising deployment of Foucault's notion of discourse. 27 Obviously, Said does not 
engage with the whole range of Foucauldian notions and his alleged collusion with 
Foucault's strategies of discourse analysis in the immense production of works on 
colonialism that followed Orientalism often tends to make a disfiguring use of both 
Foucault and Said. For instance, Sara Mills' discussion of travel literature in Discourse of 
?' Young, p. 388. 4 Said, p. 5. zs Ibid., p. 272. 26 "Despite a certain received wisdom that Said portrays Orientalism as monolithic, one of the things 
which the book does is to demonstrate the complexity of forms of intellectual production subsumed 
under Orientalism, as well as the range of strategies involved in that subsuming -none of which 
easily equates with `monolithic' qualities. " Childs, Peter and Williams, Patrick, R. J., An 
Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory, London, Prentice Hall, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1997, p. 112. 
- James Clifford suggests that one should return to Foucault's "powerful discursive formations" 
rather than producing essentialising or organic descriptions of culture. Clifford, pp. 274-275. Robert 
Young maintains that Said to an extent distances himself from the Foucauldian concept of discourse 
and replaces it by that of representation, which is, moreover, affiliated to an essentialising idea of 
the Orient that is textually transmitted. He believes that many of the problems and contradictions of 
Orientalism and, subsequently, of post-colonial theory derived from this work would be resolved if 
they were educed more directly from Foucault's Archeology of Knwledge: "One problem is that 
commentators have consistently preferred to try to modify Said 
rather 
than retheorize colonial 
discourse from Foucault's original substantive treatment of the concept. " Young, p. 386. "The irony 
is that Foucault's own model of discourse in The Archeology of Knowledge could be said to answer 
many of the fundamental objections that are made against colonial discourse. His most sustained 
and searching analysis and formulation of the nature of a discourse, however, has never been 
seriously considered by postcolonial theorists. " Ibid., p. 394. 
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Difference, An Analysis of Women's Travel and Colonialism makes a very restrictive and 
reductive use of discursive formations. 28 
To the objection against the "univocal" and "essentialising" depiction of 
Orientalism one could counterargue that Said never claims that he is doing anything else 
but analysing Orientalism as a discourse with an enduring and systematic structure. 
Undoubtedly, one should be attentive to historical and conceptual differences and to 
cultural diversity with regard to the application of terms such as "colonialism", 
"imperialism", "post-colonialism" and so on. 29 That is to say, one must not fail to consider 
the local conditions and pragmatics of colonial situations. However, even Said's critics 
acknowledge -and how could one not do so since what is involved is at least centuries of 
colonial oppression or subjugation of the Orient by the West- that there must be a certain 
systematicity and conceptual affinity that holds together the various and multi-level forms 
of colonialism. Even post-colonial critics like Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, who challenge what is seen as a polar and unidirectional approach to colonial 
discourse and refine oppositional thinking, for instance, the division between the 
metropolitan and the colonial, through notions such as ambivalence, difference, hybridity 
and the subaltern, to some extent acknowledge and largely presuppose a sort of continuity 
and structural commonality throughout the multiple and diverse instances of colonialism. 30 
28 Mills, Sara, Discourses of Di fference, An Analysis of Women's Travel Writing and Colonialism, 
London, Routledge, 1991. Mills reads women's travel writing at the peak of British imperialism 
(1850-1930) as a textual surface where the discourses of colonialism and femininity meet and clash. 
The female subject is thus interpellated and structured by these two antagonistic discourses. Mills 
produces a highly technical and reductive explanation of specific travel texts deploying what is 
guably a restricted conception of Foucauldian discourse analysis. 
Robert Young outlines the difference between "imperialism" and "colonialism". According to 
him, "imperialism" has a more ideological function and can be analysed as a concept, while 
"colonialism" is more pragmatic and can be analysed primarily as a practice: "Here a basic 
difference emerges between an empire [empire is a term with wide use not necessarily signifying 
`imperialism'] that was bureaucratically controlled by a government from the center, and which was 
developed for ideological as well as financial reasons, a structure that can be called imperialism, and 
an empire that was developed for settlement by individual communities or for commercial purposes 
by a trading company, a structure that can be called colonial. Colonization was pragmatic and until 
the nineteenth century generally developed locally in a ha hazard way (for example, the occupation 
of islands in the West Indies), while imperialism was driven by ideology from the metropolitan 
center and concerned with the assertion and expansion of state power (for example, the French 
invasion of Algeria). " Young, p. 16. "Neocolonialism", on the other hand, "denotes a continuing 
economic hege-mony that means that the postcolonial state remains in a situation of dependence on 
its former masters, and that the former masters continue to act in a colonialist manner towards 
formerly colonized states. " Ibid., p. 45. "Postcolonialism" names "a theoretical and political position 
which embodies an active concept of intervention within such oppressive circumstances. " Ibid., p. 
5,7. 
'0 Homi Bhabha disapproves of such divisions like coloniser/colonised, metropolis/colony, 
latent/manifest Orientalism, which are widely used by Said. In his view, one should "think beyond 
narratives of originar and initial subjectivities" and focus instead on the articulation of cultural 
differences as the effect of "processes" rather than the result of confrontation between preiven 
entities. These articulations and processes arise from the "enunciative boundaries" or "cultural 
interstices" that confuse the borders between "home" and "world" and eradicate the "fixity and 
fetishism of identities". The "unhomely" thus becomes a "paradigmatic colonial and post-colonial 
condition". Bhabha, Homi, K., The Location of Culture, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 9. Bhabha 
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If it were not so, neither the concept of colonialism and all its related notions, nor the 
longevity of the juxtaposition and opposition of the West and the Orient would be 
meaningful or possible. Said to an extent presupposes a pregiven, confrontational relation 
between the West and the Orient, even if he designates them as primarily discursive 
entities, of which Orientalism is the structured and regulatory expression and in this sense 
he does not question how these came about and emerged in the first place. Otherwise put, 
he does not consider their conditions of possibility. However, one cannot, independently of 
whether one is reproducing or challenging bipolar couples, hope to overcome the 
disagrees with the use of concepts such as "cultural diversity" and "multiculturalism", which, for him, suggest the pre-existence of given cultural contents and sustain the liberal notions of cultural 
relativism and exchange based on "the separation of totalized cultures that live unsullied by the intertextuality of their historical locations". Ibid., p. 34. He proposes instead the term cultural difference, which signifies the process through which both the metropolitan and the colonial emerge 
as ambivalent situations. Ambivalence, stereotype, mimicry, difference and hybridity structure the 
colonial space as a split or Third Space, beyond binary oppositions, out of which cultural 
enunciations and representations are constituted in a contradictory and aberrant mode. Ibid., pp. 36- 39. In "Signs Taken for Wonders, Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree outside Delhi, May 1817" published in the same volume, Bhabha, both drawing on and criticising Derrida's "The Double Session", designates "hybridity" as the name of the displacement of value from symbol 
to sign. Accordingly, the revaluation of the symbol of national authority as the sign of colonial difference invalidates the opposition of two previously identified distinct cultures that could be 
resolved through cultural relativism. His criticism of Derrida rests upon the belief that "an inversion 
that would suggest that the originary is, really, only an `effect"' still maintains a prerequisite of depth or truth and the principle or recognition: "Hybridity has no such perspective of depth or truth 
to provide: it is not a third term that resolves the tension between two cultures, or the two scenes of 
the book, in a dialectical play of `recognition'. The displacement from symbol to sign creates a 
crisis for a concept of authority based on a system of recognition". Ibid., pp. 113-114. For Bhabha, 
"culture, as a colonial space of intervention and agonism, as the trace of the displacement of symbol 
to sign, can be transformed by the unpredictable and partial desire of hybridity. " Ibid., 115. Bhabha 
apparently misconstrues Derrida's phrase the "becoming-sign of the symbol", which signifies the disruption of both symbol and sign. If symbol is a totalising figure that purportedly maintains an 
affinity or essential relation to the natural object and its abstract idea, whereas, the sign breaks such 
relation by means of its arbitrary and unmotivated character, the transition from symbol to sign 
would presuppose the pre-existence of the former subsiding to the transformative force of the latter. 
For Derrida, however, both symbol and sign become possible through the totalising and aleatory 
effects of writing, which always already disrupt unity, even if they make it thinkable. It is rather 
Bhabha that in misreading Derrida compromises his notions of ambivalence and hybridity, since he 
assumes, in spite of himself, that something like symbolic authority pre-exists colonial and cultural 
difference. 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has been largely associated with her critique of the Subaltern 
Studies Group formed by Indian historiographers. The project of the latter is to retrieve subaltern 
consciousness or subjectivity through the reading of authoritative colonial narratives and official 
history, which tend to play down or silence Indian-peasantry as a historical agent and to overlook 
instances of insurgency. Spivak contends that the project of recovering the voice of the subaltern 
belongs to a post-Enlightenment and positivist tradition that posits consciousness as the ground that 
makes all disclosures possible. " Spivak, Gayatri, Chakravorty, The Spivak Reader, edited by Donna 
Landry and Gerald MacLean, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 211. For her, the subaltern cannot and 
"will probably never be recovered. " Ibid., p. 213. Instead of aiming at retrieving a positive and 
sovereign subject-position, which is up to then the arrogant privilege but also the conceptual 
accomplice of an elite, Spivak dismantles sovereign subjectivity as a metaleptic effect of an effect, 
that is, of what she calls the subaltern subject-effect, a multiplied and discontinuous positionality 
arising at the intersection of linguistic, imperial, class, racial, generic, etc., discourses, hence, never 
able to speak for itself as such. Ibid. 
Both Bhabha and Spivak have been criticised for their neglect of history and insurgency and for 
their widely post-structuralist and linguistic attitude. (See Childs, Peter and Williams, Patrick, R. J., 
An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory, p. 178). One, however, should bear in mind that exploring 
the enduring structures of colonialism and colonial relations, something that in this thesis is treated 
as a matter of urgency, by no means relegates the consideration of their particular manifestations to 
a secondary place but, on the contrary, seeks to effectively and critically examine them, also raising 
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difficulties these pose if one does not scrutinise their very formation. And for sure, one 
cannot simply do away with oppositional thinking, especially when one is driven by the 
desire to react and respond to such configurations. Without suggesting that the structures 
that hold together senses of the West and the Orient, or at a more generalised level of Oikos 
and away, are substantiated or reified, one must acknowledge their persistent re-emergence 
and think them through on the level of their condition of signification. So, in a fashion, the 
problem with Said is not that he overgeneralises but rather that he does not generalise 
enough, in the sense that he does not look into the general conditions of possibility of the 
notions and discursive formations he evokes and makes use of. The appropriative force of 
Oikos manifests its most crucial and aggressive instances within the concrete historical 
situations of colonialism. This is not to say that the significatory structures of Oikos are 
themselves ahistorical. Far from it, they both operate in and engender historical contexts 
but also overflow particular historical and colonial situations. In this way, Oikos and away 
can be said to constitute the structural and historical a priori of Eurocentrism. If one is to 
radically challenge oppositions of the type West Vs East, one should look back to the 
aberrant structures that both allow for and undermine from within the constitution of 
polarities and, thus, open onto another way of thinking hegemonic rule and counter- 
hegemonic (hence, equally heteronomic) action. The deconstruction of the metaphysical 
couple of proper and metaphor and that of Oikos and travel can prove very useful in that 
direction. 
Let us now proceed to two critiques of colonial travel writing, pertaining to the 
influential stream that follows up Foucault's discourse analysis and Said's oppositional 
formulations, in order to consider how post-colonial theory enables and is being used for 
the reading and re-examination of travel texts, as well as the limitations it often poses since 
it still operates along bipolar configurations and within the discursive and conceptual space 
opened up by the division of Europe and its others. 
Our discussion of travel writing was focused on the figures of metaphor and 
allegory and its value as testimony. Rhetorical analysis has been the focus of many 
theorists who approach this genre primarily from a post-colonial standpoint. These studies 
tend to produce classifications of tropes, which are intrinsically related to the discursive 
conjunctions of structures of power and knowledge, often rearticulating ready made 
categories and failing to call into question the legitimacy and the conceptual 
the question of how these and the violence they induced were ever possible, moreover, without 
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presuppositions of their theoretical gear. For instance, David Spurr's The Rhetoric of 
Empire, Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration 
explores colonial discourse as an ensemble of various and diverse "series" of discourses 
which are, however, analysed on the basis of a repertoire of twelve basic tropes emerging 
from the Western colonial experience, such as surveillance, appropriation, 
aesthelicization, classification, insubstantialisation, naturalization, resistance and so on. 31 
Spurr recognises that the rhetorical modes which organise his study are neither definite nor 
entirely distinct from one another, but rather overlap or are subdivided. Nonetheless, the 
taxonomical principle or method is maintained. This operation, in spite of Spurr's claims, 
demystifies "the grounds of [interpretive] authority" only to a limited extent. 32 Colonial 
discourse is reduced to a series of rhetorical strategies that although, as Spurr points out, 
they bear within themselves the "seeds of resistance", these are never seriously taken into 
consideration. When there is resistance it comes from an acknowledgement of and self- 
critique for the oppressive and unequal treatment of colonised peoples and from the 
affirmation of difference. Resistance then is a counter discourse to the dominant and 
unidirectional European colonialism. 33 This critique, however, that seeks alternative modes 
of expression with regard to cultural representation, as useful as it may be in unveiling the 
workings and the structures of power in colonial discourse, can only advance in a 
somewhat predetermined way for it lacks an effective revaluation of the notions it puts into 
use. In other words, this approach comes across the same impasses as any formalistic and 
taxonomical configuration. In this study "resistance" is addressed as one of the twelve 
tropes that structure colonial discourse. Spurr neither provides a definition of "tropes" nor 
does he ground the necessity for a rhetorical analysis of colonial discourse and, by 
consequence, he does not address the problematic distinction between fact and fiction, 
which he takes to an extent for granted. Although his analysis focuses on the rhetoric of 
colonial discourse in a diversity of texts pertaining to journalism, travel writing and 
imperial administration, he somewhat continues to presuppose the distinction between 
fictional and nonfictional discourse, for instance, that of nonliterary and literary 
r? stricting their examination to historical explanations and justifications. 
"My exploration of these questions involves two basic procedures: a) a mapping of the discourse, 
which identifies a series of basic tropes which emerge from the Western colonial experience, and b) 
an informal genealogy, in which the repetitions and variations of these tropes are seen to operate 
across a range of nineteenth- and twentieth-century contexts. " Spurr, David, The Rhetoric of 
Empire, Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration, London. 
, Puke University Press, 1993. p. 3. 
Ibid., p. 9. 
33 Ibid., pp. 184-201. 
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journalism, or fiction and journalism in general. 34 Tropes may run through and structure 
the totality of colonial discourse undermining established generic distinctions but, to the 
extent that these deform a purportedly authentic ("the travel writer is prevented from 
recognizing the true authenticity of the moment"35) and directly referential situation, the 
assumption is that an immediate colonial experience still lurks behind its tropological and 
discursive restructuring and needs to be demystified and brought forward. For Spurr, "the 
question remains whether [... ] resistance, identified as latent and marginal within the texts 
of colonial discourse, can be converted into a conscious authorial strategy without simply 
recycling the conventional tropes of ideological opposition" (my italics). 36 So the issue is 
to move beyond the tropology of discourse and the asymmetries of power. This, according 
to Spurr, can be achieved through the Foucauldian mode of discourse analysis. The 
problem with such an approach is that it fails to radically disrupt the configurations of 
power relations and authoritative representation because it focuses solely on the semantics 
of discourse without addressing also the phenomenological conditions of experience and its 
essentially figurative and aporetic character. Language does not come to displace and alter 
an original and authentic experience of the world, for experience itself is always already 
"contaminated" by language; it always already emerges as writing. 
One of the most influential studies in the genre is Mary Louise Pratt's Imperial 
Eyes, Travel Writing and Transculturation, which also focuses on the rhetoric of travel 
writing as an instance of "Eurocolonialism". 37 Pratt explores the collateral emergence of a 
new epistemic paradigm of natural history in the mid-eighteenth century along with the 
territorial expansion of capitalism and the intensification of "interior" exploration 
enterprises. These developments induced a new version of European "planetary 
consciousness", that is, a unified, Eurocentred perspective toward "the rest of the world" 
that registered the mutual engagement between the new project of systematizing nature and 
34 Spurr establishes the distinction between literary and nonliterary journalism on the basis of the 
former's use of figurative language conventionally pertaining to "imaginative" literature and the 
latter's informative function. With regard to the distinction between fiction and journalism, it is a 
matter of the degree of authorial intervention. In the first case, narrative succumbs to the relative 
mastery of the fiction writer, while in the second, it is subordinated to the aleatory nature of the 
event. Finally, "literary" journalism is distinguished from fiction in terms of its alternative frames of 
historical reference. Spurr, p. 9. These distinctions, however, which are articulated on the grounds of 
historical referentiality, as Spurr also admits, are not very clear. To efficiently tackle these issues 
one would have to first pose the question of referentiality and representation in general and, to be 
sure, that of the relation between "fictional" and "literary" language. Reportage and creative 
invention have proved not to be self-evident categories and functions after all. 5 Ibid., p. 50. 36 Ibid., pp 187-188. 37 Pratt 
, 
Mary Louise, Imperial Eves, Travel Writing and Transculturation, London, Routledge, 
1992. 
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economic and political expansionism. 38 Travel writing, caught up within these structures of 
power and knowledge, is formulated in what she calls the "contact zones", that is, "social 
spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly 
asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination". 39 The "contact zone" is thus a 
space of colonial encounter where relations between the colonisers and the colonised, the 
travellers and the "travelees" are being formed through copresence, interaction, and the 
interlocking of understandings and practices. 40 Out of this interaction that constitutes 
subjects and intersubjective relations also emerges what Pratt calls "anti-conquest", that is, 
"strategies of representation whereby European bourgeois subjects seek to secure their 
innocence in the same moment as they assert European hegemony. "41 Another strategic 
operation is that of "autoethnography", by which she refers to instances in which 
"colonized subjects undertake to represent themselves in ways that engage with the 
colonizer's own terms. "4' The colonial situation, according to Pratt, is one of encounter and 
interaction, though in asymmetrical terms, through which the entity called Europe "was 
structured from the outside in as much as from the inside out. " 
So, according to Pratt, colonialism and its complicit discourse of travel writing 
from the mid-eighteenth century onwards emerges as an instance of bourgeois capitalism 
and ethnocentrism, which is, however, not simply a unidirectional force exercised upon the 
colonies but is shaped through a process of interaction, of which the transforming effects 
are brought back to the metropolis. However, one may ask, when does interaction begin? 
When is the so-called "contact zone" between two previously "geographically and 
historically separated" peoples inaugurated and how is it made structurally possible? 
Indeed, when does colonialism begin? We shall proceed to the consideration of an 
"exemplary" instance of (anti-)ethnocentrism, exemplary in also being self-defeating and 
contradictory, for it precisely premises itself upon and draws its own boundary according 
to what Pratt also tends to take for granted in spite of herself: that two previously 
constituted and unified in themselves cultural horizons (subjectivities or presences) meet, 
clash, interact inaugurating thus a colonial situation that formerly did not exist. 
s Ibid., p. 38. 39 Ibid., p. 4. 40 [bid., p. 7. 41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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Claude Levi-Strauss in Tristes Tropiques engages in a critique of ethnocentrism 
from the remorseful point of view of the ethnologist/ intruder into the naturally "innocent" 
and "good" world of the Nambikwara. The foreigner inflicts violence and contamination 
upon the natural state of the tribe merely by the simple fact of his presence there. However, 
does this fact or event, which Levi-Strauss designates as an empirical accident befalling the 
natural course of the life of the tribe, signal and inaugurate the beginning of violence, 
expropriation, in a word, colonialism? The question then is whether historical contingency 
is the principal agent or determining force to which the irruption and consequences of such 
an event can be reduced. Empirical explications and reductions introduce a contradiction in 
Levi-Strauss' structuralist project. As Derrida points out, "on the one hand, structuralism 
justifiably claims to be the critique of empiricism. But at the same time there is not a single 
book or study by Levi-Strauss which is not proposed as an empirical essay which can 
always be completed or invalidated by new information. " 43 Levi-Strauss' oeuvre captures 
an instance of ethnographic "oneirism" and nostalgia for a lost origin and natural goodness. 
It comes at a time in the history of European culture and in the tradition of Western 
metaphysics when the thought of origin, that is, the desire for a fixed point of presence or, 
put otherwise, for the reduction to an organising centre, is called into question. The 
structural centre then begins to be no longer thought as a fixed locus but rather as a 
function. The centre is decentred. Derrida: 
"In fact one can assume that ethnology could have been born as a science only at the 
moment when a decentering had come about: at the moment when European culture -and, in 
consequence, the history of metaphysics and of its concepts- had been dislocated, driven from its 
locus, and forced to stop considering itself as the culture of reference. This moment is not first and 
foremost a moment of philosophical or scientific discourse. It is also a moment which is political, 
economic, technical, and so forth. One can say with total security that there is nothing fortuitous 
about the fact that the critique of ethnocentrism -the very condition of ethnology- should be 
systematically and historically contemporaneous with the destruction of the history of metaphysics. 
Both belong to one and the same era. " 
In the history of metaphysics the concept of the sign holds central position by way 
of its substitutive and supplementary function of "standing for" a lost but recoverable 
original and "natural" meaning. In the case of ethnology this is a primordial and natural 
state of things before the institution of cultural norms and prohibitions. The sign then is 
always already removed from the origin it represents and points to. The shaking of 
metaphysical premises, which Derrida describes as an "event" in the history of structure 
and to which one could attach the names of Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger, signals a 
43 Derrida, Jacques, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" in Writing 
and Difference, translated, with an introduction and additional notes, by Alan Bass, London, 
joutle ge, 1978, p. 288. 
Ibid., p. 282. 
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further dislocation in the history of the sign that is now removed from its representational 
function. Signs no longer point to natural things or to aprimum signatum but rather refer to 
one another. Levi-Strauss seeks to "transcend the opposition between the sensible and the 
intelligible [an institutive opposition for metaphysics] by operating from the outset at the 
level of signs". 45 However, this opposition is concurrent with that between nature and 
culture, which Levi-Strauss both accepts and tries to surpass introducing antinomy in his 
discourse. Nature, for Levi-Strauss, signifies that which is universal and spontaneous, 
while culture that which is varying and instituted. He is driven by a "Rousseauist" kind of 
nostalgia for a natural state of things and by a desire for the retrieval of a symbolic or 
natural language, a language attached to the very essence of things. This can only be the 
primordial language of living speech, that is, a language present and gathered in itself that 
is effaced or made redundant before the thing itself. In other words, a language which is 
not contaminated by writing. This is why, as Derrida claims, ethnocentrism, at once the 
presupposition and the target of criticism of ethnology, is above all a phonocentrism. 46 The 
ethnologist "accepts into his discourse the premises of ethnocentrism at the very moment 
when he denounces them. This necessity is irreducible; it is not a historical contingency. "47 
Levi-Strauss refuses to attribute an ontological or truth value to the distinction 
between nature and culture, which he, nonetheless, utilizes and proposes to accept merely 
as a methodological tool. 48 Even so, he comes up against an impasse in the methodological 
45'This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the 
absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse [the moment which the thought of the] 
absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely. " 
J id., pp. 280-1. 
This relation is stated in the exergue of Of Grammatology: "This triple exergue is intended not 
only to focus attention on ethnocentrism which, everywhere and always, has controlled the concept 
of writing. Nor merely to focus attention on what I call logocentrism: the metaphysics of phonetic 
writing (for example, of the alphabet) which was fundamentally -for enigmatic yet essential reasons that are inaccessible to a simple historical relativism- nothing but the most original and powerful 
ethnocentrism, in the process of imposing itself upon the world, controlling in one and the same 
order". Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 3. Phonetic writing is considered by Hegel as hierarchically 
superior to other types of writing, for instance, hieroglyphics or Chinese ideograms, in that it 
reduces writing to the voice thus enabling the movement of the liberation of the spirit by elevating 
the material to the spiritual. The phonetic element can be interiorised by the soul because it is more 
easily disengaged from the material nature of things. See also "The Pit and Pyramid: Introduction to 
pegel's Semiology" in Margins of Philosophy, pp. 69-108. 
Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences", p. 282. 48 This method is called by Levi-Strauss bricolage. The critical language of the bricoleur is a 
mythopoetical" discourse, which cannot be reduced to a central or privileged myth or reference and 
is surrendered to the infinite play of language. The bricoleur uses, tests out and, occasionally, 
abandons everything that comes at hand, old concepts which s/he treats as tools. This is why 
bricolage, the critical method of the human sciences, of which ethnology is an exemplary case, is in 
close affinity to empiricism. Testing out hypothetical schemata by subjecting them to the proof of 
experience and on the basis of a finite quantity of information poses what Derrida calls a double 
postulation that considers totalization as both "useless" (a limited number of finite discourses should 
be methodologically adequate for the description of their grammar) and "impossible". However. the 
impossibility of totalization is not due to the limitless series of the finite discourses of the empirical 
field, which one can never hope to know or manage. As Derrida shows, it is not inexhaustibility but 
rather a lack, something missing from the field of play (that is, the play of infinite substitutions) that 
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use of this distinction; an impasse which he calls a "scandal": the prohibition of incest. The 
prohibition of incest defies the nature/culture opposition since it is something that Levi- 
Strauss considers both universal, thus natural, and institutional, hence, cultural. However, 
if one were not to take this difference as self-evident, one would have to look into its very 
condition of possibility, into a difference that is structurally "older" than that between 
nature and culture, or else, d ferance: "The incest prohibition is no longer a scandal one 
meets with or comes up against in the domain of traditional concepts; it is something which 
escapes these concepts and certainly precedes them -probably as the condition of their 
possibility. "" 
One of the most exemplary instances in Levi-Strauss' treatment of the opposition 
between nature and culture is what he describes as the "Writing Lesson" in Tristes 
Tropiques. Levi-Strauss remains within the tradition of phonocentrism, which privileges 
speech over writing that is considered a derivative and dangerous supplement. 
Accordingly, he accepts the distinction between "peoples with writing" and "peoples 
without writing", which is coterminous to that between "historical societies" and "societies 
without history". For Levi-Strauss, the Nambikwara live in a state of natural goodness 
unaffected by the exploitative implications of writing. During the "writing lesson", of 
which the Nambikwara supposedly have no concept but are only capable of imitating by 
"drawing lines", the only apt response is that of the leader of the tribe, who apprehends the 
secret privilege and power that writing confers upon its custodians. Writing introduces 
domination, exploitation and the right of legislation to a reserved minority; it is thus the 
instrument of power. This function of writing, of course, is well known and can be 
historically verified. However, by assuming that writing penetrates and upsets the peaceful 
culture of the tribe through this "extraordinary incident", befalling upon the Nambikwara 
by accident and affecting them "as if by chance", one fails to acknowledge that this 
-spontaneous borrowing" could never have taken place if it were not for the previous 
existence of the structures that make it possible. 5° The passage from speech to writing, 
which is elevated to the central problem of ethnology, that is, the passage from nature to 
which excludes totalization: the absence of a centre, what must be supplemented by the sign. 
Moreover, this decentring, what Derrida has called an event in the history of the concept of 
structure, is not a historical event -though it is nothing outside history- but rather a given fact of language and what opens the infinite play of substitution and metaphor as historical force. 
The bricoleur is distinguished from the engineer, a subject who posits itself at the origin and 
creation of meaning and is thus a notion with theological depth. According to Levi-Strauss, the 
engineer is a myth produced by the bricoleur. However, as Derrida points out, both holding up and 
reducing this distinction breaks down the difference upon which bricolage took on its meaning in 
Jýe first place. Ibid., p. 285-289. 
Ibid., p. 283. 
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culture, can only operate within writing in general, what Derrida calls arche-writing. Levi- 
Strauss performs a reduction, of which the sole function is that of "constituting the other as 
a model of original and natural goodness, "51 designating at the same time Nambikwarian 
culture by means of a lack and exclusion: the absence of writing and of history. 52 In this 
way, he produces an instance of profound ethnocentrism: 
"It is, however, an ethnocentrism thinking itself as anti-ethnocentrism, an ethnocentrism in 
the consciousness of a liberating progressivism. By radically separating language from writing, by 
placing the latter below and outside, believing at least that it is possible to do so, by &iviný oneself 
the illusion of liberating linguistics from all involvement with written evidence, one thinks in fact to 
restore the status of authentic language, human and fully signifying language, to all3languages 
practiced by peoples whom one nevertheless continues to describe as `without writing'. 
Another "telling" incident Levi-Strauss recounts is that of the violation of a 
prohibition imposed by the Nambikwara that disallowed the pronouncement of the "proper 
names" of the members of the tribe. Levi-Strauss observes a group of children playing. A 
little girl, in order to avenge one of her friends for striking her, reveals the latter's name to 
the ethnologist. Eventually, Levi-Strauss eggs on the children to reveal theirs and the 
adults' names, something for which they are later reprimanded. Now, Levi-Strauss as the 
provoker of this violation considers himself guilty of disturbing the order of the peaceful 
community by making innocent children his accomplices. The mere presence of the 
foreigner is capable of inducing the breaking of norms and inflicting violence upon the 
so Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 127. 51 Ibid., p. 114. 52 Such a division between cultures with and cultures without writing and history is also sustained 
by Tzvetan Todorov in The Conquest of America, The Question of the Other, translated by Richard 
Howard, foreword by Anthony Pagden, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. Todorov 
maintains that one of the reasons the Spaniards were able to conquer the Americas was the 
superiority of their linguistic and communicative skills. Accordingly, Cortes had in his disposal a 
more advanced system of signs than Mexicans, who still spoke a symbolic and ritual language. For 
Todorov, "the absence of writing is an important element of the situation, perhaps even the most 
important. " Ibid., p. 80. Mexican society is adumbrated as traditional, hierarchical and 
overstructured with limited capacity to be surprised, to improvise and perceive otherness or 
anything beyond its symbolic apprehension of the world. This is because its highly ritualized and 
repetitive language (but does this not imply, in spite of Todorov, a "writing" in the generalized 
sense? ) is premised upon discourses that come from and are dominated by the past, as it happens 
with the so-called oral traditions. Spaniards, on the other hand, speak a language that is disengaged 
from symbolic attachment to the world and to old prophecies and are, therefore, capable of 
improvising, adapting to new situations and being more flexible. So here we have a conflict between 
two systems of signs, which is formulated by Todorov in terms of the opposition between "ritual 
speech" and writing. For Todorov, writing is "an index of the revolution of mental structures. " Ibid., 
p. 81. Spaniards are more "advanced" in this sense, since they have achieved a more efficient form 
of intersubjective communication. Or "to generalize: societies possessing writing are more advanced 
than societies without writing". Ibid., p. 160. However, this does not entail the moral superiority of 
the Spaniards for one would have to choose between a "society of sacrifice" (Mexican) and a 
"society of massacre" (Western European). Mexican culture is represented as one steeped in myth 
and prejudice, which is unavoidably conquered and assimilated by European logos. Todorov 
adheres to Western metaphysical oppositions such as speech/writing, mythos/logos, nature/culture. 
which are taken as self-evident without ever being thoroughly problematised. This leads him to a 
reaffirmation of the ethnocentric prejudice, which distinguishes between cultures with and without 
writing and history and which privileges, moreover, the former. The implication, as we shall see a 
bit later, with regard to "the question of the other", is the formulation of a reductive "typology of 
cplations to the other" precisely premised upon such oppositions and hierarchies. 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 120. 
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"naturally" benevolent tribe. However, could that ever be a spontaneous response to an 
accidental event without the previous existence of the structural conditions that precisely 
allow for this to take place? The prohibition or, otherwise, the obliteration of proper names 
is already in place as a cultural law, of which the violation is just an empirical possibility 
actualised or rather encouraged by Levi-Strauss on a level that Derrida calls "tertiary", that 
is, on the level of "empirical consciousness", that on which "the common concept of 
violence" is situated. There are, however, other levels of violence which remain unthought 
by Levis-Strauss The denunciation of proper names and the violation of the interdict 
respectively veil and reveal a hidden classification and linguistico-social structuration 
based upon differences. But violence has long begun at a more radical level: 
"There was in fact a first violence to be named. To name, to give names that it will on 
occasion be forbidden to pronounce, such is the originary violence of language which consists in 
inscribing within a difference, in classifying, in suspending the vocative absolute. To think the 
unique within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the gesture of the arche-writing: arche- 
violence, loss of proper, of absolute proximity, of self-presence, in truth the loss of what has never 
taken place, of a self-presence which has never been given but only dreamed of and always already 
split, repeated, incapable of appearing to itself except in its own disappearance. Out of this arche- 
violence, forbidden and therefore confirmed by a second violence that is reparatory, protective, 
instituting the `moral, ' prescribing the concealment of writing and the effacement and obliteration of 
the so-called proper name which was already dividing the proper, a third violence can possibly 
emerge or not (an empirical possibility) within what is commonly called evil, war, indiscretion, 
rape; which consists of revealing by effraction the so-called proper name, the originary violence 
which has severed the proper from its property and its self-sameness [pro rete']. We could name a 
third violence of reflection, which denudes the native non-identity, classification as denaturation of 
the proper, and identity as the abstract moment of the concept. " 4 
A proper name would have to signify fully an entity in its entirety without 
attributing to it anything that would disrupt its essence. But to name properly and to 
designate an entity as such is to inscribe it within a differential and graphematic drift. Since 
there is no absolute, unique and singular proper name but always names, which introduce 
difference, classification, and predication the proper name is erased, obliterated from the 
start. Its obliteration, however, is its condition of appearance and legibility, for the proper 
name neither belongs as such to language, nor does it exist outside language. The loss of 
the proper is an a priori expropriation, what at once denounces and promises properness. 
This paradoxical force that moves simultaneously towards expropriation and re- 
appropriation, without the precedence of properness, that nominates and identifies, divides 
and classifies, giving both the condition of possibility and impossibility of unicity and 
univocity, is called by Derrida arche-writing or arche-violence. So the proper name exists 
only on the condition of its erasure, that is, of its self-erasing mode of signifying always 
inadequately to itself, to what it purportedly should be. it becomes part of language on the 
condition of its becoming noun, that is. on the condition of its translatability into 
54 Ibid., p. 112. 
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generality. This is to say, there is neither proper name nor noun (due to the lack of a unique 
source idiom, from which the noun would be abstracted) but the endless process of the 
becoming-noun-of-the-proper-name. To name an "entity" properly -an improper 
proposition- is to inflict upon "it" violence by totalising it in a unique and singular 
manifestation and by reducing "its" radical indeterminacy, that is, the essential 
(im)possibility of "it" ever signifying fully. Nominative action is a first violence upon the 
entity (presumed as such by what is called phenomenological reduction) or else arche- 
violence. The institution of the prohibition comes second and its violation, the level which 
Levi-Strauss acknowledges, third. 
The obliteration of the "proper name", by way of its a priori inscription into a 
system of differences that constitutes it as a structure of erasure and deferral, is a general 
condition exceeding the instituted prohibition put into effect and to test by the 
Nambikwara. Beyond the empirical level of violence that is associated with writing and its 
well known dominating and exploitative implications, the generalised notion of writing 
that reaches back to the forces of nomination emerges through a more originary violence: 
"In other words, if writing is to be related to violence, writing appears well before writing 
in the narrow sense; already in the differance or the arche-writing that opens speech itself. "" 
This is why a community or culture that already obliterates proper names cannot in 
any way be said to be a culture "without writing". Moreover, a culture capable of 
obliterating proper names, cannot not be violent. The ethic of the living speech as a 
condition of "social authenticity" is a theme related to that of presence, of immediacy and 
transparency still unaffected by the absence or lack implied by writing. Yet, if presence is 
an illusion, a cherished dream of wholeness and of a language fully present and adequate to 
itself, the condition of ethics can only emerge from a radical inadequacy that prevents any 
entity from ever fully signifying in a gathered or determined meaning by precisely 
allowing it to appear in a self-erasing mode, the only possible mode of signification: 
"To recognize writing in speech, that is to say differance and the absence of speech, is to 
begin to think the lure. There is no ethics without the presence of the other but also, and 
consequently, without absence, dissimulation, detour, differance, writing. The arche-writing is the 
origin of morality as immorality. The nonethical opening of ethics. A violent opening. "56 
We are here before an (im)possible ethics that neither begins with nor absolutely 
necessitates presence but, on the contrary, always already disrupts given and fixed 
positions and precedes, at least structurally, the intrusion of the ethnographer/traveller. who 
supposedly inaugurates a relation to the other, for the other has always already made its 
55 Ibid., p. 128. 
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mark, left its trace from the constitutive opening of consciousness to a first exteriority. The 
thought of the trace of the other is what gives the possibility of an ethics of travel, or 
better, as we shall soon see, of "travelling with", that a priori and from within resists 
judgement and decision upon the other, however, without dispensing with violence 
altogether: an ethics of hospitality as the very condition of colonialism. 
Hospitality 
In order to look into the structural conditions that link an ethics of hospitality to an 
ethics of travel and colonialism we should turn to "the question of the foreigner". By 
shifting the emphasis, the question of the foreigner could mean the question of the 
foreigner, addressed by the foreigner or to the foreigner. 57 Should one interrogate the new 
arrival? How should one respond to him or her and in what language should this question 
or response be uttered? Should translation be imposed on him/her? And is this phrasing 
that evokes legitimacy or duty ("should one... ") proper to hospitality? 58 When we speak 
here of language we do so also in a broad sense, that is, as the ensemble of culture, its 
values and norms, its semiological configurations that exceed linguistic operations in the 
narrow sense: "Speaking the same language is not only a linguistic operation. It's a matter 
of ethos generally. "59 In this sense, the culture that receives foreigners, if only to expel 
them, and in receiving addresses them and is addressed by them, speaks the language of 
hospitality or rather it is hospitality itself. To the extent that language, in the broad sense, 
opens itself up to the other, responds to and welcomes the other, "language is 
hospitality"60. Language as hospitality already finds itself caught up in the aporetic and 
paradoxical condition that tears it asunder between the requisite of hyberbolical or 
unconditional hospitality and a situational or conditional hospitality. Unconditional 
hospitality is hospitality in a "proper" and "transcendental" sense beyond concrete 
situations and contexts that signifies an absolute, unconditional welcoming of the other, a 
561bid., p. 140. 57 Derrida, Of Hospitality, p. 3. 58 "Among the serious problems we are dealing with here is that of the foreigner who, inept at 
speaking the language, always risks being without defense before the law of the country that 
welcomes or expels him, the foreigner is first of all foreign to legal language in which the duty of 
hospitality is formulated, the right to asylum, its limits, norms, policing, etc. He has to ask for 
hospitality in a language which by definition is not his own, the one imposed on him by the master 
of the house, the host, the king, the lord, the authorities, the nation, the State, the father, etc. This 
personage imposes on him translation into their own language, and that's the first act of violence. 
That is where the question of hospitality begins: must we ask the foreigner to understand us, to 
speak our language, in all the senses of this term, in all its possible extensions, before being able and 
so as to be able to welcome him into our country? If he was already speaking our language, with all 
that that is shared with a language, would the foreigner still be a foreigner and could we speak of 
Rylum or hospitality in regard to him? " Ibid., pp. 15,17. 
Ibid., p. 133. 60 Ibid., p. 135. 
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passivity that receives without asking and without laying down norms and regulations. In 
other words, it is a "regulatory" ideal (albeit in view of superseding regulation), language's 
promise and drive towards the attainment of properness (that is, how hospitality should 
properly be), without which (and for sure, without its essential pervertibility in specific 
situations) all forms of hospitality would be impossible. Conditional hospitality is that 
which prescribes specific requirements upon the other, that deploys a certain program and 
policy towards foreigners according to pragmatic concerns and specific historical contexts. 
It is hospitality confined to law and duty, to the necessity of regulation and to a highly 
determined sense of obligation formulated and imposed by a given and rigorously 
circumscribed sense of self-mastery or oiko-nomia. It is subjected to the-law-of-the-house. 
A problematic thus arises: 
"We have come to wonder whether absolute, hyberbolical, unconditional hospitality 
doesn't consist in suspending language, a particular determinate language, and even the address to 
the other. Shouldn't we also submit to a sort of holding back of the temptation to ask the other who 
he is, what her name is, where he comes from, etc? Shouldn't we abstain from asking another these 
questions, which herald so many required conditions, and thus limits, to a hospitality thereby 
constrained and thereby confined into a law and duty? And so into the economy of a circle? We will 
always be threatened by this dilemma between, on the one hand, unconditional hospitality that 
dispenses with law, duty, or even politics, and, on the other, hospitality circumscribed by law and 
duty. "6' 
Preoccupation with hospitality does not simply shift attention to the side of the 
visited culture. As we shall soon see, going and receiving from abroad do not constitute 
rigorously different perspectives but rather disrupt cultural and linguistic identities, in this 
case, those of the host and the guest, giving way to a possible ethics of travel and 
hospitality. The word "host" that can at once point to the master of the house and to the 
guest, something which is neither fortuitous nor situational, already signals a radical 
interruption of pregiven identities and normative behaviours. It marks the possibility of 
substitution (the master [host] becomes the guest [host] in realising him/herself as such 
upon the summon of the visitor as if s/he was the one visiting and vice versa), the law of 
hospitality beyond determined norms and regulations. "Hospitality" is used here in the 
radical sense of a primordial passivity and receptivity, that of the constitutive opening of 
consciousness to the world, to what lies beyond it as other, to what it intends to and 
through which, by the very fact and operation of intentionality, it constitutes itself. In the 
encounter with the other, hospitality is first. Whether this leads to aggression and hostility, 
the condition of hospitality is unaltered. Hostility and generosity have their very condition 
in hospitality in this radical sense. One must first receive and turn to the other in order to 
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enter in whatever relation with him or her. Derrida largely draws on Levinas in that matter. 
Intentionality is defined as hospitality, as "attention to speech or welcome of the face", the 
welcoming of alterity that is more originary than and not contrary to "phenomena of 
allergy, rejection, xenophobia, even war"6Z. 
In calling upon a "law of hospitality" that exceeds prescription and regulation, we 
are once more raising the question of generality in relation to singularity. As we have 
argued before, the generality of the law is indissociable from and co-extensive to its 
singular manifestations. It is true that even when appealing to the general or transcendental 
law of hospitality or language (for language is hospitality) we only do so through a singular 
idiom and a singular experience, or otherwise, a testimony. In view of addressing the 
double bind or turn that opens culture as an at once hospitable and colonial space, we are 
going to consider a testimony, both unique and universal or rather universalisable, of a 
Jewish Franco-Maghrebian that bears the name Jacques Derrida. 
In the Monolingualism of the Other or the Prosthesis of Origin Derrida puts 
forward the following in and between themselves paradoxical propositions: 1. We only ever 
speak one language. 2. We never speak only one language. Or otherwise formulated: "I 
have only one language, yet it is not mine". 63 This antinomy at once attests to a singular 
experience of a Maghrebian of Jewish descent in an Algeria colonised by the French and to 
a general law of language and culture. "We only ever speak one language" signifies that 
one always speaks from one's own unique position and experience one idiom only. And 
"we never speak only one language " signifies that there is no pure idiom. 64 Derrida relates 
his own story as a young Jewish boy in French Algeria, who lost his French citizenship in 
1940 when the Cremieux decree, which had granted French citizenship to the Jewish 
population of Algeria in 1870, was abolished by Petain, only to be restored three years 
later. Derrida was denied access to the French school he attended, to the only language and 
culture he ever recognized as his own. Of course, Hebrew, Arabic or Berber under the 
colonial regime had been long relegated to a marginal place in the French educational 
system. A sort of double "interdict" more traumatic in the first case, more subtle and 
ambiguous in the second, deprived of direct access to any model for cultural identification. 
Derrida speaks of an "identity disorder", of a "radical lack of culture [inculture] from 
Ibid. 
62 Derrida, Jacques, "A Word of Welcome" in Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, translated by Pascale- 
Anne Brault and Michel Naas, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 50. 
Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, pp. 7 and 21. 
64 Ibid., p. 8. 
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which [he] undoubtedly never completely emerged. "65 French, the language supposed to be 
maternal, came from elsewhere. It came from the Metropole, to where Derrida never 
travelled before the age of nineteen. France, as the source of language and culture that 
came from afar, at once offered and withdrew a model for cultural identification, which 
became an endless process: 
"No, an identity is never given, received, or attained; only the interminable and indefinitely 
phantasmatic process of identification endures. "66 
France, the origin of culture had acquired a mythical and phantasmatic quality, it 
loomed everywhere but came from elsewhere; it was there but not quite present: 
"The metropole, the Capital-City-Mother-Fatherland, the city of the mother tongue: that 
was a place which represented, without being it, a faraway country, near but far away, not alien, for 
that would be too simple, but strange, fantastic, and phantom-like [fantomal]. "67 
Derrida attests to what is an exemplary colonial situation, since linguistic and 
cultural appropriation can be said to be primarily colonial strategies. However, this is not 
merely a conscious, even though multi-levelled and often difficult to control, procedure on 
the coloniser's part. Derrida does not simply attest to a historical circumstance, even a 
paradigmatic one, although he cannot not do so but from within a specific historical 
situation. Beyond determined circumstance, Derrida's singular testimony attests to 
something that exceeds colonial rule in the common sense. It turns back upon the structural 
conditions that allow for such appropriations to take place. When he postulates that he only 
has one language that is not his, he attests to a universal condition, to the very law of 
language: language is not a property or possession; it is given to us but never in its entirety, 
never as such and never as something pure and simply available; it precedes us, it passes 
through us and survives us. And in passing through us coming from elsewhere, from the 
other, it gives us but only in depriving us of the capacity of the identificatory "I", which is 
never purely and simply given; it submits to the law of repetition and dissemination, 
enduringly dividing, subverting while promising a self, a home, a language: 
But who exactly possesses [language]? And whom does it possess? Is language in 
possession, ever possessing or possessed possession? Possessed or possessing in exclusive 
possession, like a piece of personal property? What of this being-at-home [eire-chez-soi] in 
language toward which we never cease returning? "68 
We are the hosts and hostages of language; it is what promises self-mastery, a pure 
idiom in which one should have the capacity of saying "I" and be at one with, present to 
65 Ibid., p. 53. 66 Ibid., p. 28. 67 Ibid., p. 42. 68 Ibid., p. 17. 
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oneself, and what makes of this promise a lie and a perjury because it can never be fulfilled 
but enduringly repeats and commits itself. But a promise is not nothing; everything 
happens and is awaited on its condition. From the original exile that gives rise to language 
as "the language of the other", language "can only promise and promise itself by 
threatening to dismember itself 5.69 
In our deliberation on the essential metaphoricity of language, we claimed that its 
force of signification moves along a drive to appropriation that engenders effects of 
properness and a drive to expropriation, a radical process of alienation, that divides 
meaning in and of itself. In this way, language gathers itself in disseminating itself or 
disseminates itself in gathering itself. According to this structural antinomy, Oikos as the 
ensemble of literal and appropriated meaning and travel as a deviation from home, as the 
event of encounter with foreignness, are only promised and never attained as such. As we 
saw, the generalised notion of travel as an itinerary with no origin or destination gives rise 
to senses of "home" and "travel" in the "literal" sense (can we not say that "travel in the 
literal sense" is already part of the house? ). In other words, senses of "home" and "away" 
emerge as effects of the appropriative and ex-appropriative forces of language and not the 
other way around. In this sense, every determined notion of home, culture as a place of 
origin, belonging, identity and everything one considers one's own, arise from this 
appropriative or colonising force or madness: 
"Because there is no natural property of language, language gives rise only to appropriative 
madness, to jealousy without appropriation. Language speaks this jealousy; it is nothing but jealousy 
unleashed. It takes revenge at the heart of the law. The law that, moreover, language itself is, apart 
from also being mad. Mad about itself. Raving mad. 1570 
Language is mad because it can never come to its senses. That is, it can never fully 
or properly signify, it can never possess its meanings that are essentially repeatable and 
thus alterable. It can only promise and promise itself. Since this promise always fails, since 
there is not a language or the language but only languages and singular idioms, a language 
is promised through languages, through the movements of signification that give the 
impossible possibility of meaning. Plus d' une langue: both more than a language and no 
more of a language. " This is the law of translation or better the "law itself as translation"; 
what at once imposes and forbids translation. 
72 This appropriative madness gives rise to 
69 Ibid., p. 22. 70 Ibid., p 24. " Derrida, Memoires for Paul de Man, p. 15. 
'' "Translation" is a recurrent and extremely important theme in Derrida's work. In the first chapter 
we had the chance of treating its elaboration in "Des Tours de Babel" more extensively. 
The 
Semites' quest or project for the imposition of their tongue as a "universal 
language" is a 
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totalising or colonising senses of language and culture. In this way, one can always claim 
that culture is essentially colonial and that instances of colonial appropriation in 
determined historical situations attest to this structural and universal law: 
"So much so that `colonialism' and `colonization' are only high points [reliefs], one 
traumatism over another, an increasing buildup of violence, the jealous rage of an essential 
coloniality and culture, as shown by the two names. "73 
The essential coloniality of culture, an originary violence that names, gathers, 
circumscribes in view of assuming totality and unity, hence, in view of instituting culture 
itself, gives the condition of possibility of colonialism in general and in its determined 
historical manifestations. This is not to say, of course, that specific historical situations can 
be reduced to or explained through this structural law, as some would, to be sure, hastily 
74 object. To say that actual and particular historical configurations attest to a universal law 
paradigmatic instance of colonial violence but also of the structural impossibility of such project. 
The possibility of a transparent idiom that translation tends to and presupposes is self-subverted by 
virtue of language's generality, that is, its categorical or attributive capacity, that already turns the 
proper name into a common noun. Derrida calls this irreducible semantic movement "the becoming- 
noun of the proper name", for the proper name neither precedes the noun, and so, nor does the noun 
derive from an abstraction of a given proper name. This is why the name is both translatable -in becoming noun- and untranslatable by virtue of language's repeatability or iterability that impedes it 
from fully signifying the thing itself, in other words, from naming it properly. Derrida: "In seeking 
to `make a name for themselves, ' to found at the same time a universal tongue and a unique 
genealogy, the Semites want to bring the world to reason, and this reason can signify simultaneously 
a colonial violence (since they would thus universalize their idiom) and a peaceful transparency of 
the human community. Inversely, when God imposes and opposes his name, he ruptures the rational 
transparency but interrupts also the colonial violence or the imperialism. He destines them to 
translation, he subjects them to law of a translation both necessary and impossible; in a stroke with 
his translatable-untranslatable name he delivers a universal (it will no longer be subject to the rule of 
a particular nation), but he simultaneously limits its very universality: forbidden transparency, 
ýcnpossible univocity. " Derrida, "Des Tours de Babel", p. 174. 
Derrida, Monolingualism, p. 24. 74 For instance, Gesa Mackenthun in " `Terrified by novel Forms of Justice': Travelling Theories of 
Colonialism and the Burning of Qualpopoca" in Studies in Travel Writing, number 1, referring to 
Cortes' atrocities in Mexico and to the public torture and burning of the cacique Qualpopoca and his 
companions for having fought the Spaniards, expresses uneasiness with regard to certain theorists', 
like Paul de Man, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Jacques Derrida, response to such horrific 
events. The concern here is with the assumed lack of sensitivity and "cynical" indifference to human 
suffering within particular historical junctures: "It's their pain that, disappointingly not for 
Greenblatt but certainly for Walter Benjamin, shall not be forgotten. It is their pain, too, that should 
remind us that history never was, and never will be, `a purely linguistic complication, ' as Paul de 
Man has it, and that colonial oppression is not a matter of the past simply because we choose not so 
see it any longer. " Mackenthun, pp. 62-63. And further on, "I do share the uneasiness of Henry 
Louis Gates about Spivak's `insistence on the totalizing embrace of colonial discourse' and about 
the parallels between this concept and the Derridean one of the all-inclusiveness of writing (Gates 
1991: 466). The danger of statements about the universality of colonialism seems to me that they too 
easily lose the trace of the `historical moments in which they are located' by virtue of denying the 
possibility of such locatedness (Said 1983: 4). " Ibid., p. 66. Mackenthun is unfair in assuming that 
de Man, Spivak and Derrida do not take history and, more importantly, pain and suffering into 
account, though this is a highly improper expression, for pain and suffering are, to be sure, 
unaccountable and incalculable. In painstakingly and persistently pondering over the question of the 
structural possibility of (colonial) violence and appropriation, these thinkers in no way brush aside 
single and collective suffering and martyrdom 
(tthough 
martyrdom is always singular), simply 
because they do not solely insist on historical occasions and contextual determinations. If everything 
were to be reduced to contextual explications then each singular and unique story would 
be closed, 
explained, over and done with. Derrida dedicates his Specters of Marx to Chris Hani, who was 
assassinated by the Apartheid regime on the 10 of April 1993: 
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of coloniality is neither to generalise nor to homogenise or collapse different historical 
instances that should certainly be considered in their own context. We have repeatedly 
argued that transcendental or rather quasi-transcendental conditions are nothing outside 
history and of the empirical situations they both condition and out of which they also 
emerge. However, nor can empirical occurrences be simply taken account of merely on 
their own terms, since they cannot be totally reduced to or saturated by their context: 
"Quite far from dissolving the always relative specificity, however cruel, of situations of 
linguistic oppression or colonial expropriation, this prudent and differentiated universalization must 
account, and I would even say that it is the only way one can account, for the determinable 
possibility of a subservience and hegemony. "75 
If all culture is originarily colonial and if this "obscure common power" can be to 
some extent formalised into an aporetic structure, this in no way implies indifference to or 
ignorance of the suffering, persecutions and struggles colonised peoples have undergone 
and undertaken. On the contrary, it enduringly and persistently raises the question of how 
such terrible and horrific situations can ever be possible. After such a thinking as 
Derrida's, historical explanations and reductions, even and especially when conducted 
through angry responses to colonial rule, can never reach a satisfactory conclusion. 
Peacefulness of mind is forever forbidden. Derrida has been criticised for overformalising 
and even for avoiding the question of ethics. 76 Precisely the opposite is true: 
"The question here is not to efface the arrogant specificity or the traumatizing brutality of 
what is called modem colonial war in the `strictest definition' of the expression, at the very moment 
of military conquest, or when a symbolic conquest prolongs the war by other means. On the 
contrary. Certain people, myself included, have experienced colonial cruelty from two sides so to 
speak. But once again, it reveals the colonial structure of any culture in an exemplary way. It 
testifies to it in martyrdom, and `vividly' [en martyre, et `a vif']. "" 
"At once part, cause, effect, example, what is happening there translates what takes place here, 
always here, wherever one is and wherever one looks, closest to home. Infinite responsibility, 
therefore, no rest allowed for any form of good conscience. 
But one should never speak of the assassination of a man as a figure, not even an exemplary figure 
in the logic of an emblem, a rhetoric of the flag or of martyrdom. A man's life, as unique as his 
death, will always be more than a paradigm and something other than a symbol. And this is 
precisely what a proper name should always name. " Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. xv. One should 
beware of angry and hasty responses. Who can dare evoke, set right, make a tribute to, or any claim 
on Walter Benjamin's pain? To be sure, not Mackenthun. 5 Derrida, Monolingualism, p. 23. 76 Syed Manzurul Islam in his The Ethics of Travel, From Marco Polo to Kafka levels a critique at 
Derrida's "subtle" but "monotonous" variations of Saussurian "difference", which Derrida 
purportedly frames in a formal linguistic structure. To Islam's mind, Derrida is "caught in a formal 
trap" and "Derridean difference (Differance), with its insistence that `presentation of the being- 
present' takes place entirely in the play of difference or through the structure of traces, leaves no 
room for a non-textual ethics of practice. " Islam, p. 21. Islam hurries to judge and overrule Derrida's 
thinking, especially with regard to its relation to ethics. A more persistent reading of Derrida's 
work, even in its early stages, would show his constant concern with the question of ethics, which 
moves beyond what Islam ambiguously calls "textual" or "non-textual" ethics, a somewhat curious 
distinction. In any case, Derrida's notion of the text exceeds its conventional sense and becomes co- 
Fýtensive to the whole field of experience. 
Derrida, Monolingualism, p. 39. 
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As we argued in the previous chapter, a general law is never reduced to or fully 
realised in one of its empirical occurrences. A singular experience or testimony is unique, 
secret, untranslatable and irreplaceable and, moreover, it cannot be accounted for by the 
specific juridical or generic laws it makes appeal to. A testimony, however, by virtue of its 
exemplarity and iterability -for in order to have validity it must also overflow its singular 
instance- must also have potentially a general value, or otherwise, it must be replaceable, 
translatable, universalisable: 
"What happens when someone resorts to describing an allegedly uncommon `situation', 
mine, for example, by testifying to it in terms that go beyond it, in a language whose generality 
takes on a value that is in some way structural, universal, transcendental, or ontological? When 
anybody who happens by infers the following: `What holds for me, irreplaceable, also applies to all. 
Substitution is in progress; it has already taken effect. Everyone can say the same thing for 
themselves and of themselves. It suffices to hear me; I am the universal hostage. "78 
We are hostages of language for we always surrender to it. When we speak we 
testify from depths of "aphasia" and "amnesia" to an (non-)event, of which there is no 
memory, for which there is no accountability or genealogy, of a language at once given and 
promised, of a monolanguage in the sense that it is idiomatic and singular but also 
promises the One of language, the language to come. Would language be possible if it did 
not tend to univocity or properness? Would translation be possible if it did not seek, as 
Walter Benjamin puts it, to come "to terms with the foreignness of languages"79? In other 
words, if it did not promise an absolute translation of the multiplicity of languages, even if 
what it does is to multiply differences within the target idiom? Monolingualism in all its 
possible senses is irreducibly multiple. It lacks an assignable origin. This is why it always 
comes from the other, a "monolingualism of the other, " and promises the other. This is also 
language's and culture's radical condition of hospitality. There is no such a thing as a 
mother tongue; all that endures is its promise, a promise without determinable content. 
"Aux autres ma langue maternelle". Coming from the other, destined to the other what is 
dreamed as the pure idiom, the mother tongue, is a home one always returns to failing to 
reach it lastingly. This is for Derrida, the "a priori universal truth of an essential alienation 
in language -which is always of the other- and, 
by the same token, in all culture. "80 And 
"this monolingualism of the other certainly has the threatening face and features of colonial 
hegemony. "R 
78 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 79 Benjamin, Walter, The Task of the Translator" in Illuminations, with an Introduction by Hannah 
Arendt, translated by Harry Zohn, London, Fontana Press, 1973, p. 75. 
Derrida, Monolingualism, p. 58. 
g, Ibid., p. 69. 
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What is then to be done or said about this irreducibly colonial essence of all culture 
and language? It is through attending to the multiplicity among and within languages, to 
their essential impurity and structural incapacity for (self-) mastery -for the master is 
nothing if s/he cannot possess what s/he calls his/her own languages'- that an auto- 
decolonisation is effectuated. Derrida: 
"I will state this principle summarily: there is no choice, and the choice that does not exist 
is not between one language and another, one group of languages and another (with everything a 
language entails). Every monolingualism and monologism restores mastery or magistrality. It is by 
treating each language differently, by grafting languages onto one another, by playing on the 
multiplicity of languages and on the multiplicity of codes within every linguistic corpus that we can 
struggle at once against colonization in general, against the colonizing principle in general (and you 
know that it exerts itself well beyond the zones said to be subjected to colonization), against the 
domination of language or domination by language. "M 
As post-colonial studies also show, decolonisation is an ongoing process not at all 
guaranteed by liberation and emancipation. The appropriative violence of the coloniser that 
seeks to impose his own language (in the broad sense) upon colonised peoples and of 
which the dubious and pervasive effects and established structures are long felt, is 
reproduced and confirmed by virtue of the internalisation of colonial heritage by the 
latter. 84 Colonial appropriation thus gives way to post-colonial re-appropriation. If one fails 
to attend to the ex-propriative and self-subversive forces of language, appropriative 
violence is to be inflicted endlessly. This, of course, takes us back to our familiar theme of 
metaphor or rather of the radical metaphoricity of language, what Derrida also calls quasi- 
synonymously writing. As we have been arguing so far, the metaphysical notion of 
metaphor, which is premised upon semantic appropriation in view of self-presence of 
meaning, gives rise by virtue of its totalising force to the circular and self-contained notion 
of the house, of Oikos as the locus and ensemble of appropriated or literal meaning. Travel 
(in the generalised sense), as the pre-originary condition for Oikos and travel (in the 
conventional sense), becomes a quasi-synonymous term for the ex-appropriative force of 
language. It constantly undermines, while also making possible, though in a self-erasing 
mode, everything involved with the notion of Oikos: origin, itinerary, destination, arrival, 
etc. To take account of this unaccountable and defective fact of meaning is the only chance 
for an ethics of travel. Of travel as the promise of the event of encounter, as the promise- 
of-the-other-to-come. 
82 Ibid., p. 23. 83 Derrida, Jacques, "The Crisis in the Teaching of Philosophy" in Who's Afraid of Philosophy? 
Right to Philosophy 1, translated by Jan Plug, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 105. 
The Promise of the Other 
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Indeed, what is travel if not the event of an encounter with otherness, with what 
lies beyond the house? To what, to where and to whom does a traveller destine him/herself, 
if not to the promised other? In this sense, does anyone ever travel alone? Notwithstanding 
situations of collective travelling or massive displacement that in any case do neither 
discard of the primarily phenomenological motif of travel, nor diminish the singularity of 
experience, travel gives rise to the "ultimate question-of-the-other". To travel, according to 
Derrida, is to travel with; the "with" is what gives travel its figure and limits. It opens up 
the relation to otherness, a sort of "nonrelation, " since it is not preceded by a polarity or 
two previously constituted entities, a nonrelation that creates the relata, space and time 
along the movement of travel. The traveller, like a "sleep-walker", moves in-between 
phantasmatic places, that of home and the place of arrival, which are both destroyed and 
promised along the way. In this sense, one never travels alone, that is, without the memory 
or spectre of the house, without the promise or summon of another place, even if travelling 
is always a unique and singular experience. In this way, Derrida asks, is not "travelling- 
with", what institutes the relation with the other, what also gives the measure of "living- 
with" and "being-with"? 
"Quant ä l'autre, celui ou celle qui m'accompagne -ou ne m'accompagnera jamais- 
1'experience du voyage (]'experience est le voyage, n'est-ce pas, le nom l'indique), j'y vois venir, 
comme vous diriez, le debut ou la fin de tout etre avec. J' appelle ainsi `voyage' l'epreuve des 
epreuves, mon ultime question-de-l'autre, une question de vie ou mort: avec qui voyager? Voyager, 
oui, mais d'abord avec qui? L'interrogation semble logge dans 1"avec' mais eile sejourne nulle part, 
eile s'inquiete aussi, eile remue comme une insomniaque, eile m'obsede de facon permanente, 
concrete, explicite, litterale: voyons, pourrais-je voyager avec celui-lä ou avec celle-ci? Non pas 
`vivre-avec' ou `etre-avec', amenagements alors secondaires, mais `voyager-avec'? "85 
How can one be with, live with, share one's habitat with another if not by 
accompanying one another towards this unknown place the future beholds. Along this way, 
of which the sedentary "being-with" and "living-with" are totalised instances, one moves 
towards the other that could be a person, a place, a language, oneself as another. At every 
instant of travel everything is at stake, the memory of the house, the invention of a new 
language, the passivity or receptivity of otherness, testimonial secrecy and universality. If 
language is "the home that never leaves us", "the native land" that travellers, exiles, 
foreigners "carry away on the soles of their shoes 5-)86 and a "place of immobility" from 
87 
which all journeys and distancings are measured, language is also "the experience of 
84 Derrida, Monolingualism, p. 24. 
86 Derrida, Jacques and Malabou, Catherine, La Contre-Allee, p. 13. 
Derrida, Of Hospitality, p. 89. 
87 Ibid., p. 87. 
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expropriation, of an irreducible exappropriation. "88 In the second chapter we spoke of a 
figure of the traveller as phereoikos or home-carrier that never leaves home but at once 
destroys the house by turning it into a mobile place, thus bringing forward the double bind 
of travel. Leaving home without ever leaving, being at home without ever being at-home- 
with-oneself, this is the absolute condition of travel: "Moi sauf moi, voilä peut-etre la 
formule la plus economique de mon `voyager avec' [... ]. "89 "Myself without myself', 
given up to the condition of "travelling with", that is, of moving along, towards or upon the 
summon of the other, that could be oneself as another, is also what opens up the possibility 
of hospitality and of an ethics of travel. 
What does induce one to travel? Does one travel because one is being sent away 
for one reason or another or in order to move towards the encounter? " Is not "encounter" 
the condition of travel, what calls for it, what promises the event and, thus, gathers the 
structure of eventuality of travel? "Nous devrions nous arreter pour penser le voyage au 
bord de la rencontre. Tout n' y revient pas ä la rencontre mais imaginez-vous une traversee 
sans rencontre? "9' Travel is set off by the promise of the encounter with space, a language, 
a landscape, a culture, with other persons. It acts upon the summon of the other: 
"Cette vocation (ne voyager qu'ä l'initiative de I'autre), eile parle sans doute conjointement 
de l'essence (sans essence, justement) et de la decision (dont je tiens qu'elle tient et vient toujours 
de l'autre, a 1'autre) et du voyage. L'appel de cette vocation serait le voyage meme, le premier 
voyage, si on pouvait encore dire `meme' et `premier'. Qu'on n'y soit point autorise, justement, cela 
signifie qu'avant tout vocation-au-voyage (rien ne m'aura ete plus etranger, finalement), un voyage 
repond toujours ä quelque convocation -et venue de quelqu'un, tel jour, un jour ou l'autre. En quoi 
le voyage (journey), toujours ä la merci de l'autre, est une naissance (la veille d'une mort), une 
venue au jour qui, si elle pouvait dependre seulement de moi, risquerait d'etre ä jamais ajournee. "92 
This vocation in the sense both of summon or appellation and inclination points to 
the essence of travel and decision, for a decision only takes place when the question-of-the- 
other arises. In the restricted economy of travel, the one which submits to the eco-nomy of 
the house, the house is the prime mover and destination of travel. In the generalised 
economy of travel, which also makes room for the restricted or metaphysical one, it is the 
other that is always already the prime mover. Travel then primarily becomes a response to 
the summons of the other; it always responds to some "convocation". Receptivity. 
passivity, or else, hospitality towards the other is what gives the condition of travel as 
responsiveness or responsibility. As was mentioned before, this does not necessarily imply 
88 Ibid., p 89. 89 Derrida, La Contre-. illee, p. 23. 
91 oyage-t-on parce 
qu'on est renvoye ou pour aller ä la rencontre? " Ibid., p. 58. 
Ibid. 
92 Ibid., p. 145. 
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a good or altruistic will. We are here referring to hospitality and responsibility in a radical 
sense that exceeds and precedes politeness, generosity, obligation and duty. We are 
speaking of the general, aporetic and unconditional law of hospitality, which in its 
"universal singularity" is both irreconcilable with and indissociable from historical and 
concrete laws. Unconditional law requires conditional laws, which, however, sometimes 
corrupt or pervert it, as much as conditional or historical laws need the guidance and 
aspiration given by the law of hospitality. 93 Both "perfectibility" and "pervertibility" are 
essential to the antinomic law of hospitality. Whereas hospitality in the radical and general 
sense signifies an unconditional opening onto and welcome of the other, hospitality in a 
restricted sense, which refers to situational and pragmatic conditions, is necessarily 
regulated by premeditated norms and calculations. The general law can always be 
perverted in determined situations but it is also necessary that this pervertibility is 
disengaged from perversion, that is, from its particular instances; as it is also necessary that 
there is no decided or determined limit, no "tenable threshold separating pervertibility from 
perversion. " [... ] 
"It is necessary that this threshold not be at the disposal of a general knowledge or a 
regulated technique. It is necessary that it exceed every regulated procedure in order to open itself to 
what always risks being perverted (the Good, Justice, Love, Faith -and perfectibility, etc. ). This is 
necessary, this possible hospitality to the worst so that good hospitality can have a chance, the 
chance of letting the other come, the yes of the other no less than the yes to the other. "94 
Hospitality must not be premised upon knowledge and calculation. If it is so it 
forgets or supersedes the alterity of the other by submitting it to the established norms and 
regulations of the house. Hospitality should not aspire to assimilation but, on the contrary, 
must assume "radical separation" as the experience of the alterity of the other. 95 It must 
open itself to the "infinite other"; it must offer an "infinite welcome" that resists 
interrogation and thematisation. We said before that hospitality is primarily intentionality, 
the act of consciousness through which the other is received, beyond and before 
recognition, thematisation and judgement. Thus even hostility and rejection presuppose 
hospitality in its originary sense and general structure: 
"Because intentionality is hospitality, it resists thematization. An act without activity, 
reason as receptivity. a sensible and rational experience of receiving, a gesture of welcoming, a 
welcome offered to the other as stranger, hospitality opens as intentionality, but it cannot become an 
object, thing, or theme. Thematization, on the contrary, already presupposes hospitality, welcoming, 
intentionality, the face. The closing of the door, inhospitality, war, and allergy already imply, as 
93 Derrida, Of Hospitality, p. 79. 
94 Derrida, "A Word of Welcome", p. 35. 
95 Ibid., p. 46. 
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their possibility, a hospitality offered or received: an original or, more precisely, pre-originary 
declaration of peace. "96 
In the encounter with the other, if such a thing ever takes place, the ethicity of 
travel, that is, the possible relation with the other, opens up an infinite dynamic for better 
or for worse. But the reception of the other, in the sense of intentionality, must always 
come first, before one addresses the question of whom is the other and what is to be done 
with him/her. Therefore, the event of the coming of the other cannot be foreseen or 
awaited. Because thematisation and predication (the identification and recognition of the 
other according to the categories of the same) come second, radical hospitality receives 
without awaiting or inviting, without horizon of expectation. It awaits the other as a 
"messianic" other, without attributing concrete qualities or demanding of him/her specific 
requirements. One must not be ready to receive, must not assume the role of the master of 
the house but in order to be hospitable must let oneself be overtaken and surprised, "be 
ready not to be ready". 9' 
Giving oneself up to the other that comes without warning is the ethical condition 
of travel and hospitality. It is what disrupts and deconstructs the so-called identity and 
subjectivity of the master. The receiving or welcoming subject becomes at once host and 
hostage to the other. Thus, in a paradoxical sense the welcoming one gathers him/herself as 
such on the condition of the visitation of the other, who becomes a guest and a host at 
once: "The one who welcomes is first welcomed in his own home. The one who invites is 
invited by the one whom he invites. "98 This play or drama of substitution is not a 
replacement in a homogeneous series, for the other is infinitely other beyond thematisation. 
In taking the place of the other, in abandoning oneself in his/her place -an asymmetrical 
encounter that exceeds dialogue between host and guest, which presupposes recognition, as 
every dialogue must- the subject recollects and gathers itself in responding to the other, 
that is, in becoming responsible for, in substituting for, in expiating for the other. 
Responsibility as the paradox of losing and gathering oneself before the other is not a moral 
norm or prescription. It can only take place at a singular and unique instance, one that calls 
for invention and resists reduction to already formed attitudes and preconceptions. What 
happens next can never be predicted or foreclosed. It is because the visiting other 
is beyond 
knowledge and thematisation, because the other does not reveal or offer 
him/herself as 
96 Ibid., p 48. 97 Derrida, Jacques, "Hostipitality, translated b by Gil Apidj, in Acts of Religion, edited and with an 
introduction by Gil Anidjar, London, Routledge, 2002,361 
Derrida, "A Word of Welcome", p. 42. 
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such to the intuition of the hosting subject that we can speak of visitation as the rupture of 
symmetry and as the trace of the face of the other, that is, the intractable, elusive and 
irreducible effect of a coming that upsets the structures of home: "Hospitality is the 
deconstruction of the at-home; deconstruction is hospitality to the other, to the other than 
oneself, the other than `its other, ' to an other that is beyond any `its other. 15199 
Insofar as the-at-home is disrupted through the visitation of the foreigner, of the 
infinite other, who exceeds the symmetrical relation of identity and difference and thus 
renders the appropriative force of the house and the hermeneutical process of fusion 
inadequate, "the at-home-with-oneself would thus no longer be a sort of nature or 
rootedness but a response to a wandering, to the phenomenon of wandering it brings to a 
halt"(my italics). 100 One could, therefore, point to "travel" as the condition of the-at-home, 
as the aporetic law that at once challenges the authority of the house and makes a place of 
welcoming possible. "Travel" is what makes a host of the master of the house. But insofar 
as the master of the house takes cover behind his/her identity, insofar as s/he remains a 
master, s/he puts an end to travel and to the promise of the encounter. We are here referring 
to a structure of possibility that enables but also exceeds any event of encounter that cannot 
be, therefore, simply considered as the inaugurating moment of a relation to the other. The 
possibility is there at the originary and constitutive opening of consciousness to the world, 
to what lies outside and beyond it as its other, thus, it comes from the depths of an 
"immemorial past", from the originary trace of the Other. Since everything begins with the 
trace, with what has never been present as such, since meaning arises through chains of 
traces of traces, the instant of encounter can only occur by virtue of its divisibility and 
repeatability. It can neither gather itself in a present moment that would imply interaction 
between subjectivities, each present to themselves and to one another, nor reduce the other 
to a present and available object. Such reduction coextends with the movement of the 
reduction of the trace, the movement of totalisation and forgetfulness of the infinite other, 
who is not phenomenalisable in its entirety. The reduction of the other to the categories of 
the house signals what is for Levinas allergy, "the inhospitable forgetting of the 
transcendence of the Other". 101 However, even war and allergy still testify to the very thing 
they forget, to the radical hospitality that makes every encounter possible. 
99 Derrida, "Hostipitality", p. 364. 
° Derrida, "A Word of Welcome", p. 92. 
'o Ibid., p. 95. 
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How is then the thinking of radical hospitality related to what are today considered 
matters of urgency? How can it have any relevance to pragmatic situations and what is 
called politics of hospitality? We said before that the general law of hospitality is 
unthinkable outside historically specific laws, as much as the latter attest to a general 
structure of excess and lack, since they can never be adequate to what they are examples 
of. We are referring here to a radical ethics of hospitality (unconditional hospitality) that 
overflows and exceeds the pragmatics and politics of hospitality (conditional hospitality), 
while being inconceivable outside the latter. For sure, there is a history of hospitality, a 
series of inscriptions of pervertibility and perfectability of the law of hospitality, a mad, 
disjunctive law that emerges through these inscriptions. What is then to be done? How 
should one respond and how should one justify oneself at the ethical or "mad" (because it 
can never be based on solid reasoning) moment of decision? There is no moral norm or 
prescription -as there must not be- to how one should respond to the other. One should be 
ready to improvise upon and invent the singular and unique instance of encounter, resisting 
reduction and thematisation that would reject or insult the alterity of the other. The ethics 
of hospitality in the radical sense is not something formalisable or teachable and this is, 
precisely, what it "must" not be: 
"Despite all the tensions or contradictions which distinguish it, and despite all the 
perversions that can befall it, one cannot speak of cultivating an ethic of hospitality. Insofar as it has 
to do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one's home, the familiar place of dwelling, inasmuch as it 
is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our 
own or as foreigners, ethics is hospitality; ethics is so thoroughly coextensive with the experience of 
hospitality. But for this very reason, and because being at home with oneself (l'etre-soi chez soi - 
1 'ipseite meme -the other within oneself) supposes reception or inclusion of the other which one 
seeks to appropriate, control, and master according to different modalities of violence, there is a 
history of hospitality, an always possible perversion of the law of hospitality (which can appear 
unconditional), and of the laws which come to limit and condition its inscription as a law. "102 
This is not to pursue an "ideal" situation that would aim at overcoming what 
would be set up as a tenable threshold between unconditionality and conditionality through 
a refinement and the increasing inclusiveness of regulations in the name of good will and 
of a brotherhood of humanity. The aim is not to establish a programmatic ethics. Of course, 
matters of urgency such as issues of political asylum, immigration control and political or 
economic refugees call for immediate response and a new politics of action. However, one 
should not fail to think upon the theme of hospitality, even if this must never be 
exhaustively thematised and must be always posed with regard to particular cases and 
102 Derrida, Jacques, "On Cosmopolitanism" in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, translated by 
Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes, with a preface by Simon Critchley and Richard Kearney, 
London, Routledge, 2001, pp. 16-17. 
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singular instances. To pose the question of hospitality and the question of the foreigner 
anew would be to discourage the finality of decisions and the formation of general attitudes 
towards the other based on convenience and calculation. 103 And again this is not a vision of 
hospitality or the deployment of a program for it lacks concrete content and goals. It is 
rather the thought of the fold, that is, the refolding of each singular example and instant of 
hospitality upon itself and upon the aporetic conditions that make them possible. The 
thought of the fold, or mark or trace upsets determined and circumscribed localities, 
identities, positions, in short, everything that points to totality and closure, by unsettling 
their premises and bringing forward their antinomic conditions. For sure, refolding on an 
aporetic structure also signifies infinite unfolding. This is also what a priori postpones an 
end, gives the chance of ethics and the promise of more travels, more arrivals and more 
welcoming(s) to come. Infinitely. 
The Ethics of Travel 
Syed Manzurul Islam in The Ethics of Travel, From Marco Polo to Kafka, of 
which extensive mention was made in the second chapter, discusses the possibility of an 
ethics of travel with regard to what he outlines as the two modes of travel or the two 
figures of the traveller, those pertaining to what he calls sedentary and nomadic travel. A 
sedentary traveller is one who moves along rigid lines, crossing fixed boundaries according 
to an "egological movement" that submits to the dialectic and the economy of the house, 
failing to encounter otherness and succumbing to the requisite of return, thus, never leaving 
the conceptual space of home. A sedentary traveller, therefore, does not merit being called 
a traveller. A nomadic traveller, on the other hand, moves along supple lines 
103 For instance, such a reductive attitude can be detected in Todorov's The Conquest of America, 
The Question of the Other, in which he formulates a "typology of relations to the other" consisting 
of three axes, on which the "problematics of alterity" could be located: first, the axiological level, 
that of value judgment, secondly, the praxeological level, on which the action of rapprochement or 
distancing in relation to the other is located and, thirdly, the ep istemic level, that poses the question 
of knowledge of the other. Ibid., p. 185. Conquest, love and knowledge, according to Todorov, are 
elementary forms of conduct in colonial situations operating on these three levels or axes outlined 
above. Todorov, overtly adopts a typological perspective based at large on two forms of 
communication: that of the Indians, who favor "exchanges with the world, " and that of the 
Europeans, who favor "exchanges with men". One form is distanced from the other by virtue of "an 
evolution in the `technology' of symbolism; this evolution can be reduced, for simplicity's sake, to 
the advent of writing. " Ibid., p. 252. Writing, in favoring improvisation over ritual and a linear over 
a circular conception of time, enables the perception of the other. His own position, however, is that 
neither form of communication is superior to the other on the level of moral and social values and 
that we need both. But Todorov also sustains that Europeans are superior to Indians on the 
level of 
human communication, which is awkwardly distinguished from that of "communication with the 
world". However, does not the latter evoke a kind of romantic search 
for primitiveness and 
authenticity? And is not, ultimately, ethics a question for and posed 
by the Westerner, who appears 
to be the only one capable of opening oneself to exteriority and of perceiving otherness? 
Todorov by 
adhering to traditionally Western polarities cannot 
by reproduce a highly reductive and axiological 
discourse on ethics. 
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deterritorialising geo-political space, breaks away from the authority and the gravitational 
pull of the house and opens him/herself up to the other. S/he is the one who moves towards 
the encounter, the one who says "yes" to the other. Islam traces the structural possibility of 
nomadic travel in an ontology of space, mainly drawing on Heidegger. Accordingly, space 
is not given beforehand or at hand but rather emerges and is allocated through the 
circumspective care of Dasein. Dasein finds itself in the world and in space, which thus 
becomes one of its existential conditions (what is called spatiality), but this is a pre- 
geometrical and pre-geographical space that only takes shape and substance through 
Dasein's constant involvement with the things of its environment. Space thus becomes a 
place of dwelling by virtue of Dasein's continuous "de-severing" engagement, which rather 
than moving between fixed and circumscribed locations, only allocates provisional, partial 
and multiple spaces. In this way, the distinction between dwelling and travelling cannot be 
rigidly upheld. This awareness of the nongivenness of space has vast implications for an 
ethics of travel since it upsets and invalidates what is deemed as natural or self-righteous 
boundaries enclosing homogeneous spaces. 
Tracking back nomadic travel as a fundamental condition of Dasein also upsets its 
distinction from sedentary travel. Although Islam remarks that these two types of travel are 
not mutually exclusive in actuality but are rather virtual tendencies104 and that sedentary 
travellers "are always haunted by the speed of nomadic travel and the possibility of 
encounter with the outside", 105 he organises his book around this division, which he both 
tries to overcome yet cannot leave behind. Yet is it simply a question of overcoming 
"sedentary" or "metaphysical" travel? What is the ontological and ethical value of 
"nomadic" travel, insofar as it is designated as a type of travel in disjunction to another? 
For instance, when Islam bemoans the fact that travel as a genre is located on the rigid line, 
even though it is still haunted by "speed of the supple line, "106 it is not clear how these two 
types are interconnected. How does nomadic travel upset and unsettle sedentary travel? Is 
it a question of choice or attitude? An immanent possibility waiting to be taken up? To be 
fair, Islam makes headway in tracing the ontological and ethical condition of travel in the 
primordial and pre-conceptual spatiality of Dasein. However, he compromises to some 
extent his ethical project, largely because he conceives it as a project: 
In our case, the affirmative ethics of nomadic travel, which involve saying Yes to the 
other, require overcoming the rigid boundary and the paranoia of othering. which are the 
104 Islam, The Ethics of Travel, p. 58. 
105 Ibid., p. 72. '06 Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
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characteristics of sedentary travel. Hence, it was necessary not only to distinguish the nomadic from 
the sedentary traveller, but also to trace the genealogy of the latter. However, it is worth 
remembering that nomadic travel is always the virtual possibility of all travel. In practice, one becomes a nomadic or sedentary traveller on one's performative actualisation or repression of this 
virtual possibility. " 107 
If the issue is overcoming rigid boundaries and "othering, " for sure, one would 
have to begin with a sort of division such as that between sedentary and nomadic travel and 
work one's way with and through it without hasting to brush it aside. Our preoccupation 
with the metaphysical (or restricted) and generalised notion of travel has shown that these 
are neither simply opposed nor do they constitute two different types of travel. To claim 
that nomadic travel is the virtual possibility of all travel should not merely point to a 
likelihood that could be either actualised or repressed, for it constantly structures and 
disrupts every experience of travel radically upsetting everything involved with 
"sedentary" travel (the house as point of departure and final destination, the boundary and 
so on). So it is not a question of overcoming this distinction but rather of considering the 
aporetic condition that allowed for it in the first place. It is not a question of discrediting 
sedentary travel as nontravel in favour of something else. If the distinction cannot be 
ultimately upheld, it is because both terms are radically and inherently always already 
disturbed by their self-erasing mode of emergence. Travel always promises the house, it is 
on this condition, however, this is an impossible promise for the house constitutes itself 
through the promise of the encounter with the other; it is already taken over by what is 
other than itself; it can never be itself. As Levinas contends, "the possibility for the home 
to open to the Other is as essential to the essence of the home as closed doors and 
windows. " 108 
The notion of the house as destined to and responsible for the infinitely other 
attests to the condition of an ethics of travel. This is the theme of Islam's book, which he 
explores in relation to literary works such as Kafka's "Before the Law" or Foster's A 
Passage to India and travel narratives, principally Marco Polo's The Travels. His analysis 
of A Passage to India poignantly outlines two figures of travellers, Adela, the sedentary 
traveller and Mrs Moore, the true, nomadic traveller. Upon the summon of the other, these 
two characters respond differently. Adela in the Marabar caves scene, which stages the 
possibility of an encounter, proves "unprepared" to endure the face-to-face with otherness, 
rushing "hysterically" out of the cave, withdrawing behind the 
boundary that divides 
Occident and Orient. Mrs Moore is the one who makes "the genuine passage of a 
ýoý Ibid., p. 210. 
269 
traveller". 109 She is the one who says "yes" to the summons of the other giving herself up 
to the force that breaks down her subjectivity and flattens any sort of rigid boundary. Islam, 
in describing what happened or might have happened in these scenes, necessarily 
thematises what precisely cannot tolerate thematisation: responsibility and ethics. Who can 
attest to whether an ethical response ever took place or not in an encounter between two 
subjectivities that is infinitely secret? Who can certify the coming or not of the other? Of 
course, Islam can do so here since it is literature he is referring to, to what receives and 
tolerates everything, to what "legitimately" carries an excess of meaning without facing the 
danger of reducing or offending the other in every step of the way, for the other here is not 
a person; s/he has no face. But what happens when a discourse on the other makes claim to 
an accurate representation of reality? What of the question of an ethics of travel when it 
comes to travel writing, which by definition thematises the other? 
We argued that the aporetic conditions of travel structure and, to be sure, disrupt 
the totalising forces of the travel text. Following de Man, we claimed that the essentially 
allegorical mode of the travel narrative consists in a discrepant and aberrant structure of 
excess and lack that gathers the text's signification together in a way that also allows it to 
overflow towards new meaning and reference. The disjunctive mode of the text's coming 
to being is endlessly repeated and reproduced through the text's imbalanced and 
irreconcilable yet indissociable constative and performative functions. Thus the travel 
text's descriptive, informative and referential functions, by way of which the other is 
thematised, are constantly disrupted by its performative, self-reflective or self-referential 
functions. Performance and contention continuously undo each other in the allegorical 
trajectory of the text, that produces more meaning and more reference, never allowing it to 
signify as such in a present moment in any given context. We called this the promise of the 
text, which more than giving the chance for what Islam calls the "supple line", is always 
already traversed by it. Travel narratives may engender totalising readings and 
representations of the other but it is precisely their inherent antinomies and aporetic 
formation that make them both readable and unreadable. The text's essential unreadability, 
that is, its resistance to a complete and totalising reading and to its reduction to contextual 
determinations is the text's own condition of readability, what promises what cannot be 
delivered and what is yet to come. This openness to a future arrival is the travel text's 
ethical condition that shares the same structure of possibility with the experience of travel. 
108 Quoted from Totalirr, and Infinity in "A Word of Welcome", p. 96. 109 Islam, pp. 50-55. 
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Travel and/as writing as the-promise-of-the-other-to-come attests to an aporetic law of 
textual production and to an originary openness, to hospitality in the radical sense that 
makes all sorts of hospitality and hostility possible. 
The awareness or non forgetting of the irreducibility of the other and of the 
impossible task of the travel narrative, not solely because of lack of competence or 
acuteness and not simply due to prejudice or ideology but for structural and essential 
reasons, gives the only chance for an ethics of travel. Of course, there are texts that 
manifest this awareness and that resist reduction and closure when it comes to the task of 
giving an account of an encounter with the (cultural) other. In the previous chapter we 
mentioned Derrida's Moscou Aller-Retour and his refusal to produce a recit de voyage 
about his journey to Moscow. Another example is Roland Barthes' Empire of Signs, in 
which in order not "to compromise no real country by [his] fantasy" he invents "Japan", a 
fictive nation. 110 Is this what one must do, to refuse giving an account in order not to 
reduce or compromise? Certainly not. But Derrida and Barthes do give accounts, do speak 
of journeys to Moscow and Japan and do produce knowledge and reference. To promise 
not to promise a recit when and in giving one, far from being inconsistent with what one 
does, far from being a "performative contradiction", is to attest to travel writing's condition 
of (im)possibility, to its double bind or essential aporia. Rather than having a paralysing 
effect, rather than making one turn its back on the other, one should be able to endure this 
impossible passage to a final destination, to keep promising and waiting for an unexpected 
arrival. 
10 "1 can also -though in no way claiming to represent or 
to analyze reality itself (these being the 
major gestures of Western discourse)- isolate somewhere 
in the world (faraway) a certain number of 
features (a term deployed in linguistics), and out of these features deliberately form a s\ stem. It 
is 
this system which I shall call: Japan. Barthes, Roland, 
Empire of Signs, translated h\ Richard 
Howard, New York, Hill and Wan, A Division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1982, p. 3- , 
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Concluding 
In treating questions of travel, especially at a time when travel is changing on an 
unprecedented scale and with increasingly rapid rhythms, at a time when the so-called 
globalisation, the satellite, the internet, new international configurations and the ethical- 
political institutions that support them transfigure and reinstate traditional notions of Oikos 
and sites of identification (such as the nation-state, or any type of community), it becomes 
more pertinent and pressing than ever to relocate "travel" in its history and semantic 
genealogy and to review its conditions of possibility. Even before asking what is 
happening with/to travel today, it is more urgent than ever to ask what travel is. The form 
of this question pertains, of course, to an ontological investigation and since ontology 
inquires into the question of meaning it already presupposes a phenomenological stand. So 
the investigation becomes a questioning of what is the meaning of travel and thus what is 
the origin of the sense of travel. Notwithstanding that one cannot advance without also 
inquiring into what is the origin of sense and what is the sense of origin, the 
phenomenological method of "questioning back" would aim at reaching the originary sense 
of travel. When was the first time that "travel" made sense, that is, when was its 
inaugurating and constitutive moment? Of course, this could not be an inquiry into an 
empirical or historical event, nor could it look into dates, places, give names. In other 
words, it would not establish a hic et nunc. 
Inquiring into the meaning of travel can only take place within an empirical 
horizon, starting from examples of travel, which already presuppose a general meaning to 
begin with. This meaning that someone has in advance is what is called here the 
exemplarity of the example, what exceeds and overflows singular instances and 
attestations, what makes the experience of travel recognizable as such. It is this structure of 
overflowing that gives a sense, an ideal dimension but also the historicity of travel that 
interests us here. This signifies that there is no first time, no assignable origin, no concrete 
or transcendental content beyond all instances, but a certain signifying movement that 
becomes the "nonorigin" of origin. The impossibility of a first time, of a constitutive 
moment that will have made a meaning manifest and its emergence, instead, out of 
repetitive inscriptions of nonpresent elements brings out the essential self-interruption of 
the phenomenological motif of experience. Everything then signifies through this 
fracture 
that inflicts meaning with an essential figurality. Insofar as the trace 
is the condition for the 
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self-subversive occurrence of meaning beyond presence and absence, beyond appearance 
and nonappearance, it already bears a structure of spectrality or virtuality. Never quite 
being there, it is always other than itself. 
So if one seeks to understand how travel operates today in the topology of 
"cyberspace", how it is reformulated by new technologies in transportation and 
communication and new modes and contexts of cultural encounter that confer upon it an 
increasingly "virtual" character, one can only do so by exploring its conditions of 
signification. In such consideration the stakes are very high since they have a bearing on 
politics and ethics. The question of space and boundary, which is indissociable from travel, 
is urgently posed in the age of globalisation and of the advent of what can be termed 
democratisation. (Western democracy, if such a thing exists, fosters new forms of 
humanism sustained and, for sure perverted, by such institutions and discourses as those on 
human rights, crimes against humanity, international law, forgiveness and so forth. ) In a 
fashion, the old structures of Oikos are being exported in an unprecedented way but, by the 
same token, are also exceeded and subverted. Oikos has never been more powerful and 
more elusive. This is why an exploration of the notions of home and away is urgently 
called for and needs to be acutely tackled. It becomes then a matter of close analysis or 
reading in the broad sense, texts, contexts, institutions, attitudes, of exploring signifying 
conditions and delimitations, of looking into genealogies but also inventing upon singular 
instances that call for decisions and new responsibilities. Nothing of the above is given as 
such to cognition for there is always a disruptive residue of meaning that one cannot 
account for. 
This is more poignantly shown and best formalised in the consideration of travel 
writing, which by definition is a representational discourse on the other that more often 
than not is also reductive and authoritative. In the face of the other, traveller and travel 
writer are summoned to take a stand, to make choices, decisions, on the whole, to respond 
in some way. An event of travel, however, is not simply reducible either to a present or to a 
text. Because the other exceeds knowledge, because an encounter never simply occurs in 
the immediacy of a present, any pronouncement on and attitude towards the other is 
disrupted from the start because it is always excessive and lacking. This is to say, it is at 
once too determining and too elliptical. The awareness of this 
"fact", however, need not 
bring about paralysis in the face of choices and 
decisions. On the contrary, it calls for more 
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thinking, more reading, for responsible action taking, which always implies opening up and 
paying attention to the other without prescribed finalities. There is no such thing as an easy 
decision for the latter would be the application of knowledge or the deployment of a 
programme. A decision, in order to be one, must go beyond knowledge and certainty. This 
is not to say that one should not know what one is doing or talking about in making a 
decision but rather that there can be no total or self-righteous justification for it. ' 
Undecidability does not suspend action but is rather the condition of decision, that is, a 
responsible decision, if such a thing exists. Any action calls for a decision, even if it is the 
decision not to act. Any performance of writing already implies questions of inclusion and 
exclusion, that is, the necessary selections and omissions that circumscribe and establish a 
theme. But since, as was argued, thematisation always implies reduction and totalisation 
and thus a disruptive supplement that already discredits the former, the travel text becomes 
infinitely readable and unreadable as such. It becomes susceptible to more interpretations, 
more readings, more interruptions. This is the ethical condition not simply of travel but 
also of travel writing: the openness of travel and/as writing to the other (be it a country, a 
person, a language, a meaning), the self-deconstruction of any authoritative or totalising 
standing. Travel and writing then in an essential way take place on the initiative of the 
other; they signify on the condition of a hospitable opening (notwithstanding that this can 
always turn out a hostile "reception, " but a reception all the same), of the promise-of-the- 
other-to-come. 2 
"Travel" here is used as a generalised term or name for an economy of (semantic) 
movement formalised under the structures of Oikos and away. It is first through the 
formalisation of traditional couples and their reinscription in a general economy of 
meaning that hierarchies and their appropriative and hegemonic effects are measured and 
disrupted also giving the chance for new possibilities of resistance and action. The self- 
disruption of the phenomenological motif of travel also constitutes its tropological and 
ethical conditions. What is at stake is a new topology of the event of travel, a topology 
1 "Decision, an ethical or a political responsibility, is absolutely heterogeneous to knowledge. 
Nevertheless, we have to know as much as possible in order to ground our decision. But even 
if it is 
grounded in knowledge, the moment I take a decision it is a leap, I enter a 
heterogeneous space and 
that is the condition of responsibility. " Derrida, Jacques, "Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility 
in 
Questioning Ethics, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, edited by Richard Kearny and Mark 
Dooley, London, Routledge. 1999, p-73- 
2 "Just as there would be no responsibility or decision without some self-interruption, neither would 
there be any hospitality; as master and host, the self, 
in welcoming the other, must interrupt or 
divide himself or herself. This division is the condition of hospitality. " Ibid., p. 
81. 
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constantly restructured, perpetually displacing, blurring and giving new senses to borders. 
An event of travel is always singular and excessive. This structure of excess that interests 
us here can be formalised into a counter law before the law (of the house) and all 
conditional laws (of houses, nation-states and so on), which always also implies a certain 
lack. This is to say that the meaning of an event of travel can neither be totally reduced to 
its context of occurrence, to conditional laws, nor to a general law or regulative principle 
given beforehand. The impossibility of a first time that would have given evidence of a 
sense of travel and would have placed it on a predetermined trajectory or destination 
retraceable by genealogical investigation, signifies that, although such an event is to an 
extent formalisable in its conditions of signification, it never simply occurred as such but 
was necessarily posited and thought post-factum. Lacking thus an absolute origin, meaning 
survives by its own pervertibility, which is its very law. This aporetic law that puts 
repetition or iteration before determined senses of travel is what we have described as its 
tropological or quasi-metaphorical and ethical condition, what lays down the path of travel 
and the way to the other: "the aporia is not simply paralysis, but the aporia of the non-way 
is the condition of walking: if there was no aporia we wouldn't walk, we wouldn't find our 
way; path-breaking implies aporia. This impossibility to find one's way is the condition of 
ethics. "3 Finding one's way home implies losing one's home. Then the loss of the house is 
not merely the condition of travel but also the condition of the house itself. If the house is 
necessarily posited after the fact of travel as an idealising effect of iteration, always at work 
but never quite there, the house, what is most real and familiar, what is reality itself, 
becomes a spectre haunting and inhabiting the course of travel. In this sense, spectrality is 
the condition of reality. Just as properness becomes the effect of metaphoricity in a radical 
sense, just as the phantasm of monolanguage, of the desired and promised One of 
language, emerges by virtue of translatability (for it is out of the multiplicity and 
translatability of languages that both a language or absolute idiom and, hence, languages 
become thinkable), house and travel in the traditional sense become effects of the itinerary. 
This thesis has performed its own trajectory coming together around the theme of 
travel, a writing on travel that proved to be primarily a journey along impossible paths or 
aporias. We set off with metaphor, which far more than a deviation from literalness was 
shown to be the irreducible and general condition of meaning. The deconstruction of the 
metaphysical couple of proper and metaphorical meaning proved to 
be co-extensive ýti ith 
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that of Oikos and travel. Metaphor and travel were reconsidered nondialectically, in a way 
that exceeds their submission to the exigency of recuperation of and return to properness 
dictated by the restricted eco-nomy of the house as the proper place and origin of meaning. 
This thinking of metaphor and/as travel, however, in no way signals a breaking away from 
home; the house cannot be left behind in favour of a "homeless" wandering for this would 
be a senseless wandering. In this thinking of travel and metaphor, which is not simply 
another way of approaching these notions but attempts at pointing to their essential 
presuppositions, house and properness re-emerge from/as a place of withdrawal, that is, as 
a (non)originary and unprecedented movement, a movement that rather than mediating 
between given places engenders senses of place. But even if the house can no longer be 
considered as a fixed place of origin, it is still promised. Travel is in/on this condition: the 
promise of the house but as another place, always already given or promised by the other. 
House and travel as the promise of encounter with otherness haunt each other along an 
itinerary with no origin and no telos. Thus, the house as a place of identification, the place 
that gives what is called maternal or paternal language, the motherland or fatherland, arises 
as a spectrum, as what can always come back, whose visitation is always awaited if only as 
phantasm, that which exceeds the opposition between presence and absence. Travel is put 
on course by the promise of a mother or father tongue, the promise of translation into a 
pure idiom, for sure, an impossible but necessary promise, an impossibility qua necessity. 
We dream of speaking this pure idiom, of at last speaking this language that always comes 
from the other, which we can never own. We dream of this embrace of the father, of the 
promise of the father to come even as phantasm, the father of whom the memory we 
cherish from immemorial depths, given over to him at once his survivors, hosts and 
hostages. A father who dies and is resurrected at any given instant. 
Ibid., p. 73. 
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